- Risk Attitudes and Social Choice.Simon Blessenohl - 2020 - Ethics 130 (4):485-513.details
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The biased nature of philosophical beliefs in the light of peer disagreement.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):363-378.details
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Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):471-479.details
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Objectivity and Bias.Gordon Belot - 2017 - Mind 126 (503):655-695.details
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Justification as faultlessness.Bob Beddor - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):901-926.details
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Is Memory Merely Testimony from One's Former Self?David James Barnett - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (3):353-392.details
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Warum intellektuelle Toleranz nicht irrational ist.Dominik Balg - 2020 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):51-78.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism Intuitive?Nathan Ballantyne - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4):365-378.details
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How irrelevant influences bias belief.Yuval Avnur & Dion Scott-Kakures - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):7-39.details
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Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Imprecise Probability and Higher Order Vagueness.Susanne Rinard - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):257-273.details
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Ur-Priors, Conditionalization, and Ur-Prior Conditionalization.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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Deference and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (3):709-732.details
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Arbitrariness and Uniqueness.Christopher J. G. Meacham - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):665-685.details
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EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.details
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Accuracy and infinity: a dilemma for subjective Bayesians.Mikayla Kelley & Sven Neth - 2023 - Synthese 201 (12):1-14.details
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A Disjunctive Argument Against Conjoining Belief Impermissivism and Credal Impermissivism.Mark Satta - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):625-640.details
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Epistemic Paternalism, Epistemic Permissivism, and Standpoint Epistemology.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - In Amiel Bernal & Guy Axtell (eds.), Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Lanham, Md: Rowman & LIttlefield. pp. 201-215.details
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Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions.Manhal Hamdo - 2023 - Springer Verlag.details
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Rationalist Resistance to Disagreement-Motivated Religious Skepticism.John Pittard - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 180-216.details
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Diachronic and Interpersonal Coherence.Kenny Easwaran & Reuben Stern - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.details
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Uniqueness and Metaepistemology.Daniel Greco & Brian Hedden - 2016 - Journal of Philosophy 113 (8):365-395.details
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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Sinan Dogramaci & Sophie Horowitz - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):130-147.details
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Desacuerdos Básicos entre Pares Epistémicos.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (168):81-99.details
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Basic disagreements among epistemic Peers.Nicolás Lo Guercio - 2018 - Ideas Y Valores 67 (168):81-99.details
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From values to probabilities.Wlodek Rabinowicz - unknowndetails
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When to Dismiss Conspiracy Theories Out of Hand.Ryan Ross - 2023 - Synthese 202 (3):1-26.details
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Religious Disagreement.Helen De Cruz - 2019 - Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.details
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Living on the Edge: Against Epistemic Permissivism.Ginger Schultheis - 2018 - Mind 127 (507):863-879.details
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The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme:1-20.details
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Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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On the Practical Significance of Irrelevant Factors.Seyed Mohammad Yarandi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):156-171.details
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A Defense of Impurist Permissivism.Jenny Yi-Chen Wu - 2023 - Episteme:1-21.details
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A puzzle about fickleness.Elise Woodard - 2020 - Noûs 56 (2):323-342.details
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Is Epistemic Permissivism a Consistent Position to Argue from?Matthew Wilson - 2017 - Southwest Philosophy Review 33 (1):43-51.details
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Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2021 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
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Higher-Order Evidence in Aesthetics.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (2):143-155.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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After Pascal’s Wager: on religious belief, regulated and rationally held.Jack Warman & David Efird - 2021 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 90 (1):61-78.details
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Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement.Mark Walker - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):285-309.details
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A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?Mark Walker - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):285-316.details
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Suspension of Judgement: Fittingness, Reasons, and Permissivism.Michael Vollmer - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Irrelevant Influences.Katia Vavova - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:134-152.details
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Moral disagreement and moral skepticism.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):302-333.details
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Reasonable Citizens and Epistemic Peers: A Skeptical Problem for Political Liberalism.Han van Wietmarschen - 2018 - Journal of Political Philosophy 26 (4):486-507.details
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One’s own reasoning.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):208-232.details
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