L’analyse logiciste des constructions savantes a pour but de mettre à nu leurs composantes symboliques : une base de données (observations et présuppositions) et un ensemble d’opérations de réécriture exprimant le raisonnement qui relie cette base aux thèses de la construction. Les travaux inspirés de ce programme depuis une vingtaine d’années soulèvent des questions intéressantes dans les perspectives d’une épistémologie pratique maintes fois exposées. L’étude des conflits d’interprétation y tient une large place ; elle s’apparente à l’analyse des controverses scientifiques (...) mais vise moins à expliquer celles-ci, du point de vue socio-historique, qu’à mieux définir les voies choisies pour les résoudre, les éluder ou les dépasser, selon les cas. Le questionnement logiciste porte sur les conséquences intellectuelles et institutionnelles de ces choix. L’affirmation de sa pérennité procède à la fois d’un constat et d’un pari, l’un et l’autre argumentés dans cet article. (shrink)

Open science will make science more efficient, reliable, and responsive to societal challenges. The European Commission has sought to advance open science policy from its inception in a holistic and integrated way, covering all aspects of the research cycle from scientific discovery and review to sharing knowledge, publishing, and outreach. We present the steps taken with a forward-looking perspective on the challenges laying ahead, in particular the necessary change of the rewards and incentives system for researchers (for which various actors (...) are co-responsible and which goes beyond the mandate of the European Commission). Finally, we discuss the role of artificial intelligence (AI) within an open science perspective. (shrink)

Résumé Si l’absence de moralité des psychopathes a été largement étudiée, il existe peu de recherches sur leurs capacités esthétiques. Pourtant, beaucoup d’études cliniques de cas montrent qu’ils présentent un grave déficit dans ce domaine. Cet article se propose d’en chercher les causes. Il analyse les forces et les limites de l’hypothèse d’un manque d’empathie pour expliquer ces carences esthétiques, et montre pourquoi l’hypothèse d’un manque de distance psychique se révèle plus féconde. Celle-ci permet en outre de comprendre le lien (...) de l’esthétique et de l’éthique par leur filiation commune : elles ont pour socle commun la capacité à prendre de la distance par rapport à des intérêts étroitement égoïstes. (shrink)

The issue of the definition and position of archaeology as a discipline is examined in relation to the dispute which took place from 1980 to 2009 between the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin and the sociologist Jean-Claude Passeron. This case study enables us to explore the actual conceptual relationships between archaeology and the other sciences (as opposed to those wished for or prescribed). The contrasts between the positions declared by the two researchers and the rooting of their arguments (...) in their disciplines are examined: where the sociologist makes use of his philosophical training, the archaeologist relies mainly on his work on semiology and informatics. Archaeology ultimately plays a minor role in the arguments proposed. This dispute therefore cannot be considered as evidence for the movement of concepts between archaeology and the social sciences. A blind spot in the debate, relating to the ontological specificities of archaeological objects, nevertheless presents itself as a possible way of implementing this movement. (shrink)

Dans un texte désormais célèbre, Ferdinand de Saussure insiste sur l’arbitraire du signe dont il vante les qualités. Toutefois il s’avère que le symbole, signe non arbitraire, dans la mesure où il existe un rapport entre ce qui représente et ce qui est représenté, joue un rôle fondamental dans la plupart des activités humaines, qu’elles soient scientifiques, artistiques ou religieuses. C’est cette dimension symbolique, sa portée, son fonctionnement et sa signification dans des domaines aussi variés que la chimie, la théologie, (...) les mathématiques, le code de la route et bien d’autres qui est l’objet du livre La Pointure du symbole. -/- Jean-Yves Béziau, franco-suisse, est docteur en logique mathématique et docteur en philosophie. Il a poursuivi des recherches en France, au Brésil, en Suisse, aux États-Unis (UCLA et Stanford), en Pologne et développé la logique universelle. Éditeur-en-chef de la revue Logica Universalis et de la collection Studies in Universal Logic (Springer), il est actuellement professeur à l’Université Fédérale de Rio de Janeiro et membre de l’Académie brésilienne de Philosophie. SOMMAIRE -/- PRÉFACE L’arbitraire du signe face à la puissance du symbole Jean-Yves BÉZIAU La logique et la théorie de la notation (sémiotique) de Peirce (Traduit de l’anglais par Jean-Marie Chevalier) Irving H. ANELLIS Langage symbolique de Genèse 2-3 Lytta BASSET -/- Mécanique quantique : quelle réalité derrière les symboles ? Hans BECK -/- Quels langages et images pour représenter le corps humain ? Sarah CARVALLO Des jeux symboliques aux rituels collectifs. Quelques apports de la psychologie du développement à l’étude du symbolisme Fabrice CLÉMENT Les panneaux de signalisation (Traduit de l’anglais par Fabien Shang) Robert DEWAR Remarques sur l’émergence des activités symboliques Jean LASSÈGUE Les illustrations du "Songe de Poliphile" (1499). Notule sur les hiéroglyphes de Francesca Colonna Pierre-Alain MARIAUX Signes de vie Jeremy NARBY Visualising relations in society and economics. Otto Neuraths Isotype-method against the background of his economic thought Elisabeth NEMETH Algèbre et logique symboliques : arbitraire du signe et langage formel Marie-José DURAND – Amirouche MOKTEFI Les symboles mathématiques, signes du Ciel Jean-Claude PONT La mathématique : un langage mathématique ? Alain M. ROBERT. (shrink)

Terapéutica de las enfermedades espirituales es el título del libro escrito por Jean Claude Larchet, publicado en el 2014 por Ediciones Sígueme, traducido del original francés: Thérapeutique des maladies spirituelles, Les Éditions du Cerf; del año 2000. En este texto el autor nos presenta la vida espiritual como una dimensión real del ser humano, que así como en su dimensión física trabaja por su salud, lo debe hacer también en el ámbito de su vida espiritual; no hacerlo, lo (...) conduce a enfermarse, leve o gravemente. El libro plantea la descripción de esas enfermedades espirituales que aquejan al ser humano y cuál es su terapéutica. (shrink)

Nous envisagerons dans cet article la possibilité d'un abord pratique de la relation entre linguistique et psychanalyse : la modélisation linguistique des données mises au jour par la psychanalyse à partir de corpus tirés du discours courant. La validation de tels modèles d'après les critères requis par l'« approche logiciste » de J.-C. Gardin et J. Molino sera examinée sur un exemple précis que nous exposerons en détail : l'Analyse des Logiques Subjectives, modèle développé, publié et enseigné par nous depuis (...) près de vingt ans. (shrink)

La querelle qui oppose la sémantique cognitive à la linguistique "orthodoxe" contemporaine: structuralisme et grammaire générative (Claude Vandeloise, ce numéro), éveille, en histoire des sciences du langage, des échos lointains mais familiers. Car, par bien des aspects, se trouve rappelée une querelle épistémologique ancienne de grande envergure, celle qui, dans l'Antiquité grecque, opposa les anomalistes aux analogistes, les anomalistes de l'école stoïcienne de Pergame aux analogistes de l'école aristotélicienne d'Alexandrie.

Jean-Claude Milner’s Le sage trompeur (2013), a controversial recent piece of French Spinoza literature, remains regrettably understudied in the English-speaking world. Adopting Leo Strauss’ esoteric reading method, Milner alleges that Spinoza dissimulates his genuine analysis of the causes of the persecution and survival of the Jewish people within a brief “manifesto” found at the end of the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus (TTP), Chapter 3. According to Milner, Spinoza holds that the Jewish people themselves are responsible for the hatred of the (...) Jewish people, and that the engine of their longevity is the hatred they engender. Additionally, claims Milner, Spinoza covertly insinuates that the solution to this persistent state of hatred consists in the mass apostasy of the Jewish people under the leadership of a Sabbatai Zevi-like figure. This article presents the Milner–Spinoza controversy to the English-speaking public along with the larger context of French-language scholarship on Spinoza’s relation to Judaism. While refuting Milner’s reading of Spinoza, I simultaneously clarify relevant elements of Spinoza’s discussions of Judaism in the TTP, such as Spinoza’s examination of Jewish identity and the nature of divine election, Spinoza’s understanding of the causes of national hatred, and Spinoza’s appeals to Portuguese, Spanish, Chinese, and Turkish political history. (shrink)

Larche equals person and individual, and there comes his misunderstanding of Zizioulas. He does not understand that person is a word for relation,and that way staying among the borders of classic scholastic thought. In the other hand, he understands the nature to be a realistic different entity in whichpersons participate. Because, the Fathers that Larche mentions in many places are directly opposite to Larches thought, he is forced to stretch his interpreta-tion, and is forced to come up with contradictory statements, (...) of many whichwe have shown. (shrink)

O termo “cogito” designa de modo genérico e impreciso um argumento que Descartes propõe em diversos momentos de sua obra. De um modo geral, os comentadores, tal como o fizeram os interlocutores contemporâneos ao autor, consideram que a expressão “penso, logo existo” (cogito ergo sum), ausente das Meditações Metafísicas, resume adequadamente este argumento único e procuram esclarecê-lo ou criticá-lo, nem sempre levando em consideração as diferentes formulações que recebe e os diferentes contextos em que ocorre. Meu objetivo neste texto é (...) simplesmente analisar o quarto parágrafo da Segunda Meditação (AT VII, 24-25; IX-1,19), no qual ele supostamente apresenta este mesmo argumento sem empregar a famosa expressão. Das muitas, diversas e relevantes questões filosóficas que este argumento suscita, gostaria de me concentrar em investigar se ele pode ser reconstruído sem que seja necessário introduzir – como uma premissa não justificada – a concepção do pensamento como sendo essencialmente consciência de si e, portanto, como envolvendo - por definição, a auto-referência imediata e incorrigível do sujeito a si mesmo. Gostaria de poder mostrar que o argumento não apenas independe dessa concepção como, além disso, conduz a essa concepção; todavia, somente o primeiro passo em direção a esta interpretação será dado neste artigo. Quanto à expressão “penso, logo existo”, minha hipótese é que, embora ausente do texto, ela, de fato, resume o sentido geral da posição cartesiana. Sua ausência explica-se pelo fato de que Descartes pretende apresentar nas Meditações a versão mais completa de seu argumento e a passagem que será aqui analisada constitui, na realidade, apenas uma primeira etapa dessa versão. A análise e a reconstrução que serão propostas supõe que o argumento apresentado no parágrafo 4 deva ser compreendido, como propõe H. G. Frankfurt, como composto de quatro etapas, cujo sentido depende do contexto argumentativo mais amplo no qual estão inseridas, como observou Jean-Claude Pariente, em seu artigo sobre o cogito nas Meditações Metafísicas. Nesse sentido, a estrutura do presente artigo seguirá essas etapas. (shrink)

Community detection is a major issue in network analysis. This paper combines a socio-historical approach with an experimental reconstruction of programs to investigate the early automation of clique detection algorithms, which remains one of the unsolved NP-complete problems today. The research led by the archaeologist Jean-Claude Gardin from the 1950s on non-numerical information and graph analysis is retraced to demonstrate the early contributions of social sciences and humanities. The limited recognition and reception of Gardin's innovative computer application to (...) the humanities are addressed through two factors, in addition to the effects of historiography and bibliographies on the recording, discoverability, and reuse of scientific productions: (1) funding policies, evidenced by the transfer of research effort on graph applications from temporary interdisciplinary spaces to disciplinary organizations related to the then-emerging field of computer science; and (2) the erratic careers of algorithms, in which efficiency, flaws, corrections, and authors’ status, were determining factors. (shrink)

CONTENTS: -/- SEZIONE I IL TUTTO E' UNO? IL RISVEGLIO DI UN PROBLEMA TRA SCOLASTICA E RINASCIMENTO Il principio omne causatum est compositum fra Tommaso e Cajetano Igor Agostini, p. 25 Parti e tutto in Montaigne. La natura e l'individuo tra frammentazione e integrazione Raffaele Carbone 45 Le minuzzarie e il tutto. Giordano bruno e la conoscenza universale Maurizio Cambi 75 -/- SEZIONE II A PARTIRE DA CARTESIO. COME PUO' ESSERE UN TUTTO L'UOMO? -/- Mente/Corpo in Cartesio. Spunti per un'interpretazione (...) mereologica Stefano Di Bella 93 Nos sumus ex Deo et pertinemus ad Deum. Appartenenza, dipendenza e relazione nel pensiero e nel lessico di Arnold Guelincx Cristina Santinelli 115 L'integrità di corpo e mente nell'"invenire" terapeutico di E. W. von Tschirnhaus Manuela Sanna 133 L'indivisibilità della natura umana e della società in Francesco Longano. Un episodio della ricezione di Locke in Italia Roberto Evangelista 147 -/- SEZIONE III L'IRROMPERE DELL'ORGANICO. LA BIOLOGIA FILOSOFICA TRA SEI E SETTECENTO -/- Convenienza e discrepanza. Parti e tutto nella Lettera 32 di Baruch Spinoza Francesco Toto 169 Mereologia della sostanza e mereologia del vivente in Leibniz Enrico Pasini 197 Teleologia e mereologia dell’organismo da Leibniz a Bonnet Francesco Piro 209 Il nesso delle parti: mereologia e scienza secondo Christian Wolff Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero 239 Il problema del tutto e delle parti. il caso del vitalismo di Montpellier Charles T. Wolfe 257 -/- SEZIONE 4 TOTALITA' CRITICHE: DALLA CRISI DEL NATURALISMO ILLUMINISTICO ALLA FILOSOFIA DELLE CULTURE -/- La logica del tutto (e delle parti di tutto, vale a dire niente) in Dom Deschamps Jean-Claude Bourdin 273 l’(in)afferabile forma. Totalità e contingenza nel pensiero di Kant tra Critica della ragion pura e Critica del giudizio Luigi Imperato 303 la relazione Parte-Tutto nel primo Schelling Giuseppe D’Anna 327 Hegel o della totalizzazione dello spazio di interiorità Vittorio Morfino 343 A partire da Kant: Begriffsbiìldung teleologica e relazione Parti-Tutto nelle indagini di Rickert sulla logica delle scienze storiche della cultura Edoardo Massimilla 359 . (shrink)

1. Une dispute épistémologique 1.1 Quatre itinéraires à proximité puis à distance des structuralismes 1.2 Un différend sur les « usages réglés du rationalisme » en sciences de l’homme 2. Les mots et les descriptions en sciences de l’homme 2.1 Une commune limitation du déterminisme linguistique 2.2 Un problème philosophique implicite : descriptions définies et noms propres 2.3 L’usage des descriptions définies en sciences de l’homme 2.4 Les (semi-)noms propres des sciences historiques 2.5 Le degré de généralité des concepts employés (...) et ses conséquences sur les raisonnements 3. La spécificité des raisonnements en sciences de l’homme 3.1 Quelle logique pour raisonner sur les phénomènes humains ? 3.2 Les usages d’une référence commune : la logique naturelle 3.3 Propositions et énoncés : divergences sur l’analyse des raisonnements 4. Le juste degré de formalisation du langage et des raisonnements 4.1 La formalisation des descriptions 4.2 Les modèles et la formalisation des raisonnements 4.3 Des formalisations qui s’ignorent 5. Le caractère historique des sciences de l’homme 5.1 Formaliser implique-t-il de dé-historiciser ? 5.2 Les mécanismes du changement scientifique 5.3 Pragmatique de l’intervention théorique. (shrink)

Modern Western psychology is not a monolithic discipline for it has, at its disposal, a host of therapies and techniques. However, it is sustained by a set of hegemonic and totalitarian assumptions that have, in myriad ways, served to undermine other approaches. Mainstream psychology, which is based on a foundation of materialism, is largely incapable of providing authentic healing because it cannot access realms that transcend the empirical order. Yet, since time immemorial, there have been modes of spiritually based therapies (...) connected to the diverse religious traditions of the world. In this ground-breaking work, Dr. Jean-Claude Larchet provides a compelling analysis of the Church Fathers’ profound wisdom into the human condition and its various maladies of the soul. In doing so, he offers remarkable insights into how mental health treatment can be richly informed by traditional Christianity. (shrink)

Rousseau argues that holding the talented in high public esteem leads the less talented to esteem their natural virtues less highly and therefore to neglect the cultivation of these virtues. D’Holbach’s response to Rousseau indicates a sense in which esteeming talent can avoid these detrimental consequences. The starting point of d’Holbach’s defense of the sciences and arts is an analysis of the impact that despotic regimes have on esteeming talent. He argues that there is not only a problem of over-valuing (...) talent but also a problem of under-valuing talent. These considerations form the background for his conception of valuing talent in the right way. The phenomenon of political deception in despotic regimes indicates a sense in which talent can be regarded as a tool for solving a pressing political problem: Genuinely estimable uses of talent are those that oppose despotism and support republican virtues. Esteeming such talent does not lead to a loss of esteem and self-esteem for ordinary people because republican virtues themselves are a source of esteem and self-esteem. Comparison with some aspects of the response of d’Holbach’s friend, Claude-Adrien Helvétius, to Rousseau will accentuate the specific strengths of d’Holbach’s argument. (shrink)

RENÉ DESCARTES: UMA BIOGRAFIA -/- RENÉ DESCARTES: A BIOGRAPHY -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva - CAP-UFPE, IFPE-BJ e UFRPE. E-mails: [email protected] e [email protected]. WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399. -/- -/- Nascido em 1596 em Haia, nas fronteiras de Touraine e Poitou, em uma família nobre, René Descartes vem ao mundo ao mesmo ano em que Johannes Kepler (1671-1630), em seu primeiro trabalho publicado (Mysterium cosmographicum), prova a superioridade da astronomia moderna (a de Nicolau Copérnico (1473-1543)) da astronomia antiga (a de Ptolomeu (90-168 (...) d.C.)). Ao mesmo tempo, Galileu Galilei (1564-1642), que detém a cadeira de matemática da Universidade de Pádua, funda o método experimental. As descobertas de Galileu tiveram forte impacto sobre o Colégio Real de La Fleche, realizado pelos jesuítas e onde Descartes recebeu, a partir de 1606, uma forte educação. Ele menciona, no Discurso do Método, seu “desejo extremo” em aprender, seguido, no final de seus estudos, de uma grande decepção: decepção com a filosofia ensinada, cujas controvérsias perpétuas revelam um caráter questionável, e que não pode fornecer um alicerce, em seu estado atual, para outras ciências. Também é proferido um desapontamento, mas esse desapontamento é inverso e diz respeito às matemática, capaz de fornecer esse fundamento que a filosofia não confere, mediante sua certeza e evidências, mas sobre o qual ainda não construímos nada. -/- -/- Numa Europa marcada pelo choque do tradicionalismo católico e do mercantilismo protestante, o lento declínio do poder espanhol e a luta dos Países Baixos pela sua independência, Descartes escolheu, primeiramente, após a graduação, a carreira militar. Engajado no exército do Príncipe Maurício de Nassau, ele é retirado da ociosidade da vida da guarnição pelo encontro, em 1618, de um jovem cientista holandês, Isaac Beeckman (1588-1637), que se tornou seu amigo íntimo por algum tempo. Conhecedor de todas as pesquisas científicas do momento e partidário da nova concepção “mecanicista” da natureza, Beeckman compartilhou com Descartes um entusiasmo que foi acompanhado, segundamente, da ambição de realizar a ciência universal por si mesma, mediante um método único: na noite de 10 de novembro de 1619, ele concebe em três “sonhos”, “os alicerces de uma ciência admirável”. -/- Nos anos seguintes a essa iluminação decisiva, Descartes viajou por toda a Europa, estimando, como Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592), que a demonstração de boas maneiras e costumes diferentes podem gerar muitos preconceitos. Toda sua vida, além disso, esteve vagando, isto é, foi marcada por múltiplas mudanças de residências, e a recusa de estabelecer um vínculo muito de perto com alguém. Foi na Holanda que ele, finalmente, buscará a tranquilidade que não encontrara na França ainda abalada pelas guerras religiosas, antes de ser assim pelas convulsões da Fronda. Todavia, mesmo na Holanda, ele não pôde evitar os ataques de calvinistas e polemicas teológicas que o repugnaram, como evidenciado em suas discussões com a Universidade de Utrecht entre 1643 à 1645 e a Universidade de Leiden em 1647. -/- -/- Além de sua amizade com Beeckman, outro encontro teve uma influência indubitavelmente decisiva sobre o destino de Descartes: o encontro com o cardeal de Bérulle. Fundador da congregação do Oratório (ao qual pertencem Nicolas Malebranche (1638-1715) e Jean-Baptiste Massillon (1663-1742)), o cardeal de Bérulle enxerga na nova física mecanicista, um meio de lutar contra o naturalismo resultante do Renascimento e seu paganismo latente: em uma longa entrevista com Descartes, no outono de 1647, ele fez dessa última uma obrigação de consciência para se dedicar, nesse sentido, à filosofia. -/- Em 1628, Descartes começa a escrever as Regras para a direção do espírito, um tratado inacabado e que não foi publicado durante a vida do autor. Em 1631, desenvolvera a geometria analítica que combina curvas geométricas com equações algébricas. Em 1633 escreveu O Tratado do Homem e preparava-se para publicar O Tratado do Mundo quando a notícia da condenação de Galileu Galilei pelo Santo Ofício (a Inquisição) o deixou receoso e decide, por prudência, não publicar o seu Tratado no qual a tese do movimento da Terra ao redor do Sol é apoiada. Alguns anos depois, foi divulgado em público cultivada de algumas de suas descobertas científicas: além da geometria, a dioptria (a teoria da refração da luz) e meteoros (teoria dos fenômenos atmosféricos luminosos). Esses três tratados aparecem no apêndice do Discurso do Método, e como “ensaios” desse método, em 1637. No século XIX, Victor Cousin (1792-1867) publicou pela primeira vez o Discurso sozinho, sem os ensaios. -/- Então vem a principal obra de Descartes no ramo da metafísica: as seis Meditações, aumentadas pelas objeções dos mais famosos filósofos da época (incluindo Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), Antoine Arnauld (1612-1694) e Pierre Gassendi (1592-1655)), e as respostas a essas objeções, apareceram em 1641. Ansioso para expor sua filosofia para que pudesse ser ensinada, ele também a caracteriza em forma de manual com os Princípios da Filosofia de 1644. -/- Além dos trabalhos publicados, foi por meio das cartas trocadas com personalidades do mundo erudito que Descartes encontrou a oportunidade de esclarecer vários pontos de sua filosofia. Seus principais correspondentes foram o Prade Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), o Padre Denis Mesland (1615-1672), Pierre Chanut (1601-1662), Claude Clerselier (1614-1684), Christiaan Huygens (1629-1695) e Henry More (1614-1687). A partir de 1643, Descartes sustentou, com a Princesa Isabel da Boêmia (1596-1662), uma correspondência dedicada essencialmente a questões morais, que lhe permitiu a formulação de suas ideias nesse campo: esse esforço conduziu, em 1649, ao tratado das Paixões da alma. -/- Nesse mesmo ano, 1649, a Rainha Cristina da Suécia (1626-1689) o convida para ir a Estocolmo, que ele aceitou após muita hesitação. Recebido com todas as honras, mas forçado a um modo de vida bastantemente distinto daquele que era acostumado, e submetido a um clima do qual não se adequou, ele sucumbiu a pneumonia em fevereiro de 1650. -/- Descartes deixou-nos uma espécie de autobiografia intelectual na primeira parte do Discurso do Método: em seus anos de treinamento, seus entusiasmos e suas decepções. O discurso é, também, o primeiro livro para quem busca compreender o projeto filosófico cartesiano desde sua gênese até sua realização. Existem expostos, o método claro (na segunda parte), mas também a moral (terceira parte), a metafísica (quarta parte) e finalmente a física (quinta e sexta partes). (shrink)

The Louvre Museum is the largest of the world's art museums by its exhibition surface. These represent the Western art of the Middle Ages in 1848, those of the ancient civilizations that preceded and influenced it (Oriental, Egyptian, Greek, Etruscan and Roman), and the arts of early Christians and Islam. At the origin of the Louvre existed a castle, built by King Philip Augustus in 1190, and occupying the southwest quarter of the current Cour Carrée. In 1594, Henri IV decided (...) to unite the palace of the Louvre with the palace of the Tuileries built by Catherine de Medicis. The Cour Carrée was built by the architects Lemercier and then Le Vau, under the reign of Louis XIII and Louis XIV. The Department of Paintings currently has about 7,500 paintings (of which 3,400 are exposed), covering a period that goes from the Middle Ages to 1848 (date of the beginning of the Second Republic). By including the deposits, the collection is, with 12,660 works, the largest collection of ancient paintings in the world. With rare exceptions, the works after 1848 were transferred to the Musée d'Orsay when it was created in 1986. CONTENTS: Louvre Museum - Variety of exhibited works - The Royal Palace - The collections - - Eastern antiquities - - Arts of Islam - - Egyptian Antiquities - - Greek, Etruscan and Roman Antiquities - - Paintings - - - French school - - - Northern Schools (Flanders, Netherlands, Germany) - - - Italian School - - - Other schools Painting - Definitions - Painting genres - - The landscape - - Still life Paintings - FRANCOIS BOUCHER - - Vulcan presenting arms to Venus for Aeneas - RAPHAEL - - Portrait of Baldassare Castiglione - RUBENS - - Helena Fourment with children - LOUIS DAVID - - Madame Récamier - REMBRANDT - - Portrait of Heindrickje Stoffels - VELAZQUEZ - - Portrait of the Infanta Margarita - SIMONE MEMMI - - Jesus Christ walking on Calvary - JAN STEEN - - The Bad Company - HANS HOLBEIN - - Erasmus - CORREGGIO - - Mystic Marriage of Saint Catherine - LANCRET - - Conversation - JAN VAN DER MEER (VERMEER) - - The Lacemaker - VAN DYCK - - Charles I at the Hunt - FRANÇOIS CLOUET - - Elisabeth of Austria (1554-1592), Wife of Charles IX and Queen of France (1570 - 1574) - DELACROIX - - The Barque of Dante - EL GRECO - - Saint Louis, King of France, and a page - REMBRANDT - - Pilgrims at Emmaus (The Supper at Emmaus) - GERARD DAVID - - Marriage at Cana - RAPHAEL - - Portrait of Dona Isabel de Requesens, Vice-Queen of Naples - RUBENS - - La Kermesse (The Village Fête, or Noce de village) - FRANS HALS - - The Gypsy Girl - DECAMPS - - The Sonneurs - HOLBEIN THE YOUNGER - - Anne of Cleves - P. PRUD’HON - - Psyche transported to Heaven - PHILIPPE DE CHAMPAIGNE - - Portrait of Richelieu - LANCRET - - The Autumn - L. DAVID - - Madame Seriziat - COROT - - Recollection of Mortefontaine - LEONARDO DA VINCI - - La belle ferronnière - CORREGGIO - - Venus and Cupid with a Satyr - WATTEAU - - Pilgrimage to Cythera (The Embarkation for Cythera) - NICOLAS POUSSIN - - The Inspiration of the Poet - PRUD’HON - - The Empress Josephine (1763-1814) - FRAGONARD - - The Bathers - H. RIGAUD - - Louis XIV (1638–1715) - TERBURG - - The Concert - LEOPOLD ROBERT - - The Pilgrimage to the Madonna of the Arch - LARGILLIERE - - Family Portrait - MANTEGNA - - Parnassus - MEMLING - - The Virgin and Child between St James and St Dominic - FRAGONARD - - The Music Lesson - JEAN VAN EYCK - - The Virgin of chancellor Rolin - PAOLO VERONESE - - Susannah and the Elders - FRANÇOIS BOUCHER - - Diana leaving her bath - GÉRICAULT - - The Raft of the Medusa - MURILLO - - Assumption of the Virgin - CLAUDE GELLEE (LORRAIN) - - Ulysses returning Chryseis to her father (Marine, setting sun) - INGRES - - Madame Riviere - E. MURILLO - - The Young Beggar - GREUZE - - The Broken Pitcher - PIETER DE HOOCH - - Card players in an opulent interior - POUSSIN - - Et in Arcadia ego - QUENTIN MATSYS - - The moneylender and his wife - ANDREA SOLARIO - - Madonna with the Green Cushion - TITIEN - - Woman with a Mirror - DAVID TENIERS (the Younger) - - The Works of Mercy - LEONARDO DA VINCI - - Mona Lisa (La Gioconda) - Armand Dayot . (shrink)

A dynamic semantics for epistemically modalized sentences is an attractive alternative to the orthodox view that our best theory of meaning ascribes to such sentences truth-conditions relative to what is known. This essay demonstrates that a dynamic theory about might and must offers elegant explanations of a range of puzzling observations about epistemic modals. The first part of the story offers a unifying treatment of disputes about epistemic modality and disputes about matters of fact while at the same time avoiding (...) the complexities of alternative theories. The second part of the story extends the basic framework to cover some complicated data about retraction and the interaction between epistemic modality and tense. A comparison between the suggestion made in this essay and current versions of the orthodoxy is provided. (shrink)

Every adequate semantics for conditionals and deontic ought must offer a solution to the miners paradox about conditional obligations. Kolodny and MacFarlane have recently argued that such a semantics must reject the validity of modus ponens. I demonstrate that rejecting the validity of modus ponens is inessential for an adequate solution to the paradox.

A dynamic semantics for iffy oughts offers an attractive alternative to the folklore that Chisholm's paradox enforces an unhappy choice between the intuitive inference rules of factual and deontic detachment. The first part of the story told here shows how a dynamic theory about ifs and oughts gives rise to a nonmonotonic perspective on deontic discourse and reasoning that elegantly removes the air of paradox from Chisholm's puzzle without sacrificing any of the two detachment principles. The second part of the (...) story showcases two bonus applications of the framework suggested here: it offers a response to Forrester's gentle murder paradox and avoids Kolodny and MacFarlane's miners paradox about deontic reasoning under epistemic uncertainty. A comparison between the dynamic semantic proposal made in this paper and a more conservative approach combining a static semantics with a dynamic pragmatics is provided. (shrink)

Epistemic modals are a prominent topic in the literature on natural language semantics, with wide-ranging implications for issues in philosophy of language and philosophical logic. Considerations about the role that epistemic "might" and "must" play in discourse and reasoning have led to the development of several important alternatives to classical possible worlds semantics for natural language modal expressions. This is an opinionated overview of what I take to be some of the most exciting issues and developments in the field.

In contemporary discussions of the Ramsey Test for conditionals, it is commonly held that (i) supposing the antecedent of a conditional is adopting a potential state of full belief, and (ii) Modus Ponens is a valid rule of inference. I argue on the basis of Thomason Conditionals (such as ' If Sally is deceiving, I do not believe it') and Moore's Paradox that both claims are wrong. I then develop a double-indexed Update Semantics for conditionals which takes these two results (...) into account while doing justice to the key intuitions underlying the Ramsey Test. The semantics is extended to cover some further phenomena, including the recent observation that epistemic modal operators give rise to something very like, but also very unlike, Moore's Paradox. (shrink)

The received wisdom on ability modals is that they differ from their epistemic and deontic cousins in what inferences they license and better receive a universal or conditional analysis instead of an existential one. The goal of this paper is to sharpen the empirical picture about the semantics of ability modals, and to propose an analysis that explains what makes the can of ability so special but that also preserves the crucial idea that all uses of can share a common (...) lexical semantics. The resulting framework combines tools and techniques from dynamic and inquisitive semantics with insights from the literature of the role of agency in deontic logic. It explains not only why the can of ability, while essentially being an existential modal operator, sometimes resists distribution over disjunction and interacts with its duals in particular and hitherto unnoticed ways, but also has a tendency to license free choice inferences. (shrink)

A prominent version of emotional cognitivism is the view that emotions are preceded by awareness of value. In a recent paper, Jonathan Mitchell (2019) has attacked this view (which he calls the content-priority view). According to him, extant suggestions for the relevant type of pre-emotional evaluative awareness are all problematic. Unless these problems can be overcome, he argues, the view does not represent a plausible competitor to rivaling cognitivist views. As Mitchell supposes, the view is not mandatory since its core (...) motivations can be accommodated by competing views, too. I argue that Mitchell's case against the content-priority view is unconvincing as it misconceives the principal motivation for the view. As I show, properly reconstructed, this motivation provides a strong case for the indispensability of the view to any adequate cognitivist treatment of emotion. Moreover, Mitchell's survey of candidates for pre-emotional value awareness can be seen to rest on problematic phenomenological assumptions. (shrink)

The representational theory of measurement has long been the central paradigm in the philosophy of measurement. Such is not the case anymore, partly under the influence of the critique according to which RTM offers too poor descriptions of the measurement procedures actually followed in science. This can be called the metrological critique of RTM. I claim that the critique is partly irrelevant. This is because, in general, RTM is not in the business of describing measurement procedures, be it in idealized (...) form. To support this claim, I present various cases where RTM can be said to investigate measurement without providing any measurement procedure. Such limit cases lead to a better understanding of the RTM project. They also illustrate some of the questions which the philosophy of measurement can explore, when it is ready to go beyond the metrological viewpoint. (shrink)

This summary is not exactly the way I would have done it myself but I must admit that my writing is sometimes a challenge to read. So I asked an AI to do this summary expecting that it will give an easily understandable although not totally accurate view on Ontology of Knowledge and from this general understanding help the reader to read the original papers. Jean-Louis Boucon’s works, "Introduction to the Ontology of Knowledge" and "Time, Space, and World as (...) Knowledge," delve into the intricate nature of reality, meaning, and the process of knowing. Boucon challenges traditional dichotomies in philosophy and science, presenting a cohesive framework where the knowing subject and the world are intertwined aspects of a single dynamic reality. His ideas provide a robust foundation for exploring ontological and epistemological questions, including the interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

It is popular to hold that our primary epistemic access to specific response-dependent properties like the fearsome or admirable (or so-called ‘affective properties’) is constituted by the corresponding emotion. I argue that this view is incompatible with a widely held meta-ethical view, according to which affective properties have deontic force. More specifically, I argue that this view cannot accommodate for the requirement that deontic entities provide guidance. If affective properties are to guide the formation of the corresponding emotion, our primary (...) access to them cannot be provided by that same emotion. (shrink)

Supra-Bayesianism is the Bayesian response to learning the opinions of others. Probability pooling constitutes an alternative response. One natural question is whether there are cases where probability pooling gives the supra-Bayesian result. This has been called the problem of Bayes-compatibility for pooling functions. It is known that in a common prior setting, under standard assumptions, linear pooling cannot be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. We show by contrast that geometric pooling can be nontrivially Bayes-compatible. Indeed, we show that, under certain assumptions, geometric and (...) Bayes-compatible pooling are equivalent. Granting supra-Bayesianism its usual normative status, one upshot of our study is thus that, in a certain class of epistemic contexts, geometric pooling enjoys a normative advantage over linear pooling as a social learning mechanism. We discuss the philosophical ramifications of this advantage, which we show to be robust to variations in our statement of the Bayes-compatibility problem. (shrink)

Est-il possible de parler de ce qui n’est pas ou d’y penser sans présupposer une forme d’être pour cela même que nous pensons ne pas exister? La vieille énigme parménidienne, qui hante toujours la philosophie contemporaine, est au cœur non seulement de la philosophie médiévale mais aussi des études médiévales, comme en témoigne le récent ouvrage d’Alain de Libera sur la référence vide. L’objet de cette étude est en comparaison beaucoup plus...

Structuralism has recently moved center stage in philosophy of mathematics. One of the issues discussed is the underlying logic of mathematical structuralism. In this paper, I want to look at the dual question, namely the underlying structures of logic. Indeed, from a mathematical structuralist standpoint, it makes perfect sense to try to identify the abstract structures underlying logic. We claim that one answer to this question is provided by categorical logic. In fact, we claim that the latter can be seen—and (...) probably should be seen—as being a structuralist approach to logic and it is from this angle that categorical logic is best understood. (shrink)

First recorded in the 14th century, the analogy of spit-roast meat argues that expecting the Sun to rotate around a strictly immobile Earth would be just as ludicrous as trying to move the fire around the roasting meat. On the contrary, it should be the Earth that spins upon itself in order to glean, from all possible angles, all the benefits of the Sun, just as it is the meat’s responsibility to turn on the spit before the motionless fire for (...) it to be perfectly cooked on all sides. Aimed at demonstrating, in geocentricism, the plausibility of the rotation of the Earth and, in heliocentrism, at supporting the physical reality of this terrestrial rotation, nowadays this analogy barely elicits more than an amused, or even condescending, smile. However, its continued long-term existence and its frequency of use — from the 14th to the 19th century, we found it mentioned by no less than 45 different authors — incited us to finally pay attention to it. We then noticed that beyond its explicitly cosmological scope, it raises, in its own way, the question of the purpose of the natural world: had the latter been conceived based upon humankind, then it is normal, despite what this analogy advocates, that the Sun is at the service of something more important than itself by rotating, to the profit of humankind, around the Earth; conversely, since such an infringement of the rule of common sense, as illustrated by this analogy, can neither be justified nor tolerated, it is up to the Earth to move around the Sun. Tracing the vicissitudes of this analogy, over 6 centuries, is thus not only about reconstructing the largely forgotten history of a presently obsolete analogy, but also about discovering the deeper meaning, henceforth incomprehensible, behind it. In describing how this meaning became progressively lost, one can finally pro­vide an understanding of why, in the present day, we are no longer capable of more than an amused smile when happening upon it! (shrink)

Physical reality is all the reality we have, and so physical theory in the standard sense is all the ontology we need. This, at least, was an assumption taken almost universally for granted by the advocates of exact philosophy for much of the present century. Every event, it was held, is a physical event, and all structure in reality is physical structure. The grip of this assumption has perhaps been gradually weakened in recent years as far as the sciences of (...) mind are concerned. When it comes to the sciences of external reality, however, it continues to hold sway, so that contemporary philosophers B even while devoting vast amounts of attention to the language we use in describing the world of everyday experience B still refuse to see this world as being itself a proper object of theoretical concern. Here, however, we shall argue that the usual conception of physical reality as constituting a unique bedrock of objectivity reflects a rather archaic view as to the nature of physics itself and is in fact incompatible with the development of the discipline since Newton. More specifically, we shall seek to show that the world of qualitative structures, for example of colour and sound, or the commonsense world of coloured and sounding things, can be treated scientifically (ontologically) on its own terms, and that such a treatment can help us better to understand the structures both of physical reality and of cognition. (shrink)

I examine Bayle's infamous statement that Christian mysteries are not only "above" human reason, but are "against" it. I put it back in the context of 16th-17th century Reformed thought. I then discuss the relation between reason and faith according to Bayle.

It is popular to hold that emotions are evaluative. On the standard account, the evaluative character of emotion is understood in epistemic terms: emotions apprehend or make us aware of value properties. As this account is commonly elaborated, emotions are experiences with evaluative intentional content. In this paper, I am concerned with a recent alternative proposal on how emotions afford awareness of value. This proposal does not ascribe evaluative content to emotions, but instead conceives of them as evaluative at the (...) level of intentional mode or attitude. I first argue that this proposal fails to make emotions intelligible as value apprehensions. There are reasons to suppose that emotions do not apprehend value to begin with, but are related to values in a different, non-epistemic sense. I then go on to show that the notion of an evaluative intentional mode can still help elucidate the evaluative character of emotion. I argue that there is a plausible non-epistemic understanding of the view that emotions are evaluative modes. On this account, emotions are not ways of apprehending values, but ways of acknowledging values. (shrink)

In this paper, I investigate the betting behavior of a decision-maker who can influence the likelihood of the events upon which she is betting. In decision theory, this is best known as a situation of moral hazard. Focusing on a particularly simple case, I sketch the first systematic analysis of moral hazard in the canonical Savage framework. From the results of this analysis, I draw two philosophical conclusions. First, from an observational and a descriptive point of view, there need to (...) be no incompatibility between moral hazard and the Savage framework. This qualifies the incompatibility view, that is ubiquitous in decision theory. Second, in general, moral hazard is not sufficient to overcome the challenges posed by state-dependent utility to the behavioral identification of beliefs. This qualifies the sufficiency view, that is influential in decision theory. These two philosophical conclusions are the main contributions of my paper. (shrink)

The Sure-Thing Principle famously appears in Savage’s axiomatization of Subjective Expected Utility. Yet Savage introduces it only as an informal, overarching dominance condition motivating his separability postulate P2 and his state-independence postulate P3. Once these axioms are introduced, by and large, he does not discuss the principle any more. In this note, we pick up the analysis of the Sure-Thing Principle where Savage left it. In particular, we show that each of P2 and P3 is equivalent to a dominance condition; (...) that they strengthen in different directions a common, basic dominance axiom; and that they can be explicitly combined in a unified dominance condition that is a candidate formal statement for the Sure-Thing Principle. Based on elementary proofs, our results shed light on some of the most fundamental properties of rational choice under uncertainty. In particular they imply, as corollaries, potential simplifications for Savage’s and the Anscombe- Aumann axiomatizations of Subjective Expected Utility. Most surprisingly perhaps, they reveal that in Savage’s axiomatization, P3 can be weakened to a natural strengthening of so-called Obvious Dominance. (shrink)

Maurice Merleau-Ponty was an important twentieth century contributor to the theory of recognition, even though he made literal reference to the concept only sparingly. He emphasized the importance of recognition, not only at the level of inter-personal relations and in the individual’s inclusion in the social, but also in terms of the capacity of human beings to communicate across cultures and across historical distances. The shift towards ontology in his later work provided a renewed grounding for his interest in intersubjectivity (...) and cross-cultural communication. Such continuity might be traced to lasting Hegelian and Marxian legacies in his thinking, which inflected his political interpretation of recognition. (shrink)

I examine the once popular claim according to which interpersonal comparisons of welfare are necessary for social choice. I side with current social choice theorists in emphasizing that, on a narrow construal, this necessity claim is refuted beyond appeal. However, I depart from the opinion presently prevailing in social choice theory in highlighting that on a broader construal, this claim proves not only compatible with, but even comforted by, the current state of the field. I submit that all in all, (...) the most accurate philosophical assessment consists not in flatly rejecting this necessity claim, but in accepting it in a suitably revised form. (shrink)

Bringing together two aspects of Thomas Aquinas's thought that have been studied separately: his theory of God's concurrence and his theory of instrumental causality, I show how he uses the latter (which I discuss first) to clarify the Proclusian principle that the first cause has a greater influence on an effect than the proximate causes. Thanks to this theory, Aquinas accounts for the fact that it is God who confers existence to every new being that is produced by natural processes, (...) without however negating the agency of secondary, created causes. (shrink)

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...) aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something. (shrink)