In this paper, I provide a characterisation of a neglected form of humility: magnanimous humility. Unlike most contemporary analyses of humility, magnanimous humility is not about limitations but instead presupposes that one possesses some entitlement in a context. I suggest that magnanimous intellectual humility (IH) consists in a disposition to appropriately refrain from exercising one’s legitimate epistemic entitlements because one is appropriately motivated to pursue some epistemic good. I then shown that Magnanimous IH has an important role to play in (...) contexts of disagreement and oppression. It calls on knowing parties to refrain from pressing their epistemic entitlements to facilitate mutual understanding. And it is a virtue that oppressed persons have good reason to cultivate to develop meta-lucidity in themselves and others. (shrink)

I seek to vindicate heteronomous shame: shame that one experiences in response to a judgment from another that one does not accept. I suggest that such experiences are instances of interpersonal shame. This is shame that involves a sensitivity to interpersonal ideals, whose instantiation depends partly on the attitudes of others. I defend the importance of such shame by showing how vulnerability to others is a constitutive part of rich interpersonal relationships. The account both casts light on and vindicates the (...) heteronomous shame that is pervasive among marginalised and oppressed groups. Such shame is not irrational but involves an accurate apprehension that misrecognition on the part of others has paralysed their ability to act and so degraded an important part of their identity. (shrink)

According to the perceptual theory of emotions, emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties. The account has recently faced a barrage of criticism recently by critics who point out varies disanalogies between emotion and paradigmatic perceptual experiences. What many theorists fail to note however, is that many of the disanalogies that have been raised to exclude emotions from being perceptual states that represent evaluative properties have also been used to exclude high-level properties from appearing in the content of perception. This suggests (...) that emotions are perceptions of high level properties and perceptual theorists can marshal the arguments used by proponents of high-level perception to defend the perceptual theory. This paper therefore defends an account of emotion as high-level perception. (shrink)

The disciplinary characterisation (DC) is the most popular approach to defining metaphysical naturalism and physicalism. It defines metaphysical naturalism with reference to scientific theories and defines physicalism with reference to physical theories, and suggests that every entity that exists is a posited entity of these theories. DC has been criticised for its inability to solve Hempel’s dilemma and a list of problems alike. In this paper, I propose and defend a novel version of DC that can be called a historical (...) paths approach. The idea is (roughly) that metaphysical naturalism can be defined with reference to the historical ideas that current scientific ideas descend from. I argue that it is not rendered implausible by the above problems, and hence that DC is more defensible and attractive than it may first appear. I then argue that the approach also provides a useful framework for the naturalisation of the philosophy of mind and phenomenology. (shrink)

Russellian monism – an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (1927/1992) – is roughly the view that the natural sciences can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not about their categorical properties, and, moreover, that our qualia are constituted by categorical properties. Recently, Stoljar (2001a, 2001b), Strawson (2008), Montero (2010, 2015), Alter and Nagasawa (2012), and Chalmers (2015) have attempted to develop this doctrine into a version of physicalism. Russellian monism faces the (...) so-called combination problem, according to which it is difficult to see how categorical properties could collectively constitute qualia. In this paper, I suggest that there is an insufficiently discussed aspect of the combination problem which I call the difference-maker problem. Taking the difference-maker problem into account, I argue that the combination problem – whether or not it can be solved – results in a dilemma for the project of developing Russellian physicalism. That is, Russellian monism is either physicalistically unacceptable or it is implausible; hence, Russellian monism and physicalism are incompatible. (shrink)

We commonly appeal to emotions to explain human behaviour: we seek comfort out of grief, we threaten someone in anger and we hide in fear. According to the standard Humean analysis, intentional action is always explained with reference to a belief-desire pair. According to recent consensus, however, emotions have independent motivating force apart from beliefs and desires, and supplant them when explaining emotional action. In this paper I provide a systematic framework for thinking about the motivational structure of emotion and (...) show how it is consistent with the Humean analysis. On this picture, emotions are not reducible to beliefs and desires, instead their primary motivational force comes from their role as modulators of desires—they control the strength of our occurrent desires. Emotions therefore motivate actions through the belief-desire system instead of overriding it. (shrink)

Shun argues that the distinction made between emotions experienced from the first-person perspective and those from the third-person perspective does not capture our everyday emotional experience. My proposal is that even if we accept this claim, first- and third-person perspective taking is still crucial in the development of our emotional psychology. This is so in two respects. First, the features of intimacy and impartiality that mark adult emotional response are a product of a developmental process that involves perspective taking. Second, (...) perspective taking is a crucial part of refining and developing virtuous emotional responses. (shrink)

In this paper, we describe four broad ‘meta-methods’ employed in scientific and philosophical research of qualia. These are the theory-centred metamethod, the property-centred meta-method, the argument-centred meta-method, and the event-centred meta-method. Broadly speaking, the theory-centred meta-method is interested in the role of qualia as some theoretical entities picked out by our folk psychological theories; the property-centred meta-method is interested in some metaphysical properties of qualia that we immediately observe through introspection ; the argument-centred meta-method is interested in the role of (...) qualia in some arguments for non-physicalism; the event-centred metamethod is interested in the role of qualia as some natural events whose nature is hidden and must be uncovered empirically. We will argue that the event-centred metamethod is the most promising route to a comprehensive scientific conception of qualia because of the flexibility of ontological and methodological assumptions it can provide. We also reveal the hidden influences of the different meta-methods and in doing so show why consideration of meta-methods has value for the study of consciousness. (shrink)

Russellian monism—an influential doctrine proposed by Russell (The analysis of matter, Routledge, London, 1927/1992)—is roughly the view that physics can only ever tell us about the causal, dispositional, and structural properties of physical entities and not their categorical (or intrinsic) properties, whereas our qualia are constituted by those categorical properties. In this paper, I will discuss the relation between Russellian monism and a seminal paradox facing epiphenomenalism, the paradox of phenomenal judgment: if epiphenomenalism is true—qualia are causally inefficacious—then any judgment (...) concerning qualia, including epiphenomenalism itself, cannot be caused by qualia. For many writers, including Hawthorne (Philos Perspect 15:361–378, 2001), Smart (J Conscious Stud 11(2):41–50, 2004), and Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson (The philosophy of mind and cognition, Blackwell, Malden, 2007), Russellian monism faces the same paradox as epiphenomenalism does. I will assess Chalmers’s (The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory. Oxford University Press, New York, 1996) and Seager’s (in: Beckermann A, McLaughlin BP (eds) The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford University Press, New York, 2009) defences of Russellian monism against the paradox, and will put forward a novel argument against those defences. (shrink)

Monism is our name for a range of views according to which the connection between dispositions and their categorical bases is intimate and necessary, or on which there are no categorical bases at all. In contrast, Dualist views hold that the connection between dispositions and their categorical bases is distant and contingent. This paper is a defence of Monism against an influential conceivability argument in favour of Dualism. The argument suggests that the apparent possibility of causal behaviour coming apart from (...) categorical bases is best explained by Dualism. We argue that Monism can explain the apparent possibility as well, if we take metaphysically alien laws — namely, laws whose metaphysical nature is alien to the actual world — into account. (shrink)

Contextualists and Subject Sensitive Invariantists often cite the knowledge norm of assertion as part of their argument. They claim that the knowledge norms in conjunction with our intuitions about when a subject is properly asserting in low or high stakes contexts provides strong evidence that what counts as knowledge depends on practical factors. In this paper, I present new data to suggest they are mistaken in the way they think about cases involving high and low stakes and I show how (...) insensitive invariantists can explain the data. I exploit recent work done on the distinction between flouting a norm and being blamed for that violation to formulate a rigorous theory of rational expected blameworthiness that allows insensitive invariantists to explain the data cited. (shrink)

Alexander Bird (2001; 2002; 2007) offers a powerful argument showing that, regardless of whether necessitarianism or contingentism about laws is true, salt necessarily dissolves in water. The argument is that the same laws of nature that are necessary for the constitution of salt necessitate the solubility of salt. This paper shows that Bird’s argument faces a serious objection if the possibility of emergentism – in particular, C. D. Broad’s account – is taken into account. The idea is (roughly) that some (...) emergent laws in some possible worlds may disrupt the solubility of salt without disrupting its constitution. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Lewtas [2017] recently articulated an argument claiming that emergent conscious causal powers are impossible. In developing his argument, Lewtas makes several assumptions about emergence, phenomenal consciousness, categorical properties, and causation. We argue that there are plausible alternatives to these assumptions. Thus, the proponent of emergent conscious causal powers can escape Lewtas’s challenge.

The Humility Thesis is a persistent thesis in contemporary metaphysics. It is known by a variety of names, including, but not limited to, Humility, Intrinsic Humility, Kantian Humility, Kantian Physicalism, Intrinsic Ignorance, Categorical Ignorance, Irremediable Ignorance, and Noumenalism. According to the thesis, we human beings, and any knowers that share our general ways of knowing, are irremediably ignorant of a certain class of properties that are intrinsic to material entities … Continue reading Humility Regarding Intrinsic Properties →.

Is vision merely a state of the beholder’s sensory organ which can be explained as an immediate effect caused by external sensible objects? Or is it rather a successive process in which the observer actively scanning the surrounding environment plays a major part? These two general attitudes towards visual perception were both developed already by ancient thinkers. The former is embraced by natural philosophers (e.g., atomists and Aristotelians) and is often labelled “intromissionist”, based on their assumption that vision is an (...) outcome of the causal influence exerted by an external object upon a sensory organ receiving an entity from the object. The latter attitude to vision as a successive process is rather linked to the “extramissionist” theories of the proponents of geometrical optics (such as Euclid or Ptolemy) who suggest that an entity – a visual ray – is sent forth from the eyes to the object. The present paper focuses on the contributions to this ancient controversy proposed by some 13th-century Latin thinkers. [...]. (shrink)

In “Two Dogmas”, Quine indicates that Carnap’s Aufbau fails “in principle” to reduce our knowledge of the external world to sense data. This is because in projecting the sensory material to reconstruct the physical world, Carnap gives up the use of operating rules and switches to a procedure informed by general principles. This procedure falls short of providing an eliminative translation for the connective “is at”, which is necessary for the reduction. In dissecting Quine’s objection, I argue that Quine has (...) at best proven the claim that the use of general principles essentially fails the task of radical reductionism. However, in order to establish the conclusion that the Aufbau fails in principle, Quine needs to further vindicate two other claims. They are: first, a switch from operating rules to general principles is necessary; second, the set of general principles Carnap adopts is the best alternative. By disambiguating the notion of “explicit definition” and examining the concept of definability in the Aufbau, I explore the possibility of justifying these two claims that Quine overlooks in his objection. The result suggests that Quine’s objection stands in tension with his radical reductionist reading of the Aufbau. (shrink)

This thesis presents an interpretation of David Hume’s essay ‘Of the Standard of Taste’. The most distinguishing feature of this interpretation is the emphasis placed on the significance of Hume’s general philosophical position in a faithful reading of this philosophical classic. The success of this interpretation will show that Hume’s essay should be read as an integral part of his system of philosophy. There are three parts in this thesis. The first part is an overview of some key aspects of (...) Hume’s philosophy which are relevant to my interpretation. Unlike many contemporary philosophers in the analytic tradition, Hume is a systematic thinker. A faithful reading of his works should take his general philosophical framework seriously. Therefore, this overview of his system serves as the general background of the next two parts. The second part is a discussion of Hume’s aesthetic thought. More specifically, it provides an exposition of his view on beauty and judgements of beauty. This part completes the stage-setting for the development of my interpretation, by helping the reader form a more specific conceptual framework for understanding Hume’s essay. The third part develops an interpretation of ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ according to what has been provided in the previous two parts. It starts with an outline of the essay, which indicates Hume’s aim in writing it. After that, a few sections are devoted to some central elements of the essay. The last section of this part discusses four controversies concerning Hume’s essay. These discussions establish the strength of this interpretation, or at least, the fruitful prospect of an interpretative project that integrates Hume’s essay into his whole system. (shrink)

Ontological principles are needed in order to bridge the gap between medical and biological information in a robust and computable fashion. This is essential in order to draw inferences across the levels of granularity which span medicine and biology, an example of which include the understanding of the roles of tumor markers in the development and progress of carcinoma. Such information integration is also important for the integration of genomics information with the information contained in the electronic patient records in (...) such a way that real time conclusions can be drawn. In this paper we describe a large multi-granular datasource built by using ontological principles and focusing on the case of colon carcinoma. (shrink)

There are a number of existing classifications and staging schemes for carcinomas, one of the most frequently used being the TNM classification. Such classifications represent classes of entities which exist at various anatomical levels of granularity. We argue that in order to apply such representations to the Electronic Health Records one needs sound ontologies which take into consideration the diversity of the domains which are involved in clinical bioinformatics. Here we outline a formal theory for addressing these issues in a (...) way that the ontologies can be used to support inferences relating to entities which exist at different anatomical levels of granularity. Our case study is the colon carcinoma, one of the most common carcinomas prevalent within the European population. (shrink)

Medieval Theories of Perception and the Activity of Senses in the Franciscan Context (in Czech). A book-length study (175.000 words) on Roger Bacon's, Peter Olivi's, and Peter Auriol's philosophy of perception.

In this paper we describe a few interrelated issues for validating theories that posit levels of consciousness. First, validating levels of consciousness requires consensus about the ordering of conscious states, which cannot be easily achieved. This problem is particularly severe if we believe conscious states can be irreducibly smeared over time. Second, the relationship between conscious states is probably sometimes intransitive, which means levels of consciousness will not be amenable to a single continuous measure. Finally, even if a multidimensional approach (...) to levels of consciousness is adopted, we argue that there are further problems for its validation. (shrink)

Bu çalışmanın amacı, okuma kültürünün geliştirilmesine yönelik aile farkındalık programının (OKGYAFP) çocukta okuma kültürü oluşturmaya yönelik aile yeterliliğine etkisini belirlemek ve ailelerin OKGYAFP deneyimlerinin okuma kültürü oluşturmaya yönelik yeterliliklerini nasıl değiştirdiğini keşfetmektir. Bu nedenle çalışmada karma yöntem araştırma desenlerinden açımlayıcı sıralı karma desen kullanılmıştır. Araştırmanın nicel aşamasında öntest-sontest kontrol gruplu yarı deneysel desen tercih edilmiştir. Nitel aşamasında ise odak grup görüşmeleri yapılmıştır. Araştırmanın nicel boyutunun katılımcılarını Aydın ili Köşk ilçesinde bulunan bir devlet okulunun iki 2. sınıf şubesinin gönüllü velileri (n=30) (...) oluşturmuştur. Nitel boyutunun çalışma grubunu ise araştırmanın deney grubunda yer alan velilerden gönüllü 10 kişi oluşturmuştur. Araştırmada veri toplama aracı olarak Okuma Kültürü Oluşturmada Aile Yeterliliği Ölçeği ve görüşme formu kullanılmıştır. Bu araştırmanın nicel verilerinin analizi için betimsel istatistiklerin yanı sıra tek yönlü kovaryans analizinden (ANCOVA) yararlanılmıştır. Nitel veriler ise içerik analizi yöntemiyle çözümlenmiştir. Araştırmanın bulgularına göre deney grubu velilerinin okuma kültürü oluşumunda aile yeterliliği son test puanlarının anlamlı düzeyde farklılaştığı görülmüştür. Ayrıca OKGYAFP’nin deney grubunu oluşturan veliler üzerinde okuma kültürü ediniminde aile yeterliliği noktasında yüksek etkiye sahip olduğu bulgusuna da ulaşılmıştır. Araştırma sonucunda aileler programın okuma kültürü bağlamında farkındalık oluşturduğunu ifade etmiştir. Katılımcı ailelerin programın sonunda okuma kültürü oluşturmada aile yeterliliği düzeyleri ile programa ilişkin görüşlerinin tam olarak örtüştüğü de görülmüştür. (shrink)

Conclusion: The present results support adequate psychometric properties in terms of factorial validity, reliability, convergent validity, and measurement invariance for the PHQ-4 in young adults in Hong Kong. The PHQ-4 demonstrated a substantial mediating role in the relationship between meaning in life and SI in the distress group. These findings support clinical relevance for using the PHQ-4 as a brief and valid measure of psychological distress in the Chinese context.

Delivery riders became frontline workers who assisted everyone in getting their daily supplies. They transported them to their destinations when the pandemic started, and everyone had to stay home to stop the COVID-19 virus from spreading. Thus, this study explores the experiences, challenges, and coping mechanisms of 15 Female Delivery Riders in Bulacan, Philippines. The study employed Heideggerian Phenomenology and Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis (IPA). Further, the following themes arise: (1) The Realist, (2) The Accommodated, (3) The Vulnerable, and (4) The (...) Determined. These themes highlighted the experiences and challenges faced by the participants. Moreover, it is highly suggested that female employees should be given preferential assistance given their physical capabilities and role in the family. Thus, local government units should provide an alternative source of income that will allow them to have quality time with their family, especially their children. (shrink)

Pothi, a popular Punjabi word, means a book. Among the Sikhs, however, pothi signifies a sacred book, especially one containing Gurbani or scriptural text. Although the word is used even for the Aad Granth in the index of the original recession prepared by Guru Arjan. He probably alluding to the Aad Granth pronounces pothi to be "the abode of God" for it contains "complete knowledge of God" (AGGS, p1226). However, in Aad Guru Granth Sahib (AGGS) [8, 17], the word ‘pothi’ (...) has been used to depict a prayer book, a sacred book, holy scripture and the Hindu scriptures. In this article, the historico-critical analysis of the words pothi, parmesar and thaan is done. In addition to the interpretation of the verse 'Pothi Parmesar Ka Thaan', the role and importance of pothis (Holy Scriptures) for spiritual enlightenment is described. It is pointed out that AGGS advises us to avoid the ritualism of pothi recital. Rather it exhorts us to understand the real meaning of what is written in the Holy Scriptures (pothis). Also, it urges us to become a God-conscious being [11] (Brahm Giani) - a person who always delights in doing well to others. From here onward pothi will not be depicted in italics. (shrink)

In this essay I consider the end-of-art thesis in its metaphysical and empirical versions. I show that both use the correspondence theory of truth as the basis for their conception of the history of art. As a counterpart to these theories I have chosen Patočka’s conception of the history of art. His theory is based also on the relationship between art and truth, but he conceives truth in the phenomenological sense of manifestation. In the rest of the essay I seek (...) to show the consequences Patočka’s conception has for the history of art. In the rst part, I set out to show Patocka’s critique of Hegel’s aesthetics as a system based on the correspondence theory of truth. In particular, I endeavour to explain his critique of some intrinsic problems of Hegel’s aesthetics, the general failure of Hegel’s system to achieve its goal, and, lastly, Hegel’s giving up on the meaning of the art in the present. I also seek to show that Danto’s version runs into the same problems and conclusions as Hegel’s. In the second part I discuss Patočka’s analysis of modern art and the aesthetic attitude, where he nds a hidden a nity between art and aletheia, which Hegel overlooked. e last part of the essay focuses on the consequences that the conception of the truth of art as aletheia have for the history of art. I conclude that art in such a conception represents an independent eld of the manifestation of being in history beside philosophy. Moreover, modern and contemporary art do not mean the end of art; rather, they have their place in art history based on aletheia, since they are more focused on the manifestation itself than on what is manifested. Unlike Hegel and Danto, therefore, Patočka retains the historical meaning of modern and contemporary art. His conception of the history of art, summed up under the idea of aletheia, has greater explanatory potential than Hegel’s and Danto’s conceptions, and it retains the historical meaning of modern and contemporary art. (shrink)

इस पर्चे में मैंने विज्ञान के विकास को आधुनिकता की पृष्टभूमि में मानव-मुक्ति के लक्ष्य की दशा व दिशा के सन्दर्भ में आलोचनात्मक विश्लेषण पद्धति से समझने का प्रयास किया है। इस कार्य के लिए मैंने पेपर में चार प्रमुख बिंदुओं को उढाया है। -/- पहला बिंदु विज्ञान की मूल्य निरपेक्षता (Value neutrality) को लेकर है जिसके तहत मैंने पूँजी के साथ विज्ञान के संबंध को समझने का प्रयास किया है। -/- दूसरे बिंदु में विज्ञान शिक्षा और सामाजिक सरोकार के (...) संबंध को वैज्ञानिक तार्किकता (Scientific rationality) और यांत्रिक तार्किकता (Instrumental rationality) के सन्दर्भ में समझने का प्रयास किया है। -/- तीसरे बिंदु में समाज में विज्ञान के अधिपत्य को लेकर उठाया गया है जिसके कारण विज्ञान का अन्य प्रकार की ज्ञान प्रणालियों से संबंध विच्छेद करने की प्रवित्ति को बढ़ावा मिलता है। -/- चौथे एवं अंतिम बिंदु में मैंने विज्ञान, तकनीक व विज्ञान का समाज के प्रति नैतिक उत्तरदायित्व के अंतरसंबंध को समझने का प्रयास किया है। . (shrink)

प्रस्तावित शोध-पत्र विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन के उद्भव, विकास एवं स्वरूप का विवेचन एवं विश्लेषण हैं। विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन किस प्रकार नवीन परम्परा के रूप में समकालीन पाश्चात्य दर्शन में उदित होता है एवं यह किस प्रकार से दार्शनिक विचारों में परिवर्तन लाता है, इसकी व्याख्या करना इस शोध-पत्र का प्रमुख उद्देश्य है। साथ ही प्राचीन एवं समकालीन दृष्टिकोणों में विश्लेषण की प्रकृति को लेकर क्या भिन्नता है जो विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन को दर्शनशास्त्र की अन्य शाखाओं से पृथक करता है। इस क्रम में शोध-पत्र (...) में विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन के विकास को तीन चरणों में विभक्त किया गया है। प्रथम चरण ‘प्रारम्भिक विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन’ के अन्तर्गत रसेल एवं मूर द्वारा प्रत्ययवाद के विरुद्ध नव्य-यथार्थवाद के प्रतिपादन की चर्चा की गयी है। तदुपरान्त, द्वितीय चरण ‘तार्किक विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन’ के अन्तर्गत रसेल, पूर्ववर्ती विट्गेन्सटाइन एवं तार्किक भाववादियों के मतों की विवेचना की गई है। तृतीय चरण ‘भाषाई विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन’ के अन्तर्गत परवर्ती विट्गेन्सटाइन, कैम्ब्रिज साधारण भाषा दर्शन एवं ऑक्सफोर्ड साधारण भाषा दर्शन का विवेचन एवं मूल्यांयन किया गया है।. (shrink)

Ang kakayahan ng mga mag-aaral sa paggamit ng wikang Filipino ay nararapat lamang na malinang nang lubusan ng mga tagapagturong may sapat na kasanayan. Ang pag-aaral na ito ay gumamit ng pagsusuring palarawan, upang malinaw na makita ang saloobin ng mga mag-aaral sa paggamit ng Filipino sa paraan na pagpapahayag ng kanilang saloobin. Nilayon ng pag-aaral na ito na malaman ang saloobin ng mga mag-aaral hinggil sa paggamit ng Filipino sa mga piling asignatura ng GEC (General Education Subject) kabilang dito (...) ang GEC 5 (Purposive Communication), GEC 2 (Readings in Philippine History), GEC 1 (Understanding The Self) at GEM 14 (The Life and Works of Rizal). Sinusuri rin dito ang mga uri ng pag-uulat, mga sulatin at proyekto sa naging negatibong saloobin ng mga mag-aaral sa paggamit ng wikang Filipino. At bilang midyum sa mga piling asignatura, 33 o 27.50% ng mga mag-aaral ay may negatibong tugon samantalang (87 o 72.50%) karamihan ay nagsabi na kailangan, mahalaga, nakatutulong, madaling gamitin, at gamitin pa sa ibang asignatura. Ang mga respondent ay napatunayan na batid nila na ang paggamit ng Filipino ay isa sa mga wikang panturo sa mga piling asignatura sa antas tersarya at ang walang pagkakaibang saloobin ng mga mag-aaral sa paggamit ng Filipino ay nagpapakita ng kanilang positibong pagtanggap sa Filipino ay kinakailangan sa kanilang pagkatuto. Batay sa kinalabasan ng pag-aaral, ang mga mag-aaral ay kailangang mabigyan ng mga kaukulang gawain kaugnay sa wika upang mapahalagahan ang kanilang saloobin at lalong magamit ang wikang Filipino bilang unang wika sa paraang pasulat at pasalita. (shrink)

प्रस्तावित शोध-पत्र विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन के उद्भव, विकास एवं स्वरूप का विवेचन एवं विश्लेषण हैं। विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन किस प्रकार नवीन परम्परा के रूप में समकालीन पाश्चात्य दर्शन में उदित होता है एवं यह किस प्रकार से दार्शनिक विचारों में परिवर्तन लाता है, इसकी व्याख्या करना इस शोध-पत्र का प्रमुख उद्देश्य है। साथ ही प्राचीन एवं समकालीन दृष्टिकोणों में विश्लेषण की प्रकृति को लेकर क्या भिन्नता है जो विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन को दर्शनशास्त्र की अन्य शाखाओं से पृथक करता है। इस क्रम में शोध-पत्र (...) में विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन के विकास को तीन चरणों में विभक्त किया गया है। प्रथम चरण ‘प्रारम्भिक विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन’ के अन्तर्गत रसेल एवं मूर द्वारा प्रत्ययवाद के विरुद्ध नव्य-यथार्थवाद के प्रतिपादन की चर्चा की गयी है। तदुपरान्त, द्वितीय चरण ‘तार्किक विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन’ के अन्तर्गत रसेल, पूर्ववर्ती विट्गेन्सटाइन एवं तार्किक भाववादियों के मतों की विवेचना की गई है। तृतीय चरण ‘भाषाई विश्लेषणात्मक दर्शन’ के अन्तर्गत परवर्ती विट्गेन्सटाइन, कैम्ब्रिज साधारण भाषा दर्शन एवं ऑक्सफोर्ड साधारण भाषा दर्शन का विवेचन एवं मूल्यांयन किया गया है।. (shrink)

The paper provides a historical take on Filipino populism particularly former President Rodrigo Duterte’s leadership. The study contends that Duterte’s populism relies on his charisma as a strongman, where he frames his image as the father of the nation. The study relates this to Filipino philosopher Leonardo Mercado’s concept of sakop. This notion is best seen in the Filipinos’ harmonization of familial relations into other areas of society.

प्रस्तुत शोध-पत्र निरपेक्ष अथवा ब्रह्म एवं ईश्वर के संप्रत्यय को व्यापक रूप से शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले के दर्शन के संदर्भ में विवेचित करता है। भारतीय एवं पाश्चात्य जगत के मूर्धन्य विद्वानों विशेषकर शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले के निरपेक्ष एवं ईश्वर संबंधी विचारों में निहित साम्यताओं एवं वैषम्यताओं का अनुशीलन करना, इस शोध-पत्र का मुख्य उद्देश्य है। इस हेतु शोध-पत्र के अंतर्गत सर्वप्रथम यह विमर्श किया गया है कि क्यों उक्त दोनों दार्शनिकों के संदर्भ में ही ब्रह्म एवं ईश्वर की अवधारणा का (...) विवेचन किया गया है। द्वितीयतः, शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले दोनों के सत् या निरपेक्ष संबंधी विचारों का विश्लेषण किया गया है। तृतीयतः, दोनों के दर्शन में सत् एवं ईश्वर के स्वरूप का विमर्श प्रस्तुत करते हुए तुलनात्मक अध्ययन किया गया है और अंत में उपरोक्त बिंदुओं का गहन मूल्यांकन करते हुए निष्कर्ष को प्रस्तुत करने का प्रयास किया गया है।. (shrink)

In contrast to a stereotypical account of Indian philosophy that are entailments of the interpreter’s beliefs (an approach that violates basic standards of reason), an approach to Indian philosophy grounded on the constraints of formal reason reveals not only a wide spread disagreement on dharma (THE RIGHT OR THE GOOD), but also a pervasive commitment to the practical foundation of life’s challenges. The flip side of this practical orientation is the criticism of ordinary experience as erroneous and reducible to the (...) agent’s mental states. If we ignore the background practical orientation in Indian philosophy, this seems not like an error theory, that I call Ironic Idealism, but as a defense of idealism. I consider salient candidates for Indian Idealism (Advaita Vedānta, Yogācāra Buddhism, Kāśmīra Śaivism and the Yogavāsiṣṭha) and note that these positions continue a theme in Indian philosophy of articulating Ironic Idealism. Ironic Idealism depends upon the very Indian distinction between ultimate and provisional truth, and Ironic Idealism criticizes the mundane, provisional sort of "truth" as psychological and mental --- and ultimately false. Interpretation, the common approach to the study of Indian philosophy, is an example of what Ironic Idealism criticizes. This explains why authors incorrectly find Idealism everywhere in Indian thought. (shrink)

At a distance of more ten years from publication (2000 French/2005 English translation), with this essay I will re-read, comment and discuss, in different way and in form of anthological sketch, the Derridean volume ‘On Touching-Jean Luc Nancy’, focusing in particular on its ‘tangents and its metonymies’, its manifold entanglements with the metaphysics of touch and bodily connections. Making use of the geometrical figure of the tangent, Derrida affirms that "[if] philosophy has touched the limit [my emphasis-J. D. ]. of (...) the ontology of subjectivity, this is because philosophy has been led to this limit”. To touch is to touch a limit, a limit without depth or surface. How have we regarded touching in the past? The body? My thesis is that if Derridean reflection remains mostly anchored to Jean-Luc Nancy’s Corpus, it is inspired nevertheless by a different deconstructive gesture/s similar to different geometric tangents (the deconstructive practice is similar to the tracing of many tangents). Discussing in particular Nancy’s Dis-Enclosure: The Deconstruction of Christianity, Derrida’essay ‘Deconstruction of Christianity’ and devoting an entire section of the book to the sense of touch in the Gospels, Derrida gives us numerous and special considerations on deconstruction and the deconstruction of touch in Christianity, admitting as well the enormity of this task. A reflection on the Kas Saghafi, “Safe, Intact”: Derrida, Nancy, and the “Deconstruction of Christianity” will follow in an exemplary way. Following a discussion of touch and the body in both animal and human spheres, in the closing section of the essay, I will comment on the Patrick Llored’s essay A Philosophy of Touching Between the Human and the Animal: The Animal Ethics of Jacques Derrida, recently published in A Companion to Derrida (2014). This study addresses highly topical questions such as: ‘What does it teach us about touch, but also about the body and the life of the animal? To what extent is it capable of renewing our knowledge [connaissance] of non-human life and of generating an animal ethics reconceived from top to bottom? If touching is coextensive with the living body, that implies not only that we place the haptical question at the centre of reflection on the animal, but also that we take into account the consequence that is most disruptive for us today (A Companion, p. 512). And conclude along with Patrick Llored that the question of touch promises to transform everything we have understood until now about animality. (shrink)

8-9 Kasım 2012’de, Hacettepe Üniversitesi İngilizce İktisat Bölümü tarafından düzenlenen “Marx, Marksizmler ve Özgürlük” konferansı uzun zamandır üzerinde çalıştığım konular ile ilgili görüşlerimi sunma fırsatı verdi. Praksis dergisini ilk yayınladığım 1996 yılında aşağıda sunduğum düşüncelerimin temellerini atmıştım aslında. Ancak hala teoride ki sorunu bir bütün olarak, Marx ve Engels’te değil Marksizmin kavranılışında olduğunda ısrarcıydım. Çalışmalarım, Marx’ın tarih, diyalektik yöntem, sınıf savaşımı, kapitalizm eleştirisi ve bilim anlayışı gibi pek çok temel konuda tamamen farklı teorik perspektif ve anlayış geliştirmemle sonuçlandı. Bu görüşlerimi (...) kamuoyu ile ilk paylaştığım zemin yukarıda adı geçen bilimsel konferans oldu. Kendi teorik geçmişimle de bir hesaplaşma olan bu metin kuşkusuz okuru tatmin etmekten uzaktır. Çünkü yeni bir bilim teorisi için bir başlangıç metnidir; 19. yüz yıl sosyal teorileri üzerinde yükselen geleneksel ideolojik ön yargılardan kurtulmuş aklın, çağdaş bilimsel verilere yaslanarak yeni maceralara cesaretle atılmayı özendirecek olan bir başlangıç metni. (shrink)

In the world of Avatar: The Last Airbender (ATLA) and The Legend of Korra (LOK) —let’s call it the Bending World—some people (“benders”) are endowed with telekinetic superpowers to maneuver surrounding objects without physical interaction, by mentally steering (“bending”) one of the four classical “elements of nature” composing the objects: air, fire, water, and earth. Perhaps, in a world where the fundamental laws of nature are radically different from those of our world, the fundamental conditions and manifestations of politics should (...) be radically different too. That, of course, is not to deny that political bodies familiar to us are depicted in ATLA and LOK: tribes, monarchies, autonomous townships, city-states, loose federations, colonial empires, and democracies. Despite those familiar depictions, however, it’s worth contemplating how the existence of supernatural power might fundamentally alter the norms and rationales of politics—and how it might in turn help us better understand our own political reality. (shrink)

By “epistemic pragmatism” in general I will understand the claim that whether propositions instantiate certain key epistemic properties (such as being known or being justifiably believed) depends not just on factors traditionally recognized as epistemic, but also on pragmatic factors, such as how costly it would be to the subject if the proposition were false. In what follows I consider two varieties of epistemic pragmatism. According to what I shall call moderate epistemic pragmatism, how much evidence we need in favor (...) of a proposition in order to know that the proposition is true depends on our preferences. According to what I shall call extreme epistemic pragmatism, on the other hand, our preferences influence our epistemic position at a more basic level, because they help determine how much justification we actually have in favor of the proposition in question. Simplifying brutally, moderate epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition’s being false, the more justification we need in order to know it, whereas extreme epistemic pragmatism has it that the more worried we are about a proposition’s being false, the less justification we have for it. Recently, Fantl and McGrath have presented an interesting argument for moderate epistemic pragmatism, an argument which relies on the principle that (roughly) knowledge is sufficient for action (KA). In this paper I argue that KA, together with a plausible principle about second-order evidence, entails extreme epistemic pragmatism. (shrink)

Whereas the Platonic-Christian philosophical tradition in the West favours an ”ascent to theory’ and abstract reasoning, east-Asian philosophies tend to be rooted in somatic, or bodily, practice. In the philosophies of Confucius and Zhuangzi in China, and KÅ«kai and Dōgen in Japan, we can distinguish two different forms of somatic practice: developing physical skills, and what one might call ”realising relationships’. These practices improve our relations with others -- whether the ancestors or our contemporaries, the things with which we surround (...) ourselves or the phenomena of nature -- by reducing egocentrism and increasing humility. Because they transform the practitioner’s experience, the major benefit of philosophies grounded in somatic practice is that they help close the gap between beliefs and behaviour, and between ideas and action. (shrink)

This paper argues for and explores the implications of the following epistemological principle for knowability a priori (with 'Ka' abbreviating 'it is knowable a priori that'). -/- (AK) For all ϕ, ψ such that ϕ semantically presupposes ψ: if Ka(ϕ), Ka(ψ). -/- Well-known arguments for the contingent a priori and a priori knowledge of logical truth founder when the semantic presuppositions of the putative items of knowledge are made explicit. Likewise, certain kinds of analytic truth turn out to carry semantic (...) presuppositions that make them ineligible as items of a priori knowledge. -/- On a happier note, I argue that (AK) offers an appealing, theory-neutral explanation of the a posteriori character of certain necessary identities, as well as an interesting rationalization for a commonplace linguistic maneuver in philosophical work on the a priori. (shrink)

In many languages, the same particles that form quantifier words also serve as connectives, additive and scalar particles, question markers, roots of existential verbs, and so on. Do these have a unified semantics, or do they merely bear a family resemblance? Are they aided by silent operators in their varied roles―if yes, what operators? I dub the particles “quantifier particles” and refer to them generically with capitalized versions of the Japanese morphemes. I argue that both MO and KA can be (...) assigned a stable semantics across their various roles. The specific analysis I offer is motivated by the fact that MO and KA often combine with just one argument; I propose that this is their characteristic behavior. Their role is to impose semantic requirements that are satisfied when the immediately larger context is interpreted as the meet/join of their host’s semantic contribution with something else. They do not perform meet/join themselves. The obligatory vs. optional appearance of the particles depends on whether the meet/join interpretations arise by default in the given constellation. I explicate the proposal using the toolkit of basic Inquisitive Semantics. (shrink)

Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument (KA) aims to prove, by means of a thought experiment concerning the hypothetical scientist Mary, that conscious experiences have non-physical properties, called qualia. Mary has complete scientific knowledge of colours and colour vision without having had any colour experience. The central intuition in the KA is that, by seeing colours, Mary will learn what it is like to have colour experiences. Therefore, her scientific knowledge is incomplete, and conscious experiences have qualia. In this paper I consider (...) an objection to the KA raised by Daniel Dennett. He maintains that the KA is vitiated by Jackson’s account of Mary’s scientific knowledge. While endorsing this criticism, I will defend the plausibility and relevance of the type of strategy involved in the KA by offering an account of Mary’s scientific knowledge. This account involves formulating a reasonable and not immediately false version of the physicalist thesis with regard to colour experiences. Whether this version of the KA is successful against this type of physicalism is not investigated here. (shrink)

Filosofian piirissä on viime aikoina käyty intensiivistä keskustelua metafysiikan naturalisoinnista ja tieteellisen metafysiikan mahdollisuudesta. Yksi tämän keskustelun keskeisistä teoksista on James Ladymanin ja Don Rossin (sekä osin John Collierin ja David Spurrettin) kirjoittama Every Thing Must Go (2007). Tässä kirjassa Ladyman ja Ross puolustavat, omien sanojensa mukaan, neopositivistista skientismiä. Heidän ohjelmansa on skientistinen, koska Ladymanin ja Rossin mukaan tiede on ainoa tapa tutkia todellisuutta objektiivisesti. Neopositivismi ilmenee puolestaan siinä, että heidän ohjelmansa tukeutuu eräänlaiseen verifikaatioperiaatteeseen. Ladymanin ja Rossin verifikaatioperiaate ei kuitenkaan (...) perustu, toisin kuin aiempien positivistien vastaava, kielelliseen merkitykseen tai suoriin havaintoihin vaan tiedeyhteisöön. Tiedeyhteisö päättää, mitkä kysymykset ja teoriat ovat tutkimisen arvoisia. Ladyman ja Ross esittelevät kirjassaan kaksi metafyysistä ohjelmaa: negatiivisen ja positiivisen. Toisaalta he pyrkivät kritisoimaan analyyttistä metafysiikkaa, jota he pitävät liiaksi irtautuneena nykytieteestä, ja toisaalta antamaan oman naturalistisen metafysiikkansa. Pyrimme tässä artikkelissa osoittamaan, että Ladymanin ja Rossin positiivinen ohjelma on jännitteessä, tai jopa ristiriidassa, heidän negatiivisen ohjelmansa kanssa. Tämä näkyy Ladymanin ja Rossin sitoutumisesta modaalirealismiin ja siinä, miten he yrittävät oikeuttaa sitoumuksensa. Jännitteen vuoksi Ladymanin ja Rossin on luovuttava joko modaalirealismista tai metafysiikalle antamistaan tiukoista vaatimuksista. (shrink)

Tato studie se zabývá dvěma spřízněnými jevy odehrávajícími se ve vědeckém prostředí. Jedná se o fenomén frustrace ve vědecké praxi a s ním spojenou touhu po rozpoznání vlastního výzkumu vědeckou komunitou a následně o otázku uznání od akademického společenství. Zmíněné fenomény jsou přitom úzce propojeny s ústředním tématem filosofie a sociologie vědy: kdo rozhoduje, co bude předmětem vědeckého bádání? Předkládaná studie nejprve představuje Mertonův mýtus o okamžitém rozpoznání vědeckého objevu a následně prostřednictvím exkurzu do oblasti ekonomie a na příkladech z (...) vědecké praxe poukazuje na jeho neplatnost. V závěru textu jsou společně s jejich dekonstrukcí navrhnuta možná řešení popsaných problémů. Text je také kritickým návratem ke dvěma studiím Josepha Agassiho, žáka Karla R. Poppera a tvrdošíjného zastánce kritického racionalismu, neboť právě Agassi ve svých dílech rozebírá dopady vědeckého vyloučení a neochoty naslouchat. (shrink)

Zájem současné sociologie a dalších společenských věd o výzkumy spokojenosti a štěstí zatemňuje skutečnost, že původně právě sociologie chtěla „štěstí" poskytovat a nahrazovat tak náboženské přístupy ke světu. Tento implicitně nábo- ženský charakter je patrný i v rané české sociologii v dílech prvních propagátorů sociologie, jako byl především Emanuel Makovička, a později u některých následovníků a epigonů T. G. Masaryka, v meziválečném období zejména u Ladislava Kunteho, R. I. Malého, Alexandra Sommera-Batěka, Jindřicha Fleischnera a Jana Duška. Z hlediska vývoje české (...) sociologie šlo o zcela okrajové postavy, ačkoli mnohé z nich vynikly v jiných oblastech, jako celek jsou nicméně vyjádřením jednoho z aspektů dobových teoretických úvah o společnosti, jejím uspořádání a vývoji, na který by nemělo být zapomínáno. Zatímco T. G. Masaryka a pozdější akademické sociology „omezoval" vědecký charakter jejich práce, a i pokud směřovali k sociálnímu reformismu, oddělovali jej od teoretické sociologie, „sociologie vedoucí ke štěstí" nalezla plné uplatnění ve vizích a ambiciózních projek- tech těchto amatérských takésociologů - třebaže skončily faktickými nezdary nebo ani nedošly praktického naplnění, ostatně stejně jako v případě jejich pravzoru, Comtova pozitivistického apoštolátu. (shrink)

Psichologizmas yra loginių ir psichologinių terminų reikšmių tapatinimas. Husserlio Prolegomenai yra žymiausias psichologizmą kritikuojantis tekstas. Iki šiol buvo atviras klausimas, kas būtent juose įrodyta. Šio straipsnio tikslas yra į jį atsakyti. Pagrindinis straipsnyje ginamas teiginys yra toks: Prolegomenuose Husserlis įrodė, kad jei reliatyvizmas klaidingas, tai psichologizmas klaidingas, bet neįrodė reliatyvizmo ar psichologizmo klaidingumo, nes jis neįrodė, kad reliatyvizmas save paneigia. Pirmiausia nagrinėjami du kartais Husserliui priskiriami įrodymai: paremtasis prielaida, kad logika yra normatyvi, ir paremtasis prielaida, kad psichologija remiasi logika. Tvirtinama, (...) kad jie nesuderinami su logikos samprata Prolegomenuose. Tuomet nagrinėjami likę įrodymai ir parodoma, kaip iš jų plaukia, kad jei reliatyvizmas klaidingas, tai psichologizmas klaidingas. Galiausiai nagrinėjamas įrodymas, kad reliatyvizmas save paneigia vienu ar kitu būdu: ar savaime, ar tuomet, kai yra išreiškiamas, ar tada, kai įrodinėjamas kitam. Teigiama, kad reliatyvizmo klaidingumas juo neįrodytas. Straipsnio išvados reikšmingos bet kokiam logiką reliatyvizuojančiam požiūriui. (shrink)

*This work is no longer under development* Two major themes in the literature on indicative conditionals are that the content of indicative conditionals typically depends on what is known;1 that conditionals are intimately related to conditional probabilities.2 In possible world semantics for counterfactual conditionals, a standard assumption is that conditionals whose antecedents are metaphysically impossible are vacuously true.3 This aspect has recently been brought to the fore, and defended by Tim Williamson, who uses it in to characterize alethic necessity by (...) exploiting such equivalences as: A⇔¬A A. One might wish to postulate an analogous connection for indicative conditionals, with indicatives whose antecedents are epistemically impossible being vacuously true: and indeed, the modal account of indicative conditionals of Brian Weatherson has exactly this feature.4 This allows one to characterize an epistemic modal by the equivalence A⇔¬A→A. For simplicity, in what follows we write A as KA and think of it as expressing that subject S knows that A.5 The connection to probability has received much attention. Stalnaker suggested, as a way of articulating the ‘Ramsey Test’, the following very general schema for indicative conditionals relative to some probability function P: P = P 1For example, Nolan ; Weatherson ; Gillies. 2For example Stalnaker ; McGee ; Adams. 3Lewis. See Nolan for criticism. 4‘epistemically possible’ here means incompatible with what is known. 5This idea was suggested to me in conversation by John Hawthorne. I do not know of it being explored in print. The plausibility of this characterization will depend on the exact sense of ‘epistemically possible’ in play—if it is compatibility with what a single subject knows, then can be read ‘the relevant subject knows that p’. If it is more delicately formulated, we might be able to read as the epistemic modal ‘must’. (shrink)