Universal Generalization, if it is not the most poorly understood inference rule in natural deduction, then it is the least well explained or justified. The inference rule is, prima facie, quite ambitious: on the basis of a fact established of one thing, I may infer that the fact holds of every thing in the class to which the one belongs—a class which may contain indefinitely many things. How can such an inference be made with any confidence as to its validity (...) or ability to preserve truth from premise to conclusion? My goal in this paper is to explain how Universal Generalization works in a way that makes sense of its ability to preserve truth. In doing so, I shall review common accounts of Universal Generalization and explain why they are inadequate or are explanatorily unsatisfying. Happily, my account makes no ontological or epistemological presumptions and therefore should be compatible with whichever ontological or epistemological schemes the reader prefers. (shrink)

Niccolõ Machiavelli é universalmente conhecido por sua obra política. Opresente artigo serve-se de uma obra literária, mais precisamente da peça teatral La Mandragola, para desvelar o mundo ético-político do autor. Através da análise deste trabalho, procuramos mostrar que, de certo modo, o universo valorativo da obra de Machiavelli é captado de modo mais preciso na expressão cômico-satírica do que na sua reflexão política propriamente dita, pois enquanto nesta última a visão dos homens permanece como um dado de fundo, na comédia (...) ela é matéria de representação direta. (shrink)

The essay analyses the originality of Machiavelli's reflection about the conflict under the Prince's government, in order to point out concordances and differences with the role - more extensively studied - of conflict within a republic. The questions analysed are, first of ali, the Prince's necessity of foreseeing the institutional structures for the regulation of conflict; then, the issue of alliances for the Prince who, having taken the power with the support of the great or of the people, needs popular (...) support to maintain it; finally, the nature of the popular desire of not being oppressed, and particularly the fact that it is not only a negative desire, but rather contains an active tension to defend liberty. -/- . (shrink)

This article intends to establish a contact between two proscribed thinkers: Machiavelli and Marx. Although apart in time and in political vision, they offer the possibility of a reflection which is able to provide mutual fecundation. We want to show that Machiavelli’s pessimism and Marx’s optimism both derive from the diverse understanding of what provokes the fundamental division of society into two fundamental antagonistic groups. Whereas one treats it as a division of opposite desires, to the other it is determined (...) by the way in which the individuals define themselves as to the ownership of the means of production. Is it necessary to choice on of them, or is it possible to conceive a synthesis? -/- O artigo pretende estabelecer um contato entre dois pensadores malditos: Maquiavel e Marx. Embora distantes no tempo e na visão política, oferecem a possibilidade de uma reflexão capaz de fecundar-se mutuamente. Queremos mostrar que o pessimismo de Maquiavel e o otimismo de Marx derivam da diversa compreensão daquilo que provoca a divisão fundamental da sociedade em dois grupos antagônicos fundamentais. Enquanto para um se trata de uma divisão de desejos opostos, para outro é determinada pelo modo como os indivíduos se definem em relação à posse dos meios de produção. É preciso fazer uma escolha entre ambos, ou é possível pensar numa síntese? (shrink)

We are presently confronted with an impressive growth of the religious phenomenon. This can be observed not only related to both the outbreak of new religions and the increasing attendance to worship services, but also for the presence of the religious language in the political discourse. We can see nowadays a political use of religion and a religious use of politics. When we approach the religions in a large scale perspective is possible to verify that in all of them both (...) aspects live together, and they are contradictory and excludent only in appearance. This evidence brings some particular questions: there would be more political and bellicose religions than others? Or maybe the contentious nature of religions rises when they become ideologies, in the same way ideologies impose themselves politically when they act like religion? We will let ourselves be guided by this hypothesis in order to explore the ambiguous relation between politics and religion. It was precisely after the death of the ideologies that religions of any creed reappeared strongly in the scenario. We will take as references to this theoretical task two thinkers in particular: Marsilius of Padua and Machiavelli. They both will guide us to think respectively the religious use of politics and the political use of religion. -/- Estamos confrontados na atualidade com um vertiginoso crescimento do fenômeno religioso. Isso pode ser observado não apenas pelo surgimento de novas religiões e o aumento da frequência aos cultos, mas também pela presença da linguagem religiosa no discurso político de tal modo que podemos falar num uso político da religião e um uso religioso da política. Quando abordamos as religiões na longa duração, percebemos que em todas elas coabitam estes dois aspectos, contraditórios e excludentes apenas na aparência. Esta constatação leva ao questionamento: existiriam religiões mais políticas, ou mais conquistadoras, do que outras? Ou então, talvez, a natureza belicosa das religiões emergiria a partir do momento em que elas se erigem em ideologias, da mesma forma como as ideologias se impõem politicamente quando agem à maneira de religiões? Neste trabalho nos orientaremos por esta hipótese para explorar a relação ambígua entre política e religião, pois foi precisamente após a morte das ideologias que as religiões, independente do credo, retornaram com toda a força. Para tanto, tomaremos como referência teórica dois pensadores, Marsílio de Pádua e Nicolau Maquiavel, para pensar, respectivamente, o uso religioso da política e o uso político da religião. (shrink)

We reconstruct as much as we can the part of al-Fārābī's treatment of modal logic that is missing from the surviving pages of his Long Commentary on the Prior Analytics. We use as a basis the quotations from this work in Ibn Sīnā, Ibn Rushd and Maimonides, together with relevant material from al-Fārābī's other writings. We present a case that al-Fārābī's treatment of the dictum de omni had a decisive effect on the development and presentation of Ibn Sīnā's modal logic. (...) We give further evidence that the Harmonisation of the Opinions of Plato and Aristotle was not written by al-Fārābī. (shrink)

This study brings light to the concepts of State and Government in the thought of Marsilio de Padua pointing out to profoundly modern institutions present in the reflection of this medieval philosopher. We attempt to show that Marsilio de Padua reflects based on Aristotle´s categories, but proposes a State and Government conception different from that common place of medieval politics as he insists on the need of the popular consent as a criterion of political legitimacy. -/- O estudo explicita os (...) conceitos de Estado e de Governo no pensamento de Marsílio de Pádua apontando as intuições profundamente modernas presentes na reflexão desse filósofo medieval. Procuramos mostrar que Marsílio reflete com categorias aristotélicas, mas propõe uma concepção de Estado e de Governo que se distancia do lugar comum da reflexão política medieval ao insistir na necessidade do consentimento dos súditos como critério de legitimidade política. (shrink)

Partimos do estudo na noção de homem presente no pensamento de Maquiavel para estabelecer a idéia de Estado e sua relação com a ética. Existe, quanto a esta questão, uma vasta polêmica na tradição interpretativa e que podemos reduzir a duas perspectivas fundamentais. Primeira: Maquiavel compreende a natureza humana como corrompida de forma definitiva, o que transforma o Estado em instrumento puramente coator da malevolência humana. Nesta ótica, não há espaço para pensar em finalidades éticas do Estado. Segunda: mesmo partindo (...) da idéia de que há no homem uma inclinação à maldade, não considera isso algo irreversível. Destaca a importância da educação como instrumento de formação humana e de cultivo de valores morais. O trabalho mostra que o Estado maquiaveliano se fundamenta na natureza humana e tem por objetivo possibilitar o agir ético do homem. (shrink)

The fully understanding of the Machiavellian concept of the State depends on the determination of the idea of political equality. Political equality must be conceived, in its turn, as domination equality and absence of privilege/precedence; in other words, absence of subordination. Taking into account a definition such as that, the Machiavellian model of the State could only be the Republic. So, this paper argues G. Pancera`s view, proposed in his book “Maquiavel entre Repúblicas”, that such model of the State was (...) more explicitly formulated in Machiavelli`s Discursus. This interpretation will be questioned, pointing out the existence of textual elements in the Discursus which allow us to think that a Principate or a Monarchy could also be among Machiavelli’s purpose to the reform of the Florence State examined in the Discursus. -/- Para captar a concepção maquiaveliana de Estado é necessário determinar a ideia de igualdade política. Esta deve ser entendida como igualdade de comando e ausência de privilégio/precedência, ou seja, ausência de subordinação. Considerando esta definição, o modelo de Estado maquiaveliano só pode ser a república. O artigo discute a partir da obra de G. Pancera “Maquiavel entre repúblicas” a questão, levantada por Pancera, de que seria no Discursus de Maquiavel que semelhante modelo de Estado estaria formulado de modo mais explícito. Problematizaremos esta interpretação apontando para a existência de elementos textuais da obra citada que autorizam pensar que igualmente um principado ou monarquia poderiam estar na intenção de Maquiavel na reforma do Estado de Florença examinada no Discursus. (shrink)

This paper aims to point out that Machiavelli’s contribution can go beyond from merely an articulation between individual freedom and civic participation, as viewed by Skinner. It can be showed that Machiavelli’s most fruitful contribution is in his conception of conflict as a ineradicable dimension of politics, which is an aspect neglected by Skinner when he reduced it to a form among others of cultivation of civic virtue. Drawing upon reflections developed in the last decades by Chantal Mouffe, this paper (...) analyzes some unfoldings of that Machiavelli’s original intuition. Machiavelli’s works can be thought through the analytical categories elaborated by Chantal and thus contribute to a new modern politic conception of democracy. -/- O objetivo deste artigo é apontar que a contribuição de Maquiavel pode ir além daquela já entrevista por Skinner, de uma articulação entre liberdade individual e participação cívica. Nosso propósito é mostrar que a contribuição mais fecunda de Maquiavel está na sua concepção do conflito como uma dimensão inerradicável, aspecto negligenciado por Skinner ao reduzi-lo a uma forma entre outras de cultivo da virtude cívica. Vamos analisar alguns desdobramentos desta intuição original valendo-nos das reflexões desenvolvidas nas últimas décadas por Chantal Mouffe. Procuraremos mostrar como a obra de Maquiavel poderia ser pensada a partir das categorias analíticas elaboradas por Chantal e contribuir para uma nova concepção política de democracia na contemporaneidade. (shrink)

The Global Media and Information Literacy Week commemorates the progress in achieving “MIL for all” by aggregating various MIL-related local and international events and actions across different disciplines around the world.The MIL Global Week 2018, 24 to 31 October, was marked by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization in collaboration with various organizations including the UN Alliance of Civilizations, the Global Alliance for Partnership on MIL, the International Federation of Library Associations, the International Association of School Libraries, and (...) the UNESCO-UNAOC University Cooperation Programme on Media and Information Literacy and Intercultural Dialogue. (shrink)

The article works out the thesis that to the excessive desire of the powerful for the absolute appropriation/domination it is opposed a not less excessive and absolute desire from people in order not to be appropriated/dominated: two desires of a distinct nature which are neither the desire for the same things nor the desire for different things, but desires in which the act of desiring is different. Taking into account that each desire aims at its absolute effectiveness, each one of (...) them tries to impose itself universally becoming doubly absolute: for one side it is inclined to the absolute domination (the powerful) or to the plain liberty (the people); for the other side, tries to impose itself to the whole political body. Each desire is only sustained by its heterogeneous desire. Each one pursues its own purposes whose realization will be the ruin of all collective life. Good institutions and good laws ensure liberty as long as they are capable to prevent the powerful or the people to consummate its desire or abandon its own desire to assume the other’s. However, having inscribed the order of law in the disorder of dissent, Machiavelli discarded the idea of an institutional order as a defi nitive solution to the disorder of dissent. Consequently, no law or institution is able to defi nitively resist the risk of corruption. This requires a periodic return to the origins: the experience of the constitutive moment of the original violence which, exposing men to risks, restores the initial reputation and strength of States and institutions. -/- O artigo parte da enunciação da tese de que ao desejo desmesurado dos grandes pela apropriação/dominação absoluta opõe-se um desejo não menos desmesurado e absoluto do povo de não sê-lo: dois desejos de natureza diferente que não são nem o desejo das mesmas coisas nem desejo de coisas diferentes, mas desejos cujo ato de desejar é diferente. Considerando que cada desejo visa sua efetividade absoluta, cada um tenta se impor universalmente tornando-se duplamente absoluto: por um lado, tende à dominação total (os grandes) ou à liberdade plena (o povo); por outro, tenta se impor ao conjunto do corpo político. Cada desejo somente se sustenta do desejo que lhe é heterogêneo. Cada um persegue uma fi nalidade própria cuja realização plena será a ruína de toda vida coletiva. Boas instituições e boas leis asseguram a liberdade na medida em que forem capazes de impedir que grandes ou povo consumam seu desejo ou que abandonem seu desejo próprio para assumir o do outro. Contudo, ao inscrever a ordem da lei na desordem dos dissensos, Maquiavel descartou a ideia de uma ordem institucional como solução defi nitiva da desordem dos dissensos. Consequentemente, nenhuma lei ou instituição é capaz de resistir defi nitivamente ao risco da corrupção. Isso obriga ao retorno periódico às origens: a experiência do momento constitutivo da violência originária que, expondo os homens ao risco, restaura o prestígio e vigor iniciais de Estados e instituições. (shrink)

The distinction between episodic and semantic declarative memory systems, as introduced by Tulving (1972, updated in 1984, 1991), was a revolutionary approach to human memory. While the distinction is now widely endorsed in the study of memory, there are debates about what constitutes each system’s domain, how each system is used, how each system functions, and the phenomenal experiences associated with the functioning of each system. On the basis of clinical studies and insights from conditions affecting memory, this paper argues (...) that the episodic/semantic distinction can be reframed as a result of a unified declarative memory system. In this view, experiences are encoded into memory traces, and retrieval of memories is dependent on the cues specific to each particular instance of remembering. The upshot of this proposal, called unified memory functionalism, is that the phenomenal differences of remembering can be understood in terms of the differential salience of cues without defaulting to the view that there exist multiple declarative memory systems. (shrink)

As part of a review symposium on DARWIN'S ARGUMENT BY ANALOGY: FROM ARTIFICIAL TO NATURAL SELECTION (2021), the journal METASCIENCE invited Roger White, Jon Hodge and me to submit a response to the thoughtful commentaries on our book by Andrea Sullivan-Clarke, David Depew and Andrew Inkpen.

Machiavelli is commonly known by a political theory associated to his name: "machiavellism". The initial effort of the article is to take apart Machiavellian thought from such a conception. After this it tries a detailed analysis of all occurrences of the term "education", which amounts to eleven times in his work. The hypothesis by which our reflexion is guided is that education is conceived by Machiavelli as a force addressed to control the desire's as well as the nature's inherent movement (...) disorder, preventing the deleterious effects of the first on the political life. Due to education the human being is able to know the "nature of things", i.e., to know what things "always were", and, through such knowledge, to anticipate to the "course of the things ordered by the heaven". Finally, we will try to demonstrate that for Machiavelli education provides the adaptation of the individuals behaviour in such a way that it is possible to redirect the course of things for a coherent order in regard to the collective good.Maquiavel é popularmente conhecido por uma teoria política associada ao seu nome: "maquiavelismo". O artigo realiza um esforço inicial para afastar o pensamento maquiaveliano de semelhante concepção. Em seguida, faz uma análise detalhada de todas as ocorrências do termo "educação", num total de onze, na sua obra. A hipótese que orienta nossa reflexão é de que a educação é pensada por Maquiavel como uma força destinada a controlar a desordem inerente ao movimento tanto do desejo quanto da natureza impedindo os efeitos deletérios daquele sobre a vida política. Graças à educação, o homem é capaz de conhecer a "natureza das coisas", isto é, saber o que as coisas são "desde sempre" e, desta maneira, antecipar-se ao "curso das coisas ordenado pelos céus". Por fim, procuramos mostrar que, para Maquiavel, a educação possibilita moldar o comportamento dos indivíduos de tal modo que é possível redirecionar o curso das coisas para uma ordem coerente com o bem coletivo. (shrink)

One of the Machiavelli's most famous and innovative thesis states that good laws arise from social conflicts, according to the Roman Empire example of the opposition between plebs and nobles. Conflicts are able to bring about order in virtue of the characteristic constrictive force of necessity, which prevents the ambition to prevail. Nonetheless, law does not neutralize the conflict; just give it a regulation. So, law is subjected to history, to the continuous change, which means that it is potentially corruptible. (...) On this account, Machiavelli says that a State can only maintain its authority through a continuous return to the originary moment, viz. to the revival of the experiences of "fear", "terror" and "punishment" lived in the originary event of the foundation. For that reason, in the origin of law is also the violence, whose combined function is to provide legitimacy to its exercise by the State apparatus as the only form to preserve political life from ruin.Uma das mais famosas e inovadoras teses de Maquiavel é a afirmação de que as boas leis nascem dos conflitos sociais, segundo o exemplo romano das oposições entre plebe e nobres. Os conflitos são capazes de produzir ordem por conter a força constritiva própria da necessidade, que impede a ambição de reinar. Contudo, a lei não neutraliza o conflito, mas apenas lhe dá uma ordenação. A lei está, pois, exposta à história, à contínua mudança, o que significa dizer que é potencialmente corruptível. Por causa desta possibilidade, Maquiavel afirma que um Estado somente mantém sua autoridade por meio de um retorno contínuo ao momento da origem, isto é, à revivência da experiência do "medo", do "terror" e da "punição" do acontecimento originário da fundação. Assim, na origem da lei está a violência, cuja função é proporcionar a legitimação de seu exercício pelo aparato estatal como única forma de preservar da ruína a vida política. (shrink)

A formação do conceito moderno de Estado: A contribuição de Maquiavel.

For Machiavelli, religion is valued not by the importance of its founder, the content of its teachings, the truth of its dogmas or the significance of its rites. It is not the essence of what really matters but its function and importance for collective life. Religion teaches to recognize and respect political rules through the religious commandments. This collective norm could assume the outer coercive aspect of the military discipline as well as the inner persuasive character of civic and moral (...) education for the production of collective consensus. -/- Para Maquiavel, o que confere valor a uma religião não é a importância de seu fundador, o conteúdo dos ensinamentos, a verdade dos dogmas ou a significação dos mistérios e ritos. Importa não a essência da religião e sim sua função e importância para a vida coletiva. A religião ensina a reconhecer e a respeitar as regras políticas a partir do mandamento religioso. Essa norma coletiva pode assumir tanto o aspecto coercivo exterior da disciplina militar ou da autoridade política quanto o caráter persuasivo interior da educação moral e cívica para a produção do consenso coletivo. (shrink)

exam of the issue of conflict since the “History of Florence” provides us with elements capable to show the Machiavellian reflection does not evolve according to such a simple and linear way as it is shown in the “Discourses”. In fact, investigation will reveal that the opposition between the two types of conflict – positive conflict and negative conflict –, described in the “Discourses”, is progressively defined, from the analysis of Florentian history, as being just one type – the tragic (...) and violent type –, based on contrapositions that cannot be solved in terms of a classical virtú, characteristic of the first period of Roman history. Such transformations arise a set of questions to which, in some way, the present paper intends to offer some answers: Would Machiavelli have renounced to the idea of conflict as foundation of republican liberty and surrended himself to the utopia of a homogeneous and stable order? Which element should be to blame due to the fact that disagreements did not produce, in Florence, the same effects which were seen in Rome? Would all disagreements be natural and, for that reason, inevitable, or could there be “artificial” divisions and, by that reason,avoidable ones? -/- O estudo da questão do conflito a partir da “História de Florença” nos fornece elementos capazes de mostrar que a reflexão maquiaveliana não se desenvolve de modo tão simples e linear quanto parece nos “Discursos”. Com efeito, revelará que a oposição entre dois tipos de conflito – positivo e negativo – descrita nos “Discursos” se define progressivamente, a partir da análise da história florentina, como de um só tipo – trágico e violento – baseado sobre contraposições que não são possíveis de serem resolvidas em termos de uma virtù clássica, característica do primeiro período da história de Roma. Esta transformação levanta um conjunto de interrogações para as quais, de algum modo, o presente estudo pretende oferecer respostas: teria Maquiavel renunciado à ideia de conflito como fundamento da liberdade republicana e se entregado à utopia de uma ordem homogênea e estável? A que se deve atribuir o fato de as discórdias não haverem produzido em Florença os mesmos efeitos que em Roma? Seriam todas as discórdias naturais e, portanto, inevitáveis, ou poderia haver divisões “artificiais” e, portanto, evitáveis? (shrink)

The Adverse Outcome Pathway (AOP) concept is a knowledge assembly and communication tool to facilitate the transparent translation of mechanistic information into outcomes meaningful to the regulatory assessment of chemicals. The AOP framework and associated knowledgebases (KBs) have received significant attention and use in the regulatory toxicology community. However, it is increasingly apparent that the potential stakeholder community for the AOP concept and AOP KBs is broader than scientists and regulators directly involved in chemical safety assessment. In this paper we (...) identify and describe those stakeholders who currently—or in the future—could benefit from the application of the AOP framework and knowledge to specific problems. We also summarize the challenges faced in implementing pathway-based approaches such as the AOP framework in biological sciences, and provide a series of recommendations to meet critical needs to ensure further progression of the framework as a useful, sustainable and dependable tool supporting assessments of both human health and the environment. Although the AOP concept has the potential to significantly impact the organization and interpretation of biological information in a variety of disciplines/applications, this promise can only be fully realized through the active engagement of, and input from multiple stakeholders, requiring multi-pronged substantive long-term planning and strategies. (shrink)

The decline in autobiographical memory function in people with Alzheimer’s dementia has been argued to cause a loss of self-identity. Prior research suggests that people perceive changes in moral traits and loss of memories with a “social-moral core” as most impactful to the maintenance of identity. However, such research has so far asked people to rate from a third-person perspective, considering the extent to which hypothetical others maintain their identity in the face of various impairments. In the current study, we (...) examined the impact of perspective, comparing first- and third-person perspectives, as well as memory type. This online study asked 201 participants to consider hypothetical scenarios in which either themselves or another person experienced different types of memory failures associated with a diagnosis of AD. For each scenario, participants rated the degree to which the depicted individual remained the same person, and how impactful the impairment was. Social semantic memory failures – involving failures to recognise a loved one – were rated as most detrimental to self-continuity, and procedural memory failures the least. Averaged across all memory types, people considered their own and their partner’s self-continuity to be more resilient to memory failures than that of a parent or stranger. However, this pattern was reversed for some memory types: forgetting semantic or episodic information about close relationships was rated as more detrimental from a first-person than third-person perspective. Our findings suggest that perspective and type of memory impairment interact to impact judgements about the extent to which people maintain their identity when they experience dementia, and highlight the importance of social relationships to maintaining a sense of self. (shrink)

What’s so good about John Ames? The narrator of Marilynne Robinson’s Gilead has been much admired, but it’s far from obvious why. His life is quiet and unassuming, and has for the most part been uneventful in the extreme. In this chapter I draw on Iris Murdoch’s moral philosophy to explain the moral arc of the novel, and suggest that the novel in turn can shed light on Murdoch’s key ethical ideas. What is so notable about John Ames, (...) I suggest, is his commitment to seeing the world justly and lovingly—a commitment which for Murdoch is at the heart of virtuous agency. (shrink)

Nous cherchons ici à étudier la signification du fait qu’un État, chez Spinoza, peut se comprendre intégralement comme étant une « âme » singulière. Nous montrons en quoi cette compréhension de l’État comme « âme » permet d’expliciter les éléments centraux de la théorie de l’obéissance chez Spinoza, et en quoi le succès du projet politique spinoziste n’est envisageable que de cette perspective. Nous soulevons en conclusion un paradoxe : Spinoza écrit (TP 3/8) que nul ne cède de sa faculté (...) de juger ; et à force de tirer sur ce fil, nous montrons que Spinoza y aborde de façon discrète et indirecte la possibilité de la disparition de l’État, dans la mesure même où il aura réussi à encourager l’obéissance et à faire en sorte que « l’âme » de tous devienne un bien commun. (shrink)

I argue that a Heideggerian reading of the concept of cheng 誠 strengthens Roger Ames's interpretation of the Confucian concept by providing a grounding framework that connects various dimensions of the concept.

Le traité Du Régime se démarque des autres traités du corpus hippocratique à bien des égards. Aucun autre texte de ce corpus n’a poussé aussi loin le lien entre le corps humain en tant que microcosme et le cosmos, son macrocosme. Ce lien se manifeste notamment dans de multiples analogies, dans des expressions communes utilisées pour les décrire, ainsi que dans des explications identiques des phénomènes qui les caractérisent. Le présent article enquêtera sur une expression spécifique liant l’homme et le (...) cosmos : le terme περίοδος. Dans la continuité des travaux de Luc Brisson et Jacques Jouanna qui ont signalé plusieurs traits communs au Timée de Platon et au traité Du Régime, il s’agira de mettre en lumière l’importance du terme περίοδος, du concept de rotation/révolution, dans l’association microcosme-macrocosme, autant d’un point de vue structurel que fonctionnel. (shrink)

Le Traité de l’âme d’Aristote joue, dans l’histoire de la philosophie, un rôle crucial. Assumant toute la conception de la vie et de l’homme, depuis l’aube de la réflexion jusqu’au déclin de la Grèce, il est à la source des plus riches développements de l’anthropologie musulmane et chrétienne du Moyen-Age. Hegel, Marx ou Darwin le connaissent bien et s’y réfèrent aisément. Les scientifiques de notre fin de siècle le redécouvrent avec intérêt. Mais aujourd’hui, de très nombreuses études spécialisées, des monographies (...) et des articles de revue, font de plus en plus rarement la synthèse des problèmes qu’il soulève. -/- L’intention de ce livre est de retrouver la perspective d’ensemble du Traité. Il ne s’est, en effet, plus produit depuis longtemps, d’étude globale et systématique de l’ouvrage. C’est ce créneau, abandonné parce que très exposé, que nous voudrions réoccuper. (shrink)

Few arguments from the past have stirred up as much interest as Aristotle’s “Third man” and not so many texts have received as much attention as its account in chapter 22 of the Sophistici elenchi. And yet, several issues about both remain highly controversial, starting from the very nature of the argument at stake and the exact signification of some of its features. The essay provides a close commentary of the text, dealing with its main difficulties and suggesting an overall (...) interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion of the “Third Man” argument. (shrink)

Le Commentaire du Traité de l’âme d’Aristote par Thomas d’Aquin, est le cinquième des commentaires fondamentaux des œuvres d’Aristote traduits en langue française. Avec celui des Physiques, de la Métaphysique, de l’Interprétation et des Analytiques, il fonde l’édifice de la philosophie de Thomas d’Aquin et assure les contreforts de sa théologie. Ce traité se présente comme un vaste essai de définition de l’âme et principalement de l’âme humaine, avec en filigrane, une question lancinante : cette âme est-elle immortelle ?

An examination of Hall and Ames’s claim that the classical Confucian tradition be understood as constituting an aesthetic order. Some have argued that this claim is simply false. However, this claim should be understood not in terms of its literal truth or falsity, but in terms of its usefulness and suggestiveness. It is a general description that can guide inquiry into early Chinese thought. In what follows, I locate Hall and Ames’s “aesthetic order” within a broader interpretive lineage (...) that understands the Chinese tradition as an aesthetic tradition. I show how conceptions of “aesthetic” evolve within that lineage, how Hall and Ames built upon earlier New Confucians, and how their work might be extended further. (shrink)

Zarpó del puerto de Lisboa con destino a las costas de Inglaterra. La «Grande y Felicísima Armada» de Felipe II comenzó -oro y hierro- su majestuosa marcha. Lenta, pesada, con más reveses que fortuna, la empresa al mando del duque de Medina-Sidonia dio abundantes indicios antes de arribar a tierra inglesa de lo que en escasos meses se convertiría en una colosal derrota. Todo augurio de su final. Pareció cumplirse en Alonso Pérez de Guzmán, su almirante trémulo, aquello de Mariana (...) de que «el temor y el recato demasiado nunca hicieron cosa honrosa; a los valientes ayuda Dios, a los cobardes todo se les deshace entre las manos». Con todo, nada impidió que la amenaza, que suele representarse mayor que el daño cuando se produce. se fuera dando a conocer a los ingleses con un temor creciente. Con un temor tal que en el amanecer del día 5 de abril de aquel año de 1588, una mujer de la pequeña aldea de Malmesbury, al suroeste de la Isla, alumbrará gemelos. Pues «al difundirse por nuestras plazas -contará uno de esos retoños, T. Hobbes- el rumor de que con la flota se acercaba el último día para nuestro pueblo, tanto miedo concibió mi madre que parió gemelos: a mí y al miedo al mismo tiempo». Es verdad. Pocas cosas le están tan hermanadas al hombre y le son tan reveladoras como sus propios miedos; al menos en su presente estado. Y pocas cosas como sus miedos ayudan a caracterizar mejor sus formas de organización social. De ahí que ame la paz y se goce con la compañía afable, como a renglón seguido también el propio Hobbes apunta. (shrink)

George Boole emerged from the British tradition of the “New Analytic”, known for the view that the laws of logic are laws of thought. Logicians in the New Analytic tradition were influenced by the work of Immanuel Kant, and by the German logicians Wilhelm Traugott Krug and Wilhelm Esser, among others. In his 1854 work An Investigation of the Laws of Thought on Which are Founded the Mathematical Theories of Logic and Probabilities, Boole argues that the laws of thought acquire (...) normative force when constrained to mathematical reasoning. Boole’s motivation is, first, to address issues in the foundations of mathematics, including the relationship between arithmetic and algebra, and the study and application of differential equations (Durand-Richard, van Evra, Panteki). Second, Boole intended to derive the laws of logic from the laws of the operation of the human mind, and to show that these laws were valid of algebra and of logic both, when applied to a restricted domain. Boole’s thorough and flexible work in these areas influenced the development of model theory (see Hodges, forthcoming), and has much in common with contemporary inferentialist approaches to logic (found in, e.g., Peregrin and Resnik). (shrink)

The editorial introduces issue 21.1 of Technoetic Arts via a critical reflection on the artificial intelligence hype (AI hype) that emerged in 2022. Tracing the history of the critique of Large Language Models, the editorial underscores that there are substantial ethical challenges related to bias in the training data, copyright issues, as well as ecological challenges which the technology industry has consistently downplayed over the years. -/- The editorial highlights the distinction between the current AI technology’s reliance on extensive pre-existing (...) human-generated data for pattern recognition and the performative process inherent in art practice. Patterns of creative output can be replicated without a thorough understanding of underlying concepts. In contrast, the performative process of art practice, as explored through the conceptual frameworks of creativity by Noam Chomsky, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Roger T. Ames and discussed in previous publications by this editorial's author, creates concepts and continually ‘strives to extend itself towards the unknown.’ -/- Following this introductory section, the editorial provides an overview of the ten articles featured in this issue of Technoetic Arts. The first four texts engage with emerging technologies from various perspectives in art and design. The subsequent six articles, part of a special section titled 'Perspectives from Chandigarh,' reflect a quest for meaningful existence within colonial, patriarchal, and biopolitical structures that frame everyday practices of exclusion and oppression. (shrink)

In this paper we inquire whether Leibniz’s metaphysics of the body has undergone a signifi cant change in the last twenty years of his life. Th is metaphysical conception seems incompatible with the late monadological conclusions. Yet, to explain the body in terms of monadic subordination makes soul and body inseparably united. Far from there being two incompatible ontologies in Leibniz’s late philosophy, we fi nd a seamless connection between what is monadic and what is organic: a single point of (...) view that includes the order of bodies and that of monadic substrates, and a system that accounts for all levels of reality. Ultimately, our topic is whether Leibniz was a realist metaphysician, an idealist one, or whether in the philosophy of his maturity he tried to reconcile the two tendencies. résUMé : Dans cette étude la question est de savoir si la vision de Leibniz sur la métaphysique du corps a subi un changement important dans les vingt dernières années de sa vie. Il s’agit là d’une conception métaphysique qui semble incompatible avec les conclusions monadologiques tardives. Pourtant, expliquer le corps en termes de subordination monadique, rend l’âme et le corps inséparablement unis. Loin d’être deux ontologies incompatibles dans la philosophie de maturité de Leibniz, on y trouve une connexion sans faille entre ce qui est monadique et ce qui est organique : un point de vue unique qui comprendrait l’ordre des corps et celui des substrats monadiques, un système qui rendrait compte de tous les niveaux de la réalité. Finalement, le sujet de discussion consiste à savoir si Leibniz a été un métaphysicien réaliste, un idéaliste, ou bien s’il a essayé de réconcilier les deux tendances dans sa philosophie de la maturité. (shrink)

Anaxarchus accompanied Pyrrho on Alexander the Great’s expedition to India and was known as “the Happy Man” because of his impassivity and contentment. Our sources on his philosophy are limited and largely consist of anecdotes about his interactions with Pyrrho and Alexander, but they allow us to reconstruct a distinctive ethical position. It overlaps with several disparate ethical traditions but is not merely a hodge-podge; it hangs together as a unified whole. Like Pyrrho, he asserts that things are indifferent in (...) value and that realizing this indifference leads to contentment. But this doctrine of indifference is rooted in Democritean atomism. And in his pursuit of pleasure and dismissiveness of conventional standards of what is just, noble, and pious, Anaxarchus is closer to fifth century thinkers such as Aristippus, Antiphon, and Critias. (shrink)

The classification of a state of affairs under a legal category can be considered as a kind of con- densed decision that can be made explicit, analyzed, and assessed us- ing argumentation schemes. In this paper, the controversial conflict of opinions concerning the nature of “marriage” in Obergefell v. Hodges is analyzed pointing out the dialecti- cal strategies used for addressing the interpretive doubts. The dispute about the same-sex couples’ right to marry hides a much deeper disa- greement not (...) only about what mar- riage is, but more importantly about the dialectical rules for defining it. (shrink)

There are a bewildering variety of claims connecting Darwin to nineteenth-century philosophy of science—including to Herschel, Whewell, Lyell, German Romanticism, Comte, and others. I argue here that Herschel’s influence on Darwin is undeniable. The form of this influence, however, is often misunderstood. Darwin was not merely taking the concept of “analogy” from Herschel, nor was he combining such an analogy with a consilience as argued for by Whewell. On the contrary, Darwin’s Origin is written in precisely the manner that one (...) would expect were Darwin attempting to model his work on the precepts found in Herschel’s Preliminary Discourse on Natural Science. While Hodge has worked out a careful interpretation of both Darwin and Herschel, drawing similar conclusions, his interpretation misreads Herschel’s use of the vera causa principle and the verification of hypotheses. The new reading that I present here resolves this trouble, combining Hodge’s careful treatment of the structure of the Origin with a more cautious understanding of Herschel’s philosophy of science. This interpretation lets us understand why Darwin laid out the Origin in the way that he did and also why Herschel so strongly disagreed, including in Herschel’s heretofore unanalyzed marginalia in his copy of Darwin’s book. (shrink)

Dans l’œuvre de Platon, l’image du rêve semble d’abord servir à désigner l’état d’ignorance du commun des mortels qui « rêvent » leur vie. Cet usage métaphorique ne saurait correspondre parfaitement à la pensée platoni- cienne du phénomène onirique, particulièrement lorsqu’on l’envisage d’un point de vue éthique (qu’advient-il de la vertu de l’homme dans son sommeil ?), plutôt qu’épistémologique ou ontologique. Dans la République, le sommeil apparaît essentiellement comme l’endormissement d’une partie de l’âme – la rationnelle – au profit d’une (...) autre – la désirante. Platon laisse pourtant entendre que, sous certaines conditions, les visions qui s’y manifestent ne sont pas nécessairement mensongères et pourraient même, pour certaines, avoir une origine divine. Le rêve doit donc être compris non seulement comme un moment de séparation de l’âme et du corps, mais aussi de différenciation des facultés ou parties de l’âme elles-mêmes qui acquièrent là leur autonomie propre et déploient, sans se limiter l’une l’autre, leur plein pouvoir. In Plato’s works the image of a dream at first seems to serve the purpose of indicating the state of ignorance of ordinary humans who « dream » their way through life. This metaphorical usage does not reflect perfectly Plato’s thought on the phenomenon of dreams, especially when it is considered from an ethical point of view (what happens to human virtue during sleep?) rather than an epistemological or ontological one. In the Republic sleep appears to be essen- tially where a part of the soul goes asleep – namely the rational part – to the advantage of the desiring part. However, Plato implies that under certain condi- tions the visions that occur in sleep are not necessarily false and could even, in some cases, have a divine origin. Dreams must therefore be understood not merely as a moment of separation of soul and body, but also of differentiation of the faculties or parts of the soul themselves, which acquire their own autonomy in dreams and deploy their full power without limiting one another (transl. J. Dudley). (shrink)

When two agents engage in a joint action, such as rowing together, they exercise joint know-how. But what is the relationship between the joint know-how of the two agents and the know-how each agent possesses individually? I construct an “active mutual enablement” account of this relationship, according to which joint know-how arises when each agent knows how to predict, monitor, and make failure-averting adjustments in response to the behaviour of the other agent, while actively enabling the other to make such (...) adjustments. I defend the AME account from three objections, and I then use this account as the platform for an examination of the reducibility of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge. A summative account of joint propositional knowledge is incompatible with the reduction of joint know-how to joint propositional knowledge, whereas a distributive account is not. I close by highlighting some open questions the AME account brings into view concerning the evolutionary origin and scaling up of joint know-how. (shrink)

My article concerns constitutional interpretation and substantive due process, issues that played a central role in Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), one of the two same-sex marriage cases. (The other same-sex marriage case was United States v. Windsor (2013).) -/- The late Justice Scalia consistently maintained that the Court “invented” substantive due process and continues to apply this legal “fiction” not because the Constitution supports it but simply because the justices like it. Two theories underlay his cynical conclusion. First is (...) the theory of “Constitutional Textualism”—or just plain “Textualism”—which says that the meaning of the Constitution lies entirely within the “four corners” of the document. Second is the theory of “Originalism,” which says that this meaning was fixed at the time of ratification. (Likewise, the meanings of the amendments were fixed at the time of their ratification.) -/- While Justice Scalia helped to inspire a Textualist/Originalist (and anti-substantive-due-process) movement, his Originalism has received far more attention than his Textualism. Since Judge Robert Bork first introduced Originalism to the general public during his Supreme Court nomination hearings in 1987, this theory has ignited passions on all sides and effectively re-framed the entire debate about how to interpret the Constitution. Constitutional scholars, left and right, now define themselves as either for or against Originalism. Meanwhile, Textualism has merely retreated into the background. -/- Part of the reason for this disparate treatment is that many who reject Originalism still consider themselves to be Textualists. They agree with Justice Scalia (and Judge Bork) that the text is all-important. They disagree, however, that its meaning was fixed for eternity at ratification. Instead, they maintain that either the meaning of the text or applications of this meaning to new cases can change as society changes. -/- In this Article, I bring Textualism out of Originalism’s shadow and into broad daylight. I argue that once we dig just a little deeper into the proposition that all of the meaning in the Constitution inheres in its words, we find that this theory simply cannot work. In order to interpret the nation’s foundational document, we must resort to assumptions that it does not explicitly state. (Indeed, even Textualism itself is a theory that the Constitution does not explicitly endorse.) And the notion that “extra-textual” assumptions necessarily inform our interpretations of the Constitution poses a direct and insurmountable threat to Textualism. -/- The Constitution actually requires each judge, when faced with a case concerning the right to privacy, not merely to consider the text but also to anticipate and evaluate the moral, social, and political consequences of both possible decisions before choosing between them. While this position may initially sound counterintuitive, it turns out to be a much more realistic theory of constitutional interpretation than Textualism (and Originalism). -/- I ultimately conclude that, contrary to Justice Scalia, the Constitution most certainly does protect a right to privacy. For what it’s worth, the Obergefell majority agree with me (and oppose Justice Scalia). I aim to show exactly why they are correct. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 35.1 (2005) 8-21MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Klossowski's Reading of Nietzsche Impulses, Phantasms, Simulacra, StereotypesDaniel W. SmithIn his writings on Nietzsche, Pierre Klossowski makes use of various concepts—such as intensities, phantasms, simulacra and stereotypes, resemblance and dissemblance, gregariousness and singularity—that have no place in Nietzsche's own oeuvre. These concepts are Klossowski's own creations, his own contributions to thought. Although Klossowski consistently refused to characterize himself as a philosopher ("Je (...) suis une 'maniaque,'" he once said, "Un point, c'est tout!"),1 his work in its entirety was marked by an extraordinary conceptual creation. From this point of view, his Nietzsche and the Vicious Circle can be read as a work in philosophy—at least in the idiosyncratic sense given to this term by Gilles Deleuze, who defined philosophy as the creation or invention of concepts [Deleuze and Guattari 2]. No doubt, Klossowski remains an almost unclassifiable figure—philosopher, novelist, essayist, translator, artist—and attempting to analyze his work through the prism of philosophy may seem to be a reductive approach that belies the complexity of his exceptional oeuvre. Reading Klossowski as a conceptual innovator, however, at least has the advantage of allowing us to chart a consistent trajectory through his difficult and often labyrinthine text, without denying its other dimensions (affective, perceptive, literary, and so on). In what follows, then, I would like to examine three of Klossowski's most characteristic and important concepts—impulses and their intensities, phantasms, and simulacra and their stereotypes—as well as the precise interrelations he establishes among them. Taken together, these three concepts describe what Klossowski terms the tripartite economy of soul, which constitutes the implicit model through which he interprets Nietzsche's thought.1Impulses as Fluctuating IntensitiesKlossowski describes his books on both Nietzsche and Sade as "essays devoted not to ideologies but to the physiognomies of problematic thinkers who differ greatly from each other" ["Postface" 137, emphasis added]. This emphasis on the "physiognomy" of thinkers reflects Nietzsche's insistence on taking the body rather than the mind as a guide for philosophy since the body is a more accessible phenomenon, less surrounded by myth and superstition. "The body and physiology as the starting point," Nietzsche wrote. "Why?... The phenomenon of the body is the richer, clearer, more tangible [End Page 8] phenomenon.... Belief in the body is more fundamental than belief in the soul" [WP §§492, 489, 491]. Klossowski himself, however, when writing of the intensive status of the impulses, frequently makes use of the term "soul" (âme), owing in part, no doubt, to his interest in the theological literature of the mystics, such as Meister Eckhardt and Teresa of Avila. For the mystics, the depth of the soul is something irreducible and uncreated: it eludes the exercise of the created intellect, and can only be grasped negatively.2 Nonetheless, if one can find a similar apophaticism (or "negative theology") in Klossowski, it is related exclusively to the immanent and chaotic movements of the soul's intensive affects, and not to the transcendence of God. What is incommunicable in the soul (or body) are its "impulses"—their fluctuations of intensity, their rises and falls, their manic elations and depressive descents, which are in constant variation.Nietzsche himself had recourse to a highly varied vocabulary to describe what Klossowski summarizes in the term "impulse": "drive" (Triebe), "desire" (Begierden), "instinct" (Instinke), "power" (Mächte), "force" (Kräfte), "impulse" (Reize, Impulse), "passion" (Leidenschaften), "feeling" (Gefülen), "affect" (Affekte), "pathos" (Pathos), and so on.3 Klossowski frequently employs the musical term tonalité to describe these states of the soul's fluctuating intensities—their diverse tones, timbres, and changing amplitudes—which can take on various forms ("aggressiveness, tolerance, intimidation, anguish, the need for solitude, the forgetting of oneself" [NVC 6]). At bottom, what these impulses express are what Klossowski calls the "obstinate singularity" of the human soul, which is by nature noncommunicable; they constitute "the unexchangeable depth" (le fond inéchangeable) or "the unintelligible depth" (le fond unintelligible) of the soul. What makes every individual... (shrink)

Morality is often thought of as non-rational or sub-rational. In Moral Notions, first published in 1967, Julius Kovesi argues that the rationality of morality is built into the way we construct moral concepts. In showing this he also resolves the old Humean conundrum of the relation between 'facts' and 'values'. And he puts forward a method of reasoning that might make 'applied ethics' (at present largely a hodge-podge of opinions) into a constructive discipline. Kovesi's general theory of concepts - important (...) in its own right - is indebted to his interpretation of Plato, and his three papers on Plato, first published here, explain this debt. This new edition of Moral Notions also includes a foreward by Philippa Foot, a biography of the author, and a substantial afterword in which the editors, Robert Ewin and Alan Tapper, explain the signficance of Kovesi's work. (shrink)

This chapter offers an interpretation of Roger Ames' use of the field-focus ontology, tying the topic to Daoist meditation practices.

In this paper Peirce's notion of sign is studied to try to characterize the artistic sign as representation. Then, some considerations about the work of art as a sign are developed involving three elements: experience, expression and interpretation. Finally it is concluded that beauty requires for Peirce a peculiar balance, the imaginative conjunction of the sensible and the reasonable in an artistic sign; it requires moreover the expression of something that transcends the sensible; it requires, as a sign, an interpretation (...) which is not exact and which implies growth. It requires, finally, love, because an artist will only reach beauty guided by agape updating and harmonizing possibilities through abduction, that is, creating new signs that give form to what does not have it; the artist only reaches beauty when he loves what he does and when he can express himself freely. -/- En este artículo se estudia, en primer lugar, la noción de signo de Peirce para tratar de caracterizar después el signo artístico como representación. Se desarrollan enseguida algunas consideraciones sobre la obra de arte como signo que como tal conlleva tres elementos: experiencia, expresión e interpretación. Finalmente se concluye que la belleza requiere para Peirce un peculiar equilibrio, la conjunción imaginativa de lo sensible y lo razonable en un signo artístico; requiere además la expresión de algo que trasciende lo sensible; requiere, en tanto signo, de una interpretación que no es exacta y que implica crecimiento. Requiere, por último, amor, pues el artista solo alcanzará lo bello cuando sea guiado por el ágape y a través de la abducción vaya actualizando y armonizando posibilidades, creando nuevos signos que den forma a lo que no la tiene, cuando ame lo que hace y se exprese libremente. (shrink)

In one of his influential works ‘One the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme’, Donald Davidson argues against conceptual relativism. According to Davidson, ‘we could not be in a position to judge that others had concepts or beliefs radically different from our own’. Davidson’s thesis seems to have a consequence for comparative philosophy, particularly in a comparative study between Chinese and Western traditions of philosophy which are often considered to differ conceptually. If Davidson is correct, it is not clear whether (...) or not we can have insight into how and why concepts differ between these traditions. -/- In this paper, I philosophically reflect on Davidson’s argument against conceptual relativism. Though this paper retains the backbone of his argument, I reject Davidson’s thesis that different ways of conceptualisation cannot be compared. I do this through a discussion of the comparative studies conducted by David Hall and Roger Ames. In conclusion, I self-reflectively examine the nature of the demarcation between different traditions of philosophy and show how the activities of comparative philosophy can proceed. (shrink)