- The advancement of science: science without legend, objectivity without illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech.Sanford Goldberg - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 167-196.details
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The division of cognitive labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.details
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(1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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(1 other version)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. pp. 167-196.details
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Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
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(1 other version)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 167-196.details
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Disagreement.Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.) - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Endorsement and assertion.Will Fleisher - 2019 - Noûs 55 (2):363-384.details
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On the Independence of Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - Philosophical Issues 32 (1):9-31.details
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How to endorse conciliationism.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9913-9939.details
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Disagreement, Dogmatism, and Belief Polarization.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):611-633.details
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A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
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Belief in the Face of Controversy.Hilary Kornblith - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Publishing without (some) belief.Will Fleisher - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (4):237-246.details
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Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment.John Pittard - 2019 - New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, Credence, and Faith.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Religious Studies 55 (2):153-168.details
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Rational Agnosticism and Degrees of Belief.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4:57.details
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The Epistemic Benefits of Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2019 - Springer Verlag.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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(1 other version)A justificationist view of disagreement’s epistemic significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - In Duncan Pritchard, Alan Millar & Adrian Haddock (eds.), Social Epistemology. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 145-154.details
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Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement.Sanford Goldberg - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 277-294.details
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The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - Religious Studies 56 (3):390-408.details
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Diversity and the Division of Cognitive Labor.Ryan Muldoon - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (2):117-125.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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How to Solve the Puzzle of Peer Disagreement.Michele Palmira - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):83-96.details
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Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
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(1 other version)A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 53:145-154.details
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When to defer to majority testimony - and when not.Philip Pettit - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):179-187.details
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Scepticism about philosophy.Jason Brennan - 2010 - Ratio 23 (1):1-16.details
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Conciliationism and Moral Spinelessness.James Fritz - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):101-118.details
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(1 other version)Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible?Hilary Kornblith - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 260.details
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Disagreement and Public Controversy.David Christensen - 2014 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Reliabilism in philosophy.Sanford Goldberg - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (1):105 - 117.details
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