- Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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An Accuracy‐Dominance Argument for Conditionalization.R. A. Briggs & Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Noûs 54 (1):162-181.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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Justified judging.Alexander Bird - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):81–110.details
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Applying pragmatics to epistemology.Kent Bach - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):68-88.details
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Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.details
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Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.details
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Inquiry and Belief.Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 53 (2):296-315.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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The will to believe.William James - 1896 - [New York]: Dover Publications.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Norm of Belief.Michael Huemer - 2007 - In Susana Nuccetelli & Gary Seay (eds.), Themes From G. E. Moore: New Essays in Epistemology and Ethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief.Richard Jeffrey - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 157-185.details
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Deconstructing the mind.Stephen P. Stich - 1996 - In Deconstructing the mind. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 479-482.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Accuracy, Risk, and the Principle of Indifference.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):35-59.details
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The Rational Mind.Scott Sturgeon - 2020 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Generalized probabilism: Dutch books and accuracy domi- nation.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (5):811-840.details
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Gradational accuracy and nonclassical semantics.J. Robert G. Williams - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (4):513-537.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Fine-grained opinion, probability, and the logic of full belief.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 24 (4):349-377.details
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Belief and cognitive limitations.Weng Hong Tang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):249-260.details
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Repugnant Accuracy.Brian Talbot - 2019 - Noûs 53 (3):540-563.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Accuracy and epistemic conservatism.Florian Steinberger - 2018 - Analysis 79 (4):658-669.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
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Knowledge and Intellectual Virtue.Ernest Sosa - 1985 - The Monist 68 (2):226-245.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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How truth governs belief.Nishi Shah - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (4):447-482.details
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Doxastic deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.details
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Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.details
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Conditionalization Does Not Maximize Expected Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1155-1187.details
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An Accuracy Based Approach to Higher Order Evidence.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):690-715.details
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Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations.Leonard Savage - 1971 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 66 (336):783-801.details
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The Population Ethics of Belief: In Search of an Epistemic Theory X.Richard Pettigrew - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):336-372.details
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Précis and replies to contributors for book symposium on accuracy and the laws of credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):1-30.details
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Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of ‘the will to believe’.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.details
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Epistemic Utility and the Normativity of Logic.Richard Pettigrew - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (4):455-492.details
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A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
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Accuracy, Chance, and the Principal Principle.Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):241-275.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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