- Theory of Mind.Arvin Goldman - 2012 - In Eric Margolis, Richard Samuels & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Oxford University Press.details
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Belief in Psyontology.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (11).details
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(1 other version)Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Review Essay: Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric EpistemologyWorking Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Marian David & Richard Foley - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):943.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge.Sarah Moss - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Beliefs do not come in degrees.Andrew Moon - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):760-778.details
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(1 other version)Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1949 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 54 (2):198-199.details
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Review of P sychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind. [REVIEW]Jay L. Garfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.details
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(2 other versions)Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limits.Robert Feys - 1950 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 15 (3):213-215.details
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Vindicating Intentional Realism: A Review of Jerry Fodor's "Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind". [REVIEW]Frances Egan - 1990 - Behavior and Philosophy 18 (1):59-61.details
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A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Alan Millar - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):367-372.details
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(2 other versions)Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1998 - Philosophical Quarterly 48 (192):406-408.details
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Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.details
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Warrant: The Current Debate. [REVIEW]John Koethe - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):136-139.details
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(1 other version)Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):265-275.details
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(3 other versions)Change in View: Principles of Reasoning, Cambridge, Mass.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.details
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Review of Gilbert Harman: Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. [REVIEW]Howard Margolis - 1986 - Ethics 99 (4):966-966.details
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The nature of doubt and a new puzzle about belief, doubt, and confidence.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1827-1848.details
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(1 other version)Decision Theory as Philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction.Alvin I. Goldman & Matthew McGrath - 2014 - New York: Oxford University Press. Edited by Matthew McGrath.details
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Knowing our degrees of belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.details
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(1 other version)VI-B ayesian E xpressivism.Seth Yalcin - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (2pt2):123-160.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Betting on Theories.Patrick Maher - 1993 - Cambridge, New York and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Architecture of the Mind:Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought: Massive Modularity and the Flexibility of Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits.Bertrand Russell - 1948 - London and New York: Routledge.details
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(1 other version)An ‘Evidentialist’ Worry About Joyce's Argument for Probabilism.Branden Fitelson Kenny Easwaran - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):425-433.details
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(1 other version)Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (7):384-389.details
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2010: Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Belief and cognitive limitations.Weng Hong Tang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):249-260.details
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(1 other version)Confidence and coarse-grained attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2005 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126.details
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The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.details
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Luminosity and vagueness.Elia Zardini - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):375-410.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.details
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Can there be reasoning with degrees of belief?Julia Staffel - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3535-3551.details
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Knowing That P without Believing That P.Blake Myers-Schulz & Eric Schwitzgebel - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):371-384.details
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The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
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Intention as a Model for Belief.Richard Holton - 2014 - In Manuel Vargas & Gideon Yaffe (eds.), Rational and Social Agency: The Philosophy of Michael Bratman. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality and Religious Commitment.Robert Audi - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Expressing Credences.Daniel Rothschild - 2012 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):99-114.details
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Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Embedding Epistemic Modals.Cian Dorr & John Hawthorne - 2013 - Mind 122 (488):867-914.details
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Representation theorems and the foundations of decision theory.Christopher Meacham & Jonathan Weisberg - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):641 - 663.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - , US: Oxford University Press.details
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
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