- An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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Subjective Probability: The Real Thing.Richard C. Jeffrey - 2002 - Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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How probable is an infinite sequence of heads?Timothy Williamson - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):173-180.details
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A Defense of the Principle of Indifference.Greg Novack - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (6):655-678.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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A Decision Theory for Imprecise Probabilities.Susanna Rinard - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.details
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Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency.Anna Mahtani - 2014 - Noûs 49 (3):522-537.details
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Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
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Is Strict Coherence Coherent?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):411-424.details
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Disagreement and Evidential Attenuation.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2013 - Noûs 47 (4):767-794.details
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A Mathematical Theory of Communication.Claude Elwood Shannon - 1948 - Bell System Technical Journal 27 (April 1924):379–423.details
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Expected Accuracy Supports Conditionalization—and Conglomerability and Reflection.Kenny Easwaran - 2013 - Philosophy of Science 80 (1):119-142.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Theory of Probability: A Critical Introductory Treatment.Bruno de Finetti - 1970 - New York: John Wiley.details
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Updating Subjective Probability.Persi Diaconis & Sandy L. Zabell - 1982 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 77 (380):822-830.details
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Subjective Probabilities Should be Sharp.Adam Elga - 2010 - Philosophers' Imprint 10.details
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(1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 161-186.details
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Why conditionalize.David Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 403-407.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):201-235.details
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(1 other version)Logical foundations of probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]: Chicago University of Chicago Press.details
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(1 other version)Reasonable religious disagreements.Richard Feldman - 2010 - In Louise M. Antony (ed.), Philosophers Without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life. Oup Usa. pp. 194-214.details
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Distorted reflection.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):59-85.details
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Laws and symmetry.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The notion of consistency for partial belief.Susan Vineberg - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 102 (3):281 - 296.details
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Two principles of bayesian epistemology.William Talbott - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 62 (2):135-150.details
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What conditional probability could not be.Alan Hájek - 2003 - Synthese 137 (3):273--323.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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Representation theorems and realism about degrees of belief.Lyle Zynda - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):45-69.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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A mistake in dynamic coherence arguments?Brian Skyrms - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (2):320-328.details
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(1 other version)Coherence and the axioms of confirmation.Abner Shimony - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (1):1-28.details
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Probability kinematics.Isaac Levi - 1967 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 18 (3):197-209.details
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Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgment.Isaac Levi - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (3):390-409.details
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Fair bets and inductive probabilities.John G. Kemeny - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):263-273.details
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(1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Dutch Book Arguments.Alan Hájek - 2008 - In Paul Anand, Prasanta Pattanaik & Clemens Puppe (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Clever bookies and coherent beliefs.David Christensen - 1991 - Philosophical Review 100 (2):229-247.details
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Is there a dutch book argument for probability kinematics?Brad Armendt - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):583-588.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2015 - New York: Palgrave.details
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Graded Incoherence for Accuracy-Firsters.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (2):189-213.details
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(2 other versions)The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.details
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Probability Theory. The Logic of Science.Edwin T. Jaynes - 2002 - Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Edited by G. Larry Bretthorst.details
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Uniqueness revisited.Igor Douven - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):347 - 361.details
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