Một đại gia hàng đầu thế giới trong ngành kinh doanh giết mổ gia súc, chế biến thịt có xuất xứ Brazil là JBS SA đang chịu áp lực lớn từ các nhóm hoạt động môi trường toàn cầu. JBS đang làm hồ sơ niêm yết cổ phiếu tại SGD New York (NYSE), với hy vọng sẽ có thể bắt đầu niêm yết cuối 2023. Tuy vậy, họ bị tố cáo đã gây tác động tiêu cực qua việc phá rừng, (...) thúc đẩy tiêu cực biến đổi khí hậu và hàng loạt các vấn đề liên quan. (shrink)

1. Biomedical sciences are fast-growing fields with unprecedented speed of research outputs, especially in the quantities of papers. Philosophers aiming to study ongoing biomedical changes face cha...

Regarding the connection between the Qur'an and the New Testament, we noted that Jesus Christ is often presented in the pages of the Qur'an as a moral model, along with his mother Mary. The events of the life of "Qur'an Jesus" are marked by marginal Christianity of the Monophysitism and by the Christian apocrypha circulating in the time of Muhammad in the Eastern space. The Qur'anic images of the figure of Jesus Christ present Him in His dignity as the Messiah, (...) the Prophet, the Divine Sign, and the Word of God. The Qur'anic exegesis proposes variants that diminish the image of Jesus in the Qur'an, reducing him to a mere Prophet, despite obvious Qur'anic texts that state otherwise. The Qur'an does nothing but reforms the Christian morality and change the sense to other meanings assessed by Muhammad and the Caliphs of Islam as suitable for the social life of Muslim communities. References to the Biblical Jesus Christ in the text of the Qur'an are generally divided into four main themes, which are discussed in detail in this article: Birth and Childhood; Teaching and Miracles; Nature and Status before God (Allah); The Death and the Resurrection. (shrink)

Priest's theory of motion is based on Leibniz's Continuity Condition (LCC), which states that any state that exists at each instant in a continuous set of moments also exists at its temporal limit. If we accept the CCL, a free-falling pen would have to be simultaneously in motion and at rest at the instant of change: the critical moment when it hits the ground, thus passing from the state of motion to that of rest. This seems to be a contradictory (...) state of affairs, which is precisely what Priest claims to be the case. In this article, I discuss the logical possibility of empirically testing whether such a contradictory state of affairs occurs. (shrink)

While a plethora of studies has been conducted to examine stress and its impact on mental health in western countries, research is scarce investigating the relationship between student challenge stress and health illness in the context of Chinese colleges. No studies examined the moderating effect of self-efficacy on the relationship between challenge stress and health illness. This study attempted to investigate the relationships between these three variables among Chinese college students. Especially, this study focused on examining whether self-efficacy moderated the (...) effect of perceived challenge stress on students’ mental health. Also, the differences were tested between male and female students in terms of these three variables. A sample of 578 Chinese college students was recruited over an approximately 12-week period from 7 Chinese universities. An online survey link was distributed through WeChat. The SPSS version 26 software was used to analyze the data. Results showed that there is no significant difference between genders in terms of perceived challenge stress, self-efficacy, and students’ mental health. In addition, challenge stress was positively related to the students’ mental health (β = 0.35, p < 0.01) while there was a negative association between self-efficacy and mental health (β = -0.41, p < 0.01). Furthermore, self-efficacy plays a moderating role in the relationship between challenge stress and mental health (β = -0.11, p = 0.02). Students with low self-efficacy tend to experience more mental health issues. It is suggested that Chinese colleges and universities pay more attention to students with low self-efficacy, either through faculty/staff interventions or peer counseling. Professors consider reducing students’ academic stress to improve their mental health. (shrink)

According to our understanding, when we discuss about the religious life in Romania, one must take into account, first of all, the characteristics of this people, its culture and traditions that are over two millennia old. The similarities and differences with the organization and functioning of other religious systems in Europe and around the world cannot and must not exclude the defining elements of a people that has asserted its origins and defended its spiritual integrity over the centuries. In our (...) country there is a close connection between the history, culture, spirituality and education of this people of Latin origin and mostly of Orthodox faith. Starting from these realities, the Romanian Orthodox Church had an important role in preserving the values and national identity in the face of the frequent stepsons of history. Regarding interreligious education in Romania, it is done in public schools, with the discipline of Religion, where, especially in high school, there are classes in the History of Religions in which one learns about religious traditions around the world and how to interact with people belonging to other denominations, religions and ideologies. The phenomenon of migration increases in our country from one year to another producing important changes in terms of economic, cultural, social and religious realities. Taking into account all these realities, the state must promote policies that protect migrant populations and defend human rights for these communities. At the same time, they must be actively involved in protecting families where one or more members are working abroad and in the process of educating children who remain in the care of relatives. (shrink)

The Syncretism, specific of old and new religious currents, is a phenomenon closely linked to millenarian movements and the emergence of so-called prophets that say that transmit divine messages being dependent at the same time, important social changes, economic political and, not least, religious. In the history of religions, syncretism is determined by several factors, among which are the changes in social, political, economic, and new philosophical and religious synthesis, the term acquiring a cosmopolitan sense. Syncretism occurs when two or (...) more social groups with different religions, contact, assimilating their members and various other religious characteristics specific groups and, for the most part, are foreign to their own beliefs. Religious syncretism has grown particularly intense during the first four centuries of the Christian era, but its traces can envision more or less pronounced in all religious history of humanity, with respect to the merger of two or more deities or acceptance of new forms and often contradictory in different parts of religious worship of pagan deities specifically different. (shrink)

The results showed that the relative poverty of women in rural households is extensive and broader, especially in the economic, humanities, and rights dimensions, and is much higher than that of men. Education level, physical health, ideology, and family status are the primary factors affecting the multidimensional relative poverty of women. -/- Conclusion: This study finds that the relative poverty of rural women exists within the family and it is multi-dimensional. This finding provides a reference for promoting well-rounded human development (...) and achieving common prosperity for everyone. (shrink)

Artificial intelligence (AI) is increasingly expected to disrupt the ordinary functioning of society. From how we fight wars or govern society, to how we work and play, and from how we create to how we teach and learn, there is almost no field of human activity which is believed to be entirely immune from the impact of this emerging technology. This poses a multifaceted problem when it comes to designing and understanding regulatory responses to AI. This article aims to: (i) (...) defend the need for a novel conceptual model for understanding the systemic legal disruption caused by new technologies such as AI; (ii) to situate this model in relation to preceding debates about the interaction of regulation with new technologies (particularly the ‘cyberlaw’ and ‘robolaw’ debates); and (iii) to set out a detailed model for understanding the legal disruption precipitated by AI, examining both pathways stemming from new affordances that can give rise to a regulatory ‘disruptive moment’, as well as the Legal Development, Displacement or Destruction that can ensue. The article proposes that this model of legal disruption can be broadly generalisable to understanding the legal effects and challenges of other emerging technologies. (shrink)

Bu çalışmada, Türkiye’de 1963 ile 2012 yılları arasında din psikolojisi alanında yapılan ve hala devam eden yüksek lisans ve doktora tezlerine ilişkin analizler yer almaktadır. Bunun yanında din psikolojisinin Türkiye’de akademide yer alışına dair kısa bir tarihçe vardır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, din psikolojisi doktora tezlerine ilişkin bir bibliyografya oluşturarak, araştırmacılara ve lisansüstü öğrencilerine bir katalog sunmaktır. Ayrıca, tezlere ait verilerin analizleriyle, yapılacak yeni çalışmalara yol göstermek amaçlanmıştır. Yöntem olarak literatür taraması yapılmış, farklı kurumların katalogları taranmış ve alandaki akademisyenlerle görüşülmüştür. Elde (...) edilen bilgiler doğrultusunda tezler, yüksek lisans ve doktora tezleri olarak tasnif edilmiş ve yazar referans alınarak alfabetik sıraya göre dizilmiştir. Tez başlıklarının içerdikleri konular tespit edilmiş ve bu veriler analiz edilmiştir. (shrink)

This paper is the introduction to the volume. It gives an argumentative view of the philosophical landscape concerning incommensurability and incomparability. It argues that incomparability, not incommensurability, is the important phenomenon on which philosophers should be focusing and that the arguments for the existence of incomparability are so far not compelling.

In a society that is constantly changing and transforming, in which new aspects of reality always tend to replace older forms, traditional communities are beginning to lose both their place and the role they have played in history for a long time. Traditional Romanian values acknowledgement and promotion through modern means of mass communication, present and used on a global scale in the modern world, must become both a necessity and priority in order to confirm and preserve the identity, form (...) new generations and reintegrate our national culture into the great universal culture, to which it has always belonged to. In today’s global society we can speak of an increasing dependence of people on media systems. There is an interdependent relationship created between people and the media system as a whole or with certain parts of media. This relationship does not bear only one significance, but it also concerns the way in which media system depends more and more on the resources controlled by others. Without being the only modern means used to achieve certain goals, media facilitates their understanding, orientation and fulfilment. The consumption of a media product depends both on the context in which it is broadcast and on the product itself. The study of media in Romania must start from the Romanian realities, a country which has undergone from totalitarianism to democracy. This has also been reflected and illustrated by the way in which the Romanian media are perceived both locally and in Europe. Radio and television continue to play an important role in this process, along with other modern means of mass communication. The analysis of the Romanian audio-visual media contributes to outline an overview on the impact that media have on the society which we live in. (shrink)

This paper investigates two puzzles in practical reason and proposes a solution to them. First, sometimes, when we are practically certain that neither of two alternatives is better than or as good as the other with respect to what matters in the choice between them, it nevertheless seems perfectly rational to continue to deliberate, and sometimes the result of that deliberation is a conclusion that one alternative is better, where there is no error in one’s previous judgment. Second, there are (...) striking differences between rational agents – some rational agents have most reason to pursue careers on Wall Street while others have most reason to take up a career in teaching, or scuba diving, or working for political causes. These differences aren’t plausibly explained by ‘passive’ facts about our psychology or their causal interaction with our environment; instead, these facts seem in some sense to ‘express who we are’. But what is this sense? These puzzles disappear if we adopt a novel view about the source of the normativity of reasons – some reasons are given to us and others are reasons in virtue of an act of will. We make certain considerations reasons through an act of will and thus sometimes make it true through an act of agency that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. (shrink)

What sorts of consideration can be normative reasons for action? If we systematize the wide variety of considerations that can be cited as normative reasons, do we find that there is a single kind of consideration that can always be a reason? Desire-based theorists think that the fact that you want something or would want it under certain evaluatively neutral conditions can always be your normative reason for action. Value-based theorists, by contrast, think that what plays that role are evaluative (...) facts (or the facts that subvene them) about what you want, such as the fact that having it would be good in some way. This paper argues that value-based theorists are wrong; if we try to find a single kind of consideration that can always be normative reason, we find that sometimes our reason is the fact that we want something and not any corresponding evaluative fact. (shrink)

This encyclopedia entry urges what it takes to be correctives to common (mis)understandings concerning the phenomenon of incommensurability and incomparability and briefly outlines some of their philosophical upshots.

This paper argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model – as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you (...) make a promise to x, then you have a reason to x’. Instead, internal commitments are that in virtue of which one has the special reasons of committed relationships; they are the grounds of such reasons. In this way, the will is a source of practical normativity. (shrink)

The power of music to arouse garden-variety emotions has attracted attention from musicians, psychologists, and philosophers over decades. Despite its widespread acknowledgement, there is no agreement on how pure music with no propositional content can induce such a wide range of emotions. Jenefer Robinson coined this 1 problemthepuzzleofmusicalemotion. Inthisessay,Iwillfirstdiscusswhymusical emotion is a puzzle. Then, Jesse Prinz’s perceptual theory of emotion and his solution 2 to the puzzle will be discussed. Prinz regards an emotion as an embodied appraisal, and a musical (...) emotion as an illusory embodied appraisal which is a by-product of the adaptive emotion system. I argue that it is problematic to regard musical emotions as illusions for two reasons: 1) the bodily responses aroused by music are not specific enough to produce an illusion of a real emotion; 2) musical emotion is adaptive by itself in the sense that it is a mirroring-based simulation of the emotion represented by music, and such mirroring system plays an important role in interpersonal emotion communications. (shrink)

In the recent past, Vietnam has dramatically increased its investment relationship and trade with the United States. At the same time, United States foreign direct investment and trade with China has been decreasing. This is even more significant when we are in a period of internal growth within the United States. Using comparative business system analysis theory and a mixed method approach we conclude that Vietnam is turning into the new China for United States firms due to the fewer differences (...) that exist between their business systems. The Chinese business system has major differences when compared with the economic system of the United States, whereas the Vietnam system has closer resemblance to the United States system. We have laid out inferences of our arguments for future research, particularly in the area of institutional comparative advantage. (shrink)

This paper argues for the existence of a fourth positive generic value relation that can hold between two items beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’: namely ‘on a par’.

Can quite different values be rationally weighed against one another? Can the value of one thing always be ranked as greater than, equal to, or less than the value of something else? If the answer to these questions is no, then in what areas do we find commensurability and comparability unavailable? And what are the implications for moral and legal decision making? This book struggles with these questions, and arrives at distinctly different answers.".

Conflicts between morality and prudence are often thought to pose a special problem because the normativity of moral considerations derives from a distinctively moral point of view, while the normativity of prudential considerations derives from a distinctively prudential point of view, and there is no way to ‘put together’ the two points of view. I argue that talk of points of view is a red herring, and that for any ‘prumoral’ conflict there is some or other more comprehensive value – (...) often nameless – that accounts for the relative normative weight of conflicting moral and prudential considerations. The rational resolution of conflict is possible only in virtue of a more comprehensive value that includes the conflicting moral and prudential considerations as parts. (shrink)

In virtue of what is something a reason for action? That is, what makes a consideration a reason to act? This is a metaphysical or meta-normative question about the grounding of reasons for action. The answer to the grounding question has been traditionally given in ‘pure’, univocal terms. This paper argues that there is good reason to understand the ground of practical normativity as a hybrid of traditional ‘pure’ views. The paper 1) surveys the three leading ‘pure’ answers to the (...) question of a normative ground, 2) examines one or two of the most difficult problems for each, proposing along the way a new objection to one, and 3) argues that a particular hybrid view about normative grounds –‘hybrid voluntarism’ – avoids each of the main problems faced by the three leading ‘pure’ views. (shrink)

In the contemporary epistemological literature, peer disagreement is often taken to be an instance of a more general phenomenon of “higher-order evidence.” Correspondingly, its epistemic significance is often thought to turn on the epistemic significance of higher-order evidence in general. This chapter attempts to evaluate this claim, and in doing so to clarify some points of unclarity in the current literature – both about what it is for evidence to be “higher-order,” and about the relationship between disagreement and higher-order evidence. (...) We will begin by considering some candidate definitions of “higher-order evidence,” and offering our own definition that attempts to capture the phenomenon of interest. We will then consider, in light of this definition, whether disagreement and its epistemic significance are best-understood as a kind of higher-order evidence. We’ll argue that although peer disagreement can be epistemically significant qua higher-order evidence, this role doesn’t exhaust its significance, and that it can also serve as straightforward first-order evidence. Finally, we’ll suggest that inattention to this latter point has made broadly conciliatory views about peer disagreement seem somewhat easier to resist than they in fact are. (shrink)

The goal of this article is twofold. First, it revises the historiographic partition proposed by John Deely in Four Ages of Understanding (2001) by arguing that the moment marking the beginning of philosophical Modernity has been vividly recorded in Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy with the experiment with the wax. Second, an upshot of this historical study is that it helps make sense of Deely’s somewhat iconoclastic use of the words “subject” and “subjectivity” to designate mind-independent worldly things. The hope (...) is that successfully accomplishing these twin tasks will give semiotic inquiry a better appreciation of its own history, as well as resources genial to furthering its ongoing development. (shrink)

What, normatively speaking, are the grounds of rational choice? This paper defends ‘comparativism’, the view that a comparative fact grounds rational choice. It examines three of the most serious challenges to comparativism: 1) that sometimes what grounds rational choice is an exclusionary-type relation among alternatives; 2) that an absolute fact such as that it’s your duty or conforms to the Categorial Imperative grounds rational choice; and 3) that rational choice between incomparables is possible, and in particular, all that is needed (...) for the possibility of rational choice is that one alternative is not worse than the others. Each challenge is questioned. If comparativism is correct, then no matter what normative theory you favor, your answer to the question, ‘What makes my choice rational?’ must be comparative in form. In this way, comparativism provides a framework for normative theorizing. (shrink)

The paper has two aims. The first is to propose a general framework for organizing some central questions about normative practical reasons in a way that separates importantly distinct issues that are often run together. Setting out this framework provides a snapshot of the leading types of view about practical reasons as well as a deeper understanding of what are widely regarded to be some of their most serious difficulties. The second is to use the proposed framework to uncover and (...) diagnose what I believe is a structural problem that plagues the debate about practical reasons. A common move in the debate involves a proponent of one type of view offering what she and others proposing that type consider to be a devastating criticism of an opposing type of view, only to find that her criticism is shrugged off by her opponents as easy to answer, misguided, or having little significance for their view. This isn’t due to conceptual blindness or mere slavish devotion to a theory but something fundamental about the argumentative structure of a debate over genuinely shared issues. Hence, the debate about practical reasons suffers from argumentative gridlock. The proposed framework helps us to see why this is so, and what we might do to move beyond it. (shrink)

‘Value pluralism’ as traditionally understood is the metaphysical thesis that there are many values that cannot be ‘reduced’ to a single supervalue. While it is widely assumed that value pluralism is true, the case for value pluralism depends on resolution of a neglected question in value theory: how are values properly individuated? Value pluralism has been thought to be important in two main ways. If values are plural, any theory that relies on value monism, for example, hedonistic utilitarianism, is mistaken. (...) The plurality of values is also thought to raise problems for rational choice. If two irreducibly distinct values conflict, it seems that there is no common ground that justifies choosing one over the other. The metaphysical plurality of values does not, however, have the implications for rational choice that many have supposed. A charitable interpretation of value pluralist writings suggests a ‘nonreductive’ form of value pluralism. Nonreductive value pluralism maintains that in the context of practical choice, there are differences between values—whether or not those values reduce to a single supervalue—that have important implications for rational choice. This article examines the main arguments for metaphysical value pluralism, argues that metaphysical value pluralism does not have certain implications that it is widely thought to have, and outlines three forms of nonreductive value pluralism. (shrink)

What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about what (...) it is to be a rational agent. (shrink)

Politics, Philosophy & Economics, Volume 21, Issue 4, Page 347-371, November 2022. We sometimes have to choose between options that are seemingly incomparable insofar as they seem to be neither better than, worse than, nor equal to each other. This often happens when the available options are quite different from one another. For instance, consider a choice between prioritizing either criminal justice reform or healthcare reform as a public policy goal. Even after the relevant details of the goals and possible (...) reforms are filled in, it is plausible that neither goal is better than, worse than, nor equal to the other. Such seemingly incomparable options present a problem for rational choice since it is unclear how an agent might rationally choose between them. What we need are some principles to help govern rational choice when faced with seemingly incomparable options. I here present three such principles. While each principle is individually compelling, I show that they are jointly incompatible. I then argue that the correct response to this inconsistent triad is to reject the principle that rationally censures performing a sequence of choices one knows will result in a suboptimal outcome. The upshot is that when seeming incomparability is involved, an agent can money pump themselves without being less rational for it. (shrink)

‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...) exercise of the will can afford us special freedom in determining our reasons? I argue that normative approaches to answering this question prove to be inadequate. To vindicate the thought that normative powers can make our reasons ‘up to us’, we need an altogether different approach to understanding them, one that is located not in the normative but in the metaphysical. I end the paper by sketching a metaphysical explanation of normative powers. This metaphysical defence of normative powers provides a window into a different, more agent-centered way of thinking about rational agency. (shrink)

This article explores the main similarities and differences between Derek Parfit’s notion of imprecise comparability and a related notion I have proposed of parity. I argue that the main difference between imprecise comparability and parity can be understood by reference to ‘the standard view’. The standard view claims that 1) differences between cardinally ranked items can always be measured by a scale of units of the relevant value, and 2) all rankings proceed in terms of the trichotomy of ‘better than’, (...) ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. Imprecise comparability, which can be understood in terms of the more familiar notions of cardinality and incommensurability, rejects only the first claim while parity rejects both claims of the standard view. -/- I then argue that insofar as those attracted to imprecise comparability assume that all rankings are trichotomous, as Parfit appears to, the view should be rejected. This is because imprecise equality is not a form of equality but is a sui generis ‘fourth’ basic way in which items can be ranked. We should, I argue, understand imprecise equality as parity, and imprecise comparability as entailing ‘tetrachotomy’ – that if two items are comparable, one must better than, worse than, equal to, or on a par with the other. Thus those attracted to the idea that cardinality can be imprecise should abandon trichotomy and accept parity and tetrachotomy instead. -/- Finally, I illustrate the difference between Parfit’s trichotomous notion of imprecise comparability and parity by examining how each notion might be employed in different solutions to the problem posed by the Repugnant Conclusion in population ethics. I suggest that parity provides the arguably more ecumenical solution to the problem. (shrink)

This paper proposes a way to understand transformative choices, choices that change ‘who you are.’ First, it distinguishes two broad models of transformative choice: 1) ‘event-based’ transformative choices in which some event—perhaps an experience—downstream from a choice transforms you, and 2) ‘choice-based’ transformative choices in which the choice itself—and not something downstream from the choice—transforms you. Transformative choices are of interest primarily because they purport to pose a challenge to standard approaches to rational choice. An examination of the event-based transformative (...) choices of L. A. Paul and Edna Ullman-Margalit, however, suggests that event-based transformative choices don’t raise any difficulties for standard approaches to rational choice. An account of choice-based transformative choices—and what it is to be transformed—is then proposed. Transformative choices so understood not only capture paradigmatic cases of transformative choice but also point the way to a different way of thinking about rational choice and agency. (shrink)

This paper begins with a response to Josh Gert’s challenge that ‘on a par with’ is not a sui generis fourth value relation beyond ‘better than’, ‘worse than’, and ‘equally good’. It then explores two further questions: can parity be modeled by an interval representation of value? And what should one rationally do when faced with items on a par? I argue that an interval representation of value is incompatible with the possibility that items are on a par (a mathematical (...) proof is given in the appendix). I also suggest that there are three senses of ‘rationally permissible’ which, once distinguished, show that parity does distinctive practical work that cannot be done by the usual trichotomy of relations or by incomparability. In this way, we have an additional argument for parity from the workings of practical reason. (shrink)

This introductory article describes the phenomena of incommensurability and incomparability, how they are related, and why they are important. Since incomparability is the more significant phenomenon, the paper takes that as its focus. It gives a detailed account of what incomparability is, investigates the relation between the incomparability of values and the incomparability of alternatives for choice, distinguishes incomparability from the related phenomena of parity, indeterminacy, and noncomparability, and, finally, defends a view about practical justification that vindicates the importance of (...) incomparability — assuming it exists — for practical reason. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of (...) hard choices should be rejected. Incomparabilism about hard choices leads us to an implausible error theory about the phenomenology of hard choices, threatens an unattractive view of human agency, and leaves us in perplexity about what we are doing when we choose in hard choices. The second part of the argument explores the main competitor to comparativist views of practical reason, noncomparativist view, according tow which a choice is justified so long as it is not worse than any of the alternatives. This view is often assumed by rational choice theorists but has its best philosophical defense in work by Joseph Raz. On Raz’s view, incomparabilism about hard choices avoids the problems faced if comparativism is correct, but it faces different difficulties. I argue that Raz’s noncomparativist view mistakenly assimilates practical reason to more restricted normative domains such as the law. (shrink)

Chắc lại phải thốt lên lời cũ của tiền nhân: -/- Bất tri tam bách dư niên hậu -/- Thiên hạ hà nhân khấp Tố Như.

This chapter argues that there is a particular kind of ‘internal’ commitment typically made in the context of romantic love relationships that has striking meta-normative implications for how we understand the role of the will in practical normativity. Internal commitments cannot plausibly explain the reasons we have in committed relationships on the usual model—as triggering reasons that are already there, in the way that making a promise triggers a reason via a pre-existing norm of the form ‘If you make a (...) promise to x, then you have a reason to x’. Instead, internal commitments are that in virtue of which one has the special reasons of committed relationships; they are the grounds of such reasons. In this way, the will is a source of practical normativity. (shrink)

One of the most common judgments of normative life takes the following form: With respect to some things that matter, one item is better than the other, with respect to other things that matter, the other item is better, but all things considered – that is, taking into account all the things that matter – the one item is better than the other. In this paper, I explore how all-things-considered judgments are possible, assuming that they are. In particular, I examine (...) the question of how the different considerations relevant to an all-things-considered judgment come together in a way that gives each relevant consideration its proper due. I propose an answer which provides a unified account of all-things-considered judgments and highlights a deep connection between value and reason. My suggestion is that ‘all things considered’ is, in effect, a placeholder for a more comprehensive, sometimes nameless, value that includes the things considered as parts, and that this more comprehensive value determines how the things considered normatively relate. (shrink)

Slurs are derogatory words and they are used to derogate certain groups. Theories of slurs must explain why they are derogatory words, as well as other features like independence and descriptive ineffability. This paper proposes an illocutionary force indicator theory of slurs: they are derogatory terms because their use is to perform the illocutionary act of derogation, which is a declarative illocutionary act to enforce norms against the target. For instance, calling a Chinese person “chink” is an act of derogation (...) to enforce racist norms that license exclusion of the Chinese, deny their rights to dignity, etc. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it offers a more comprehensive explanation of the features of slurs than earlier speech act approaches. Second, it provides a theory that is immune to the problems faced by existing theories, such as wrong predictions of truth-conditions, explaining unacceptability to non-bigots, and explaining slurs against the dominant groups. (shrink)

Dĩ nhiên ngàn đời xưa nay cây vẫn như vậy. Nhưng cái sự quen thuộc ngàn đời vẫn có nhiều thứ có thể làm người quan sát thấy thú vị, đáng học hỏi và hiểu thêm ra vài điều giá trị.

Trong Xóm Chim, bọn nó xì xào ghê lắm. Chúng nó tị nạnh, cả xóm giờ mới có một lão Bói Cá này xuất ngoại.

The article seeks to reclaim a type of fear lost in silent omission in education, yet central to the development of an ethical subject. It distinguishes the fear described by Martin Heidegger through the concept of befindlichkeit and fear for the other as an essential moment for ethics articulated by Emmanuel Levinas. It argues that the latter conception of fear has inverted the traditional assumption of the ideal ethical subject as fearless. It then examines how Levinas’s interpretation of fear might (...) contribute to the discussion on fear and responsibility in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. It concludes that fear for the other reveals our tremendous capacity to suffer for the other, which is an aspect of the emotional life that has not been identified in the general educational discourse. This inattention manifests itself as a categorical omission in which the existence of fear for the other is not recognized and impedes the ability of educators to address ethics as it is deeply lived. (shrink)

TS. Nguyễn Minh Hoàng (ĐH Phenikaa), đã giảng bài về tiếp cận tính toán sử dụng bayesvl và ứng dụng BMF cho công việc nghiên cứu KHXH.

Recently, some of the leading proponents of the view that there is widespread incommensurability among goods have suggested that the incommensurability of some goods is a constitutive feature of the goods themselves. So, for example, a friendship and a million dollars are incommensurable because it is part of what it is to be a friendship that it be incommensurable with money. According to these ‘constitutive incommensurabilists’ incommensurability follows from the very nature of certain goods. In this paper, I examine this (...) idea and argue that constitutive incommensurabilists have mistaken for constitutive incommensurability a particular emphatic kind of comparability. This examination involves an account of ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ goods and an explanation of how goods of different ‘types’ figure in practical conflict. (shrink)

As the aim of the responsible robotics initiative is to ensure that responsible practices are inculcated within each stage of design, development and use, this impetus is undergirded by the alignment of ethical and legal considerations towards socially beneficial ends. While every effort should be expended to ensure that issues of responsibility are addressed at each stage of technological progression, irresponsibility is inherent within the nature of robotics technologies from a theoretical perspective that threatens to thwart the endeavour. This is (...) because the concept of responsibility, despite being treated as such, is not monolithic: rather this seemingly unified concept consists of converging and confluent concepts that shape the idea of what we colloquially call responsibility. From a different perspective, robotics will be simultaneously responsible and irresponsible depending on the particular concept of responsibility that is foregrounded: an observation that cuts against the grain of the drive towards responsible robotics. This problem is further compounded by responsible design and development as contrasted to responsible use. From a different perspective, the difficulty in defining the concept of responsibility in robotics is because human responsibility is the main frame of reference. Robotic systems are increasingly expected to achieve the human-level performance, including the capacities associated with responsibility and other criteria which are necessary to act responsibly. This subsists within a larger phenomenon where the difference between humans and non-humans, be it animals or artificial systems, appears to be increasingly blurred, thereby disrupting orthodox understandings of responsibility. This paper seeks to supplement the responsible robotics impulse by proposing a complementary set of human rights directed specifically against the harms arising from robotic and artificial intelligence technologies. The relationship between responsibilities of the agent and the rights of the patient suggest that a rights regime is the other side of responsibility coin. The major distinction of this approach is to invert the power relationship: while human agents are perceived to control robotic patients, the prospect for this to become reversed is beginning. As robotic technologies become ever more sophisticated, and even genuinely complex, asserting human rights directly against robotic harms become increasingly important. Such an approach includes not only developing human rights that ‘protect’ humans but also ‘strengthen’ people against the challenges introduced by robotics and AI [This distinction parallels Berlin’s negative and positive concepts of liberty ], by emphasising the social and reflective character of the notion of humanness as well as the difference between the human and nonhuman. This will allow using the human frame of reference as constitutive of, rather than only subject to, the robotic and AI technologies, where it is human and not technology characteristics that shape the human rights framework in the first place. (shrink)

Cuốn sách ngụ ngôn Bói Cá hài hước đột nhiên được thấy nằm ở vị trí Bestseller #1 trên hệ thống Amazon Japan, ngày đầu tháng 12-2023.

The feeling of being offended, as a moral emotion, plays a key role in issues such as slurs, the offense principle, ethics of humor, etc. However, no adequate theory of offense has been developed in the literature, and it remains unclear what questions such a theory should answer. This paper attempts to fill the gap by performing two tasks. The first task is to clarify and summarize the questions of offense into two kinds, the descriptive questions (e.g., what features differentiate (...) offense from similar moral states like anger?) and the normative questions (e.g., what are the conditions for taking offense to be apt?). The second task is to answer these questions by developing what I call ‘the violated norm theory of offense’. According to this theory, feeling offended entails that the norm one endorses is judged to be violated by the offender. Appealing to the violated norm enables this theory to answer the descriptive questions (e.g., taking offense differs from anger because of features like not requiring victims and the difficulty of animal offense) and the normative questions of offense (e.g., taking offense is apt only if the violated norm is universalizable). (shrink)

In this article, I identify and critically examine 3 dogmas of normativity that support a commonly accepted ‘Passivist View' of rational agency. I raise some questions about these dogmas, suggest what we should believe in their place, and moot an alternative ‘Activist View' of what it is to be a rational agent that grows out of rejection of the 3 dogmas. Underwriting the dogmas and the Passivist View, I suggest, is a deeply held but mistaken assumption that the normative domain (...) is fundamentally akin to the nonnormative domain. Once we allow that the normative may be fundamentally unlike the nonnormative in certain key ways, a shift in our thinking about what it is to be rational becomes possible. I end by considering some implications of this paradigm shift in rationality from the passive to the active for various applied matters. (shrink)

Chẫu Chàng (HN 21-8-2023) -- Cuộc ở đây là cuộc xếp trong mấy đầu sách trên Amazon. Thứ tự xếp này là số lượng đọc KENP Amazon. Đọc nhiều chính là thứ hạng cao.

Thời gian trôi qua, Trái Đất nghe tin nóng lên ghê lắm. Bọn bói cá ở ngoài đê Sông Hồng thỉnh thoảng báo tin nước cạn, cá gầy. Bây giờ ngẫm lại Bói Cá thấy nguy hiểm thật. Ngài tăng cường tìm hiểu, mà phải tin tức khoa học nghiêm chỉnh nhé. Một đội tinh nhuệ, thạo tin, gồm Cò, Chim Sâu, Chim Sẻ, Chào Mào, v.v.., được lập ra để báo cáo tình hình nguy cấp.