Aristoteles Περὶ ἑρμηvείας Erklärungen Griechisch-deutsch ins Deutsche übersetzt von Gottfried Scherer -/- In seiner Schrift Erklärungen handelt Aristoteles von Namen, die alles, vieles oder Einzelnes bezeichnen, von Prädikatswörtern, die bestimmende oder zufällige Eigenschaften angeben, und von Worten und deren Kombinationsmöglichkeiten. Dabei untersucht er konkret die Struktur von Aussagesätzen, die er von anderen Redensarten abgrenzt, und stellt fest, dass sie etwas als existent und zutreffend, als wahr oder falsch bezeichnen. Er gibt an, wann mehrwertige Aussagen entstehen und beschreibt, was (...) für Gattungsnamen und was für Eigennamen gilt. Er definiert lakonisch, was ein Mensch im Unterschied zu anderen Lebewesen ist, und unterscheidet verschiedene Möglichkeiten, Namen und Prädikatswörter zu negieren. Ausführlich diskutiert er die Frage, ob logisch richtige Kombinationen von Bejahungen und Verneinungen Tatsachen präjudizieren oder ob Tatsachen unabhängig von Logik entstehen - Tatsachen und deren Feststellung werden ausdrücklich nicht erörtert, weil sich darüber nicht streiten lasse. Er gibt Hinweise darauf, wie notwendige, hypothetische und wirksame Bestimmungen zu verwenden seien und beschreibt Möglichkeiten, solche Aussagen schlüssig zu benutzen. Seine formalen Überlegungen demonstriert er an Beispielen, in denen er sich auch auf das Zeitgeschehen bezieht. -/- Mit dieser Übersetzung, die sich weitgehend an der Bekkerschen Ausgabe der Aristotelischen Schriften orientiert, soll ein lesbarer Text vorgelegt werden, der systematisch versucht, die griechischen Wortbedeutungen lebendig werden zu lassen. Auf eine Interpretation des Textes im Sinne traditioneller oder moderner Logiken oder auf eine an den Massengeschmack der 20er und folgender Jahre angepasste oder an andere Zeitgeister angelehnte Verdeutschung wurde bewusst verzichtet. Die Übersetzung möchte dem Leser Lust machen, selber zu denken - und sich intensiver mit Aristoteles zu beschäftigen. -/- . (shrink)

Human beings, according to Aristotle, are not the only political animals. Bees, wasps, ants and cranes are the other political species mentioned by Aristotle in the History of Animals. Politics, I, 2 confirms this point and makes the additional statement that human beings, if not the only political animals, are nevertheless more political than the other political animals. There has been a traditional scholarly agreement that the capacity for rational speech is the reason why human beings are more (...) political. This traditional view seems to have some support from the same chapter of Politics, where Aristotle addresses, right after having stated that human beings are more political, the role of language in human beings’ political life. This paper contests this traditional view about language and claims that it is the more political character of human beings which explains the political role of language and not vice versa. -/- . (shrink)

The text of Physics 2.8 has been recently interpreted so as to restore the reading that Aristotle holds an external, and even an anthropocentric, natural teleology. This reading has been defended by D. Furley, and especially by D. Sedley. In this paper I present several arguments against this interpretation of the text. Thus, I will argue that Aristotle does not claim, in this chapter, that it rains for the sake of the growing of the crop, against an opinion (...) which is currently somewhat extended among interpreters. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Physics I-II into Portuguese, with commentaries. Tradução para o português dos livros I e II da Física de Aristóteles, com comentários.

Translation of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics I into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2003/4, was preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics IV and VI, with notes. The translation is preliminary and intended as a provisional teaching tool to be also used in seminars and discussions with peers in order to reach a more elaborated version.

I discuss the exact meaning of the thesis according to which the object of scientific knowledge is necessary. The thesis is expressed by Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics, in his definition of scientific knowledge. The traditional interpretation understands this definition as depending on two parallel and independent requirements, the causality requirement and the necessity requirement. Against this interpretation, I try to show, through the examination of several passages that refer to the definition of scientific knowledge, that the necessity requirement (...) specifies more exactly the causality requirement: what cannot be otherwise is the explanatory relation between the explanandum and the cause by which it is what it is. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics I-III into Portuguese, with a few notes and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2007, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

Translation of Aristotle’s Metaphysics IX and X (Theta & Iota) into Portuguese, with a few notes, experimental glossary and introduction. The translation, which was made at 2004, is preliminary and its publication was intended to provide a didactic tool for courses as well as a provisional resource in research seminars. It needs some revision. I am currently working (slowly...) on the revision of the translation and a new revised one will surely appear at some point.

The essay surveys recent developments in ontology and defends a strategy for improvement of ontologies based on ontological realism. As a thought experiment, we consider central theses of Aristotelian metaphysics, and show how they fall short of what we believe to be the requirements of ontology today. Above all, Aristotle provides us with no strategy for the reconciliation of common-sense realism and scientific realism where these diverge. We focus specifically on shortfalls in Aristotle’s treatment of individual accidents, especially (...) in regard to the category of place. We then show how Aristotle’s metaphysics needs to be supplemented by a theory of holes, of fiat boundaries, of granularity, and of vagueness. (shrink)

Aristotle on the problem of the posh and twits.

This work sheds light on the presence of Aristotelian elements in Augustine’s early works, which was more substantial than what it is usually believed. In fact, the young African rhetorician did not only know Aristotle’s Categoriae, which he read when he was a student in Carthage, but also other works by him, such as his De interpretatione, already translated into Latin at Augustine’s time, as well as Aristotelian-inspired works. That is the case of Themistius’s paraphrases of Aristotle’s Analytica (...) and his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysica, which Augustine knew well, especially with regard to book IV. Moreover, Augustine knew the De mundo by Apuleius, who perhaps was also the author of a Peri hermeneias, and who translated during the second century several Aristotelian-inspired works on various natural topics. Moreover, Augustine read the summaries of Plotinus’s Enneades, translated into Latin by Marius Victorinus, and Cicero’s Hortensius, which constitutes a commentary on Aristotle’s De interpretatione. (shrink)

I discuss the issue whether Aristotle's philosophy of science allows the use of mathematical premises or mathematical tools in general for explanaing phenomena in the natural sciences. I thereby discuss the concept of "metabasis eis allo genos" as it appears in Posterior Analytics I.7.

O presente artigo tem como objetivo principal esclarecer a concepção da tradição megárica acerca do conceito de capacidade (δύναμις), tal como apresentada no livro Theta da Metafísica de Aristóteles. A análise se faz necessária devido à falta de atenção aristotélica na formulação da tese adversária dos megáricos, pois em nenhum momento Aristóteles parece nos oferecer argumentos plausíveis que justifiquem de maneira adequada a tese de seus oponentes. Partindo desta dificuldade de reconstrução do argumento megárico e visando lhe oferecer uma maior (...) dignidade, o estudo irá, em primeiro lugar, destrinchar possíveis argumentos que sustentem a tese no contexto da referida obra. Em seguida, irá provar que, mesmo a tese megárica não sendo tão facilmente refutável como uma primeira leitura poderia sugerir, há em sua estrutura problemas graves, que se evidenciam diante da concepção aristotélica da capacidade. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to free Aristotle's Metaphysics, especially book XII (Lambda), frome some metaphysical and theological presuppositions by detecting their inappropriate conceptual framwork, which once was progressive, but now holds an obsolete position. Ousia, being (not substance, a much later concept, construed to solve other problems than Aristotle's), stand for a question, not for an answer. Book Lambda develops a highly speculative argument for this queston. The famous noesis noeseos says that empirical being and knowledge (...) is the realization of a noetic structure (noesis), laid down in our most fundamental opinioons about being. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Parts of Animals Book I into Portuguese, with full commentaries.

Tradução para o Português de Ethica Nicomachea VI.

This paper explores some aspects of Aristotle’s notion of subject for predications. I examine the argument Aristotle develops in Posterior Analytics I.22, 83a1-14. I argue that the notion advanced by Aristotle in that argument is different from the one found in his Categories, although they are far from being incompatible with each other. I also add some philological considerations to justify the Portuguese translation of “hypokeimenon” as “algo subjacente” (“underlying thing”) instead of “sujeito” (“subject”).

There is very little information about the proving by Aristotle’s ecthesis method both in Aristotle’s and his commentators’ articles. Researches on ecthesis which were made by recent commentators are only on expository term. In our study, comments have been evaluated, points that are subject to contradiction have been determined, and opinions about ecthesis have been cited by giving proofs obtained by the ecthesis method.

In almost every handbook and in almost every history of philosophy you will find the thesis that Aristotle in Metaphysics Z has developed a theory about substance – an imperfect one unfortunately. From the Middle Ages until now this has been the most widely accepted claim about this book. Because the basis for this claim is not so easy to find in the text, there is a dispute about the question what a substance really is and ”which things“ are (...) substances. But the theory itself remains. If you engage to clear the field of problems in which this book has its roots, you will see apories developed by Plato in his dialogue Sophistes, mainly the apory in the middle of the dialogue. Here the guest from Elea is led to the question ”What in the world do we have to understand by the term ’to be’?“ ”...For you evidently understood the matter long ago; we, on the contrary, before thought we understood, but now are in trouble about it.“ Aristotle repeats this question, the question about being, on a new level and with new conceptual tools. In the Topics he develops what I call the ”topical approach.“ The use of it is suppported by a new type of concepts, the quotations (e. g. to ti estin: ”Say what you mean, if you ask 'What is this?'“ The standard translation ”essence“ makes impossible to see the genuine meaning of the term.) In Metaphysics Z he puts in concrete terms what in Metaphysics Λ was just a sketch of his speculation about ”to be.“ Seeing this background, it becomes clear that Metaphysics Z never contains the expected theory, which many allege that Aristotle is defending. This is no more than the remains of the pastristic and medieval interpretation. The German translation with commentary which I submit with this book, and an extensive introduction to these questions, should contribute to the destruction of this part of metaphysics. (shrink)

Although there are many questions to be asked about philosophy of mathematics, the fundamental questions to be asked will be questions about what the mathematical object is in view of being and what the mathematical reasoning is in view of knowledge. It is clear that other problems will develop in parallel within the framework of the answers to these questions. For this rea­ son, when we approach Aristotle's philosophy of mathematics over these two basic problems, we come up with (...) the concept of abstraction. In our work, I will try to explain the mathematical abstraction that Aristotle has developed to understand mathematical philosophy. (shrink)

This paper revises Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle, in which the greek philosopher is portrayed as a proto-phenomenologist. On this regard, an attempt is made in order to render an account of Heidegger’s teaching phase (1919-1927) right before the publication of Sein und Zeit, in which Heidegger develops a search of his own philosophical terminology, resulting from the phenomenological procedure of the so-called ‘destruction’ (Destruktion) of the ontological tradition.

This study attempts to reconstruct Nietzsche’s reading of Aristotle in the 1860s and 1870s—the years before he left his career as a philologist. Against the popular view that Nietzsche read only one book by Aristotle, namely the Rhetoric, the present study hopes to show that he had direct knowledge of several of Aristotle’s main works, while much of his interest in Aristotle centred on the latter’s account of art. The particular aim of this study is to (...) explore how Nietzsche’s reading of Aristotle contributed to the formation of The Birth of Tragedy. It will show that, although Nietzsche mentions Aristotle in his first book only en passant, his theory of tragedy should be understood against the background of Aristotelian poetics, especially as interpreted by such contemporaries as Jacob Bernays, Joseph Hubert Reinkens, and Gustav Teichmüller. (shrink)

Gregor Schiemann verteidigt die Aktualität des aristotelischen und cartesianischen Naturbegriffes, die Natur in Gegensatz zu Nichtnatürlichem definieren. Als gültig könnnen sich diese traditionellen Naturbegriffe jedoch nur noch innerhalb begrenzter Kontexte erweisen. -/- Im ersten Teil seines Buches zeigt der Autor, dass Aristoteles' Bestimmung der Natur als Gegenbegriff zur Technik in der Lebenswelt sowie Descartes' Dualismus von Natur und Geist für das eigene Bewusstseinserleben orientierungsleitend geblieben sind. Dass die Begriffspaare nicht nur in gesonderten Kontexten vorkommen, sondern sich ihre Anwendungen auch (...) wechselseitig durchdringen, führt er im zweiten Teil am Beispiel von Aristoteles' Seelenlehre und Descartes' Mechanismus aus. Die naturphilosophische und erkenntnistheoretische Untersuchung verbindet Elemente der analytischen Philosophie mit Ansätzen der Phänomenologie. Sie will zu einem pluralen Verständnis der Natur beitragen, das universelle Geltungsansprüche verabschiedet. (shrink)

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics V.1-8 with a few notes.

These are the commentaries (or notes) for Aristotle's Metaphysics V (Delta) 18-30. This file must be read together with the translation into Portuguese, which has been published as a different item, with a different DOI. In the Introduction, I discuss many issues about Aristotle's jargon, Aristotle's style and Aristotle's awareness of many philosophical problems that nowadays we locate within the branch Philosophy of Language.

Translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda into Portuguese.

It is becoming increasingly clear that there is something wrong with the way we treat nature, because it is apparently even harmful to ourselves. Therefore it could be good for us, if this dealing with nature would be corrected by an alternative conception of nature. Since our own thinking is influenced by Aristotle in some deep and essential aspects - but in a very mediated form - and nevertheless originates from another world, it has at the same time a (...) closeness and a distance to our own thinking. This is favorable for a comparison. Reflection on this thinking about nature could therefore be particularly helpful. -/- The attempt to understand Aristotle's theory of nature might also be helpful because, as will be shown, the physis of which Aristotle speaks is not at all the nature of modern natural science, as is usually assumed. The basic premise of this assumption, that there is only one nature and only one correct and successful handling of it, namely the modern natural scientific one, has to be questioned, even if it rightly exists in everyday life. -/- Second, not only the Aristotelian concept of nature differs from ours, but also that of theory. We use the term theory today, often thinking that we are following Aristotle; some might not even make a distinction between a "scientific theory" and a "theory of nature." A correction of this view might be helpful. Aristotle's theory neither wants to assert anything, on the contrary, it is the reflection on that which is first in nature with the method of topical attitude, it is an example of "unassertive thinking." Aristotle's theory of nature is not a model to find out something or to produce something, it is the ideal of a knowledge for its own sake. (shrink)

Like the doctrine of the categories in general, Aristotle’s category of the relative fulfils disparate functions: On the one hand, the category of the pros ti fulfils a dialectic or logical function that aims at the avoidance of fallacies. On the other hand, the category respects the peculiar mode of being of the relative. Taking these two different functions into consideration helps with the interpretation of Aristotle’s two definitions of the relative and his treatment of the properties of (...) the relative in Cat. 7, with the question whether corresponding relatives are of equal priority or ontologically independent, with the genus-species problem , and with the categorical classification of potency and act. (shrink)

Within the general discussion of space and its dimensionality, Aristotle's position is of the greatest relevance, as one will have the opportunity to argue and discuss in this article.

Aristotle’s Politicsis not only famous for its theory of constitutions, but for its statements about human nature. According to the central claim of Aristotle’s political anthropology, man is by nature a political animal (phusei politikon zôon). This famous statement is presented as the conclusion of the first set of arguments that Aristotle develops in the second chapter of book I of the Politics(Pol.,I, 2, 1252a24–1253a3). Aristotle’s statement is inextricably linked with the claim that the polisexists by (...) nature (phusei), which he mentions in the same phrase, as part of his conclusion: “From these considerations it is evident that the polisis one of the things that exist by nature, and that man is by nature a political animal”(Pol.,I, 2, 1253a1–3). Evidently, the claims that the polisexists by nature and that man is by nature a political animal are complementary. This article presents an interpretation of the two complementary claims or theses arguing that in Pol.,I, 2 Aristotle conceives exclusively of human beings as political animals because the whole chapter focuses on theanalysisof the polis,a community peculiar to humans. Italso examines Aristotle’sclaim that the polis“is by nature prior (proteron) to the household and to the individual”(Pol.,I, 2, 1253a18–19). The paperdisagrees withscholars whounderstand this claim as an independent third thesis and theoremand argues that Aristotle’s claim functions as a strong argument for the thesis that man is by nature a political animal. Furthermore, it contends thatAristotle neither defends an organic theory of the polisnor has a “tendency towards totalitarianism”(J. Barnes). -/- . (shrink)

Nella «Metafisica» Aristotele fonda una scienza filosofica a cui assegna il compito di occuparsi dell’«essere in quanto essere», indagandone le cause e i principi primi. Egli denomina questa scienza «filosofia prima» e la eleva a forma massima di sapere. La filosofia prima è abitualmente riconosciuta come il punto di partenza per la formazione della disciplina filosofica che, a partire dalla prima età moderna, chiamiamo ontologia. Nel delinearne la fisionomia teorica e lo statuto, tuttavia, Aristotele si confronta da vicino con un (...) altro autorevole modello di scienza suprema, avente anch’essa l’essere per oggetto proprio: la dialettica platonica. Scopo di questo libro è esplorare il retroterra platonico della progettazione aristotelica della filosofia prima e mostrare, attraverso dettagliate ricostruzioni testuali, che Aristotele ha elaborato questa scienza come un’alternativa alla dialettica platonica. (shrink)

Redictio ad absurdum is an important part of Aristotle’s syllogistic. It is connected with direct proof and they are complementary methods. All moods of Aristotle are provable by direct methods and redictio ad absurdum. In this paper, I have studied on the bases and principles of redictio ad absurdum, I showed how to prove by redictio ad absurdum, and how to prove Aristotle by redictio ad absurdum. By redictio ad absurdum, all forms of Aristotle’s method proved (...) in the first figure can be reduced to the perfect forms. (shrink)

Collective volume with papers by alumni and students from the Campinas Aristotle Group.

This work describes the main basic concepts of the astrological work of Ptolemy, through an analysis of his Tetrabiblos. Comparing his ideas to those of other authors of his time, it is shown that Ptolemy does not present stoic influences, as claimed by some historians. The conclusion of the article is that the basis of Ptolemy's astrology was Aristotle's physics.

The reason for Aristotle’s treatment of (traditional) fourth figure syllogisms as first figure syllogisms with inverted terms in the conclusion is the following: To disprove the conclusiveness of a premiss pair Aristotle formulates two triplets of true propositions such that two of them correspond to the premiss pair in question and that the third proposition corresponding to a conclusion is an a-proposition in the first case, an e-proposition in the other. Since the truth of an a-proposition grants the (...) falsity of the contrary e- and of the contradictory o-proposition, the first triplet offers two counter-instances for invalid syllogisms with true premisses and false conclusions. Similarly the true e-proposition grants the falsity of an a- and an i-conclusion. Since an a-proposition can be converted to an i-proposition and an e-proposition is equivalent to its converse, these first figure triplets also disprove any first figure syllogism with converted conclusions, with the exception of o-conclusions. The invalidity of the latter ones, however, can be shown by using premiss conversions of (invalid) second and third figure syllogisms. The proposed explanation also makes clear why there are no rejection proofs for invalid syllogisms of (traditional) fourth figure syllogisms in the Analytics. (shrink)

Este artículo constituye un comentario a Peri Hermeneias 16a 4-9 y a otros pasajes del corpus aristotélico concernientes a las relaciones entre lenguaje y pensamiento, así como a las consecuencias que estas relaciones puedan tener en tomo al problema de la representación lingüística del mundo. En la primera parte el A. sostiene, en confrontación con la interpretación de Max Black, que la distinción aristotélica entre, de un lado, lenguaje oral y escrito, y del otro, afecciones del alma, es nominal y (...) no real, lo cual conduce a replantear el tema del realismo en Aristóteles. En la parte final del artículo se analiza las relaciones en el texto mencionado del Peri Hermeneias. Tales relaciones sugieren entender la representación lingüística del mundo no como mero reflejo, sino como un acto de interpretación y, en consecuencia, de atribución de significado, lo que constituye propiamente la naturaleza apofántica del logos. (shrink)

The article concerns the relationship between the concept of phronesis in Aristotle and that of prudentia in Thomas Aquinas.

I present Aristotle’s theory of causation in a way that privileges a comparison with contemporary discussion on causation. I do so by selecting in Aristotle’s theory points that are interesting to contemporary discussion and by translating Aristotle in the contemporary philosophical terminology. I compare Aristotle’s views with Mackie’s (1993/1965) and Sosa’s (1993/1980). Mackie is a humean regularist regarding the metaphysics of causal necessity, but his theory postulates some formal aspects of the causal relation which are similar (...) to the Aristotelian theory. By introducing the notion of causal field as a third causal relatum – a sample in which the cause must be picked out as a explanation coextensive to the effect –, Mackie holds a point very similar to Aristotle, inasmuch as both defend that the causal relation is triadic and both have the extensional desideratum. Sosa (1993/1980) defends that every cause necessitates its effect, arguing against classical Humeanism, and he also proposes a causal pluralism. Both these theses are clearly Aristotelian. Aristotle comprehends that the causal relation has three relata: a subjacent C, a property of that subjacent A and a cause B that explains why such property is attributed to that subjacent. The subjacent is similar to Mackie’s notion of causal field, for in regard to it the cause must be coextensive to the property. But Aristotle also says that for each explanandum (property attributed to a subjacent of which one aims to investigate a cause) there is only one cause, which necessitates it. Sosa and Aristotle are similar because both develop a causal pluralism from a theory of causes as having intrinsic necessitation. For Aristotle, causes/explanations [aitiai] are central for attaining scientific knowledge, and its triadic structure determines the syllogistic structure of scientific demonstrations. Aristotle’s theory of causation also involves comprehending the actualisation of capacities (dispositional properties of objects) affirming that the causal relation is resultant from intrinsic properties of the objects, and the cause B is the essence of the explanandum. (shrink)

From the point of view of the history and philosophy of science, the relationship of Descartes' to Aristotle's concept of nature has not been grasped in an entirely satisfactory way. In this article, the two concepts will be subjected to a comparative analysis, beginning with the outstanding feature that both concepts of nature are characterized by a contradistinction to the non-natural: Aristotle separates nature and technology; Descartes opposes nature to thinking. My thesis is that these meanings have found (...) privileged application in specific contexts of experience: the field of application especially suitable for the Aristotelian concept is the experience of everyday life, while for the Cartesian concept it is subjective experience. Historically, the relationship between meaning and experience is of help in understanding the conditions in which the two concepts arose. The topical relevance of the concepts to modern society is a consequence of the continued existence of the favored contexts of experience. Roughly stated, we sometimes still perceive in an Aristotelian way and at other times think in a Cartesian way. (shrink)

This paper provides an interpretation of Aristotle’s criticism to the solution to Meno’s Paradox suggested by Plato. According to Aristotle, when Plato says that reminiscence (anámnēsis) is achieved, what is actually achieved is induction (epagōgê). Our interpretation is based on two aspects: (1) semantic criticism, since Plato’s use of the term anámnēsis is unusual; and (2) the theory is not able to give an adequate explanation of the effective discovery.

This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause.

This book faces the problem of how is it possible to conceive Aristotelian philosophy as a way of life, and not as a discipline or profession. If there are any of his texts where this concerns are to be found, it is in his practical treatises, in which he defends a philosophy of human affairs. However, Aristotle insists on the fact that philosophy, in its greatest expression, is the first philosophy, to which the idea of contemplation seems to refer (...) to, at the end of the Nicomachean ethics. How is this tension between human and first philosophy to be understood? Which one was more important in Aristotle’s conception of the good life? What will we be claiming here is that there’s no dichotomy between active and contemplative life beyond the conceptual analysis. On the contrary, the Aristotelian proposal is that choosing between action and contemplation is impossible without appealing to philosophy itself. The intellect, in his role as ruler of life, requires contemplation to lead action, in the same way as a medical practitioner requires natural science in order to guide his deeds. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to show how the intellect and the reality go together by a metaphysical analysis of the intellectual potency. According to the classical think, there is a true ‘idealist’ way to considerate the intellect. In the divine intellect there is —ontologically— all being that is present —logically— in God’s mind.

Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda. It accompanies the translation of Aristotle's Metaphysics Lambda into Portuguese in the same volume of the journal.

Usage and limits of analogy and metaphor in Aristotle’s science could be confusing. In some passages Aristotle uses both elements in explanations, and their clarity is defended. However, in other texts the metaphor is excluded from science. In this article, I will analyze the difference between metaphor and analogy and examine in what context metaphor can be used. My thesis is that Aristotle uses the analogy as an argumentative resource understood by epagoge. On the case of metaphors, (...) they should be excluded from science, but is a valid strategy for some kind of speeches, and as a pedagogical element of explanations. Key words: metaphor, analogy, argumentation, science, language. (shrink)