- Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.details
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Epistemic democracy: Generalizing the Condorcet jury theorem.Christian List & Robert E. Goodin - 2001 - Journal of Political Philosophy 9 (3):277–306.details
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The moral evil demons.Ralph Wedgwood - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Entitlement and mutually recognized reasonable disagreement.Allan Hazlett - 2013 - Episteme (1):1-25.details
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The role of trust in knowledge.John Hardwig - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (12):693-708.details
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Epistemic dependence.John Hardwig - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (7):335-349.details
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(1 other version)Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Evident, but rationally unacceptable.Earl Conee - 1987 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3):316 – 326.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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(1 other version)The epistemology of democracy.Elizabeth Anderson - 2006 - Episteme 3 (1-2):8-22.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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Attitude in Philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.details
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Self-Favoring Theories and the Bias Argument.Bálint Békefi - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):199-213.details
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The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge: Why Philosophers are Not Entitled to Their Beliefs.János Tőzsér - 2023 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Would Disagreement Undermine Progress?Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (3):139-172.details
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Disagreement in philosophy.Catherine Z. Elgin - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-16.details
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Transitional attitudes and the unmooring view of higher‐order evidence.Julia Staffel - 2021 - Noûs 57 (1):238-260.details
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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
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Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett - 2014 - Ratio 29 (1):29-41.details
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A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
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(1 other version)Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.details
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Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):353-372.details
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The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (1):85-98.details
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Formulating Independence.David Christensen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-34.details
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Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments.Andrew Moon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):785-809.details
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Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.details
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Dispossessing Defeat.Javier González de Prado - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):323-340.details
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Skepticism and Disagreement.Markus Lammenranta - 2011 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer. pp. 203-216.details
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Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
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The Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreements: Cases of Unconfirmed Superiority Disagreements.Frederick Choo - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1139-1147.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary.Simon Blessenohl - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):1-22.details
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The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement.Sanford Goldberg - 2012 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Disagreement and skepticism. New York: Routledge. pp. 277-294.details
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Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
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Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):179-196.details
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(1 other version)From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary.Errol Lord - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):365-377.details
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Questionable Peers and Spinelessness.Sherman Benjamin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.details
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When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):142-156.details
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Independence and new ways to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):65-79.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
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Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.details
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Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.details
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Is it Safe to Disagree?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2017 - Ratio 30 (3):305-321.details
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What is (Dis)Agreement?Darrell Patrick Rowbottom - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):223-236.details
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Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others.Richard Foley - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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