- Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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Belief in Psyontology.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (11).details
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Knowledge, Practical Adequacy, and Stakes.Charity Anderson & John Hawthorne - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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(1 other version)Evidential Symmetry and Mushy Credence.Roger White - 2009 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3:161-186.details
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Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
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Impermissive Bayesianism.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (Suppl 6):1185-1217.details
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(1 other version)Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul Churchland - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1999 - In Keith DeRose & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Skepticism: a contemporary reader. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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A Defense of Belief-Credence Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2018 - In João Luis Pereira Ourique (ed.), Proceedings of the Fifth Conference of the Brazilian Society of Analytic Philosophy. pp. 77-78.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief in a Fallen World.Robert Pasnau - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):531-559.details
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A new puzzle about belief and credence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):272-291.details
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The wrongs of racist beliefs.Rima Basu - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2497-2515.details
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Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
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Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu & Mark Schroeder - 2018 - In Brian Kim & Matthew McGrath (eds.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 181-205.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Rational Credence Through Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2018 - Philosophers' Imprint 18.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.details
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The Nature and Rationality of Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - In Kevin Vallier & Joshua Rasmussen (eds.), A New Theist Response to the New Atheists. New York: Routledge. pp. 77-92.details
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Normative theories of rational choice: expected utility.Rachael Briggs - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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When Obstinacy is a Better Policy.Justin Dallmann - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17.details
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When Does Evidence Suffice for Conviction?Martin Smith - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1193-1218.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Lotteries and justification.Christoph Kelp - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1233-1244.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Moral Encroachment.James Fritz - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):643-661.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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The Accuracy and Rationality of Imprecise Credences.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):667-685.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
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(2 other versions)Inquiry.Robert C. Stalnaker - 1984 - Linguistics and Philosophy 11 (4):515-519.details
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(2 other versions)The Logic of Decision.Brian Skyrms - 1965 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 50 (1):247-248.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge and Action.J. Stanley & J. Hawthorne - 2008 - Revista Cultura E Fé 37 (144).details
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Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.details
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On the value of faith and faithfulness.Daniel J. McKaughan - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):7-29.details
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The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.details
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Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction.Alvin I. Goldman & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Review: The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry. [REVIEW]Alan Hájek - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):166.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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(1 other version)Faith, Belief and Fictionalism.Finlay Malcolm & Michael Scott - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):257-274.details
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(1 other version)Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
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(1 other version)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.details
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Action-Centered Faith, Doubt, and Rationality.Daniel J. McKaughan - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41 (9999):71-90.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Chancy accuracy and imprecise credence.Jennifer Carr - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):67-81.details
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Mind and Supermind.Keith Frankish - 2004 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through Inquiry.Isaac Levi - 1991 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.details
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