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Belief, credence, and norms.Lara Buchak - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):1-27.details
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Elusive knowledge.David Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.details
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Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
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Beliefs, Degrees of Belief, and the Lockean Thesis.Richard Foley - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 37-47.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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The paradox of the preface.David C. Makinson - 1965 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability.Hannes Leitgeb - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Probability and the logic of rational belief.Henry Ely Kyburg - 1961 - Middletown, Conn.,: Wesleyan University Press.details
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Ambiguous rationality.Timothy Williamson - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):263-274.details
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Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter K. Unger - 1975 - Oxford [Eng.]: Oxford University Press.details
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The Persistent Problem of the Lottery Paradox: And Its Unwelcome Consequences for Contextualism.Travis Timmerman - 2013 - Logos and Episteme (I):85-100.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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Beliefs, buses and lotteries: Why rational belief can’t be stably high credence.Julia Staffel - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1721-1734.details
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What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Total Adjectives vs. Partial Adjectives: Scale Structure and Higher-Order Modifiers. [REVIEW]Carmen Rotstein & Yoad Winter - 2004 - Natural Language Semantics 12 (3):259-288.details
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The Structure of Emotions: Investigations in Cognitive Philosophy.Robert C. Roberts & Robert M. Gordon - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):266.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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``The Paradox of the Preface".D. C. Makinson - 1964 - Analysis 25 (6):205-207.details
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Don’t Know, Don’t Believe: Reply to Kroedel.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (2):231-38.details
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The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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Reducing belief simpliciter to degrees of belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2013 - Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164 (12):1338-1389.details
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The lottery paradox, epistemic justification and permissibility.Thomas Kroedel - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):57-60.details
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Probability and the Logic of Rational Belief.Peter Krauss - 1961 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 35 (1):127.details
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The Virtues of Inconsistency.Peter Klein - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):105-135.details
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Vagueness and grammar: The semantics of relative and absolute gradable adjectives.Christopher Kennedy - 2007 - Linguistics and Philosophy 30 (1):1 - 45.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Partial belief, partial intention.Richard Holton - 2008 - Mind 117 (465):27-58.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief is weak.John Hawthorne, Daniel Rothschild & Levi Spectre - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (5):1393-1404.details
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Review of Gilbert Harman: Change in View: Principles of Reasoning. [REVIEW]Howard Margolis - 1986 - Ethics 99 (4):966-966.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Credal pragmatism.Jie Gao - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1595-1617.details
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Trust and the doxastic family.Pascal Engel - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):17-26.details
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Emotional Justification.Santiago Echeverri - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (3):541-566.details
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Dr. Truthlove or: How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Bayesian Probabilities.Kenny Easwaran - 2016 - Noûs 50 (4):816-853.details
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Generalizing the lottery paradox.Igor Douven & Timothy Williamson - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (4):755-779.details
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Lockeans Maximize Expected Accuracy.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):175-211.details
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Reasons and factive emotions.Christina H. Dietz - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (7):1681-1691.details
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I_— _Ronald de Sousa.Ronald De Sousa - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247-263.details
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I_— _Ronald de Sousa.Ronald De Sousa - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247-263.details
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I_— _Ronald de Sousa.Ronald de Sousa & Adam Morton - 2002 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 76 (1):247-263.details
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Emotional Truth.Ronald de Sousa - 2011 - Oxford University Press USA.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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The emotions: a philosophical introduction.Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni - 2012 - New York: Routledge. Edited by Fabrice Teroni.details
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Justifications, Excuses, and Sceptical Scenarios.Timothy Williamson - forthcoming - In Fabian Dorsch & Julien Dutant (eds.), The New Evil Demon. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.details
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``Justified Inconsistent Beliefs".Richard Foley - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):247-257.details
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