Resumo: Uma das características comuns dos primeiros filósofos modernos da Europa Ocidental é a ênfase na liberdade e na igualdade. Os filósofos desse período buscavam respostas para “o que é liberdade e igualdade?” e transformaram a liberdade e a igualdade em direitos humanos fundamentais. De John Locke a Montesquieu e Jean Jacques Rousseau, todos consideram a liberdade e a igualdade como direitos naturais do ser humano. O conceito de liberdade e igualdade de Rousseau é refletido em O (...) Contrato Social. No início desse trabalho, ele comentou, com uma famosa frase de abertura: “O homem nasce livre, mas está em toda parte acorrentado.” Esse é o argumento fundamental para dar uma visão única de liberdade e igualdade. Dentro do escopo do artigo, o autor se concentra em analisar seus pontos de vista sobre liberdade e igualdade, em muitos aspectos diferentes - liberdade e igualdade, no estado de natureza, liberdade e igualdade, na sociedade civil, e como alcançar a liberdade e a igualdade - apresentando, assim, os valores e as limitações de seus pontos de vista sobre liberdade e igualdade. (shrink)

The aim of this contribution is to critically explore the understanding, the goals and the meaning of education in the philosophy of education by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. In his educational novel Emile: or On Education [Emile ou De l’éducation] (1762) he depicts his account of the natural education. Rousseau argues that all humans share one and the same development process which is independent of their social background. He regards education as an active process of perfection which is curiosity-driven (...) and intrinsic to each child. Rousseau’s educational goals are autarky, happiness and freedom. (shrink)

Spanish translation, with some additions, of "Spectators and Giants in Rousseau and Víctor Erice.".

The aim of this text is to elucidate the concept of citizenship of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This conception of citizenship can be denominated like Republican. For this, the concept of citizenship in Rousseau is addressed in three fundamental principles: freedom, equality and fraternity. Some traditional political conceptions of contractualism as Hobbes and Locke are considered, especially in relation to their conceptions of citizen. Following this, those fundamental aspects of the anthropology conceived by Rousseau are realized. Those allow (...) to reach at the construction of his idea of republic. In addition, the three fundamental principles, that characterize citizenship in the republican sense, are developed. And so the conclusion is the formulation of a truly democratic state from the perspective of Rousseau, inspired by the republican state of the ancients and where the people is properly the legislator of this. (shrink)

The initial problem which motivated the writing of this thesis arose from reading of Emile by Rousseau. In this work, it was possible to detect the influence of different theoretical approaches, such as rationalism and empiricism, inspiring the development of the educational plan designed by Rousseau for his imaginary student (Emile). The very core question of the present thesis regards to whether there was a theory of knowledge pertaining to Rousseau’s philosophical thinking and, if so, how it (...) was related to his theories of education. In the set of his oeuvre, Rousseau’s affiliation to authors like Descartes, Leibniz, Locke and Malebranche, as well as Condillac, Diderot, D’Holbach and Helvétius was discovered. As the reading of the great philosophical work of Rousseau progressed, an original knowledge theory was discovered, of the kind which accepts the coexistence of opposite thoughts. Pedagogy, in the context of (the work) Emile, arose out of the miscellany of such theories and also for the intense philosophical maturing process on the core of Rousseau’s thinking. This study intended, therefore, to understand the origin and development of Rousseau’s theory of knowledge, and also to figure out how the philosopher formulated his theories on Education, especially in Emile. The object of this research, materialized through the extensive bibliography of the Swiss philosopher, was intensively read and analyzed. The methodology used was that of comparative, descriptive and critical documentary research of the mentioned authors. This research is divided into three sections: the first one intends to investigate the philosophical influence from different authors on the foundations of Rousseau’s epistemology; the second section addresses Rousseau’s theories of Education; the third and final part investigates the link between theory of knowledge and Education within Rousseau’s philosophical thought. -/- . (shrink)

The thesis analyses the relation between Rousseau’s musical writings and elements of his moral, social and linguistic philosophy. In particular, I am concerned to demonstrate: (i.) how the core of Rousseau’s theory of musical imitation is grounded in the same analysis of the nature of man which governs his moral and social philosophy; (ii.) how this grounding does not extend to the stylistic prescriptions the justification of which Rousseau intended his musical writings to offer. The central argument (...) draws on Rousseau’s analysis of the origin of man as distinctively human. This origin extends to the awareness of moral and aesthetic value, and to communication in speech and song. Rousseau’s moral analyses of social and political life usually take the form of relating contemporary practice to the original structure in which man’s awareness of his own good is commensurate with that of the good of others. The analysis of music follows a similar model: music is to be considered good in so far as it replicates, or faithfully reflects, the original model of communication. The value of music is thereby understood to extend to moral as well as aesthetic goodness. Given the subtlety of Rousseau’s understanding of the ‘origin’, I argue that this analysis of music’s aesthetic value is powerful and far‐ reaching in its relevance for contemporary musical aesthetics. However, I also argue that while the analysis in general is good in this way, it does not entail the specific kind of musical‐stylistic preferences which Rousseau sought to use it to advance. (shrink)

Obwohl Rousseaus Mitleidsbegriff in heutige Verständnis weisen des Mitleids eingegangen ist spielt er in ihren Thematisierungen nur eine eher untergeordnete Rolle. Rousseaus Beitrag zum modernen Begriffsverständnis steht einerseits im Schatten des Einflusses anderer ethischer Gefühlsauffassungen. Andererseits liegen Ursachen für die periphere Stellung des Begriffes darin, dass er in Rousseaus Werk selbst nur an wenigen Stellen erörtert wird. Meine These ist, dass Rousseaus Begriff eine für die Moderne kennzeichnende ambivalente Struktur aufweist, die aus der Dominanz des Selbstbezuges resultiert. Die Rekonstruktion des (...) Begriffes gliedert sich in drei Teile: Zuerst verorte ich seine Position in Rousseaus Werk und fasse seine Bestimmungen zusammen; dann diskutiere ich seine Ambivalenzen auf der Ebene des individuellen Mitleidserlebens; abschließend nehme ich eine Revision und eine Bewertung des Begriffes vor. (shrink)

Trata-se de relacionar as duas posições concorrentes que pautaram o debate sobre representação e democracia na filosofia moderna. Em um primeiro momento, reconstruiremos a crítica à representação, feita por Jean-Jacques Rousseau, no Contrato social (1762). A incompatibilidade entre democracia e representação postulada neste livro apoia-se nos seguintes pressupostos: 1) a soberania consiste unicamente na vontade; 2) a representação é uma forma de delegação. Em um segundo momento, investigaremos a defesa da democracia representativa, feita por John Stuart Mill, em (...) Considerações sobre o governo representativo (1861) e destacaremos como Mill busca rebater a crítica à representação feita por Rousseau. Para que pudesse elaborar o conceito de representação democrática, Mill precisou problematizar os dois pressupostos do Contrato social. Como resultado deste esforço, Mill postulou as seguintes teses: 1) a soberania engloba não só a vontade, mas também o juízo; 2) a representação não pressupõe a delegação do poder político do representado para o representante. Daí a possibilidade de uma democracia representativa e participativa. (shrink)

This essay explores how some themes in the writing of Jean-Jacques Rousseau—particularly having to do with what it is to be a spectacle before others—might illuminate two feature films by the Spanish director Víctor Erice, The Spirit of the Beehive (El espíritu de la colmena, 1973) and El sur (1983).

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is often associated with a certain political mode of relating to another, where a person is a locus of enforceable demands. I claim that Rousseau also articulated an affective mode of relating to another, where a person is seen as the locus of a kind of value that cannot be demanded. These are not isolated sides of a distinction, for the political mode constitutes a solution to certain problems that the affective mode encounters in common (...) social circumstances, allowing us to see how these modes might be distinct while the political nevertheless shapes the affective. I contrast this approach with that of some contemporary Kantian writers on affective phenomena who, for reasons rooted in Kant’s moral philosophy, have modeled affective ways of relating to others on duty. I claim that Rousseau’s writing provides us with a way of capturing the correct insight of these accounts—that some of our emotional responses to others are ways of appreciating their personhood—while avoiding the characteristic implausibilities of their close association between the affective and the political. (shrink)

This paper explores Jean Starobinski's often tacit conception of the implied author, with a view to clarifying his intellectual legacy for literary criticism. It argues that it is plausible to trace a certain strand in the intellectual genealogy of Starobinski's literary theory from the descriptive psychology of Wilhelm Dilthey to twentieth-century psychoanalysis and phenomenology. Accordingly, the question "Who is Jean Starobinski?" is formulated in a sense which seeks to move beyond the bare facticity of biographical detail, a sense (...) that can be expected to differentiate between scholarly and purely journalistic enquiry to ask: who, exactly, is the Jean Starobinski that we encounter in his major works - works like "The Living Eye" and "Transparency and Obstruction"? It is from this vantage point that the discussion proceeds to clarify Starobinski's ambivalent relations to both Rousseau and Freud, and thereby to illuminate some of the tensions and nuances inherent in his notion of the implied author. (shrink)

Investigando a desigualdade da societé civile da sua época, Rousseau, se lhe contrapondo através do Discurso sobre a origem e os fundamentos da desigualdade entre os homens, não identifica a sua emergência senão em um pacto iníquo (ilegítimo), que se impõe em função da propriedade privada e da divisão do trabalho e instaura uma organização que converge para a alienação, caracterizando-se o Contrato Social como um pacto legítimo que guarda capacidade de assegurar a constituição de uma sociedade igualitária e (...) uma ordem política baseada no interesse comum, tendo em vista a perspectiva da liberdade como condição sine qua non do homem que, se no Estado de Natureza usufrui uma independência que possibilita a autodeterminação, no âmbito civil a sua existência social demanda o desafio da construção da autonomia, o que implica na inter-relação que, envolvendo liberdade e igualdade, consiste no direito de ser homem e perfaz a verdadeira democracia -/- . (shrink)

This paper discusses Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist interpretation of Jean-Jacques Rousseau's philosophy of education, or Emile. It aims to show the Sartrean concept of freedom and responsibility in understanding education, as shown in Emile and his tutor's narrative. It utilizes Sartre’s significant works, such as Being and Nothingness, and Existentialism is Humanism, in explicating the Sartrean concept in Rousseau's book, Emile. Existentialist hermeneutics helps the paper to re-interpret the text of Emile. It argues that Rousseau's philosophy (...) of education, as demonstrated by Emile and his tutor, implicitly manifests absolute freedom and responsibility in the learning process. Thus, this paper provides a Sartrean existentialist perspective of understanding Rosseau's Emile. (shrink)

It can be said that Rousseau is one of the most acute thinkers of the corruption of civilisation. In fact, the Second Discourse and the Essay on the Origins of Languages could be read as elaborate analyses of advancing social and cultural decline inasmuch as mankind is continually moving away from the original state of natural innocence. But Rousseau’s idea of corruption is not straightforward. I try to show that in the Essay, Rousseau emphasizes the natural causes (...) for corruption. I argue that an opposition between necessity and contingency, which more accurately represents the two modes operating in Rousseau’s doctrine, should replace the standard nature/culture divide. The contingency of natural catastrophes is found to be ultimately responsible for the corruption in the social realm, which is therefore largely driven by natural causes. (shrink)

For over last two centuries, education in the West has been destructively influenced by the philosophical thought of Jean Jacques Rousseau. Following the route of exposing threats, which waylay the Catholic understanding of human being and education, I would like to point out that Rousseau’s educational utopianism is actually neither alone, nor prevailing. For the contemporary culture seems to be under the dramatic impact of many idealistic thinkers which actually are captained by Karl Marx.

Mit den Werken von Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel und Karl Marx erscheinen in einem Abstand von knapp einhundert Jahren einschlägige Gründungstexte der Sozialphilosophie. Allen drei Autoren ist dabei das Vorhaben gemein, sich kritisch-reflexiv mit den Wandlungen ihrer jeweiligen Zeit auseinandersetzen zu wollen: Rousseau im absolutistischen Frankreich Hege! im agrarischen Preußen und Marx im industrialisierten England: Trotz der unterschiedlichen historischen und nationalen Kontexte gibt es dabei ein verbindendes Moment zwischen den drei Autoren. Sie alle versuchen nämlich, (...) die sozialen Pathologien ihrer Zeit als Pathologien der Anerkennung zu verstehen. Soziale Desintegration, so ihre Überzeugung, darf nicht allein vor dem Hintergrund materieller Ungleichheit verstanden werden, sondern muss selbst noch einmal als Ausdruck verweigerter Teilhabe gedeutet werden. Die Arbeiten von Rousseau, Hegel und Marx zeichnen sich nun dadurch aus, diese grundlegende Einsicht auf ganz unterschiedliche Art und Weise zu einer je spezifischen Pathologiediagnose ausgeweitet zu haben: Während Rousseau das Phänomen der Anerkennungsbesessenheit in den Mittelpunkt seiner Überlegungen rückt, ist es bei Hegel das Phänomen der Anerkennungsabhängigkeit und bei Marx das Phänomen der Anerkennungsvergessenheit . (shrink)

This paper explores some connections between depictions of mortality in portrait-painting and philosophical (and psychoanalytic) treatments of our need to be recognized by others. I begin by examining the connection that Georg Simmel makes in his philosophical study of Rembrandt between that artist’s capacity for depicting his portrait subjects as non-repeatable individuals and his depicting them as mortal, or such as to die. After noting that none of Simmel’s explanations of the tragic character of Rembrandt’s portrait subjects seems fully satisfactory, (...) I then turn to Rousseau’s writing on our need for the recognition of others in order to argue that (1) it is at least as sources for the satisfaction of this need that other persons figure for us as irreplaceable (in a way that contrasts with the kinds of satisfaction that intersubstitutable things afford us); and that (2) it is exactly this kind of irreplaceability that Simmel is gesturing at in connecting the concepts of individuality and mortality in his writing on Rembrandt’s portraits. For the remainder of the paper I argue that the foregoing ideas are in fact central to the psychoanalytic writing of Melanie Klein, and in particular (a) Klein’s understanding the infant’s apprehension of other persons as internally related to their anxieties about the possibility of those persons’ irretrievable loss; (b) her understanding that it is as sources of recognition that others’ personhood is made salient to us; and (c) her treatment of portrait-painting as an activity for working through those aforementioned anxieties. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate under-explored moments in Rousseau’s and Adam Smith’s writings in which each presents speech, and particularly testimony, as a manifestation of the desire for others’ recognition. I begin by considering some features of Rousseau’s understanding of amour-propre (or the desire for recognition from others) as well as that desire’s relevance for the conception of vocal speech (as in its nature passional) at the center of Rousseau’s Essay on the Origin of Languages. Since a (...) feeling of insult is the characteristic response to the thwarting of amour-propre, this connection between amour-propre and vocal speech might help to illuminate the distinctive insult (remarked upon by several philosophers) in having one’s speech act rejected. But there is also something incomplete in this thought insofar as it cannot yet distinguish the rejection involved in, say, not being believed from just any thwarting of amour-propre (or any instance of taking oneself to be demoted in another’s opinion). I then consider the possibility that this latter sort of observation might lie behind not only Adam Smith’s interest in what he calls our “mortification” in not being believed, but also his interest in a distinctive kind of response that we typically think of ourselves as owed, especially in the context of our addressing another person, but whose satisfactoriness consists in its being unforced. I end the paper by considering how Rousseau’s egalitarian political prescriptions (which contrast with the individual psychological maneuvers that Smith offers to those who go unbelieved) can be understood, in part, as aiming to limit the social significance of our dependence on another’s capricious judgment about our trustworthiness. (shrink)

Our work focuses on the novel Julie, or the New Heloise by Jean Jacques Rousseau (1761), particularly on the character of Saint Preux, Julie's lover. Our interest is strictly philosophical. First, we expose the ways in which Rousseau takes pleasure in denigrating Saint Preux to conclude that he is a feminine character: the virility-femininity distinction has no relation to the gender difference because (following a Socratic tradition through Plutarch) it is in agreement with the opposition between self-control (...) (activity) - submission to the passions (passivity); femininity is always a lack of virtue proper to men. Secondly, we focus on the annihilation of Saint Preux by the voluntary renunciation of his freedom, that is, of his humanity—an absurd and inconceivable renunciation, according to The Social Contract (1762). Thirdly, we examine the reasons for this annihilation; we propose that the novel, far from contradicting, ratifies and deepens the ethical and political condemnation of gallant love that Rousseau had carried out in the Letter to M. D'Alembert on Spectacles (1758). Finally, we examine the relevance of Saint Preux in our time, pointing out the connection that Rousseau denounces between the alleged freedom to love and political inaction Keywords: Virtue  Freedom  Slavery  Ethics  Plutarch. -/- Nuestro trabajo se centra en la novela Julia o la Nueva Eloísa de Jean Jacques Rousseau (1761), particularmente en el personaje de Saint Preux, el amante de Julia. Nuestro interés es estrictamente filosófico. Primero, mostramos los modos en los que Rousseau se complace en denigrar a su personaje enamorado para concluir que Saint Preux es femenino: la distinción virilidad-femineidad prescinde de la diferencia de género porque (recuperando una tradición socrática a través de Plutarco) coincide con la oposición entre dominio (de sí) /actividad - sumisión (a las pasiones) /pasividad; la femineidad es un defecto de virtud que compete siempre a los hombres. Segundo, nos detenemos en la (auto) aniquilación de Saint Preux por la renuncia voluntaria a su libertad, es decir, a su humanidad, renuncia absurda e inconcebible, según Del Contrato Social (1762). Tercero, preguntamos por las razones de esta aniquilación; proponemos que la novela de amor, lejos de contradecir, ratifica y lleva al último extremo la condena ética y política del amor galante que Rousseau había llevado a cabo en la Carta a d’Alembert sobre los espectáculos (1758). Finalmente, preguntamos sobre la actualidad de Saint Preux señalando la vigencia de esta imbricación que Rousseau denuncia entre la pretendida libertad de amar y la inacción política. Palabras Clave: Virtud  Libertad  Esclavitud  Ética  Plutarco. -/- . (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau was undoubtedly the first to investigate the ethical role of art in modern philosophical thought. However, his position was decidedly eccentric amidst the backdrop of the Enlightenment. According to Rousseau, Art was responsible for the destruction of virtue, but is responsible now for concocting a moral veneer. Art’s function is to construct this “moral veneer” that brings a stop to man’s turpitudes or, at least, reduces their occurrence. Art’s ethical benefit is not that it leads (...) man to do good. Rather, the artistic simulacrum prevents the most hideous crimes from occurring. This paper investigates the ethical role of art in Rousseau's First Discourse and in the preface to his play Narcissus or the Self-Admirer. (shrink)

The Italian philosopher Augusto Del Noce (1910-1989) gave an original interpretation of the modern secular age. In this paper, I analyze the reasons why Del Noce saw in Descartes and in Rousseau two fundamental expressions of secularization: according to the two French philosophers, the human being is characterized by an original goodness (status naturae purae). Del Noce noted that this anthropological optimism, widespread in modernity, made superfluous the Christian faith: without the presence of original sin (an evil in human (...) nature), the redemption is no longer necessary. In the last part of the paper it is examined “the Rousseau problem”, i.e. the constitutive ambiguity of the Genevan thinker. Rightly Del Noce pointed out that Rousseau was, at the same time, a religious and revolutionary philosopher: on the one hand, Rousseau criticized modern rationalists and reevaluated the sphere of human feelings (including religious feelings), but on the other, he theorized a revolutionary and Jacobin thought. Therefore, Rousseau can be interpreted as a philosopher who emblematically expressed the ambiguities of the modern process of secularization. (shrink)

There is a great deal of room for misunderstanding in the pages of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s work. His prose is not as weighed down by jargon as Heidegger’s or as difficult to wade through as Hegel’s — by all accounts his writing is easy to parse! And yet, at times, his writing seems to leave too much up in the air. As such, his work has been both a guiding star for the political left and decried as a wolf (...) in sheep’s clothing. Much of this disparity in opinion can be traced back to a common concern that Rousseau’s attempt to create a basis for legitimate political power seems to take place at the expense of individual freedom. But this raises a question: What is freedom for Rousseau? (shrink)

A função e o sentido do casamento são apresentados por Mary Wollstonecraft (1759-1797), em “Reivindicação dos direitos da mulher” (1792). Escrito em formato de reunião de panfletos e publicado antes de partir para a França revolucionária, com o propósito de acompanhar o levante republicano contra o Antigo Regime, “Reivindicação dos direitos da mulher” contém uma denúncia generalizada da desigualdade de gênero e de seus efeitos deletérios, e um projeto de reforma das instituições e da sociedade. É nesse texto que a (...) filósofa teoriza de maneira consistente e fecunda, sobre o casamento como instituição central a ser transformada, e é também ao tratar do casamento que a filósofa de fato opera com os conceitos de direitos e obrigações. “Reivindicação dos direitos da mulher” tem “direitos” no título, mas é de fato um livro sobre educação e sua argumentação se ergue sobre um pressuposto metafísico, a partir e contra a teoria da liberdade de Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Neste estudo, apresento como a categoria do casamento como instituição pedagógica e política desempenhar papel estruturante na transformação da sociedade. A função do casamento, para a filósofa, é articular as esferas privada e pública, de maneira engajada nos requisitos revolucionários, como uma categoria da transformação social. Este é o sentido da noção de “cimento da sociedade” que pretendo apresentar. (shrink)

Rousseau argues that holding the talented in high public esteem leads the less talented to esteem their natural virtues less highly and therefore to neglect the cultivation of these virtues. D’Holbach’s response to Rousseau indicates a sense in which esteeming talent can avoid these detrimental consequences. The starting point of d’Holbach’s defense of the sciences and arts is an analysis of the impact that despotic regimes have on esteeming talent. He argues that there is not only a problem (...) of over-valuing talent but also a problem of under-valuing talent. These considerations form the background for his conception of valuing talent in the right way. The phenomenon of political deception in despotic regimes indicates a sense in which talent can be regarded as a tool for solving a pressing political problem: Genuinely estimable uses of talent are those that oppose despotism and support republican virtues. Esteeming such talent does not lead to a loss of esteem and self-esteem for ordinary people because republican virtues themselves are a source of esteem and self-esteem. Comparison with some aspects of the response of d’Holbach’s friend, Claude-Adrien Helvétius, to Rousseau will accentuate the specific strengths of d’Holbach’s argument. (shrink)

In his 'Contrat social', § 2.1, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues that the general will alone can steer the forces of the state towards the end for which it was instituted, i.e., the common good. The argument's logical structure is more intricate than it seems at first glance. And the intricacy appears to be deliberate. Rousseau's authorial strategy is designed to evoke the reader's voice in articulating the fundamentals of politics.

Dans cette contribution, nous nous penchons sur la figure du bonheur paradoxal qui, dans les "Rêveries du promeneur solitaire" de Rousseau, se définit au sein d’un jeu de tensions multiples. Si le bonheur exige la solitude, il est toujours hanté par l’altérité ; si sa source est en soi-même, il ne cesse toutefois de dépendre de circonstances contingentes ; et si, enfin, il s’éprouve tout entier dans le sentiment, il s’agit pourtant d’un sentiment augmenté d’un caractère réfléchi ou, pour (...) mieux dire, redoublé dans le souvenir que retrace l’écriture. Dans tous les cas, ces antinomies du bonheur – sur lesquelles nous reviendrons longuement plus loin – s’enracinent dans une marqueterie de références dont l’hétérogénéité est l’expression d’un dialogue tendu au sein duquel, comme nous souhaiterions d’abord le montrer, la philosophie morale des Anciens se réinvente en adoptant le langage, éminemment moderne, du sentiment. (shrink)

Die Darstellung konzentriert sich auf den Naturbegriff in seinem Verhältnis zu Kultur, die folglich nur reduzierte Charakterisierung erfährt. Herausgearbeitet werden vor allem die Umfänge, Eigenschaften und Grenzen der auf Kultur bezogenen Naturbegriffe. Das Feld dieser Bedeutungen ist in einer Pluralität von sich teils überschneidenden, teils wechselseitig ergänzenden Naturbegriffen eingebettet. Weil erst vor diesem Hintergrund die Spezifität der Beziehung von Natur und Kultur sowie ihrer Natur - Kultur und ihr Anderes Bestimmungselemente deutlich wird, beginne ich mit einer Vorbemerkung zum Naturdiskurs (1). (...) Im Anschluss daran stelle ich fünf Varianten der Verhältnisbestimmung von Natur und Kultur vor. Bei den ersten beiden handelt es sich um die klassischen Entgegensetzungen von Natur zu Technik einerseits und zu Geschichte andererseits. Die Differenz von Natur und Technik geht auf Aristoteles zurück und hat sich bis heute vor allem Aktualität im lebensweltlichen Erfahrungsbereich bewahrt. (2). Den lebensweltlichen Nahbereich des direkt Wahrnehm- und Veränderbaren transzendiert die exemplarisch von Jean-Jacques Rousseau formulierte Gegenüberstellung von Natur und Geschichte. (3). Übergangsbereiche von Natur und Kultur sowie Bereiche, in denen sich zwischen beiden nicht mehr sinnvoll unterscheiden lässt, sind in den vergangenen zwei Jahrhunderten zunehmend zum Gegenstand wissenschaftlicher Arbeit geworden. Die Vielfalt der gegenwärtigen Forschungen in diesem Zusammenhang gestattet keine einheitliche Bestimmung des Natur-Kultur-Verhältnisses. Es lassen sich jedoch gemeinsame Strukturen bevorzugter Thematisierungsrichtungen ausmachen. Dazu gehört das Festhalten an den beiden, nicht dualistisch aufgefassten Begriffen als Bezeichnung von Gegenstandskomponenten. Hieran anknüpfend schlage ich vor, die Begriffe als polare Extreme eines Feldes von Mischungszuständen zu verstehen (4). Abschließend folgen die zwei Varianten, in deren Konsequenz es liegt, die Legitimität jeweils eines der beiden Begriffe zu bestreiten: Die naturalistische und die kulturalistische Variante. Sie rekurrieren jeweils beide auf einen historischen Prozess und sind als theoretisches Programm formuliert (5 und 6). (shrink)

In the United States today, much interpersonal racism is driven by corrupt forms of self-preservation. Drawing from Jean- Jacques Rousseau, I refer to this as self-love racism. The byproduct of socially-induced racial anxieties and perceived threats to one’s physical or social wellbeing, self-love racism is the protective attachment to the racialized dimensions of one’s social status, wealth, privilege, and/or identity. Examples include police officer related shootings of unarmed Black Americans, anti-immigrant sentiment, and the resurgence of unabashed white supremacy. (...) This form of racism is defined less by the introduction of racism into the world and more on the perpetuation of racially unjust socioeconomic and political structures. My theory, therefore, works at the intersection of the interpersonal and structural by offering an account of moral complacency in racist social structures. My goal is to reorient the directionality of philosophical work on racism by questioning the sense of innocence at the core of white ways-of-being. (shrink)

This is a simple work, a Book review, in fact, that try to show Jean Jacques Rousseau ideas on the first book of Emile, or on Education, in their writes “The age of need” period between the birth and the 2 years of their fictional character Emile, -/- Doi: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18339.76324 -/- ISBN: 978-65-5869-160-0 [Impresso] 978-65-5869-159-4 [Digital].

One of the most legendary educational books ever written is Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s “Émile ou de l’Education”. Most obviously Rousseau wrote this book guided by diverse more or less conscious purposes and one of the main problems it presents is paradoxical: Does education have to promote freedom by force? In this article I will, firstly, present several aims that might have triggered Rousseau to write “Émile”. Secondly, I will discuss Rousseau’s view of the so called “educational (...) paradox”. Since this quandary touches the topic of many other of his books, I will discuss “Émile” along with Rousseau’s other works and thus place his educational story in his “great narrative”. (shrink)

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is one of the most controversial philosophers and political theorists of the Enlightenment. He has often been accused of laying the ideological foundation for many repressive and radical movements and regimes, from the reign of terror of the French Revolution to the right-wing and left-wing totalitarian regimes of the twentieth century. Especially his idea of the general will has been criticised by scholars as an abstract Platonism that establishes the dictatorship of the state and rejects basic (...) human rights. Some authors even believe that all of Rousseau’s authoritarian passages are merely a paraphrase of arguments found in French absolutist thought. Nevertheless, Rousseau’s novelty lay in his denial of identifying authority with only one person. Instead, sovereignty was based on the will of all those people who made up the political body. Accordingly, the theory of absolute monarchy was transformed into an alternative democratic version of absolute popular sovereignty. Rousseau is also considered one of the classics of the contractual tradition. He argued that mankind without a govern- ment would live in what he called a “state of nature” where there would be no law and order. Thus, the main purpose of this paper is to compare Rousseau’s ideas about the principles of political authority in two of his works: “The Social Contract” and “Considerations on the Government of Poland”. In the first part of the paper we will briefly review the main concepts developed in The Social Contract, such as the general will, the social contract, sovereignty and direct democracy. In the second part, we will focus on the main ideas put forward in Considerations on the Government of Poland. Then, at the end, we will try to identify the reasons for the conceptual changes in some of Rousseau’s views. (shrink)

... The Philosophers’ Quarrel is an enjoyable tour through the salons, great cities and country retreats of the Enlightenment, in the company of some of its brightest stars. Although much of the tale turns on some tedious details of the various intrigues of Hume and Rousseau, together with their friends and collaborators, Zaretsky and Scott manage to provide their account with a number of interesting and valuable insights into the character of the thinkers involved and the social and cultural (...) life of Enlightenment Europe at this time. I particularly recommend this book to contemporary academics, who may be comforted and reassured to see that prickly, neurotic and insecure dispositions are not the invention of contemporary academic life. (shrink)

The contemporary political philosopher John Rawls considers himself to be part of the social contract tradition of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant, but not of the tradition of Locke's predecessor, Thomas Hobbes. Call the Hobbesian tradition interest-based, and the Lockean tradition right-based, because it assumes that there are irreducible moral facts which the social contract can assume. The primary purpose of Locke's social contract is to justify the authority of the state over its citizens despite the (...) fact that those citizens are naturally free and equal. I assume that this task is of central importance to all right-based social contract theories: in chapter one I lay out the general problems faced by all contract theories, and in chapter two, three and four I examine in depth the accounts of political obligation offered by Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls. I conclude that all members of the right-based social contract tradition fail to provide an account of obligation that can explain the bond between a citizen and her state. (shrink)

Detendo-se na transição do estado de natureza para a sociedade civil, o artigo contrapõe o caráter contingente e voluntário do contrato hobbesiano e a necessidade que implica o processo de constituição do social que determina o pacto rousseauniano, convergindo para a antinomia da relação envolvendo liberdade e autoridade. Essa, de acordo com a perspectiva de Hobbes demanda a renúncia dos direitos ilimitados dos sujeitos em função da soberania estatal e acarreta a instituição do soberano como representante, detentor de todo o (...) poder coletivo e única fonte da lei. Segundo a leitura de Rousseau requer a “alienação verdadeira” dos indivíduos em face da soberania popular e resulta na constituição do povo soberano, única fonte legítima do poder e seu único detentor, e na instituição da Vontade Geral como condição para o seu exercício. (shrink)

In mid-eighteenth-century France, a series of debates revolved around reflections on origins and their epistemological status, elaborating models of historical temporality to frame the present. The origins of the arts, sciences, human inequality, human knowledge, fables or religions reveal a certain relationship between man (individuals and civilisations) and time, articulating forms of past permanence and future anticipation in the present. Within this framework, this article seeks to shed light on the peculiar temporal status of Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger’s reflection on origins. In (...) a close comparison with Rousseau’s ‘atrabilious philosophy’ (philosophie atrabilaire), Boulanger identifies catastrophe as a temporal model for conceptualising the origin of a human history that has always already begun: origin appears not as that which stands at the beginning of time, but rather as a historical form of the relationship between humanity and time – an emotional and cognitive tone – that constitutes the background and precondition of human action. (shrink)

Em meados do século XVI, surgiu a ideia de autonomia do indivíduo, que deu origem ao individualismo e ao liberalismo político. A concepção de democracia que se desenvolveu com base nesses princípios assumiu um perfil bastante diferente daquele utilizado na Grécia antiga. Se antes a democracia estava diretamente ligada à ideia de igualdade, em sua nova versão passou a ser relacionar primordialmente com a ideia de liberdade. Em decorrência dos ideais desenvolvidos naquele momento histórico, o principal dilema político fundamentava-se na (...) limitação de poder do soberano (que às vezes se confundia com o próprio Estado) e na ampliação das liberdades individuais, como o direito a dispor da propriedade material e a defender-se judicialmente. Até hoje, grande parte do debate político tem como tema a defesa dos ideias liberais ou a crítica a eles. Na perspectiva do filósofo inglês Thomas Hobbes, a constituição e o funcionamento de uma sociedade pressupõem que os indivíduos cedam, por transferência, seus direitos naturais (mantendo somente o direito de conservarem sua vida) ao soberano. O autor entendia que os seres humanos, em estado de natureza (isto é, compartilhando do direito a tudo o que existe, em razão de não haver limitação legal), tendem a agir pela força e pela violência para conseguir o que desejam, o que acabaria provocando uma guerra contínua entre todos. Para Hobbes, a justificativa para o poder absoluto dos reis residia na compreensão de que os homens em estado de natureza se encontrariam em constante conflito. Na foto, palácio na Arábia Saudita, em 2012, uma das poucas monarquias absolutas da atualidade. Por isso, para disciplinarem a si mesmos e garantirem o bem-estar físico e material, seria necessário que os indivíduos firmassem um contrato social regulado por uma autoridade soberana. Hobbes manifestou preferência pela monarquia absolutista, pois acreditava que as assembleias e os Parlamentos estimulam os conflitos graças às disputas entre diferentes facções e partidos. O poder absoluto defendido por Hobbes se justificava pela transferência dos direitos dos indivíduos ao soberano. É um nome desse contrato social que o poder deve ser exercido, e não para a realização da vontade pessoal do soberano. Por conta dessa perspectiva, Hobbes não pode ser considerado defensor da democracia. Entretanto, seu pensamento é importante, pois serve de parâmetro para as reflexões sobre a organização do poder construídas posteriormente. No século XVII, John Locke, também filósofo inglês, propôs uma reflexão bem diferente das de Hobbes. Para ele, o poder soberano deve permanecer nas mãos dos cidadãos, que são os melhores juízes dos próprios interesses. Cabe ao governante retribuir a delegação de poderes ao garantir as prerrogativas individuais: segurança jurídica e propriedade privada. Assim, o contrato social teve como função garantir os direitos naturais para todos. Esse pensamento é uma das bases do liberalismo político. Entretanto, deve ser ressaltado que sua implantação não permitiu a construção da igualdade propagada por Locke, mas foi uma das estruturas de consolidação do poder da burguesia. As ideias de Locke são uma das referências para o desenvolvimento da democracia representativa. Na imagem, vemos o palácio de Westminster, em Londres, onde estão situadas as casas do Parlamento e ocorrem as principais decisões políticas do Reino Unido. Para Locke, o princípio da maioria é fundamental para o funcionamento das instituições políticas democráticas, assim como as leis, que devem valer para todos. Por isso, segundo o filósofo, a elaboração das leis precisa estar a cargo de representantes escolhidos pelo povo, que exerceriam o papel de legisladores no interesse da maioria: o regime político proposto por Locke é, portanto, uma democracia representativa. O escritor e filósofo político suíço Jean-Jacques Rousseau se preocupou com o problema da legitimidade da ordem política. Para ele, a desigualdade ocasionada pelo advento da propriedade privada é a causa de todos os sentimentos de ruins do ser humano. No contrato social, é preciso definir a questão da igualdade e do comprometimento de todos com o bem comum. Se a vontade individual é particular, a do cidadão, que vive em sociedade e tem consciência disso, deve ser coletiva e voltada para o bem comum. A participação política é, portanto, ato de deliberação pública que organiza a vontade geral, ou seja, traduz os elementos comuns a todas as vontades individuais. Esse seria, portanto, o núcleo do conceito de democracia. Em seu livro Do Contrato Social2 , Rousseau afirma que a democracia só pode existir se for diretamente exercida pelos cidadãos, sem representação política, pois a vontade geral não poderia ser representada, apenas exercida diretamente. Para Rousseau, a democracia direta é o único sistema legítimo de autoridade e de ato político.3 Em O espírito das leis, o filósofo e político Montesquieu, afirmou que igualdade na democracia é algo muito difícil de garantir plenamente. Partindo do princípio de que é necessário um controle externo para que os sistemas políticos funcionem bem, esse pensador defende a criação de regras que estabeleçam limites aos detentores do poder a fim de manter a liberdade dos indivíduos. Por isso, propôs a divisão da esfera administrativa em três poderes ou funções independentes entre si: o Legislativo, o Executivo e o Judiciário. De maneira resumida, cabem ao poder Legislativo as funções de fiscalizar o poder Executivo, votar leis de interesse público nas instâncias relativas (municipal, estadual e federal) e, em situações específicas, julgar autoridades como o presidente da República ou os próprios membros do Parlamento. O Executivo é o poder do Estado que, nos moldes da Constituição de um país, tem por atribuição governar a nação e administrar os interesses públicos, colocando em prática políticas públicas e leis, e garantindo o acesso aos direitos. Por fim, o poder Judiciário é exercido pelos juízes, que têm a capacidade e a prerrogativa de julgar com base nas regras constitucionais e nas leis criadas pelo poder legislativo. Para Montesquieu, a democracia não pode prescindir da divisão entre os poderes. Na imagem, foto da Praça dos Três Poderes, em Brasília (DF), 2013. A democracia, na perspectiva de Montesquieu, seria garantida pelo equilíbrio entre os três poderes, assegurando assim maior liberdade aos indivíduos. A liberdade, porém, só existiria com moderação, o que equivaleria a fazer tudo o que as leis permitissem (pois, se um cidadão pudesse fazer tudo o que as leis proibissem, não teria mais liberdade, por que todos poderiam fazer o mesmo). Karl Marx e Friedrich Engels acreditavam que um governo democrático seria inviável numa sociedade capitalista, pois a regulação democrática da vida não poderia se realizar com as limitações impostas pelas relações capitalistas de produção. Seria necessário, portanto, mudar as bases da sociedade para criar possibilidade de uma política democrática. Para entender a posição desses autores com relação à democracia, é necessário entender como eles percebem a função do Estado na sociedade capitalista. Para Marx e Engels, os princípios que protegem a liberdade dos indivíduos e defendem o direito à propriedade tratam as pessoas como iguais apenas formalmente. O movimento em favor do sufrágio universal e de igualdade política é reconhecido por Marx como um passo importante, mas, segundo esse autor, seu potencial emancipador está limitado pelas desigualdades de classe. Desse modo, as democracias liberais seriam cerceadas pelo capital privado, que restringiria sistematicamente as opções políticas. De acordo com esse olhar, a liberdade nas democracias capitalistas é, portanto, puramente formal, pois a desigualdade de classe prevalece. Nas palavras de Marx: “Na democracia liberal, o capital governa”. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS HOBBES, T. Leviatã. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1974. (Coleção Os Pensadores). LOCKE, J. Segundo tratado sobre o governo civil. São Paulo: Martin Claret, 2002. MARX, K. O capital: crítica a economia política. São Paulo: Abril Cultural, 1974. (Coleção Os Pensadores). MARX, K.; ENGELS, F. O manifesto do partido comunista. 5. ed. Rio de Janeiro: Paz e Terra, 1999. ROUSSEAU, J. J. O contrato social e outros escritos. São Paulo: Cultrix, 1971. SILVA, A. et al. Sociologia em movimento. 2. ed. São Paulo: Moderna, 2016. (shrink)

Ação que intencionaliza a construcionalidade humana de acordo com um arcabouço paradigmático institucionalizado pela sociedade [ou melhor, através de uma de suas classes ou segmentos, em nome dela], o processo formativo-educacional tende a atribuir caráter preeminente à constitutividade do ser social ou a absolutizar a estruturalização individual, cujas vertentes o texto em questão aborda, ilustrando a primeira através do pensamento de Durkheim e recorrendo a Rousseau para exemplificar a segunda, embora até mesmo nesta haja um rastro de prerrogativas que (...) esboçam a silhueta do cidadão, arquétipo não circunscrito àquela, mas que pode emergir, e emerge, guardando relacionalidade com a contextualidade sociocultural [e consequencialmente polí­tica, econômica, histórica], como o demonstra Bourdieu. (shrink)

The history of philosophy is replete with attempts at invoking rationality as a means of directing and even subduing human desire and emotion. Understood as that which moves human beings to action, desire and emotion come to be associated with human freedom and rationality as a means of curbing that freedom. Plato, for instance, takes for granted a separation between thought and action that drives a wedge between our rational ability to exercise self-discipline and the free expression of desire and (...) emotion. Hobbes, on the other hand, replaces our internal ability for rational self-control with the external authority of the political State. So long as freedom and control are pitted against one another, human beings are incapable of attaining a symbiosis of these two elements of human action so essential to realizing true democracy. Unlike Plato, John Dewey sees in democracy the greatest potential for individual and social life. The purpose of this dissertation is to demonstrate how the educational philosophy of Dewey, which culminates in an educational aesthetic, appeals to and makes the most of the symbiosis of freedom and self-control, emotion and reason. Dewey’s educational aesthetic not only offers an alternative to traditional methods of education, but also demonstrates how the goal of a democratic way of life is made feasible by means of intelligently guided self-discipline—a form of self-control guided by intelligence that is not a constraint upon freedom, but instead embodies greater opportunity for freedom. I trace the basis for this synthesis, in the social-political and pedagogical principles of John Locke and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Both Locke and Rousseau offer educational theories that begin turning our attention toward the essential partnership required of rationality and emotion. Dewey's educational aesthetic is then considered as a response to alienating forms of education that continue to pit control and freedom against one another, and which thwart the intellectual and emotional development necessary for autonomy and democratic forms of social organization. (shrink)

World peace was a common theoretical consideration among philosophers during Europe’s Enlightenment period. The first robust essay on peace was written by Charles Irénée Castel de Saint- Pierre, which sparked an intellectual debate among prominent philosophers like Jean- Jacques Rousseau and Jeremy Bentham, who offered their own treatises on the concept of peace. Perhaps the most influential of all such writings comes from Immanuel Kant, who argues that world peace is no “high- flown or exaggerated notion” but rather (...) a natural result of the rational progression of the human species. U.S. President Woodrow Wilson, the mastermind behind the formation of the League of Nations in 1920 that provided the scaffolding to today’s United Nations, read Kant’s philosophy while he was a student at the College of New Jersey (now Princeton University). Some have argued that it is no coincidence that the per-son responsible for embarking upon the first serious political pursuit of world peace on a global scale was familiar with Kant. Indeed, William Galston claims that “Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points [for world peace] were a faithful transcription of both the letter and spirit of Kant’s Perpetual Peace.”3 Historical connections aside, the question remains as to whether Kant’s philosophy is a viable conception of peace in a contemporary context. Using the conceptual distinction of positive and negative peace provided by Johan Galtung, I argue that Kant’s philosophy does provide the scaffolding for a viable conception of peace. In particular, I provide particular examples as to what social rights must be included in a Kantian model of peace. (shrink)

Easy to understand philosophy papers in all areas. Table of contents: Three Short Philosophy Papers on Human Freedom The Paradox of Religions Institutions Different Perspectives on Religious Belief: O’Reilly v. Dawkins. v. James v. Clifford Schopenhauer on Suicide Schopenhauer’s Fractal Conception of Reality Theodore Roszak’s Views on Bicameral Consciousness Philosophy Exam Questions and Answers Locke, Aristotle and Kant on Virtue Logic Lecture for Erika Kant’s Ethics Van Cleve on Epistemic Circularity Plato’s Theory of Forms Can we trust our senses? Yes (...) we can Descartes on What He Believes Himself to Be The Role of Values in Science Modern Science Kant’s Moral Philosophy Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy Schopenhauer on Human Suffering Bertrand Russell on the Value of Philosophy The Philosophical Value of Uncertainty Logic Homework: Theorems and Models Searle vs. Turing on the Imitation Game Hume, Frankfurt, and Holbach on Personal Freedom Manifesto of the University of Wisconsin, Madison Secular Society Michael’s Analysis of the Limits of Civil Protections Bentham and Mill on Different Types of Pleasure Set Theory Homework Aristotle on Virtue Nagel On the Hard Problem Wittgenstein on Language and Thought Camus and Schopenhauer on the Meaning of Life Camus’ Hero as Rebel without a Cause My Little Finger: Camus’ Absurdism Illustrated Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? Does Mathematics Assume the Truth of Platonism? The Self-defeating Nature of Utilitarianism and Consequentialism Generally What is The Good Life? Bentham and Mill regarding types of pleasures Kant’s Moral Philosophy Five Short Papers on Mind-body Dualism Tracy Latimer’s Father had the Right to Kill Her: Towards a doctrine of generalized self-defense Arguments Concerning God and Morality Goldman, Rousseau and von Hayek on the Ideal State J.S Mill on Liberty and Personal Freedom A Kantian Analysis of a Borderline Date-rape Situation Living Well as Flourishing: Aristotle’s Conception of the Good Life Three Essays on Medical Ethics: Answers to Exam Questions on Elective Amputation, Vaccination, and Informed Consent Hobbes, Marx, Rousseau, Nietzsche: Their Central Themes De Tocqueville on Egoism Mill vs. Hobbes on Liberty Exam-Essays on the Moral Systems of Mill, Bentham, and Kant Kant’s Moral System Aristotle on Virtue Plato’s Cave Allegory An Ethical Quandary Superorganisms The Tuskegee Experiment A Rawlsian Analysis Why Moore’s Proof of an External World Fails A Defense of Nagel’s Argument Against Materialism A Utilitarian Analysis of a Case of Theft The Paradox of the Self-aware Wretch: An Analysis of Pascal’s Moral Philosophy Jean-Paul Sartre: Decline and Fall of a Marxist Sell-out A One Page Proof of Plato’s Theory of Forms Plato’s Republic as Pol Potist Bureaucracy The problem of the one and the many Four Short Essays on Truth and Knowledge What is ‘the Good Life?’ The Ontological Argument Different Political Philosophies: Plato, Locke, Madison, Rousseau, Hayek, and Mill on the State What do I know with certainty? Skepticism about skepticism Neuroscience and Freewill Operant Conditioning What makes us special? Are Late-term Abortions Ethical? No Two Papers on Epistemology: Gettier and Bostrom Examination Nietzsche on Punishment God’s Foreknowledge and Moral Responsibility . (shrink)

This article defends Ibn Khaldun as a social holist philosopher. Ibn Khaldun is an Arab philosopher regarded as a proto-social holist theorist of modern social thought. The central thesis of social holism asserts that human beings are social creatures because they depend upon one another for their biological existence and the development of human cognitive potential. Many European philosophers since the eighteenth century, including Giambattista Vico, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Johann Gottfried Herder, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Ferdinand Tönnies, contributed (...) their roles to the development of social holism in the modern Western tradition. Significantly, after Aristotle and before these European social holist theorists, Ibn Khaldun developed his notion of social holism in the fourteenth century in the Islamic tradition. The key argument of Ibn Khaldun’s social holism holds that cooperation is essential for human existence. He makes a distinction between the sedentary and the nomadic social groups. Ibn Khaldun claims that Asabiyyah is the central value of the nomadic society. ‘Asabiyyah’ refers to ‘social cohesiveness’ which binds people together. Indeed, Ibn Khaldun is an essential philosopher because he is not only a bridge between classical and modern thought in Western tradition but also between Islamic and Western traditions. Thus, I argue that Ibn Khaldun is a significant social holist philosopher. (shrink)

Na długo przed rewolucją francuską oraz jej pierworodną Deklaracją Praw Człowieka i Obywatela w europejskiej myśli politycznej członek państwa przedzierzgnięty został z poddanego w obywatela. Ta fundamentalna zmiana w definiowaniu stanowiska jednostki w państwie korespondowała z humanistycznym postrzeganiem rozumu ludzkiego nie tylko jako instrumentu poznawania świata, ale też narzędzia głębokiej refleksji i krytycznej oceny mechanizmów światem rządzących. Siła rozumu kojarzona była przez oświeceniowych filozofów z porządkiem naturalnym, który jawił się przeciwwagą dla społecznych i politycznych realiów absolutnego władztwa monarszego. W XVIII (...) w. we francuskiej i niemieckiej filozofii państwa nastąpił istotny postęp w zakresie kształtowania się idei obywatela pojmowanego w sensie zbliżonym do Arystotelesowskiej istoty państwowej (politikon zoon). Stało się tak jednak w dużej mierze dzięki XVII-wiecznym angielskim reformom wolnościowym. Racjonalistyczne i materialistyczne podwaliny oświeceniowego światopoglądu konstytuowała też, powstała na bazie krytyki pism Thomasa Hobbesa, myśl Johna Locke’a, stymulująca do urządzania życia społecznego zgodnie z zaleceniami umysłu i potrzeb ludzkich, a wbrew bezwzględnym prawom samowładztwa, w tym jego monopolu na rację, który dusił inicjatywę jednostki. (shrink)

Based on the argumentative analysis, the essential title is interpreted within its entitle as it leaves bias open 'along the lines' as to whether the January 6th insurrection that took place on Capitol Hill was or was not justified or unjustifiably ‘so’ by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s right to revolution. Detailed evidence to support and prove such intended thesis stretches this theoretical statement as it gambles to reckon with a central paradoxical and unhumored tone that leaves the reader and/or author’s (...) perspective to be ‘centered’ (and left due to a play of ‘centeredness’). As it pertains to the fallout and outcome of how governmental, national, and militaral leadership (given the reality of a sovereign leader or a reign). Presentational style is constructed or structured oddly awakes uncontrollable, uncensored, unmeasurable, and untouchable personification that is nonstop. Such series of quoted citations are pieces of instruction that serve to admire and of acceptability in pursuit of Rousseauian logic as it poses a modest figurative language where its main objective is to attempt to underline the principles and techniques that plague post-modernists within the scope of legislative, executive, or even judicial systems of functionalities. (shrink)

The paper addresses the issue and theoretical articulations of religious tolerance, overviewing theoretical approaches of various authors - starting with the period of enlightenment. In that sense, we analyze the standpoints of John Locke, François Marie Arouet, Voltaire, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, John Stuart Mill, Andrew Heywood, John Rawls, Žolt Lazar, Aleksandar Prnjat and Đuro Šušnjić. At the end of the paper we give a short summary of the 18th century Habsburg Monarchy relation towards freedom of religious beliefs, bearing in (...) mind minority status of the Serbian community of Orthodox religion. (shrink)

INTRODUÇÃO Para compreender como a Sociologia nasceu e se desenvolveu, é essencial analisar as transformações que ocorreram a partir do século XIV, na Europa ocidental, marcando a passagem da sociedade feudal para a sociedade capitalista, ou a passagem da sociedade medieval para a sociedade moderna. Para isso, é necessário realizar uma pequena viagem histórica, já que, para entender as ideias de um autor e de determinada época, é fundamental contextualizá-las historicamente. Em cada sociedade, em todos os tempos, os seres humanos (...) elaboraram explicações religiosas, míticas, culturais, étnicas etc. para as situações em que vivem. No século XIX, a busca por outro tipo de explicação para os fenômenos da sociedade – a explicação científica – deu origem à Sociologia. Para demonstrar como o pensamento social organizou-se historicamente e como a Sociologia estruturou o saber sobre a sociedade humana, este trabalho terá como objetivo estudar alguns autores que se sobressaíram no processo de desenvolvimento dessa ciência. PREMISSA A Sociologia surgiu como um corpo de ideias a respeito do processo de constituição, consolidação e desenvolvimento da sociedade moderna. É fruto da Revolução Industrial e, nesse sentido, é denominada “ciência da crise”, porque, com base nela, procurou-se dar respostas às questões sociais desencadeadas pelo processo revolucionário que, num primeiro momento, alterou a sociedade europeia e, depois, a maior parte do mundo. Como todas as ciências, a Sociologia não despontou de repente ou da reflexão de algum autor iluminado. Constituiu-se com base em conhecimentos sobre a natureza e a sociedade que se desenvolveram a partir do século XIV, acompanhando as mudanças que marcaram a transformação da sociedade feudal e a constituição da sociedade capitalista. Entre essas mudanças, a expansão marítima europeia e a ampliação do comércio ultramarino, a Reforma protestante e o desenvolvimento científico e tecnológico podem destacados. São o pano de fundo do movimento intelectual que alterou profundamente as formas de explicar a natureza e a sociedade. Essas mudanças estão todas vinculadas e não podem ser entendidas como eventos isolados. 1 A EXPANSÃO MARÍTIMA Com a circum-navegação da África e o descobrimento da rota para as Índias e para a América, a concepção de mundo dos europeus foi consideravelmente ampliada. A definição de um mundo territorialmente bem mais vasto, com outros povos, outras culturas e outros modos de explicar as coisas, requereu a reformulação da maneira de ver e de pensar dos europeus. Assim, ao mesmo tempo que conheciam novos povos e novas culturas, os europeus instalavam colônias na África, na Ásia e na América. Em razão disso, expandiu-se o comércio de mercadorias (sedas, especiarias e produtos tropicais, como açúcar, milho, tabaco e café) entre as metrópoles e as colônias, bem como entre os países europeus. Surgiu a possibilidade de um mercado muito mais amplo e com características mundiais. Este seria o primeiro grande movimento de globalização. A exploração de metais preciosos, principalmente na América, e o tráfico de escravos para suprir a mão de obra nas colônias deram grande impulso ao comércio, que não mais ficou restrito aos mercadores das cidades-repúblicas (Veneza, Florença ou Flandres), passando também para as mãos de grandes comerciantes e de soberanos dos Estados nacionais em formação na Europa. Toda essa expansão territorial e comercial acelerou o desenvolvimento da economia monetária, com a acumulação de capitais pela burguesia comercial, que, mais tarde, teve importância decisiva na gestação do processo de industrialização da Europa. 2 A REFORMA PROTESTANTE No século XVI, assistiu-se também ao movimento que ficaria conhecido como Reforma protestante. Os reformistas questionavam as condutas do clero, a estrutura da Igreja católica e a autoridade do Papa. Os líderes do movimento promoviam a valorização do indivíduo ao pregar a livre leitura das Escrituras Sagradas e dispensar a intermediação dos ministros da Igreja nas práticas religiosas e nos assuntos relativos à fé. A Reforma contribuiu, assim, para alimentar um movimento de resistência à autoridade e à tradição que desembocaria na Ilustração. Entre seus principais líderes figuram Martinho Lutero (1483-1546) e João Calvino (1509-1564). 3 O DESENVOLVIMENTO CIENTÍFICO E TECNOLÓGICO A nova maneira de se relacionar com as coisas sagradas foi acompanhada de uma nova forma de analisar o universo e a vida em sociedade. A razão passou a ser considerada essencial para conhecer o mundo; com base nela, as pessoas se consideraram livres para julgar, avaliar, pensar e emitir opiniões sem se submeter a nenhuma autoridade transcendente ou divina. A análise do universo e da vida em sociedade com base no conhecimento racional, fundado na observação e na experimentação, difundiu-se de maneira lenta, entre os séculos XV e XVII. Os pensadores que adotaram essa forma de análise enfrentaram o dogmatismo e a autoridade da Igreja. Por meio do Concílio de Trento (1545-1563) e dos processos da Inquisição, por exemplo, os membros do clero procuraram impedir toda e qualquer manifestação que pudesse pôr em dúvida a autoridade eclesiástica, fosse no campo da fé, fosse no das explicações que se propunham para a sociedade e a natureza. Os principais representantes do pensamento racional nos séculos XV a XVII foram Nicolau Maquiavel (1469-1527), Erasmo de Roterdã (1466-1536), Nicolau Copérnico (1473- 1543), Galileu Galilei (1564 -1642), Thomas Hobbes (1588 -1679), Francis Bacon (1561- 1626), René Descartes (1596 -1650) e Baruch Spinoza (1632 -1677). Os conhecimentos desses precursores alimentaram outros pensadores, como John Locke (1632-1704), Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) e Isaac Newton (1643-1727), que propuseram novos princípios para a compreensão da sociedade e da natureza. Vale salientar, por fim, que os pensadores europeus dos séculos XV a XVII buscaram compreender os fenômenos da natureza e da sociedade por meio da observação e da experimentação. 4 AS TRANSFORMAÇÕES NO SÉCULO XVIII No final do século XVIII, na maioria dos países europeus, a burguesia comercial, formada basicamente por comerciantes e banqueiros, constituía uma classe poderosa, em razão, na maior parte das vezes, das ligações econômicas que mantinha com as monarquias. Além de sustentar o comércio entre os países europeus, a burguesia europeia lançava seus tentáculos a vários pontos do mundo, até onde pudesse chegar, comprando e vendendo mercadorias. O capital mercantil estendia-se também a outro ramo de atividade: gradativamente se organizava a produção manufatureira. A compra de matérias-primas e a organização da produção, por meio do trabalho domiciliar ou do trabalho em oficinas, levavam ao desenvolvimento de um novo processo produtivo em contraposição ao das corporações de ofício. Os organizadores das manufaturas passaram a se interessar cada vez mais pelo aperfeiçoamento das técnicas de produção, a fim de produzir mais com menos gente e aumentar significativamente seus lucros. Para tanto, procuraram financiar a invenção de máquinas que pudessem ser utilizadas no processo produtivo. Com a invenção das máquinas de tecer e de descaroçar algodão, e a aplicação industrial da máquina a vapor e de outros tantos inventos destinados a aumentar a produtividade do trabalho, desenvolveu-se o fenômeno que veio a ser chamado de maquinofatura. O trabalho que as pessoas faziam com as mãos ou com ferramentas passava, a partir de então, a ser realizado por máquinas, elevando muito o volume da produção de mercadorias. A utilização da máquina a vapor, que podia mover outras tantas, impulsionou a indústria construtora de máquinas e, consequentemente, a indústria voltada para a produção de ferro e, posteriormente, de aço. Nesse contexto de profundas alterações no processo produtivo, no qual a utilização do trabalho mecânico era cada vez mais frequente, o trabalho artesanal continuou a existir. A maquinofatura se completou com o trabalho assalariado, no qual eram utilizadas, numa escala crescente, a mão de obra feminina e a infantil. Longe da Europa, explorava-se ouro no Brasil, prata no México e algodão nos Estados Unidos da América e na Índia. A maioria dessas atividades era realizada com a utilização do trabalho escravo ou servil. Esses elementos, conjugados, asseguraram as bases do processo de acumulação necessária para a expansão da indústria na Europa. Essas mudanças, somadas à herança cultural e intelectual do século XVII, definiram o século XVIII como explosivo. Se no século anterior a Revolução Inglesa determinou novas formas de organização política, no século XVIII a Revolução Americana e a Francesa alteraram o quadro político ocidental e serviram de exemplo e parâmetro para as revoluções políticas posteriores. As transformações na esfera da produção, a emergência de novas formas de organização política e a exigência da representação popular conferiram características muito específicas a esse século, em que pensadores como Charles de Montesquieu (1689 -1755), Voltaire (1694 - 1778), Denis Diderot (1713 -1784), Jean le Rond d’Alembert (1717 -1783), David Hume (1711 -1776), Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712 -1778), Adam Smith (1723 -1790) e Immanuel Kant (1724 -1804) procuraram, por caminhos às vezes divergentes, refletir sobre a realidade, na tentativa de explicá-la. (shrink)