- The Cognitive Science of Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Neil Van Leeuwen & Tania Lombrozo (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Cognitive Science of Belief. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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“Adding Up” Reasons: Lessons for Reductive and Nonreductive Approaches.Shyam Nair - 2021 - Ethics 132 (1):38-88.details
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Deontic Logic and Ethics.Shyam Nair - forthcoming - In Gabbay, John Horty, Xavier Parent, Ron van der Meyden & Leon van der Torre (eds.), Handbook of Deontic Logic and Normative System, Volume 2. College Publications.details
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Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.details
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Maximising Expected Value Under Axiological Uncertainty. An Axiomatic Approach.Stefan Riedener - 2015 - Dissertation, Oxforddetails
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Exceeding Expectations: Stochastic Dominance as a General Decision Theory.Christian Tarsney - manuscriptdetails
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Reflections on knowledge and belief.Simon Bastian Wimmer - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Warwickdetails
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Deontic Logic, Weakening and Decisions Concerning Disjunctive Obligations.Michael J. Shaffer - 2022 - Logos and Episteme 13 (1):93-102.details
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Collective Action and Rational Choice Explanations.Randall Harp - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Research 42:149-176.details
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Deontological decision theory and lesser-evil options.Seth Lazar & Peter A. Graham - 2021 - Synthese (7):1-28.details
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Models of Decision-Making: Simplifying Choices.Paul Weirich - 2014 - Cambridge University Press.details
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The Measurement of Subjective Probability.Edward J. R. Elliott - 2024 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Rational Choice Using Imprecise Probabilities and Utilities.Paul Weirich - 2021 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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Decision Theory without Representation Theorems.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14.details
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Being Rational and being Right.Juan Comesaña - 2020 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Vagueness and Thought.Andrew Bacon - 2018 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Unsettled Thoughts: A Theory of Degrees of Rationality.Julia Staffel - 2019 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Reason and Explanation: A Defense of Explanatory Coherentism.T. Poston - 2014 - Palgrave Macmillan UK.details
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Reasons Without Persons: Rationality, Identity, and Time.Brian Hedden - 2015 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Decision Theory with a Human Face.Richard Bradley - 2017 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Normative theories of rational choice: expected utility.Rachael Briggs - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Functionalism and the role of psychology in economics.Christopher Clarke - 2020 - Journal of Economic Methodology 27 (4):292-310.details
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The Nomic Likelihood Account of Laws.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (9):230-284.details
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Surreal Decisions.Eddy Keming Chen & Daniel Rubio - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):54-74.details
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Representation and Rationality.Ray Buchanan & Sinan Dogramaci - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):221-230.details
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Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
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Constraints on Rational Theory Choice.Seamus Bradley - 2017 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 68 (3):639-661.details
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When propriety is improper.Kevin Blackwell & Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):367-386.details
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Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1205-1230.details
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Better Foundations for Subjective Probability.Sven Neth - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.details
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An axiomatic approach to axiological uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):483-504.details
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Non-Ideal Decision Theory.Sven Neth - 2023 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeleydetails
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Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
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Uncertain Values: An Axiomatic Approach to Axiological Uncertainty.Stefan Riedener - 2021 - Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter.details
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Representational Scepticism: The Bubble Puzzle.J. Robert G. Williams - 2016 - Philosophical Perspectives 30 (1):419-442.details
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What is "real" in Probabilism?H. Orri Stefánsson - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):573-587.details
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On the Ratio Challenge for Comparativism.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):380-390.details
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How Tolerant Can You Be? Carnap on Rationality.Florian Steinberger - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3):645-668.details
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Risk, rationality and expected utility theory.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5-6):798-826.details
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On the interpretation of decision theory.Samir Okasha - 2016 - Economics and Philosophy 32 (3):409-433.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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In dubious battle: uncertainty and the ethics of killing.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):859-883.details
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Deontological Decision Theory and Agent-Centered Options.Seth Lazar - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):579-609.details
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Rational preference in transformative experiences.Saira Khan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6715-6732.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Incoherence without Exploitability.Brian Hedden - 2011 - Noûs 47 (3):482-495.details
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Radical interpretation and decision theory.Anandi Hattiangadi & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6473-6494.details
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What Is ‘Real’ in Interpersonal Comparisons of Confidence.Edward Elliott - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (1):102-116.details
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‘Ramseyfying’ Probabilistic Comparativism.Edward Elliott - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (4):727-754.details
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