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Normative theories of rational choice: expected utility.Rachael Briggs - 2017 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.details
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Inductive Logic.James Hawthorne - 2011 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Evidence Cannot Be Permissive.Roger White - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312.details
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Evidence Can Be Permissive.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Chichester, West Sussex, UK: Blackwell. pp. 298.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - New York, NY.: Oxford University Press UK.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
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The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme:1-20.details
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Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.details
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The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
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Continuing on.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):670-691.details
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Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.details
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The logic of reliable and efficient inquiry.Oliver Schulte - 1999 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (4):399-438.details
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Permissivism and the Value of Rationality: A Challenge to the Uniqueness Thesis.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):286-297.details
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Means-ends epistemology.O. Schulte - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):1-31.details
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Bridging Rationality and Accuracy.Miriam Schoenfield - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy 112 (12):633-657.details
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A New Epistemic Utility Argument for the Principal Principle.Richard G. Pettigrew - 2013 - Episteme 10 (1):19-35.details
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Permissivism and the Truth Connection.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):641-656.details
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Speed-Optimal Induction and Dynamic Coherence.Michael Nielsen & Eric Wofsey - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):439-455.details
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Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
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Learning theory and the philosophy of science.Kevin T. Kelly, Oliver Schulte & Cory Juhl - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (2):245-267.details
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Objectively reliable subjective probabilities.Cory F. Juhl - 1996 - Synthese 109 (3):293 - 309.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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The Truth Problem for Permissivism.Sophie Horowitz - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy 116 (5):237-262.details
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Immoderately rational.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):41-56.details
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Self‐Reinforcing and Self‐Frustrating Decisions.Caspar Hare & Brian Hedden - 2015 - Noûs 50 (3):604-628.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Riches and Rationality.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (1):114-129.details
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Probabilities over rich languages, testing and randomness.Haim Gaifman & Marc Snir - 1982 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 47 (3):495-548.details
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Bayes or Bust?: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory.John Earman - 1992 - Bradford.details
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The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin T. Kelly - 1996 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press USA. Edited by Kevin Kelly.details
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Formal learning theory.Oliver Schulte - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard J. Savage - 1954 - Synthese 11 (1):86-89.details
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Degree of confirmation’ and Inductive Logic.Hilary Putnam - 1963 - In Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap. Open Court: La Salle. pp. 761-783.details
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Simplicity, Truth, and Probability.Kevin T. Kelly - unknowndetails
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How Simplicity Helps You Find the Truth Without Pointing at it.Kevin T. Kelly - unknowndetails
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Could've Thought Otherwise.Jonathan Weisberg - 2020 - Philosophers' Imprint 20 (12).details
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The Logic of Reliable Inquiry.Kevin Kelly - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):351-354.details
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