Results for 'logical inconsistency'

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  1. First-Order Swap Structures Semantics for Some Logics of Formal Inconsistency.Marcelo E. Coniglio - forthcoming - Journal of Logic and Computation.
    The logics of formal inconsistency (LFIs, for short) are paraconsistent logics (that is, logics containing contradictory but non-trivial theories) having a consistency connective which allows to recover the ex falso quodlibet principle in a controlled way. The aim of this paper is considering a novel semantical approach to first-order LFIs based on Tarskian structures defined over swap structures, a special class of multialgebras. The proposed semantical framework generalizes previous aproaches to quantified LFIs presented in the literature. The case of (...)
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  2.  20
    A Name for the Logics of Inconsistent Systems.Francisco Miró Quesada Cantuarias & Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - forthcoming - South American Journal of Logic.
    We present the letter where Francisco Miró Quesada answers Newton da Costa’s request to suggest a name for his logic of inconsistent systems. In this document, translated from Spanish into English for the first time here, Miró Quesada discusses three proposals for naming these kinds of logics: “ultraconsistent,” “metaconsistent,” and “paraconsistent.” After weighing up the pros and cons of each term, he ranks them according to their negative semantic load.
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  3. Towards a Philosophical Understanding of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency.Walter Carnielli & Abílio Rodrigues - 2015 - Manuscrito 38 (2):155-184.
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non-contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order (...)
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  4. Logics of Formal Inconsistency Enriched with Replacement: An Algebraic and Modal Account.Walter Carnielli, Marcelo E. Coniglio & David Fuenmayor - manuscript
    One of the most expected properties of a logical system is that it can be algebraizable, in the sense that an algebraic counterpart of the deductive machinery could be found. Since the inception of da Costa's paraconsistent calculi, an algebraic equivalent for such systems have been searched. It is known that these systems are non self-extensional (i.e., they do not satisfy the replacement property). More than this, they are not algebraizable in the sense of Blok-Pigozzi. The same negative results (...)
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  5.  39
    Smashing Husserl’s Dark Mirror: Rectifying the Inconsistent Theory of Impossible Meaning and Signitive Substance From the Logical Investigations.Thomas Byrne - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (2):127-144.
    This paper accomplishes three goals. First, the essay demonstrates that Edmund Husserl’s theory of meaning consciousness from his 1901 Logical Investigations is internally inconsistent and falls apart upon closer inspection. I show that Husserl, in 1901, describes non-intuitive meaning consciousness as a direct parallel or as a ‘mirror’ of intuitive consciousness. He claims that non-intuitive meaning acts, like intuitions, have substance and represent their objects. I reveal that, by defining meaning acts in this way, Husserl cannot account for our (...)
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  6.  8
    Logically-Consistent Hypothesis Testing and the Hexagon of Oppositions.Julio Michael Stern, Rafael Izbicki, Luis Gustavo Esteves & Rafael Bassi Stern - 2017 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 25 (5):741-757.
    Although logical consistency is desirable in scientific research, standard statistical hypothesis tests are typically logically inconsistent. To address this issue, previous work introduced agnostic hypothesis tests and proved that they can be logically consistent while retaining statistical optimality properties. This article characterizes the credal modalities in agnostic hypothesis tests and uses the hexagon of oppositions to explain the logical relations between these modalities. Geometric solids that are composed of hexagons of oppositions illustrate the conditions for these modalities to (...)
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  7. Formal Inconsistency and Evolutionary Databases.Walter A. Carnielli, João Marcos & Sandra De Amo - 2000 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 8 (2):115-152.
    This paper introduces new logical systems which axiomatize a formal representation of inconsistency (here taken to be equivalent to contradictoriness) in classical logic. We start from an intuitive semantical account of inconsistent data, fixing some basic requirements, and provide two distinct sound and complete axiomatics for such semantics, LFI1 and LFI2, as well as their first-order extensions, LFI1* and LFI2*, depending on which additional requirements are considered. These formal systems are examples of what we dub Logics of Formal (...)
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  8. How Expressivists Can and Should Explain Inconsistency.Derek Clayton Baker & Jack Woods - 2015 - Ethics 125 (2):391-424.
    Mark Schroeder has argued that all reasonable forms of inconsistency of attitude consist of having the same attitude type towards a pair of inconsistent contents (A-type inconsistency). We suggest that he is mistaken in this, offering a number of intuitive examples of pairs of distinct attitudes types with consistent contents which are intuitively inconsistent (B-type inconsistency). We further argue that, despite the virtues of Schroeder's elegant A-type expressivist semantics, B-type inconsistency is in many ways the more (...)
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  9. Curry’s Paradox and Ω -Inconsistency.Andrew Bacon - 2013 - Studia Logica 101 (1):1-9.
    In recent years there has been a revitalised interest in non-classical solutions to the semantic paradoxes. In this paper I show that a number of logics are susceptible to a strengthened version of Curry's paradox. This can be adapted to provide a proof theoretic analysis of the omega-inconsistency in Lukasiewicz's continuum valued logic, allowing us to better evaluate which logics are suitable for a naïve truth theory. On this basis I identify two natural subsystems of Lukasiewicz logic which individually, (...)
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  10. An Inconsistency in Direct Reference Theory.George Bealer - 2004 - Journal of Philosophy 101 (11):574 - 593.
    Direct reference theory faces serious prima facie counterexamples which must be explained away (e.g., that it is possible to know a priori that Hesperus = Phosphorus). This is done by means of various forms of pragmatic explanation. But when those explanations that provisionally succeed are generalized to deal with analogous prima facie counterexamples concerning the identity of propositions, a fatal dilemma results. Either identity must be treated as a four-place relation (contradicting what just about everyone, including direct reference theorists, takes (...)
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  11.  78
    Inconsistency in Empirical Science.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This paper deals with a relatively recent trend in the history of analytic philosophy, philosophical logic, and theory of science: the philosophical study of the role of inconsistency in empirical science. This paper is divided in three sections that correspond to the three types of inconsistencies identified: (i) factual, occurring between theory and observations, (ii) external, occurring between two mutually contradictory theories, and (iii) internal, characterising theories that entail mutually contradictory statements.
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  12.  10
    Inconsistency in empirical sciences.Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This paper deals with a relatively recent trend in the history of analytic philosophy, philosophical logic, and theory of science: the philosophical study of the role of inconsistency in empirical science. This paper is divided in three sections that correspond to the three types of inconsistencies identified: (i) factual, occurring between theory and observations, (ii) external, occurring between two mutually contradictory theories, and (iii) internal, characterising theories that entail mutually contradictory statements.
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  13. Dutch Books, Coherence, and Logical Consistency.Anna Mahtani - 2015 - Noûs 49 (3):522-537.
    In this paper I present a new way of understanding Dutch Book Arguments: the idea is that an agent is shown to be incoherent iff he would accept as fair a set of bets that would result in a loss under any interpretation of the claims involved. This draws on a standard definition of logical inconsistency. On this new understanding, the Dutch Book Arguments for the probability axioms go through, but the Dutch Book Argument for Reflection fails. The (...)
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  14. Coherentism and Justified Inconsistent Beliefs: A Solution.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):21-41.
    The most pressing difficulty coherentism faces is, I believe, the problem of justified inconsistent beliefs. In a nutshell, there are cases in which our beliefs appear to be both fully rational and justified, and yet the contents of the beliefs are inconsistent, often knowingly so. This fact contradicts the seemingly obvious idea that a minimal requirement for coherence is logical consistency. Here, I present a solution to one version of this problem.
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  15. On Conceiving the Inconsistent.Francesco Berto - 2014 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 114 (1pt1):103-121.
    I present an approach to our conceiving absolute impossibilities—things which obtain at no possible world—in terms of ceteris paribus intentional operators: variably restricted quantifiers on possible and impossible worlds based on world similarity. The explicit content of a representation plays a role similar in some respects to the one of a ceteris paribus conditional antecedent. I discuss how such operators invalidate logical closure for conceivability, and how similarity works when impossible worlds are around. Unlike what happens with ceteris paribus (...)
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  16.  90
    The AGM Theory and Inconsistent Belief Change.Koji Tanaka - 2005 - Logique Et Analyse 48 (189-192):113-150.
    The problem of how to accommodate inconsistencies has attracted quite a number of researchers, in particular, in the area of database theory. The problem is also of concern in the study of belief change. For inconsistent beliefs are ubiquitous. However, comparatively little work has been devoted to discussing the problem in the literature of belief change. In this paper, I examine how adequate the AGM theory is as a logical framework for belief change involving inconsistencies. The technique is to (...)
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  17. Paraconsistency: Logic and Applications.Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares, Koji Tanaka & Francesco Paoli (eds.) - 2013 - Springer.
    A logic is called 'paraconsistent' if it rejects the rule called 'ex contradictione quodlibet', according to which any conclusion follows from inconsistent premises. While logicians have proposed many technically developed paraconsistent logical systems and contemporary philosophers like Graham Priest have advanced the view that some contradictions can be true, and advocated a paraconsistent logic to deal with them, until recent times these systems have been little understood by philosophers. This book presents a comprehensive overview on paraconsistent logical systems (...)
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  18.  75
    Elimination of Cuts in First-Order Finite-Valued Logics.Matthias Baaz, Christian G. Fermüller & Richard Zach - 1993 - Journal of Information Processing and Cybernetics EIK 29 (6):333-355.
    A uniform construction for sequent calculi for finite-valued first-order logics with distribution quantifiers is exhibited. Completeness, cut-elimination and midsequent theorems are established. As an application, an analog of Herbrand’s theorem for the four-valued knowledge-representation logic of Belnap and Ginsberg is presented. It is indicated how this theorem can be used for reasoning about knowledge bases with incomplete and inconsistent information.
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  19. On Using Inconsistent Expressions.Arvid Båve - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):133-148.
    The paper discusses the Inconsistency Theory of Truth (IT), the view that “true” is inconsistent in the sense that its meaning-constitutive principles include all instances of the truth-schema (T). It argues that (IT) entails that anyone using “true” in its ordinary sense is committed to all the (T)-instances and that any theory in which “true” is used in that sense entails the (T)-instances (which, given classical logic, entail contradictions). More specifically, I argue that theorists are committed to the meaning-constitutive (...)
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  20. The Logical Space of Democracy.Christian List - 2011 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 39 (3):262-297.
    Can we design a perfect democratic decision procedure? Condorcet famously observed that majority rule, our paradigmatic democratic procedure, has some desirable properties, but sometimes produces inconsistent outcomes. Revisiting Condorcet’s insights in light of recent work on the aggregation of judgments, I show that there is a conflict between three initially plausible requirements of democracy: “robustness to pluralism”, “basic majoritarianism”, and “collective rationality”. For all but the simplest collective decision problems, no decision procedure meets these three requirements at once; at most (...)
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  21. On Philosophical Motivations for Paraconsistency: An Ontology-Free Interpretation of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency.Walter Carnielli & Abilio Rodrigues - manuscript
    In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of non- contradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in (...)
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  22. On the Philosophical Motivations for the Logics of Formal Consistency and Inconsistency.Walter Carnielli & Rodrigues Abilio - manuscript
    We present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language. We shall defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency are theories of logical consequence of normative and epistemic character. This approach not only allows us to make inferences in the presence of contradictions, but offers a philosophically acceptable account of paraconsistency.
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  23. Impossible Worlds and the Logic of Imagination.Francesco Berto - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1277-1297.
    I want to model a finite, fallible cognitive agent who imagines that p in the sense of mentally representing a scenario—a configuration of objects and properties—correctly described by p. I propose to capture imagination, so understood, via variably strict world quantifiers, in a modal framework including both possible and so-called impossible worlds. The latter secure lack of classical logical closure for the relevant mental states, while the variability of strictness captures how the agent imports information from actuality in the (...)
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  24. The Logical Problem of the Trinity.Beau Branson - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Notre Dame
    The doctrine of the Trinity is central to mainstream Christianity. But insofar as it posits “three persons” (Father, Son and Holy Spirit), who are “one God,” it appears as inconsistent as the claim that 1+1+1=1. -/- Much of the literature on “The Logical Problem of the Trinity,” as this has been called, attacks or defends Trinitarianism with little regard to the fourth century theological controversies and the late Hellenistic and early Medieval philosophical background in which it took shape. I (...)
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  25. Non-Deterministic Algebraization of Logics by Swap Structures1.Marcelo E. Coniglio, Aldo Figallo-Orellano & Ana Claudia Golzio - 2020 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 28 (5):1021-1059.
    Multialgebras have been much studied in mathematics and in computer science. In 2016 Carnielli and Coniglio introduced a class of multialgebras called swap structures, as a semantic framework for dealing with several Logics of Formal Inconsistency that cannot be semantically characterized by a single finite matrix. In particular, these LFIs are not algebraizable by the standard tools of abstract algebraic logic. In this paper, the first steps towards a theory of non-deterministic algebraization of logics by swap structures are given. (...)
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  26. Logics for Modelling Collective Attitudes.Daniele Porello - 2018 - Fundamenta Infromaticae 158 (1-3):239-27.
    We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes. Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are then modelled by means of minimal modalities (...)
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  27. Jaina Logic and the Philosophical Basis of Pluralism.Jonardon Ganeri - 2002 - History and Philosophy of Logic 23 (4):267-281.
    What is the rational response when confronted with a set of propositions each of which we have some reason to accept, and yet which taken together form an inconsistent class? This was, in a nutshell, the problem addressed by the Jaina logicians of classical India, and the solution they gave is, I think, of great interest, both for what it tells us about the relationship between rationality and consistency, and for what we can learn about the logical basis of (...)
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  28. What is a Paraconsistent Logic?Damian Szmuc, Federico Pailos & Eduardo Barrio - 2018 - In Jacek Malinowski & Walter Carnielli (eds.), Contradictions, from Consistency to Inconsistency. Springer Verlag.
    Paraconsistent logics are logical systems that reject the classical principle, usually dubbed Explosion, that a contradiction implies everything. However, the received view about paraconsistency focuses only the inferential version of Explosion, which is concerned with formulae, thereby overlooking other possible accounts. In this paper, we propose to focus, additionally, on a meta-inferential version of Explosion, i.e. which is concerned with inferences or sequents. In doing so, we will offer a new characterization of paraconsistency by means of which a logic (...)
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  29. Many-Valued Logics. A Mathematical and Computational Introduction.Luis M. Augusto - 2020 - London: College Publications.
    2nd edition. Many-valued logics are those logics that have more than the two classical truth values, to wit, true and false; in fact, they can have from three to infinitely many truth values. This property, together with truth-functionality, provides a powerful formalism to reason in settings where classical logic—as well as other non-classical logics—is of no avail. Indeed, originally motivated by philosophical concerns, these logics soon proved relevant for a plethora of applications ranging from switching theory to cognitive modeling, and (...)
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  30. An Inconsistency in Craig’s Defence of the Moral Argument.Erik J. Wielenberg - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 4 (4):49--58.
    I argue that William Craig’s defence of the moral argument is internally inconsistent. In the course of defending the moral argument, Craig criticizes non-theistic moral realism on the grounds that it posits the existence of certain logically necessary connections but fails to provide an adequate account of why such connections hold. Another component of Craig’s defence of the moral argument is an endorsement of a particular version of the divine command theory. Craig’s version of DCT posits certain logically necessary connections (...)
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  31.  25
    Can We Test Inconsistent Empirical Theories?Luis Felipe Bartolo Alegre - manuscript
    This paper discusses the logical possibility of testing inconsistent empirical theories. The main challenge for answering this affirmatively is to avoid that the inconsistent consequences of a theory both corroborate it and falsify it. I answer affirmatively by showing that we can define a class of empirical sentences whose truth would force us to abandon such inconsistent theory: the class of its potential rejecters. Despite this, I show that the observational contradictions implied by a theory could only be verified (...)
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  32. Imperatives, Logic Of.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Oxford: Blackwell. pp. 2575-2585.
    Suppose that a sign at the entrance of a hotel reads: “Don’t enter these premises unless you are accompanied by a registered guest”. You see someone who is about to enter, and you tell her: “Don’t enter these premises if you are an unaccompanied registered guest”. She asks why, and you reply: “It follows from what the sign says”. It seems that you made a valid inference from an imperative premise to an imperative conclusion. But it also seems that imperatives (...)
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  33. Future Contingents and the Logic of Temporal Omniscience.Patrick Todd & Brian Rabern - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):102-127.
    At least since Aristotle’s famous 'sea-battle' passages in On Interpretation 9, some substantial minority of philosophers has been attracted to the doctrine of the open future--the doctrine that future contingent statements are not true. But, prima facie, such views seem inconsistent with the following intuition: if something has happened, then (looking back) it was the case that it would happen. How can it be that, looking forwards, it isn’t true that there will be a sea battle, while also being true (...)
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  34. No New Solutions to the Logical Problem of the Trinity.Beau Branson - 2019 - Journal of Applied Logics 6 (6):1051-1092.
    Analytic theologians have proposed numerous “solutions” to the Logical Problem of the Trinity (LPT), mostly versions of Social Trinitarianism (ST) and Relative Identity Trinitarianism (RI). Both types of solution are controversial, but many hold out hope that further “Trinitarian theorizing” may yield some as yet unimagined, and somehow importantly different, solution to the LPT. I first give a precise definition of the LPT and of what would count as a solution to it. I then show how, though there are (...)
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  35. Understanding the Logical Constants and Dispositions.Corine Besson - 2009 - The Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 5:1-24.
    Many philosophers claim that understanding a logical constant (e.g. ‘if, then’) fundamentally consists in having dispositions to infer according to the logical rules (e.g. Modus Ponens) that fix its meaning. This paper argues that such dispositionalist accounts give us the wrong picture of what understanding a logical constant consists in. The objection here is that they give an account of understanding a logical constant which is inconsistent with what seem to be adequate manifestations of such understanding. (...)
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  36. The Species Problem and its Logic: Inescapable Ambiguity and Framework-Relativity.Steven James Bartlett - 2015 - Willamette University Faculty Research Website, ArXiv.Org, and Cogprints.Org.
    For more than fifty years, taxonomists have proposed numerous alternative definitions of species while they searched for a unique, comprehensive, and persuasive definition. This monograph shows that these efforts have been unnecessary, and indeed have provably been a pursuit of a will o’ the wisp because they have failed to recognize the theoretical impossibility of what they seek to accomplish. A clear and rigorous understanding of the logic underlying species definition leads both to a recognition of the inescapable ambiguity that (...)
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  37. Modal Logic S4 as a Paraconsistent Logic with a Topological Semantics.Marcelo E. Coniglio & Leonardo Prieto-Sanabria - 2017 - In Carlos Caleiro, Francisco Dionisio, Paula Gouveia, Paulo Mateus & João Rasga (eds.), Logic and Computation: Essays in Honour of Amilcar Sernadas. London, UK: College Publications. pp. 171-196.
    In this paper the propositional logic LTop is introduced, as an extension of classical propositional logic by adding a paraconsistent negation. This logic has a very natural interpretation in terms of topological models. The logic LTop is nothing more than an alternative presentation of modal logic S4, but in the language of a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, LTop is a logic of formal inconsistency in which the consistency and inconsistency operators have a nice topological interpretation. This constitutes a new (...)
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  38. Swap Structures Semantics for Ivlev-Like Modal Logics.Marcelo E. Coniglio & Ana Claudia Golzio - 2019 - Soft Computing 23 (7):2243-2254.
    In 1988, J. Ivlev proposed some (non-normal) modal systems which are semantically characterized by four-valued non-deterministic matrices in the sense of A. Avron and I. Lev. Swap structures are multialgebras (a.k.a. hyperalgebras) of a special kind, which were introduced in 2016 by W. Carnielli and M. Coniglio in order to give a non-deterministic semantical account for several paraconsistent logics known as logics of formal inconsistency, which are not algebraizable by means of the standard techniques. Each swap structure induces naturally (...)
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  39. Extensions of Priest-da Costa Logic.Thomas Macaulay Ferguson - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (1):145-174.
    In this paper, we look at applying the techniques from analyzing superintuitionistic logics to extensions of the cointuitionistic Priest-da Costa logic daC (introduced by Graham Priest as “da Costa logic”). The relationship between the superintuitionistic axioms- definable in daC- and extensions of Priest-da Costa logic (sdc-logics) is analyzed and applied to exploring the gap between the maximal si-logic SmL and classical logic in the class of sdc-logics. A sequence of strengthenings of Priest-da Costa logic is examined and employed to pinpoint (...)
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  40. An Epistemic Interpretation of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene Logic.Damian E. Szmuc - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    This paper extends Fitting's epistemic interpretation of some Kleene logics, to also account for Paraconsistent Weak Kleene logic. To achieve this goal, a dualization of Fitting's "cut-down" operator is discussed, rendering a "track-down" operator later used to represent the idea that no consistent opinion can arise from a set including an inconsistent opinion. It is shown that, if some reasonable assumptions are made, the truth-functions of Paraconsistent Weak Kleene coincide with certain operations defined in this track-down fashion. Finally, further reflections (...)
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  41.  72
    Defining LFIs and LFUs in Extensions of Infectious Logics.Szmuc Damian Enrique - 2016 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 26 (4):286-314.
    The aim of this paper is to explore the peculiar case of infectious logics, a group of systems obtained generalizing the semantic behavior characteristic of the -fragment of the logics of nonsense, such as the ones due to Bochvar and Halldén, among others. Here, we extend these logics with classical negations, and we furthermore show that some of these extended systems can be properly regarded as logics of formal inconsistency and logics of formal undeterminedness.
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  42. Re-Examining Husserl’s Non-Conceptualism in the Logical Investigations.Chad Kidd - 2019 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 101 (3):407-444.
    A recent trend in Husserl scholarship takes the Logische Untersuchungen (LU) as advancing an inconsistent and confused view of the non-conceptual content of perceptual experience. Against this, I argue that there is no inconsistency about non-conceptualism in LU. Rather, LU presents a hybrid view of the conceptual nature of perceptual experience, which can easily be misread as inconsistent, since it combines a conceptualist view of perceptual content (or matter) with a non-conceptualist view of perceptual acts. I show how this (...)
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  43. Belief Dynamics: (Epistemo)Logical Investigations.Allard Tamminga - 2001 - Dissertation, University of Amsterdam
    C.S. Peirce's and Isaac Levi's accounts of the belief-doubt-belief model are discussed and evaluated. It is argued that the contemporary study of belief change has metamorphosed into a branch of philosophical logic where empirical considerations have become obsolete. A case is made for reformulations of belief change systems that do allow for empirical tests. Last, a belief change system is presented that (1) uses finite representations of information, (2) can adequately deal with inconsistencies, (3) has finite operations of change, (4) (...)
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  44.  25
    A State-of-Affairs-Semantic Solution to the Problem of Extensionality in Free Logic.Hans-Peter Leeb - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (6):1091-1109.
    If one takes seriously the idea that a scientific language must be extensional, and accepts Quine’s notion of truth-value-related extensionality, and also recognizes that a scientific language must allow for singular terms that do not refer to existing objects, then there is a problem, since this combination of assumptions must be inconsistent. I will argue for a particular solution to the problem, namely, changing what is meant by the word ‘extensionality’, so that it would not be the truth-value that had (...)
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  45. Peirce on Grounding the Laws of Logic.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 50 (4):480.
    This paper is a contribution to the long-standing debate over the coherence of Charles Sanders Peirce’s overall system of philosophy. It approaches that issue through the lens of a contemporary debate over the notion of metaphysical grounding, or more broadly, the nature of metaphysical explanation, employing the laws of logic as a case study. The central question concerns how we can take seriously what we shall call Peirce’s Rule—that nothing can be admitted to be absolutely inexplicable—without being vulnerable to a (...)
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  46.  87
    Logical Problems of Evil and Free Will Defences.Graham Oppy - 2017 - In Chad Meister & Paul Moser (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Problem of Evil. Cambridge, UK: pp. 45-64.
    In this paper, I offer a novel analysis of logical arguments from evil. I claim that logical arguments from evil have three parts: (1) characterisation (attribution of specified attributes to God); (2) datum (a claim about evil); and (3) link (connection between attributes and evil). I argue that, while familiar logical arguments from evil are known to be unsuccessful, it remains an open question whether there are successful logical arguments from evil.
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  47.  98
    Toward a Resolute Reading of Being and Time: Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and the Dilemma Between Inconsistency and Ineffability.Gilad Nir - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.
    Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein consider the possibility of a philosophical inquiry of an absolutely universal scope—an inquiry into the being of all beings, in Heidegger’s case, and into the logical form of everything that can be meaningfully said, in Wittgenstein’s. Moreover, they both raise the worry that the theoretical language by means of which we speak of particular beings and assert particular facts is not suited to this task. And yet their own philosophical work seems to include many assertions (...)
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  48.  82
    Logic of Paradoxes in Classical Set Theories.Boris Čulina - 2013 - Synthese 190 (3):525-547.
    According to Cantor (Mathematische Annalen 21:545–586, 1883 ; Cantor’s letter to Dedekind, 1899 ) a set is any multitude which can be thought of as one (“jedes Viele, welches sich als Eines denken läßt”) without contradiction—a consistent multitude. Other multitudes are inconsistent or paradoxical. Set theoretical paradoxes have common root—lack of understanding why some multitudes are not sets. Why some multitudes of objects of thought cannot themselves be objects of thought? Moreover, it is a logical truth that such multitudes (...)
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  49. Depicting Negation in Diagrammatic Logic: Legacy and Prospects.Fabien Schang & Amirouche Moktefi - 2008 - Diagrammatic Representation and Inference: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference Diagrams 2008 5223:236-241.
    Here are considered the conditions under which the method of diagrams is liable to include non-classical logics, among which the spatial representation of non-bivalent negation. This will be done with two intended purposes, namely: a review of the main concepts involved in the definition of logical negation; an explanation of the epistemological obstacles against the introduction of non-classical negations within diagrammatic logic.
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  50. What Would a Deontic Logic of Internal Reasons Look Like?Rufus Duits - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (4):351-373.
    The so-called ‘central problem’ of internalism has been formulated like this: one cannot concurrently maintain the following three philosophical positions without inconsistency: internalism about practical reason, moral rationalism, and moral absolutism. Since internalism about practical reason is the most controversial of these, the suggestion is that it is the one that is best abandoned. In this paper, I point towards a response to this problem by sketching a deontic logic of internal reasons that deflates moral normativity to the normativity (...)
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