The scope of my considerations here is defined along two lines, which seem to me of essential relevance for a theory of dialectic. On the one hand, the form of negation that – as self-referring antinomical negation – gains a quasi-semantic expulsory force [Sprengkraft] and therewith a forwarding [weiterverweisenden] character; on the other hand, the notion that every logical category is defective insofar as the explicit meaning of a category does not express everything that is already implicitly presupposed for its (...) meaning. Both lines are tightly interwoven. This I would like to demonstrate with the example of the dialectic of Being and Non-Being at the beginning of the Hegelian Logic. I will first make visible the basic structures of dialectical argumentation (sections II and III) – whereby certain revisions will turn out to be necessary in comparison with Hegel’s actual argument. Thereby it proves essential that the whole apparatus of logical categories and principles must be always already available and utilized for the dialectical explication: proving dialectic as a self-explication of logic by logical means: dialectic, as it were, as the self-fulfillment of logic (sections IV–VI). (shrink)

First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). The central question here is that about the actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form (...) of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). ---------- Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass das Verbot sprachlicher Selbstreferenz als Lösung des Antinomienproblems einen pragmatischen Widerspruch enthält und damit nicht nur zu restriktiv, sondern geradezu inkonsistent ist (Kap.1). Ferner werden Möglichkeiten nicht-restriktiver Strategien zur Antinomienvermeidung diskutiert, wobei sich die explizite Einbindung der – pragmatisch präsupponierten – Konsistenzforderung als optimale Strategie erweist (Kap.2). Zentral ist hier die Frage nach dem eigentlichen Grund antinomischer Strukturen. Er erweist sich als eine Form von negativer Selbst-Bedingung (Kap.3). Dies nötigt zu einer Klärung des Status negativer Begriffe (Kap.4). Die Verallgemeinerung dieser Überlegungen (Kap.5) leitet über zur eigentlichen Analyse der antinomischen Grundstruktur (Kap.6): Entscheidend zur Pragmatik des Begriffs gehört, dass ihm eine Bedeutung positiv zukommt, sodass durch den Begriff qua Begriff stets auch Positivität konstituiert ist. Dadurch ist ein negativer Begriff durch eine prinzipielle Ambivalenz gekennzeichnet: In semantischer Hinsicht hat er negativen Charakter, in seinem pragmatischen Status als Begriff hingegen positiven Charakter. Ist die Bedeutung insbesondere die eines negativen Selbstbezugs, führt die Ambivalenz zur antinomischen Konstellation einer negativen Selbst-Bedingung – das ist hier der springende Punkt! Der Begriff besitzt so die durch ihn definierte Eigenschaft genau dann, wenn er sie nicht besitzt und umgekehrt. Die nähere Analyse zeigt, dass hierbei die Funktion reflexiver Strukturen für das Auftreten von Antinomien weitaus differenzierter zu beurteilen ist, als bisherige Auffassungen nahelegen. Nicht nur dass in diesem Kontext vier Formen von Reflexivität – ontische, semantische, pragmatische Reflexivität und insbesondere auch die Form negativer Selbstbedingung – unterschieden werden müssen; es zeigt sich auch, dass diese in schwer durchschaubarer Weise ineinander verschränkt sind. Die damit verbundene erstaunliche Beziehungsvielfalt läßt die Irritation, die seit je vom Antinomienproblem ausging, begreiflicher erscheinen. In der entwickelten pragmatischen Perspektive werden ferner Parallelen zur Struktur von Selbstbewußtsein sichtbar (Kap.7). Ich schließe mit Überlegungen zur Bedeutung der antinomischen Struktur für das Problem der Dialektik, insbesondere zur Synthesebildung einander ausschließender Bestimmungen (Kap.8). (shrink)

The center of this investigation is the hard problem of phenomenal perception. To be clear, hereby it is thought of higher animals; accordingly the problem of Human consciousness will explicitly not be treated. The so-called explanatory gap (Levine), i.e. missing a neural explanation of experiences, here is emergence-theoretically countered: It is argued that systems own properties and laws different from those of their components. Applied to the brain the phenomenal character of perception is explained as an emergence effect from the (...) systemic cooperation of perception, valuation and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson’s anomal monism. As is further shown, feelings are to be understood as a necessary completion of perception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception. (shrink)

The center of this investigation is the ‘real hard problem’ of phenomenal perception (Chalmers), i.e. of the qualitative kind of perception presenting the subject with forms, colors, smell, pleasurable or negative feelings etc.; the problem of Human consciousness, however, will explicitly not be treated. The ‘explanatory gap’ (Levine) complained by the philosophy of mind, that is to say the failure of all attempts to supply a neuronal explanation of experiences, is emergence-theoretically treated: Systems own properties and laws different from their (...) components; so the emergence concept shows promise also for the explanatory potential with respect to neuronal systems. Here the phenomenal character of perception is explained from the systemic co-action of perception and behavior, whereby also an interpretation is opened to Davidson’s anomal monism. Qualitative feelings, as is further shown, are not to be understood as needless ‘epiphenomena’, but as a necessary completion of per-ception when, as in the case of higher animals, the behavior is primarily controlled by phenomenal perception. (shrink)

Transzendental wird hier, abweichend von Kant, im Sinn transzendentaler Argumente verstanden. Im Kontext der Letztbegründungsdiskussion sind diese dadurch definiert, dass ihre Verneinung zu einem pragmatischen Widerspruch führt. Nun ist Hegels Philosophie auf die ‚logische Idee‘ gegründet, also auf die in Hegels Verständnis fundamentale dialektische Logik. Sein philosophischer Systementwurf hat dadurch, wie gezeigt wird, transzendentalen Charakter und schließt dementsprechend auch eine transzendentale Naturphilosophie ein. Gezeigt wird weiter, dass Grundbe- stimmungen der Natur, die üblicherweise einfach vorausgesetzt werden, in diesem Rahmen grundsätzlich erklärt (...) werden können: die Existenz der Natur und ihr (räumlich-zeitliches) Auseinandersein, ferner die Erkenn- barkeit der Natur, ihre Gesetzmäßigkeit, Kontingenz und immanente Idea- lisierungstendenz. Dass sich so auch konkrete Naturphänomene erschließen, wird an zwei Exempeln verdeutlicht: in der Begründung dimensionaler Raumstrukturen und in der Begründung des Relativitätsprinzips der Bewe- gung – letzteres mit der Pointe (im Sinn einer Philosophie der (speziellen) Relativitätstheorie), dass die Relativität der Körperbewegung und die Absolutheit der Lichtbewegung so als logisch zusammengehörende Momente kinematischer Relativität verstehbar werden. (shrink)

Seele kommt zweifellos schon ‚höheren‘ Tieren zu, die als solche über phänomenale Wahrnehmung verfügen. Als aufschlussreich erweist sich der kontrastierende Vergleich von Tier und Roboter: Was hat das Tier, was der Roboter nicht hat? Schlüsselfunktion kommt hier Hegels Deutung zu, die als eine Phänomenologie der ‚animalischen Seele‘ angesprochen werden kann. Sein Diktum ‚Nur ein Lebendiges fühlt Mangel‘ verweist auf das alles Organische durchwaltende Prinzip Selbsterhaltung als Grund des Seelischen: Alles, was das Tier wahrnimmt, hat dadurch existentiellen Sinn, Selbsterhaltungs-Sinn. Zugleich wird (...) deutlich, dass die Roboter-Wahrneh- mung nicht zur Sinn-Konstitution befähigt, sondern durch Sinn-Demenz charakterisiert ist. Konkret-systemtheoretisch wird die Sinnbezogenheit des Tiersubjekts hier als Emergenzphänomen desjenigen Systems gedeutet, das durch die Kooperative von Wahrnehmung, Bewertung und Verhalten (Perc-Eval-Act-System) konstituiert wird. In dieser emergentistischen Perspektive gibt es so gleichsam den Dualismus des ‚bloß Physischen‘ und des Ideell-Seelischen, der im Hinblick auf die insgesamt physische Basis zugleich ein Monismus ist. (shrink)

Our starting point is the question ‘What is mass’, what in particular enables mass to constitute duration: so that mass can be regarded as moving as well as at rest (the kinematic principle of relativity). In a thought experiment, this question is attacked here not from the perspective of mass itself, but from that of a standing light wave. In this model, mass-analogous structures can be re- constructed that can be in relative motion to each other. The (empirically known) constancy (...) of the speed of light in every reference system is not as- sumed here. However, it can be shown that the speed of light is identical in all systems constituted by mass-analogous structures that move uniformly relative to each other and that the speed of light moreover is the limiting speed of mo- tions. This indepence of the motion of light from the system of reference, this character of absoluteness, and the relativity of mass motions thus prove to be contrary but inextricably linked moments of the kinematic principle of relativi- ty: an interesting perspective concerning a philosophy of relativity theory. - The mathematical relationships are explained in more detail in the appendix. (shrink)

Ausgangspunkt ist die Frage, was Masse ist, wodurch sie insbesondere befähigt ist, Dauer zu konstituieren und deshalb - im Sinn des kinematischen Relativitätdprinzips - ebenso als bewegt wie als ruhend betrachtet werden kann. In einem Gedankenexperiment wird diese Frage, in Umkehrung der Perspektive, hier nicht von der Masse selbst, sondern von einer stehenden Lichtwelle her angegangen. In diesem Modell lassen sich masse-analoge Strukturen rekonstruieren, die in relativer Bewegung sein können. Die (empirisch bekannte) Unabhängigkeit der Lichtgeschwindigkeit vom Bezugssystem ist dabei nicht (...) vorausgesetzt. Doch kann gezeigt werden, dass die Lichtgeschwindigkeit Grenzgeschwindigkeit solcher relativer Bewegungen ist, dass dies für alle durch masse-analoge Strukturen konstituierte, relativ zueinander gleichförmig bewegten Bezugssysteme gilt und dass die Lichtgeschwindigkeit selbst in allen diesen Systemen gleich ist. Die Absolutheit der Lichtgeschwindigkeit und die Relativität der Massebewegungen erweisen sich so als zwar differente, aber intrinsisch zusammengehörende Momente des kinematischen Relativitätsprinzips: ein Beitrag zu einer Philosophie der Relativitätstheorie. - Die mathematischen Zusammenhänge werden im Anhang ausführlicher dargelegt. (shrink)

Ziel der Untersuchung ist zu zeigen, inwiefern Hegels Charakterisierung des Schönen als ‚das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee‘ auch für die Deutung des Naturschönen Erklärungswert hat. Vorausgesetzt ist die für den Idea- lismus Hegelscher Prägung zentrale Doktrin, derzufolge der Natur Ideel- les zugrunde liegt. Schön sind dann Naturphänomene, in denen jener ideelle Grund der Natur durchscheint. Das Erfassen von Ideellem scheint ein Privileg geistiger Wesen zu sein. Dem stehen evolutionsbiologische Argumente entgegen, die dem Schönen einen positiven Selektionswert, etwa bei der sexuellen (...) Partnerwahl, zusprechen. Auch der Mensch hat stammesgeschichtliche Wurzeln, die in ihm weiter wirken. Doch sobald der Geist auf der evolutionären Bühne erscheint, herrscht das Biologische nicht länger mit der uneingeschränkten Macht, die es im Rahmen natürli- cher Selektion hat. Hegels Deutung des Schönen, auch des Naturschönen, ist wesentlich bezogen auf den Geist. Ich verdeutliche dies an einigen Exempeln (Schneekristall, musikalische Harmonie, Abendhimmel, Ge- birgslandschaft, organische Blüten- und Körperformen). Aber wodurch sind Naturschönheit und Kunstschönheit dann voneinander unterschie- den? Die Hervorbringungen der Natur sind lediglich Zufallskonstellatio- nen. Allerdings, so Hegel, hat der Zufall es ‘recht’ gemacht, d.h. hat er etwas reizend Stimmiges gefügt, gewahrt der Geist darin das im Sinnli- chen durchscheinende Ideelle. Eben darin wird, mit Adorno gesprochen, die gemeinsame Wurzel des Kunstschönen und des Naturschönen erkennbar. Wer das Naturschöne preist, begebe sich „an den Rand der Afterpoe- sie“, des Kitsches, meint Adorno. Gleichwohl sei es wahr zu sagen, „die Landschaft der Toscana sei schöner als die Umgebung von Gelsenkirchen“ (Adorno 1993, 110, 112). In der Tat. Doch was meinen wir, wenn wir Landschaften, Blumen, Sonnenuntergänge ‘schön’ nennen, und welche Kriterien bringen wir dafür in Anschlag? Im Folgenden möchte ich darle- gen, inwiefern Hegels Charakterisierung des Schönen als „das sinnliche Scheinen der Idee“ diesbezüglich erhellend und klärend ist. Hinweise auf Adornos ästhetische Theorie ergänzen diese Überlegungen. Dem stehen evolutionsbiologische Argumente entgegen, die zunehmend Einfluss auf die ästhetische Diskussion gewinnen. (shrink)

Summary: Kant's characterization of organic entities by the principle of an inner, and that is to say, immanently natural and mind-independent purposiveness has continued to retain validity. Difficulties however exist for Kant's theory from the conditions of their realization. The following inquiry attempts to describe to what extent this difficulty has currently found a system-theoretical solution: The realizability of cyclical causal relationships proves itself here to be a fundamental prerequisite. The possibility for self-regulating systems thus consequently ensues. Decisive for the (...) cybernetical reconstructability of inner purposiveness is however the evidence that the principle of self-regulation - which has apparently been misunderstood in recent discussions (Jonas, Spaemann, Löw) includes not only the possibility of active goal pursuance (robots) but, additionally, the possibility forexistential self-reference (organism). This has fostered greater insight into how normative instances can be established upon a purely physical basis. The status of information will then accordingly be questioned. This inquiry closes with a look to possible ontological consequences. (shrink)

Previous efforts to bring the Hegelian dialectic closer to a clarification give reason for skepticism. The question: "What is dialectic", according to Dieter Henrich, "has remained without an answer so far". Hegel's objective-idealistic program is, however, so much linked to the possibility of a dialectical logic that it is an urgent desideratum to gain clarity about the stringency of dialectical argumentation. But this is only possible on the basis of a theory of dialectic. Hegel's own reflection on methods cannot (...) be considered sufficient in this respect. It does not enable us to defend the dialectical procedure against objections or to answer questions of method. In the following, a detailed reconstruction of the dialectic of 'being' and 'nothing' in Hegel's 'Science of Logic' will reveal basic structures of dialectical argumentation. As will be shown, antinomic structures play a key role. Such a 'reconstruction', however, will not be a simple confirmation of Hegelian texts, but will always have the character of a critique. In fact, it will turn out that in comparison with Hegel's development of categories, radical revisions are to be expected. ----- Bisherige Bemühungen, das Verfahren Hegelscher Dialektik einer Klärung näherzubringen, geben Anlass zur Skepsis. Die Frage: „Was ist Dialektik?“, so Dieter Henrich, sei „bisher ohne Antwort geblieben“. Das objektiv-idealistische Programm Hegels ist indes so sehr mit der Möglichkeit einer dialektischen Logik verknüpft, daß über die Stringenz dialektischer Argumentation Klarheit zu gewinnen ein dringliches Desiderat darstellt. Das aber ist nur auf der Grundlage einer Theorie der Dialektik möglich. Hegels eigene Methodenreflexion kann diesbezüglich nicht als zureichend erachtet werden. Sie versetzt uns nicht in die Lage, das dialektische Verfahren gegen Einwände zu verteidigen oder Methodenfragen zu beantworten. Im Folgenden sollen in einer detaillierten Rekonstruktion der Dialektik von ‘Sein’ und ‘Nichts’ in Hegels ‘Wissenschaft der Logik’ Grundstrukturen dialektischer Argumentation sichtbar gemacht werden. Wie gezeigt wird, kommt dabei antinomischen Strukturen eine Schlüsselfunktion zu. Eine solche 'Rekonstruktion' wird allerdings nicht eine umstandslose Bestätigung der Hegelschen Textvorlage sein können, sondern immer auch den Charakter einer Kritik haben. In der Tat wird sich ergeben, daß im Vergleich mit Hegels Kategorienentwicklung einschneidende Revisionen zu gewärtigen sind. (shrink)

The well-known empiricist apories of the lawfulness of nature prevent an adequate philosophical interpretation of empirical science until this day. Clarification can only be expected through an immanent refutation of the empiricist point of view. My argument is that Hume’s claim, paradigmatic for modern empiricism, is not just inconsequent, but simply contradictory: Empiricism denies that a lawlike character of nature can be substantiated. But, as is shown, anyone who claimes experience to be the basis of knowledge (as the empiricist naturally (...) does), has, in fact, always already presupposed the lawfullness of nature, i.e. has assumed the ontology of a nature lawful in itself. If lawfulness is, more closely, understood as dependency on conditions, then the functional character of the laws of nature is involved with the consequence that verification is not to be taken as a mere repetition of measurements but as clarification of the conditional structure of the physical process. Furthermore the functionality of the laws of nature also includes a statement on their invariance (relative to certain transformations) and so their lawlikeness. This throws a new light on the problem of induction. Seen in this way it is hardly surprising that the notorious neglect of the functional aspect in empiricism has led to fundamental problems with the concept of the law of nature. (shrink)

Without doubt already ‘higher’ animals which as such have phenomenal perception possess an animalic soul. The contrasting comparison of animal and robot proves to be revealing: What does the animal have that the robot does not? A key role here plays Hegel’s interpretation, which can be addressed as a phenomenology of the ‘animalic soul’. His dictum ‘Only what is living feels a lack’ refers to the principle of self-preservation which governs everything organic. Concerning higher animals this too appears as the (...) basis of the soul: Everything, which the animal perceives thus has existential sense, self-preservation-sense. At the same time it becomes clear that robot perception is not capable of a constitution of sense, but is characterized by dementia of sense. Concretely systemtheoretically regarded, the relatedness to sense of the animal subject is here interpreted as an emergence phenomenon of the system constituted by the cooperative of perception, valuation and behavior (perc-val-act-system). In this emergentist perspective, there is, as it were, the dualism of solely-physical being and of immaterial-mental being, which at the same time is a monism with regard to the physical basis alltogether. (shrink)

Hegel's Science of Logic makes the just not low claim to be an absolute, ultimate-grounded knowledge. This project, which could not be more ambitious, has no good press in our post-metaphysical age. However: That absolute knowledge absolutely cannot exist, cannot be claimed without self-contradiction. On the other hand, there can be no doubt about the fundamental finiteness of knowledge. But can absolute knowledge be finite knowledge? This leads to the problem of a self-explication of logic (in the sense of Hegel) (...) and further, as will be shown, to a new definition of the dialectical procedure. The stringency of which results from the fact that always exactly that implicit content is explicated that was generated by the preceding explication step itself and is thus concretely comprehensible. At the same time, a new implicit content is generated by this act of explication, which requires a new explication step, and so forth. In the dialectical procedure reinterpreted in this way, dialectical arguments are not beheld, guessed at or even surreptitiously obtained, but are methodically accountable. Thereby dialectics is understood as a self-explication of logic by logical means and thus as a proof of the possibility of ultimate-grounding in the form of absolute and nevertheless finite – and thus also fallible – knowledge. (shrink)

The well-known empiricist apories of the lawfulness of nature prevent an adequate philosophical interpretation of empirical science until this day. Clarification can only be expected through an immanent refutation of the empiricist point of view. My argument is that Hume’s claim, paradigmatic for modern empiricism, is not just inconsequent, but simply contradictory: Empiricism denies that a lawlike character of nature can be substantiated. But, as is shown, anyone who claimes experience to be the basis of knowledge (as the empiricist naturally (...) does), has, in fact, always already presupposed the lawfullness of nature, i.e. has assumed the ontology of a nature lawful in itself. If lawfulness is, more closely, understood as dependency on conditions, then the functional character of the laws of nature is involved with the consequence that verification is not to be taken as a mere repetition of measurements but as clarification of the conditional structure of the physical process. Furthermore the functionality of the laws of nature also includes a statement on their invariance (relative to certain transformations) and so their lawlikeness. This throws a new light on the problem of induction. Seen in this way it is hardly surprising that the notorious neglect of the functional aspect in empiricism has led to fundamental problems with the concept of the law of nature. (shrink)

The zombie, mocking all nomological arguments, gives rise to axiological considerations that also result in a vindication of the nomological paradigm. So the ‘philosophical benefit of zombies’ ultimately proves to be that they lead to an understanding they were originally invented to refute.

The study ties in with former considerations concerning the problem of phenomenal perception of higher animals. Accordingly the phenomenal character results from the adjustment of perceptions to (species-specific) behavioral dispositions under the principle of self-preservation: an emergence phenomenon provided by the constitutive system unity of perception, valuation and behavior, here named as perc-val-act-system. Thereby the subject of the behavior can be emergentistly explained as an emergent instance of the – systems-theoretically highest rank – perc-val-act-level. In terms of the principle of (...) self-preservation all sensations are submitted to a valuation. Perception thus gaining existential sense for the subject, a phenomenal-mental sense-dimension is spanned out which as such does not own physical but ideal character: Accordingly the ontological basis of this view is the lawfulness of nature, understood as the ideal essence underlying it. In virtue of this – basically Hegelian-type idealistic – conception the physical being of nature always includes the possibility of phenomenal-mental being, because of the implicit ideality of nature itself. (shrink)

Since there is no really elaborated theory of the dialectic of nature, it is not only desirable but necessary to take a look at some of Hegel's original intuitions, which in many cases lost their distinctness in his later works, or fell victim to the exigencies of his system. Philosophy makes use not only of reasoning but also of intuition. In respect of the mass which offers persistent resistance to a notional solution, it is important to find a suitable image (...) for developing a first approximation to the understanding of the question. According to Hegel, the metaphors of circular and gyratory motion are well-suited for this. Here it is essential to clarify what we can gain by a structural interpretation of such ideas. I think that an attempt has to be made to bring out the contemporary relevance of the topic. Doing so is always a delicate matter, but it is a must if undertakings of the present kind are to be anything more than philological expositions of Hegel's philosophy, if they are to make a real contribution to reflection on the foundations of physics. I shall first give a brief review of the arguments put forward in the Encyclopedia; then I shall analyse Hegel's interpretation of circular and gyratory motion and discuss the possibility of bringing out the relevance of his ideas; finally, I shall draw certain conclusions in respect of the principles involved in comprehending the divisibility of matter, and in putting forward a philosophical interpretation of the theory of relativity. (shrink)

There are arguments for determinism. Admittedly, this is opposed by the fact of everyday experience of autonomy. In the following, it is argued for the compatibility of determinism and autonomy. Taking up considerations of Donald MacKay, a fatalistic attitude can be refuted as false. Repeatedly, attempts have been made to defend the possibility of autonomy with reference to quantum physical indeterminacy. But its statistical randomness clearly misses the meaning of autonomy. What is decisive, on the other hand, is the possibility (...) of knowledge, which opens up opportunities for planning, freedom of choice and ultimately 'self-choice'. Results of neurobiological research, especially Benjamin Libet's and more recently John-Dylan Haynes', seem to refute this: Actions are unconsciously initiated before conscious decision. But, as Libet has also shown, consciousness always has the possibility of a veto – and thus also of knowledge-driven action control. Ultimately, the idea of possible self-choice can thus become the determining condition. Only such a form of rational self-determination establishes a spiritual identity and at the same time represents the maximum of autonomy possible for human beings. (shrink)

What corresponds to the present-day ‘transcendental-pragmatic’ concept of ultimate grounding in Hegel is his claim to absoluteness of the logic. Hegel’s fundamental intuition is that of a ‘backward going grounding’ obtaining the initially unproved presuppositions, thereby ‘wrapping itself into a circle’ – the project of the self-grounding of logic, understood as the self-explication of logic by logical means. Yet this is not about one of the multiple ‘logics’ which as formal constructs cannot claim absoluteness. It is rather a fundamental logic (...) that only makes logical textures possible at all and so owns transcendental character. The non-contradiction-principle is an example for this. Es- sential is that it is ‘under-cover-effcient’ as soon as meaningful concepts are used. Self-explication of the fundamental logic then means explicating its implicit under-cover validity, in fact by means of the fundamental logic itself. As is shown this is the affair of dialectic which thereby is to be understood as ultimate grounding of the fundamental logic. This is analyzed in detail using the example of the being/non-being-dialectic. As is demonstrated each explication step generates a new implicit issue and therewith a new explication-discrepancy inducing an antinomical structure that anew forwards the explication procedure. So this is entirely determined by itself. Decisive for the ultimate grounding argumentation is that thereby an objectively verifyable procedure is found, which is apparently possible only in a Hegelian framework. In contrast the immediate evidence of a speech act claimed by the transcendental-pragmatic position has only private character, which is grounding-theoretically irrelevant. (shrink)

Krause’s philosophy deserves to be memorized as the first link in a chain of thinking on animal rights that is still on the way today. Though Krause was not the first to talk of animal rights in the history of animal ethics, his theory of animal rights is pathbreaking in embedding a conception of animal rights in an all-encompassing metaphysical system. The essay situates Krause’s theory of animal rights in the framework of his general theory of rights and points to (...) the challenges Krause’s theory faces by the inevitability of trade-offs between animal and human rights. (shrink)

Dass Kunst Sinnliches zu vergeistigen und Geistiges zu versinnlichen vermag, macht ihren Wesenskern und zugleich Rätselcharakter aus. Dass dieses Rätsel immer erneut als unaufgelöst erscheint, bedeutet auch, dass eine fortdauernde Irritation von Kunst ausgeht. Das Bestürzende der Kunst ist dies, dass sie den scheinbar unversöhnlichen Gegensatz des Geistigen und Sinnlichen zugleich als versöhnt erscheinen lässt: als Ver-Sinnlichung von Ideellem. Hegels These, dass die Kunst, eben durch diese Bindung an Sinnliches, 'ihrer eigentlichen Bestimmung nach für uns ein Vergangenes' sei, erscheint so (...) gesehen problematisch. Hat die geistesgeschichtliche Entwicklung die Kunst ihrer Irrelevanz überführt im Vergleich mit den nach Hegel höheren Formen des Geistigen, der Religion und der Philosophie? Entscheidend ist die Bewertung des sinnlichen Elements – dies näher zu klären wird hier in der Konfrontation der Hegelschen These mit den Kunstdeutungen Heideggers und Adornos unternommen. (shrink)

Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox – with the consequence, that the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of change of unique unrepeatable (...) temporal points. It is exactly this (mis-)understanding that also generated the induction problem. From the intrinsic connection between universality and functionality, however, – that is my claim – the ontological consequence of a nature results, for which lawfulness is coupled to essentially functionally defined time sequences, thereby implying a potentiality dimension of nature, too. (shrink)

Essential for the concept of the law of nature is not only spatio-temporal universality, but also functionality in the sense of the dependency on physical conditions of natural entities. In the following it is explained in detail that just the neglect of this functional property is to be understood as the real reason for the occurrence of the Goodman paradox. As a consequence, the behavior of things seems to be completely at the mercy of the temporal change of unique absolute (...) temporal points. It is exactly this (mis-)understanding that also generated the induction problem. From the intrinsic connection between universality and functionality, however, - that is my claim - the ontological consequence of a nature results, for which the potentiality of lawfulness is coupled to essentially functionally defined time sequences. (shrink)

[[[ (Here only the chapters 3 – 8, see *** ) First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). ]]] The central question here is that about the (...) actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a form of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). (shrink)

The status of being a subject, a self and being self-aware of it, is to be interpreted here through the process of the child‘s role play with the doll: By speaking to the doll, this inanimate being is seen as animate and becoming the alter ego of the child. Communicating with it thus means that the child speaks to it- self. It has thus established a — so to speak 'tautological‘ — self-relationship, a behavior in which it encounters only figures (...) of itself. This effect of reflexive tautologization, as I would like to say briefly, is decisive: The individual does not gain a self be- cause he puts himself in the other´s place — think of G.H. Mead — but because he rather eliminates the moment of otherness by means of reflexive tautologization and thus, in tautological self-execution, constitutes himself as self and ultimately as self- consciousness: role-playing as the self-fulfilling design of self- hood. Implicated thereby is, according to my argument, that the self-interpretation of the subject as free or as determined is essentially to be conceived as a self-fulfilling design — free is he who (with all conditionalities) 'designs' himself as free. And in turn, the demand for mutual recognition of the subjects results from this as well. ************************************************************************************************* Der Status, ein Subjekt, ein Selbst und dessen sich selbst bewusst zu sein, soll hier am Vorgang des kindlichen Rollenspiels mit der Puppe gedeutet werden: lndem das Kind zur Puppe spricht, kann dieses an sich Leblose begeistet und zum Alter Ego werden. Mit ihm kommunizieren bedeutet somit, dass das Kind vielmehr zu sich selbst spricht. Es hat damit ein — gleich- sam 'tautoIogisches‘ — Selbstverhältnis hergestellt, ein Verhal- ten, in dem ihm nur Gestalten seiner selbst begegnen. Dieser Effekt reflexiver Tautologisierung, wie ich kurz sagen möchte, ist entscheidend: Das lndividuum gewinnt nicht deshalb ein Selbst, weil es sich in den Andern versetzt — man denke an G.H. Mead —, sondern weil es vermittels reflexiver Tautologi- sierung das Moment der Andersheit vielmehr eliminiert und sich so, im tautologischen Selbstvollzug, als Selbst und letztlich als Selbst-Bewusstsein konstituiert: Rollenspiel als sich selbst er- füllender Entwurf von Selbstsein. lmpliziert ist damit, so mein Argument, dass die Selbstdeutung des Subjekts als frei oder als determiniert, essentiell als selbsterfüllender Entwurf zu be- greifen ist — frei ist, wer sich (bei allen Bedingtheiten) als frei 'entwirft'. Und im Gegenzug ergibt sich die Forderung wechsel- seitiger Anerkennung der Subjekte ebenso daraus. (shrink)

Die Beschäftigung mit Platon hat eine lange Geschichte, Rezeptionen seines Denkens sind so prägend für die Philosophiegeschichte geworden, dass diese verständlicherweise zuweilen als eine Sammlung von Fußnoten zu seinem Werk begriffen wurde. Das gilt besonders für einen durchgängigen metaphysischen Zug des abendländischen Denkens, ein grundsätzliches Ordnungsmodell aus der Antike, das, christlich gewendet, die Theoriebildung bis in unsere Tage fundiert. Aber mit einer Reihe anderer Gewissheiten ist auch dieser erfolgreiche Platonismus Gegenstand der Kritik geworden. Kann und soll man den metaphysischen Platon (...) retten oder muss man Platon vielmehr gegen die metaphysische Tradition neu verstehen? Muss man Platon gegen die Platonisten verteidigen, ist er der Anfang einer philosophischen Verirrung? -- Dorothea Frede, Ekkehard Martens, Arbogast Schmitt, Gernot Böhme, Hermann Schmitz, Wolfgang Detel und andere entdecken – auch durch ihre Kritik – Platon als Gesprächspartner der Gegenwart neu. (shrink)

The Cartesian concept of nature, which has determined modern thinking until the present time, has become obsolete. It shall be shown that Hegel's objective-idealistic conception of nature discloses, in comparison to that of Descartes, new perspectives for the comprehension of nature and that this, in turn, results in possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. If the argumentation concerning philosophy of nature is intended to catch up with the concrete Being-of-nature and to meet it in its concretion, then this is (...) impossible for the finite spirit in a strictly a priori sense – this is the thesis supported here which is not at all close to Hegel. As the argumentation rather has to consider the conditions of realization concerning the Being-of-nature, too, it is compelled to take up empirical elements – concerning the organism, for instance, system-theoretical aspects, physical and chemical features of the nervous system, etc. With that, on the one hand, empirical-scientific premises are assumed (e.g. the lawlikeness of nature), which on the other hand become (now close to Hegel) possibly able to be founded in the frame of a Hegelian-idealistic conception. In this sense, a double strategy of empirical-scientific concretization and objective-idealistic foundation is followed up, which represents the methodical basic principle of the developed considerations. In the course of the undertaking, the main aspects of the whole Hegelian design concerning the philosophy of nature are considered – space and time, mass and motion, force and law of nature, the organism, the pro-blem of evolution, psychic being – as well as Hegel's basic thesis concerning the philosophy of nature, that therein a tendency toward coherence and idealization manifests itself in the sense of a (categorically) gradually rising succession of nature: from the separateness of space to the ideality of sensation. In the sense of the double strategy of concretization and foundation it is shown that on the one hand possibilities of philosophical penetration concerning actual empirical-scientific results are opened, and on the other hand – in turn – a re-interpretation of Hegel's theorem on the basis of physical, evolution-theoretical and system-theoretical argumentation also becomes possible. In this mutual crossing-over and elucidation of empirical and Hegelian argumentation not only do perspectives of a new comprehension of nature become visible, but also, at the same time – as an essential consequence of this methodical principle – thoughts on the possibilities of actualizing Hegel's philosophy of nature. (shrink)

There are many treatises concerning the soul. Plato was not the first to write on the subject. From Greek philosophy and religion the soul wandered over to Christianity. According to this religion, the soul accompanies the body, which it inhabits for a short while in order to then return to its primary homeland embodied in areas of primary existence and truth. There are many treatises concerning the soul. Plato was not the first to write on the subject. Wisława Szymborska, in (...) her collection of poems published in 2002 and titled A Moment, poses the most essential questions: Why does man exist? Why isn’t there nothingness? She also asks: What is the soul? Does man really possess a soul? What is the relationship between man and soul – to whom does the soul really belong? This is a treatise in the form of a poem which appears to be plain and modest, yet the questions it asks are fundamental. This interpretation aims to develop and translate from the language of poetry the religious and philosophical questions embraced by Szymborska’s poem. (shrink)

Autologous nerve grafts are steadily regarded as the method of choice for bridging the nerve gaps resulting after peripheral nerve lesions with substance defects. Microsurgical techniques and the perineurial suture of corresponding fascicles have improved the functional results following peripheral nerve graft. -/- However, regeneration success is often disappointing, despite the most thorough technique and expertise. The loss of spinal motoneurons associated with a nerve lesion and the growth of axon sprouts in inadequate endoneurial sheaths were held responsible as the (...) reason for the lowered muscular strength, limited movement coordination and fine motor skills, poor differentiation and localization of sensory stimuli and for the lack of tactile gnosis. -/- In this experimental study, it is assumed that the central effects at the level of the spinal motoneuron nuclei show an image of the peripheral misinnervation in topographical-morphological terms, and can supply an explanatory model for the functional motor deficits after peripheral nerve graft. -/- On the other hand, the plastic changes of a motor cell column in the reinnervation process influence the structural-functional relationships of the motor units in a variety of clinically relevant ways. (shrink)

When in doubt, for the embryo. New arguments on the moral status of human embryos. - In the first part of our essay we distinguish the philosophical from the legal and political level of the embryo debate and describe our indirect justification strategy. It consists in renouncing a determination of the dignity-giving φ-properties and instead starting from premises that are undoubted by all discussion partners. In the second part we reconstruct and criticize the species, continuum, identity and potentiality arguments. The (...) species argument only has a certain plausibility, if at all, as a critical argument. From the continuum argument and identity argument we take over the idea of numerical identity (NI) and link it with the core idea of the potentiality argument (P). So we come to the NIP argument: -/- (NIP) -/- (1) Every living human body that is the bearer of (or has) potential φ-properties has dignity. (2) Every viable human embryo is a living human body that is the bearer of (or has) potential φ properties. Therefore, (3) Every viable human embryo has dignity. -/- Reversibly comatose people and newborns are protected because they have the potential to have actual personal characteristics in the future; our thesis is that embryos that are capable of development also have the same potential in moral terms. The basic idea of numerical identity, with which we support the second premise, is that every human being, from embryonic existence to adulthood, forms a physical unity. In a detailed part, we deal with the crown princess, gametes, parthenogenesis, somatic cell, pronuclear stage, biological heteronome early embryo, multiple, fusion, Siamese twin, hydatidiform mole and finally trophoblast problems. In a third part, the indirect argument is supplemented by a metatheoretical cautionary argument. It states that in situations where there is doubt as to whether a being falls within the scope of a moral norm, but there are sufficiently strong reasons for this subsumption, it must be assumed that this is the case if the contrary assumption and the positive effects it may have are in no acceptable proportion to the moral harm that would result if that subsumption were not made. The main result of our considerations is therefore: When in doubt, for the embryo. (shrink)

The so-called ”argument from religious experience’ plays a prominent role in today’s analytical philosophy of religion. It is also of considerable importance to richard Swinburne’s apologetic project. However, rather than joining the polyphonic debate around this argument, the present paper examines the fundamental concept of religious experience. The upshot is that Swinburne neither develops a convincing concept of experience nor explains what makes a religious experience religious. The first section examines some problems resulting mainly from terminology, specifically Swinburne’s use of (...) appear-words as success-verbs. While these problems might be resolved by a recurrence to the observer, the second and third part of our paper present problems not so easily resolved: namely, that Swinburne’s concept of experience as conscious mental events is too broad and inaccurate for its role in the argument given ; and that Swinburne does not even attempt to figure out which features of an experience, when present, turn an experience simpliciter into a distinctly religious experience. Section 4, in conclusion, outlines possible reasons for this unusual and remarkable inaccuracy in conceptualisation. (shrink)

In future φ. On a subjectivist thought experiment in the embryo debate. -.

Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, however, (...) that no relevant ethical implications can be drawn from the thought experiment. It demonstrates neither that one always ought to let the embryos die, nor does it allow for any general conclusion concerning the moral status of human embryos. (shrink)

The dignity of human embryos. On the moral relevance of potentiality and numerical identity. -.

Natural systems are categorized according to their structural and dynamical similarities. A two-dimensional schema is proposed as a kind of "periodic table" of natural systems. Six of eight levels in this schema serve as sources of analogies, two levels are the targets of analogical reasoning. The source domains are the atomic, molecular, macromolecular, micro-organismic, organismic and socio-cultural systems and processes. One of the target domains discussed in the article is the level of subatomic particles. The other target domain, not discussed (...) in the article, could be the level of future supra-national systems. Three types of processes are identified occurring in natural systems: conservation, modification and transformation. Modifications allow a reversible adaptation of a system to environmental influences by changing its internal state. The entirety of all internal states defines the "state space" of the system. Similarities of state spaces between systems of six levels are investigated. A dual-space picture of natural systems can be defined on six levels, the source domains of analogical reasoning. On the subatomic level, space-time is identified as part of the state space of subatomic particles. However, space-time needs a completion by an additional state space in order to obtain a dual-space picture also for subatomic particles. A "basic space" is proposed, so that subatomic particles exist simultaneously in space-time and in basic space. The basic space is assumed to be a circular space, where masses and charges circulate force-free and generate the spin and the magnetic moment of particles. A presumption about the existence of hypothetical matter not detectable in space-time is derived. Such primitive forms of matter could exist in basic space only and represent the dark matter. (shrink)

This examination provides a history of the problematic characterisation of Early German Romanticism (or Frühromantik) as subjectivist, and challenges this characterisation in light of recent scholarship. From its earliest critical reception in the early nineteenth century, the movement suffered from a set of problematic characterisations made by popular philosophical figures. Goethe, Hegel, Heine, Kierkegaard and others all criticised the movement for holding a dangerous subjective egoism. This characterisation remained with the Frühromantik throughout the twentieth century until it was challenged by (...) recent re-evaluations offered by figures such as Dieter Henrich, Manfred Frank, Frederick Beiser and Andrew Bowie. Their work has opened new possibilities for the re-interpretation of Frühromantik and our understanding of the movement’s religious thought. (shrink)

Methodological critique of the sociological theory "spontaneous cooperation" to explain the revolution in Germany in 1989. This approach represented the german sociologists Dieter Opp and Detlef Pollack. The author reconstructs the two statements. Opp's approach is logically inconsistent. This approach is also unfit for scientific prediction, but Opp says the possibility of prediction is a necessary criterion for a scientific theory. Pollack's systemtheoretical approach ignores the really existing organized resistance of the subversive groups in Leipzig, for example the "Working (...) group for human rights" or the "Working group for Justice". Miracle or surprise chance are scientifically anacceptable models to explain a revolution. Both economically and politically offered the capitalist welfare state more for the workers than the socialism. So people noticed socialism as a system with more work for less prosperity and without civil rights, as a system of "exploitation by inefficiency" (Elsenhans). The author describes the revolution as a result of very effective collaboration between people, who willing to take risks and wanted to emigrate from the GDR to West, and the subversive groups, that could organize the revolutionary resistance. - This is a possible interpretation of the revolution from the interaction of transition-theory and voice-and-exit-theory (Hirschman). (shrink)

Dieter Henrich’s reconstruction of the transcendental deduction in "Identität und Objektivität" has been criticised (probably unfairly) by Guyer and others for assuming that we have a priori Cartesian certainty about our own continuing existence through time. In his later article "The Identity of the Subject in the Transcendental Deduction", Henrich addresses this criticism and proposes a new, again entirely original argument for a reconstruction. I attempt to elucidate this argument with reference to Evans’s theory of the Generality Constraint and (...) a remark of Strawson’s in Individuals. Its logical form of a sentence-operator requires that the "I think" be capable of accompanying every thought that we can form. Henrich seems to rely on this point, claiming in addition that we must be aware of this property of the "I think". I object that we cannot assume everyone to be capable of doing the philosophy of her own situation. (shrink)

Dieter Schmidtchen hat mein institutionenökonomisch-evolutionäres Wettbewerbsleitbild einer kritischen Würdigung unterzogen. In dieser Replik werden drei Arten von Argumenten zugunsten meines Wettbewerbsleitbildes vorgetragen. Zunächst wird mit Hilfe von wissenschaftstheoretischen Argumenten gezeigt, dass die Konkurrenz von Erkenntnisprogrammen auch im Fall der Wettbewerbstheorie durchaus wünscheswert ist. Dann werden die normativen Grundlagen des Leitbildes erläutert und gezeigt, wie das Prinzip der kritischen Prüfung zum Tragen kommt. Schließlich wird für eine regelgeleitete Wettbewerbspolitik plädiert, die den Schutz des Wettbewerbs als minimalistisches Ziel anstrebt.

This essay partly builds on and partly criticizes a striking idea of Dieter Henrich. Henrich argues that Kant's distinction in the first Critique between the question of fact (quid facti) and the question of law (quid juris) provides clues to the argumentative structure of a philosophical "Deduction". Henrich suggests that the unity of apperception plays a role analogous to a legal factum. By contrast, I argue, first, that the question of fact in the first Critique is settled by the (...) Metaphysical Deduction, which establishes the purity of origin of the Categories, and, second, that in the second Critique, the relevant factum is the Fact of Reason, which amounts to the fact that the Moral Law is pure in origin. (shrink)

Tomasi, D. 2024. Psychotherapy: Essence, Experience, and Examination. Foreword to Adler, D. 2024. What we really need – Experiences of a psychoanalyst. New York, NY: Ibidem Verlag / Columbia University Press, Original: Adler, D. 2023. Was wir wirklich brauchen: Erfahrungen eines Psychoanalytikers. Stuttgart, D: Schattauer / Klett-Cotta Verlag -/- Psychotherapy: Essence, Experience, and Examination Foreword to Dieter Adler: What we Truly Need – Experiences of a Psychoanalyst. -/- In any serious, scientific, and ethically justified healthcare profession, the focus should (...) be always on the overall health, treatment, improvement, and amelioration of the patient. What clinical and professional background should therefore a mental health professional have? In his book, Adler does not want to simply offer a quick guide to self-help. In fact, he is clear about the fact that this is not the purpose of the book: “Maybe I’ll write one sometime: How you can reliably become independent of self-help books.” In fact, this book is a reflection on a 30-year-long professional career in which the author has learned to ask questions, to listen attentively, and to help shed light on some of the most complex and hidden aspects of what makes us human. To be sure, this does not mean that this book does not present a practical approach to well-being, quite the contrary. The author lists a series of areas the patient can focus on, in order to achieve a higher state of balance, healing, and happiness. Amongst these we find socialization, upbringing, and community, making friends, understanding and working on one’s emotions and the emotions of others, staying physically and mentally active, finding a sense of security and confidence, maintaining a sense of curiosity, finding a work-life balance and rediscovering peace and calmness, having goals, purposes, and meaning in life, and of course, understanding those negative, self-sabotaging mechanisms and processes which hinder such developments. (shrink)

“ A man orders a whole pizza pie for himself and is asked whether he would like it cut into eight or four slices. He responds, ‘Four, I’m on a diet ”’ (Noël Carroll) -/- While not hilarious --so funny that it induces chortling punctuated with outrageous vomiting--this little gem is amusing. We recognize that something has gone wrong. On a first reading it might not compute, something doesn’t quite make sense. Then, aha! , we understand the hapless dieter (...) has misapplied general rules of thumb, mental short-cuts, or heuristics, that we were also initially committed to and that would usually be good enough to rely upon— fewer slices equals fewer calories; diets require fewer calories, etc—but in this particular case they fail, and the feeling of mirth is our reward for making this discovery. We don’t say all of that after a punchline, of course, but that’s what is happening according to the Humor as Error-Detection Theory : our sense of humor can sense our errors. This chapter will focus on the overlap and benefits of a humorous and philosophical attitude toward the world and our place in it. The historian of philosophy Will Durant tells us that genuine philosophy begins when one learns to doubt; we can say something similar with humor--trust me. (shrink)

Kant’s doctrine of the Fact of Reason is one of the most perplexing aspects of his moral philosophy. The aim of this paper is to defend Kant’s doctrine from the common charge of dogmatism. My defense turns on a previously unexplored analogy to the notion of ‘matters of fact’ popularized by members of the Royal Society in the seventeenth century. In their work, ‘facts’ were beyond doubt, often referring to experimental effects one could witness first hand. While Kant uses the (...) German equivalent in different contexts, I argue that the scientific analogy opens up a new framework for interpreting his strategy of justification in the Critique of Practical Reason. In the final section, I address a few possible objections to my reading, one of which I anticipate coming from Dieter Henrich and Ian Proops, who have argued that Kant’s Fact of Reason is best understood under a legal analogy. (shrink)

Habermas’s postmetaphysical reading of Kierkegaard is paradigmatic for his understanding of religion. It shows, why Habermas reduces religion to fideism. Therefore the paper reconstructs Habermas’s reception of Kierkegaard and compares it with the accounts of Dieter Henrich and Michael Theunissen. Furthermore it demonstrates how Habermas makes use of Kierkegaard’s dialectics of existence to formulate his postmetaphysical thesis of a cooperative venture.

The Contingency Postulate of Truth. - Is there a statement that cannot be false under any contingent conditions? Two well-known philosophical schools have given contradictory answers to this question about the existence of a necessarily true statement: Fallibilists (Albert, Keuth) have denied its existence, transcendental pragmatists (Apel, Kuhlmann) and objective idealists (Wandschneider, Hösle) have affirmed it. Dieter Wandschneider has (following Vittorio Hösle) translated the principle of fallibilism, according to which every statement is fallible, into a thesis which he calls (...) the contingency postulate of truth (CPT). It says: <For every true statement there are contingent conditions.> If this postulate were true, it would mark an insurmountable boundary of knowledge: a final epistemic justification would then not be possible. Wandschneider has therefore developed a counterargument to show that the contingency postulate of truth cannot be formulated without contradiction and implies the thesis that there is at least one necessarily true statement. This essay deals with the systematic question whether the contingency postulate of truth really cannot be presented without contradiction. To this end I will first present the contingency postulate and the associated problems (I.). Then I will analyze Wandschneider's argument against the consistency of the contingency postulate (II.) and finally reject it with the help of some considerations from the field of epistemic logic (III.). (shrink)