- Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
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Can Bayesian agents always be rational? A principled analysis of consistency of an Abstract Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - unknowndetails
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Foundations of Probability.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):625-640.details
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Scoring Imprecise Credences: A Mildly Immodest Proposal.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):55-78.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
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Because Hitler did it! Quantitative tests of Bayesian argumentation using ad hominem.Adam J. L. Harris, Anne S. Hsu & Jens K. Madsen - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):311 - 343.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):513-537.details
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Bigger, Badder Bugs.Benjamin A. Levinstein & Jack Spencer - forthcoming - Mind.details
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Unprincipled.Gordon Belot - 2024 - Review of Symbolic Logic 17 (2):435-474.details
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Accuracy, Deference, and Chance.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):43-87.details
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Formal Epistemology Meets Mechanism Design.Jürgen Landes - 2023 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 54 (2):215-231.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Sleeping Beauty and the Evidential Centered Principle.Namjoong Kim - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (5):2073-2095.details
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Accurate Updating.Ginger Schultheis - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
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The comparison problem for approximating epistemic ideals.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Ratio 36 (1):22-31.details
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Proper scoring rules in epistemic decision theory.Maomei Wang - 2020 - Dissertation, Lingnan Universitydetails
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Rationalizing the Principal Principle for Non-Humean Chance.J. Khawaja - manuscriptdetails
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Local and global deference.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2753-2770.details
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One world is (probably) just as good as many.Jer Steeger - 2022 - Synthese 200 (97):1-32.details
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Why Ideal Epistemology?Jennifer Rose Carr - 2021 - Mind 131 (524):1131-1162.details
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Expert Deference De Se.J. Dmitri Gallow - manuscriptdetails
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Topic-sensitive Two-dimensional Truthmaker Semantics.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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New Boundary Lines.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - manuscriptdetails
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Probabilism for stochastic theories.Jer Steeger - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 66:34–44.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory's Reckoning.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - manuscriptdetails
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Accuracy and Credal Imprecision.Dominik Berger & Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Noûs 54 (3):666-703.details
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What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
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Logical norms, accuracy and degree of belief.Robert Williams - 2015 - In Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Morality Under Risk.Chad Lee-Stronach - 2019 - Dissertation, details
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Additivity Requirements in Classical and Quantum Probability.John Earman - unknowndetails
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Updating for Externalists.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Noûs 55 (3):487-516.details
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Learning and Value Change.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19:1--22.details
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A Bayesian explanation of the irrationality of sexist and racist beliefs involving generic content.Paul Silva - 2020 - Synthese 197 (6):2465-2487.details
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The future, and what might have been.R. A. Briggs & Graeme A. Forbes - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):505-532.details
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Making Fit Fit.Michael Townsen Hicks - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (5):931-943.details
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Logical and Epistemic Modality.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Chance, Credence and Circles.Fabrizio Cariani - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):49-58.details
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Measure theoretic analysis of consistency of the Principal Principle.Miklós Rédei & Zalán Gyenis - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):972-987.details
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On the Formal Consistency of the Principal Principle.Gergei Bana - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (5):988-1001.details
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States of ignorance and ignorance of states: Examining the Quantum Principal Principle.Alexander Meehan - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 90 (C):160-167.details
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A modesty proposal.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3581-3601.details
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The Relation between Credence and Chance: Lewis' "Principal Principle" Is a Theorem of Quantum Probability Theory.John Earman - unknowndetails
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Credence in the Image of Chance.Michael Caie - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):626-648.details
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