The topic of fake news has received increased attention from philosophers since the term became a favorite of politicians (Habgood-Coote 2016; Dentith 2016). Notably missing from the conversation, however, is a discussion of fake news and conspiracy theory media as a market. This paper will take as its starting point the account of noxious markets put forward by Debra Satz (2010), and will argue that there is a pro tanto moral reason to restrict the market for fake (...) class='Hi'>news. Specifically, we begin with Satz’s argument that restricting a market may be required when i) that market inhibits citizens from being able to stand in an equal relationship with one another, and ii) this problem cannot be solved without such direct restrictions. Our own argument then proceeds in three parts: first, we argue that the market for fake news fits Satz’s description of a noxious market; second, we argue against explanations of the proliferation of fake news that are couched in terms of “epistemic vice”, and likewise argue against prescribing critical thinking education as a solution to the problem; finally, we conclude that, in the absence of other solutions to mitigate the noxious effects of the fake news market, we have a pro tanto moral reason to impose restrictions on this market. At the end of the paper, we consider one proposal to regulate the fake news market, which involves making social media outlets potentially liable in civil court for damages caused by the fake news hosted on their websites. (shrink)

Across two studies, one of which was pre-registered, we find that a simple questionnaire that measures intellectual virtue and vice predicts how many fake news articles and conspiracy theories participants accept. This effect holds even when controlling for multiple demographic predictors, including age, household income, sex, education, ethnicity, political affiliation, religion, and news consumption. These results indicate that self-report is an adequate way to measure intellectual virtue and vice, which suggests that they are not fully immune to introspective (...) awareness or “stealthy” in the sense that Cassam (2015) argues. This is an important methodological result and may pave the way for future research on intellectual virtue and vice. (shrink)

Recently, the term «fake news» has become ubiquitous in political and public discourse and the media. Despite its omnipresence, however, it is anything but clear what fake news is. An adequate and comprehensive definition of fake news is called for. We take steps towards this goal by providing a systematic account of fake news that makes the phenomenon tangible, rehabilitates the use of the term, and helps us to set fake news apart from related phenomena. (...) (You can email us for a penultimate draft of this paper.). (shrink)

Philosophers and social scientists largely agree that fake news is not just necessarily untruthful, but necessarily insincere: it’s produced either with the intention to deceive or an indifference toward its truth. Against this, I argue insincerity is neither a necessary nor obviously typical feature of fake news. The main argument proceeds in two stages. The first, methodological step develops classification criteria for identifying instances of fake news. By attending to expressed theoretical and practical interests, I observe how (...) our classification practices turn on worries about fake news’s unique political-epistemic risks. From this, I argue (i) theories of fake news should capture independent mechanisms that realise these risks and (ii) the manifestation of them suffices for classifying a news story as fake news. The second step applies the classification criteria to bad science journalism. I argue the systematic epistemic faults in bad science journalism manifest the same political-epistemic risks we see in fake news, which suffices to justify classifying it as fake news. But since such faults aren’t plausibly attributed to its propagators being insincere, insincerity doesn’t function independently as a mechanism for realising fake news’s political-epistemic risks. Thus, I conclude, we should exclude insincerity from our accounts of the phenomenon. (shrink)

Since 2016, there has been an explosion of academic work and journalism that fixes its subject matter using the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’. In this paper, I argue that this terminology is not up to scratch, and that academics and journalists ought to completely stop using the terms ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’. I set out three arguments for abandonment. First, that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ do not have stable public meanings, entailing that they are either nonsense, (...) context-sensitive, or contested. Secondly, that these terms are unnecessary, because we already have a rich vocabulary for thinking about epistemic dysfunction. Thirdly, I observe that ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’ have propagandistic uses, meaning that using them legitimates anti-democratic propaganda, and runs the risk of smuggling bad ideology into conversations. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the growing literature in social epistemology of diagnosing the epistemically problematic features of fake news. I identify two novel problems: the problem of relevant alternatives; and the problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment. The former arises among individual epistemic transactions. By making salient, and thereby relevant, alternatives to knowledge claims, fake news stories threaten knowledge. The problem of the degradation of the epistemic environment arises at the level of entire epistemic communities. I (...) introduce the notion of an epistemic environment, roughly the totality of resources and circumstances relevant to assessing the epistemically interesting statuses, such as knowledge. Fake news degrades our epistemic environment by undermining confidence in epistemic institutions and altering epistemic habits, thereby making the environment less conducive to achieving positive epistemic statuses. This is problematic even if the decrease in confidence and the altering of habits are rational. I end by considering solutions to these problems, stressing the importance of reproaching each other for proliferating fake news. I argue that we should reproach even faultless purveyors of fake news. This is because fake news typically arises in abnormal epistemic contexts, where there is widespread ignorance of, and noncompliance with, correct epistemic norms. (shrink)

In a recent contribution to conceptual ethics, Joshua Habgood-Coote argues that philosophers should refrain from using the term “fake news,” which is commonly employed in public discussions focusing on the epistemic health of democracies. In this short discussion note, I take issue with this claim, discussing each of the three arguments advanced by Coote to support the conclusion that we should abandon this concept. First, I contend that although “fake news” is a contested concept, there is significant agreement (...) among contemporary philosophers about its key feature. Second, I argue against the claim that “fake news” is an unnecessary concept by underlying that it is not reducible to other terms we customarily use to describe the epistemic dysfunctions of democracies. Lastly, I suggest that using the term “fake news” need not serve propagandistic aims, and that philosophers can use this concept without engaging in epistemic policing, that is, commanding their interlocutors not to believe specific news stories or sources. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In Habgood-Coote : 1033–1065) I argued that we should abandon ‘fake news’ and ‘post-truth’, on the grounds that these terms do not have stable public meanings, are unnecessary, and function as vehicles for propaganda. Jessica Pepp, Eliot Michaelson, and Rachel Sterken and Étienne Brown : 144–154) have raised worries about my case for abandonment, recommending that we continue using ‘fake news’. In this paper, I respond to these worries. I distinguish more clearly between theoretical and political reasons (...) for abandoning a term, assemble more evidence that ‘fake news’ is a nonsense term, and respond to the worries raised by Pepp, Michaelson and Sterken, and Brown. I close by considering the prospects for anti-fascist and anti-authoritarian conceptual engineering. (shrink)

Questo articolo prende in esame il fenomeno della proliferazione di fake news da un punto di vista filosofico—anzi, per meglio dire, prettamente epistemologico—con particolare attenzione a tre questioni fondamentali: cosa sono le fake news e come debbano essere definite; quali meccanismi ne favoriscono la proliferazione sui social media; chi debba essere ritenuto responsabile e degno di biasimo nel processo sotteso alla generazione, pubblicazione e diffusione di fake news. A partire dall'analisi dei principali lavori nella letteratura filosofica sul (...) tema, ci proponiamo di: offrire una definizione di fake news che eviti le obiezioni sollevate contro altre definizioni discusse dalla letteratura (§1); mettere in luce le principali cause della propagazione di fake news, con particolare riferimento ai bias cognitivi e alle strutture comunitarie in cui si organizzano gli utenti dei social media (§2); infine, presentare una analisi originale della responsabilità epistemica dei consumatori di fake news (§3). (shrink)

Looking at the recent spate of claims about “fake news” which appear to be a new feature of political discourse, I argue that fake news presents an interesting problem in epistemology. Te phenomena of fake news trades upon tolerating a certain indiference towards truth, which is sometimes expressed insincerely by political actors. Tis indiference and insincerity, I argue, has been allowed to fourish due to the way in which we have set the terms of the “public” epistemology (...) that maintains what is considered “rational” public discourse. I argue one potential salve to the problem of fake news is to challenge this public epistemology by injecting a certain ethical consideration back into the discourse. (shrink)

An important way in which philosophy can contribute to public discourse is by clarifying concepts that are central to it. This paper is a philosophical contribution in that spirit. It offers an account of fake news—a notion that has entered public debate following the 2016 US presidential election. On the view I defend, fake news is Frankfurtian bullshit that is asserted in the form of a news publication. According to Frankfurt’s famous account, bullshit has two characteristics. There (...) is, firstly, an “indifference to how things really are” on the part of the bullshitter. This does not mean that what a bullshitter says is always false. It might well be true. What it does mean, however, is that, unlike a liar, who tries to convince us that a given statement he believes to be false is true, a bullshitter simply does not care whether what he says is true. The same, I believe, is true of the publisher of fake news. Secondly, the bullshitter misrepresents “in a certain way … what he is up to”. Likewise, the publisher of fake news seems to misrepresent what he is up to. It appears that he wants to hide his actual motives. At any rate, so I will argue. (shrink)

Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then show what does and does not fall under the rubric of ‘fake news’. I then go on to argue that fake news is not a new (...) problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate. (shrink)

The purpose of a study is to critically assess common presupposition, that fake news is a) a threat for civilization as we know it; b) something that appeared only recently or at least that recent examples present a more serious threat for civilization as those from the past. It looks like the fast and global spread of fake news widens the gap between objective reality and that reality asserted by fake news. It is thus accepted especially by (...) so-called liberal media but also a wider intellectual community that we are living in the post-truth era. Such shift is mainly attributed to a strong anti-scientific movement of which one of more important consequence is agnotology that is then understood as one of the major causes for the inefficiency of democracy, post-democracy. (shrink)

Our current understanding of ‘fake news’ is not in good shape. On the one hand, this category seems to be urgently needed for an adequate understanding of the epistemology in the age of the internet. On the other hand, the term has an unstable ordinary meaning and the prevalent accounts which all relate fake news to epistemically bad attitudes of the producer lack theoretical unity, sufficient extensional adequacy, and epistemic fruitfulness. I will therefore suggest an alternative account of (...) fake news that is meant as an explication rather than a traditional conceptual analysis of the term and that understands fake news solely from the consumer’s perspective. I will argue that this new account has the required theoretical unity, that it is epistemically highly fruitful, and that it is still very close to the ordinary usage. I conclude with addressing some of the main objections to this view. (shrink)

This paper focuses on extant approaches to counteract the consumption of fake news online. Proponents of structural approaches suggest that our proneness to consuming fake news could only be reduced by reshaping the architecture of online environments. Proponents of educational approaches suggest that fake news consumers should be empowered to improve their epistemic agency. In this paper, we address a question that is relevant to this debate: namely, whether fake news consumers commit mistakes for which they (...) can be criticized and that they could easily avoid by reforming their doxastic conduct. Proponents of structural approaches, like R. Rini and B. Millar, have defended in different ways a negative answer to this question. In this paper, we criticize their views and suggest that individual users could improve on their epistemic practice by widening their information diet. (shrink)

Many philosophers are skeptical about disjunctivism —a theory of perceptual experience which holds roughly that a situation in which I see a banana that is as it appears to me to be and one in which I have a hallucination as of a banana are mentally completely different. Often this skepticism is rooted in the suspicion that such a view cannot adequately account for the bad case—in particular, that such a view cannot explain why what it’s like to have a (...) hallucination can be exactly like what it’s like to have a veridical experience, that it cannot explain why the hallucination I have in the bad case is subjectively indistinguishable from the kind of experience I have in the good case, and that it cannot offer a viable account of the nature of hallucination. -/- In this paper, I argue that a proper formulation of disjunctivism can avoid these objections. Disjunctivism should be formulated as the weakest claim required to preserve its primary motivation, viz., Naïve Realism—the view that veridical experience fundamentally consists in the subject perceiving entities in her environment. And the weakest claim required to preserve Naïve Realism allows for many sorts of commonalities across the good and hallucinatory cases, commonalities that can be marshaled in responding to the objections. Most importantly, disjunctivism properly formulated is compatible with “positive” accounts of the nature of hallucination. (shrink)

When a society is characterized by a climate of distrust, how does this impact the professional practices of news journalism? I focus on the practice of balance, or fair presentation of both sides in a story. I articulate a two-step model of how trust modulates the acceptance of tes-timony and draw out its implications for justifying the practice of balance.

This study examined correlations between moral value judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), and participant scores on the Short-D3 “Dark Triad” Personality Inventory—a measure of three related “dark and socially destructive” personality traits: Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy. Five hundred sixty-seven participants (302 male, 257 female, 2 transgendered; median age 28) were recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk and Yale Experiment Month web advertisements. Different responses to MIS items were initially hypothesized to be “conservative” or “liberal” in line with (...) traditional public divides. Our demographic data confirmed all of these hypothesized categorizations. We then tested two broad, exploratory hypotheses: (H1) the hypothesis that there would be “many” significant correlations between conservative MIS judgments and the Dark Triad, and (H2) the hypothesis that there would be no significant correlations between liberal MIS judgments and Machiavellianism or Psychopathy, but “some” significant correlations between liberal MIS judgments and Narcissism. Because our hypotheses were exploratory and we ran a large number of statistical tests (62 total), we utilized a Bonferroni Correction to set a very high threshold for significance (p = .0008). Our results broadly supported our two hypotheses. We found eleven significant correlations between conservative MIS judgments and the Dark Triad—all at significance level of p < .00001—but no significant correlations between the Dark Triad and liberal MIS judgments. We believe that these results raise provocative moral questions about the personality bases of moral judgments. In particular, we propose that because the Short-D3 measures three “dark and antisocial” personality traits, our results raise some prima facie worries about the moral justification of some conservative moral judgments. (shrink)

Two Members of BBS awarded Erasmus Mundus Master of Bioethics -/- Shamima Parvin Lasker, Professor and Head, Department of Anatomy, City Dental College, Dhaka & General Secretary of BBS and Dr Abu Sadat Mohammad Nurunnabi, Lecturer of Anatomy, Dhaka Medical College, Dhaka & Life member of BBS awarded Master of Bioethics in 2012. Both they are the scholars of Erasmus Mundus Master of Bioethics. Degree was awarded by K.U.Leuven, Belgium, Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Netherlands and Università degli Studi di Padova, Italy. (...) -/- Prof Shamima’s research was on “Attitudes Toward Surrogacy Around Muslim World” under supervision of Dr Marcello Ghilardi, University of padova , Italy whereas Dr Nurunnabi worked on Prospects and Problems of Stem Cell Research in Bangladesh: Can Equity and Justice be Maintained in Context of Public Health Demand? under supervision of Professor Evert van leeuwen, Chair of the Section Ethics, IQ healthcare, Philosophy and History of Medicine, Radboud University, Nijmegen Medical Centre, Netherlands. -/- Thanks and congratulations for them and for their outstanding achievements on behalf of all the Members of the Bangladesh Bioethics Society. -/- . (shrink)

The term "fake news" ascended rapidly to prominence in 2016 and has become a fixture in academic and public discussions, as well as in political mud-slinging. In the flurry of discussion, the term has been applied so broadly as to threaten to render it meaningless. In an effort to rescue our ability to discuss—and combat—the underlying phenomenon that triggered the present use of the term, some philosophers have tried to characterize it more precisely. A common theme in this nascent (...) philosophical discussion is that contemporary fake news is not a new kind of phenomenon, but just the latest iteration of a broader kind of phenomenon that has played out in different ways across the history of human information-dissemination technologies. While we agree with this, we argue that newer sorts of fake news reveal substantial flaws in earlier understandings of this notion. In particular, we argue that no deceptive intentions are necessary for fake news to arise; rather, fake news arises when stories which were not produced via standard journalistic practice are treated as though they had been. Importantly, this revisionary understanding of fake news allows us to accommodate and understand the way that fake news is plausibly generated and spread in a contemporary setting, as much by non-human actors as by ordinary human beings. (shrink)

Many media critics believe news reports are inevitably biased and have urged journalists to abandon the objectivity norm. I show that the main arguments for inevitable bias fail but identify factors that make producing objective news difficult. I indicate what the next steps should be to understand bias in the news and to combat it.

Why do we trust TV news? What reasons might support a recipient’s assessment of the trustworthiness of this kind of information? This paper presents a veritistic analysis of the epistemic practice of news production and communication. The topic is approached by discussing a detailed case study, namely the characteristics of the most popular German news programme, called the ‘Tagesschau’. It will be shown that a veritistic analysis can indeed provide a recipient with relevant reasons to consider when (...) pondering on the trustworthiness of sources of information. Moreover, it will turn out that these reasons are part of what recipients might gather from media literacy. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag greift das Phänomen Fake News auf und plädiert für einen analytischen Zugang zur Thematik. Zunächst grenzt er den Begriff der Fake News von anderen Phänomenen ab. Er zeigt auf, dass der Begriff nicht nur keinen analytischen Mehrwert bietet, sondern dass er die eigentlichen Probleme verschleiert und als Propagandabegriff u.a. Verwendung findet, um Zensur zu rechtfertigen und die Gegenseite zu delegitimieren. Trotzdem sollte die Politische Bildung nicht vollkommen auf den Begriff verzichten. Versteht man Fake News als (...) einen fließenden Signifikant in hegemonischen Projekten, erlaubt dies den Zugriff auf die politische Dimension von Desinformation. Fake News als politischer Kampfbegriff lässt sich darüber hinaus als einen Angriff auf die Autorität der Leitmedien interpretieren. Der Autor geht im Anschluss sowohl auf die inhaltliche als auch auf die formelle Dimension dieses Angriffs ein. Darauf basierend erarbeitet er einen Vorschlag, wie Fake News auf analytischer Basis in der Politischen Bildung behandelt werden könnten. (shrink)

The complex issue of fake news has been approached extensively by many disciplines in academia. Despite this variety of approaches, the concept of fake news still lacks a reasonable degree of definitional unicity. This paper critically analyzes a sample of definitions from the current literature. By diving into the set of definitions, it will exhibited a total of ten necessary conditions that scholars generally consider: imitation, falsity, deception, bullshit, purpose, morality, assessability, virality, channel, and appeal. Current definitions of (...) fake news have certain blindspots and leave too much leeway for interpretation. This leeway is utterly problematic because it creates a grey zone in which articles are left stranded halfway between fake news and factual news articles. However, it has the crucial advantage of opening up new epistemic paths of inquiry regarding fake news. As a conclusion, we will summarize the conditions one can accept or reject to define fake news. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the nature of objective news and the debate regarding its possibility. It then assesses the main arguments for the unattainability of objective news. A close examination of these arguments shows that, contrary to widespread belief, journalists who try to provide objective news are not striving in vain. The chapter discusses the effect of competing journalistic aims and other limitations on our efforts to generate objective news. It suggests that the unwarranted skepticism regarding the (...) possibility of objective news is an artifact of the changing priorities of journalists and inadequate journalistic methods, and that the only real issue is how we can better train those journalists who want to generate objective news. (shrink)

Das Funktionieren moderner Demokratien hängt von der Informiertheit der Öffentlichkeit ab. Durch den Erfolg von Fake News und post-faktischer Politik ist die Informiertheit der Öffentlichkeit jedoch in Gefahr, zumal parallele Öffentlichkeiten zunehmend sogenannte alternative analoge und digitale Medienangebote nutzen. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir, wie sich Fake News verbreiten und Einfluss auf Öffentlichkeit und Politik gewinnen. Dazu analysieren wir das Zusammenspiel einer Reihe kognitiver Verzerrungen mit der Funktionsweise sozialer Medien sowie die strukturellen Anreize, die der digitalisierte Medienkapitalismus setzt. (...) Beides spielt der Verbreitung von Fake News in die Hände, was einige politische Akteure auszunutzen wissen. Fake News werden in diesem Fall als Propaganda eingesetzt. Wir unterscheiden vier Funktionen von Fake-News-Propaganda: (1) die Täuschung der Öffentlichkeit, (2) die Stärkung von Gruppenidentitäten, (3) die Demonstration von Macht und (4) die Destabilisierung der politischen oder öffentlichen Ordnung. (shrink)

In a recent study appearing in Neuroethics, I reported observing 11 significant correlations between the “Dark Triad” personality traits – Machiavellianism, Narcissism, and Psychopathy – and “conservative” judgments on a 17-item Moral Intuition Survey. Surprisingly, I observed no significant correlations between the Dark Triad and “liberal” judgments. In order to determine whether these results were an artifact of the particular issues I selected, I ran a follow-up study testing the Dark Triad against conservative and liberal judgments on 15 additional moral (...) issues. The new issues examined include illegal immigration, abortion, the teaching of “intelligent design” in public schools, the use of waterboarding and other “enhanced interrogation techniques” in the war on terrorism, laws defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman, and environmentalism. 1154 participants (680 male, 472 female; median age 29), recruited online through Amazon Mechanical Turk, completed three surveys: a 15-item Moral Intuition Survey (MIS), the 28-item Short Dark Triad personality inventory, and a five-item demographic survey. The results strongly reinforce my earlier findings. Twenty-two significant correlations were observed between “conservative” judgments and the Dark Triad (all of which were significant past a Bonferonni-corrected significance threshold of p = .0008), compared to seven significant correlations between Dark Triad and “liberal” judgments (only one of which was significant past p = .0008). This article concludes by developing a novel research proposal for determining whether the results of my two studies are “bad news” for conservatives or liberals. (shrink)

‘Fake news’ has become an increasingly common refrain in public discourse, though the term itself has several uses, at least one of which constitutes Frankfurtian bullshit. After examining what sorts of fake news appeals do and do not count as bullshit, I discuss strategies for overcoming our openness to such bullshit. I do so by drawing a parallel between openness to bullshit and naïve skepticism—one’s willingness to reject the concept of truth on unsupported or ill-considered grounds—and suggest that (...) this parallel indicates three principles for how we ought to combat our openness to fake news and other bullshit. First, the root causes of bullshit openness are not monolithic; we should adopt anti-bullshit strategies in recognition of this fact. Second, our efforts to overcome bullshit openness should be collaborative efforts to create an environment that allows for sustained interrogation of our bullshit openness, rather than a confrontational provision of contrary evidence, despite the fact that such strategies are more time-intensive. Third, social media is unlikely to be a fertile ground on which we will make meaningful progress in the fight against bullshit because of the inherent nature of social media platforms as spaces for short, declarative, confrontational claims. (shrink)

Deliberative democracy is increasingly criticised as out of touch with the realities of partisan politics. This paper considers the rise of fake and hyperpartisan news as one source of this scepticism. While popular accounts often blame such content on citizens’ political biases and motivated reasoning, I survey the empirical evidence and argue that it does not support strong claims about the inability of citizens to live up to deliberative ideals. Instead, much of this research is shown to support the (...) deliberative capacities of citizens and points to their potential in helping to reduce the spread of false and misleading content. (shrink)

The growing importance of Social Networking Sites (SNS) in today's information economy has generated significant interest for understanding and managing shared fake news about brands on social media among academia and industry worldwide. In this context, we consider it is important to discuss the role of flow, also called optimal experience, in sharing fake news about brands on social media. Firstly, we will critically analyze the conceptualizations of the umbrella term „fake news‟ in the so-called „post-truth‟ era (...) and assume a narrow definition from literature. Secondly, we will review different theories from literature (i.e., selective exposure theory, uses and gratifications theory, social comparison theory, rational choice theory and self- determination theory) in order to explain why users share fake news. Furthermore, we will refer to flow theory proposed by Csikszentmihalyi (1975), which could be used as a framework to better the understanding of the user‟s behavior regarding the sharing of fake news about brands on social media. Flow is a hedonistic construct whose importance is widely recognized as having a major impact on the user's behavior in relation to information systems. According to Csikszentmihalyi (1975, 1988), flow is a “crucial component of enjoyment” and is “the holistic sensation that people feel when they act with total involvement”. In a flow state, the consumer perceives an effortless action, loss of time and a sense that the experience stands out as being exceptional compared to daily activities (Csikszentmihalyi 1997). Flow is a continuous variable that can occur on different levels, ranging from none to an intense (or complete) state (Csikszentmihalyi & Csikszentmihalyi 1988). Flow experience has been studied as an independent variable, as a dependent variable, and lately, as a mediator variable. In this paper we propose a new conceptual model containing 3 variables: (1) fake news spread about brands in SNS, (2) flow state experienced by SNS human users (i.e., optimal experience) and (3) sharing fake news about brands on social media by SNS human users (i.e., social media behavior). We conclude by outlining the need to empirically test the new conceptual model proposed in this paper. (shrink)

Will future lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS), or ‘killer robots’, be a threat to humanity? The European Parliament has called for a moratorium or ban of LAWS; the ‘Contracting Parties to the Geneva Convention at the United Nations’ are presently discussing such a ban, which is supported by the great majority of writers and campaigners on the issue. However, the main arguments in favour of a ban are unsound. LAWS do not support extrajudicial killings, they do not take responsibility away (...) from humans; in fact they increase the abil-ity to hold humans accountable for war crimes. Using LAWS in war would probably reduce human suffering overall. Finally, the availability of LAWS would probably not increase the probability of war or other lethal conflict—especially as compared to extant remote-controlled weapons. The widespread fear of killer robots is unfounded: They are probably good news. (shrink)

Every day, television news operations have available dozens of video news releases (VNRs), public relations handout videos designed to mimic news formats. Electronic tracking indicates some of these VNRs are used. Critics typically assail VNRs on ethical grounds, that VNRs deceive audience members into thinking they are watching news gathered by reporters, rather than a promotional pitch. Using a snowball technique, the researchers presented survey respondents with authentic-looking local television news stories; 157 respondents evaluated three (...) stories (out of nine). Some stories used station-generated footage, some network, and some VNRs. Respondents were asked their best estimation of the source. The data indicated a real likelihood VNR deception is occurring. Two of the three VNRs deceived at least half the respondents. Respondents were incorrect an average of 46% of the time when attempting to identifying VNRs, compared to 29% incorrectly identifying network video and 20% incorrectly identifying locally shot video. (shrink)

This chapter introduces a novel account of fake news and explains how it differs from other definitions on the market. The account locates the fakeness of an alleged news report in two main aspects related to its production, namely that its creators do not think to have sufficient evidence in favor of what they divulge and they fail to display the appropriate attitude towards the truth of the information they share. A key feature of our analysis is that (...) it does not require that fake news must be circulated with the intention to deceive one’s audience. In this way, our account overcomes a potential limitation of the current philosophical discussion about fake news, which appears to individuate the main problem with this phenomenon in the fact that fake news consumers are misled and misinformed. In contrast, the proposed analysis shows that an additional (and perhaps equally fundamental) problem uncovered by the spread of fake news is a widespread pathological relationship with information, one on which we consume information not to satisfy our interest in the truth but to strengthen our social identities and quench our hunger for social recognition. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between users' optimal experience while surfing SNS, the sharing behavior of fake news about companies, online trust, and increased social media usage. Our theoretical framework enhances flow theory, which is conceptualized as a sequential process, involving social media users' intrinsic interest, concentration, perceived control, enjoyment, and time distortion. Relevant studies from fake news literature, online trust, and social media usage were also included to develop the hypothesis and conceptual (...) model. We conducted an empirical investigation through a questionnaire-based online survey among social media users of the most popular SNS. A convenience sample was chosen, and 922 valid responses were obtained. Using structural equations modeling we tested the research hypothesis and the proposed conceptual model. The findings show that the optimal experience of social media users can be viewed as a sequential process that influences sharing fake news about companies: intrinsic interest influences concentration, concentration influences perceived control, perceived control influences enjoyment, enjoyment influences users time distortion, and time distortion influences sharing fake news about companies on SNS. Moreover, online trust has a positive influence on sharing fake news. Also, the results of this study indicate that sharing fake news about companies while browsing SNS has a positive influence on social media usage. The paper extends the theoretical understanding of the flow theory in the social media context of an emerging market. Marketers can benefit from the results of this study when designing communication strategies via social media, as to know what content to post, how to avoid the spread of fake news, and which aspects to consider enhancing optimal experience among SNS users. (shrink)

The problem of fake news and the spread of misinformation has garnered a lot of attention in recent years. The incentives and norms that give rise to the problem, however, are not unique to journalism. Insofar as academics and journalists are working towards the same goal, i.e., publication, they are both under pressures that pervert. This chapter has two aims. First, to integrate conversations in philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphilosophy to draw out the publishing incentives that promote analogous (...) problems of fake news and misinformation in academic research communities more broadly. Second, to argue for a (partial) solution. This chapter argues that research communities benefit when authors believe what they argue for in print and it warns against attempts to loosen our publication norms to permit publishing without belief. (shrink)

I argue racial injustice undermines the reliability of news source reports in the information domain of racial injustice. I argue that this in turn undermines subjects’ doxastic justification in inferences they base on these news sources in the racial injustice information domain. I explain that racial injustice does this undermining through the effect of racial prejudice on news organizations’ members and the effect of society's racially unjust structure on non-dominant racial group-controlled news sources.

Neste artigo, nós buscamos compreender como a disseminação de fake news, através do uso de tecnologias digitais, tornou-se uma ferramenta poderosa na manipulação da opinião pública, contribuindo para o processo de colonialidade de mentes. A colonialidade de mentes, contextualizada nos estudos de Dascal (2009), é um tipo de violência epistêmica, caracterizada como transmissão e modificação de hábitos através de sistemas sociais como família, linguagem, religião, ciência, educação, ideologia e mídia que disseminam as formas de imposição do pensamento e ação (...) do colonializador. Nossa hipótese é a de que o paradigma da complexidade, fundamentado no pensamento de Morin (2003; 2005), oferece subsídios teóricos para pensarmos o problema da disseminação de fake news, bem como a sua influência na colonialidade de mentes na medida em que expressa uma visão de mundo não fragmentada e sistêmica, pautada por princípios como o hologramático e o dialógico. Com base nestes princípios, nosso principal foco será oferecer um caminho para pensarmos sobre a colonialidade de mentes através da ética da complexidade. (shrink)

Conceptual metaphors have received much attention in research on discourse about infectious diseases in recent years. Most studies found that conceptual metaphors of war dominate media discourse about disease. Similarly, a great deal of research has been undertaken on the new coronavirus, i.e., COVID-19, especially in the English news discourse as opposed to other languages. The present study, in contrast, analyses the conceptual metaphors used in COVID-19 discourse in French-language newspapers. The study explored the linguistic metaphors used in COVID-19 (...) discourse in these newspapers and conceptual metaphors that underlie and motivate them, using a conceptual metaphor theory framework (CMT). Therefore, two North African French-language newspapers, namely Libération, published in Morocco, and La Presse de Tunisie, published in Tunisia, formed the corpus of the current study. The results showed that the most frequent framing of COVID-19 was in terms of WAR, followed by DISASTER and KILLER, respectively. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to explore the effects of fake news on consumers’ brand trust in the food security context. The starting point of our research is the finding that issues related to food security cannot be addressed without the contribution of multinational food corporations. The efficiency of their intervention depends on their capacity to build and preserve their brand trust despite the multifarious fake news stories that contaminate the information flow. Is brand trust sensitive to (...) fake news? In some cases, the spread of fake news in mass media and social media negatively affects food companies. In other cases, consumers’ trust remains relatively unchanged. These ambivalent reactions give us good reason to assess whether consumers’ exposure to negative fake news influences their trust in international food brands. Using a one-group pretest-posttest research design, we found that the effects of fake news on consumers’ brand trust are predominantly negative, but in a few cases, these effects can be neutral or positive. These results could be useful for PR and marketing researchers and professionals interested in fake news phenomena and brand trust because they shed light on the real threat fake news represents for multinational food companies. (shrink)

In this paper, I offer a conceptual analysis of fake news. In essence, I suggest analysing this notion as a species of Frankfurtian bullshit. This construal, I argue, allows us to distinguish it from similar phenomena like bad or biased journalism and satire. First, I introduce four test cases. The first three are, intuitively, not cases of fake news, while the fourth one is. A correct conceptual analysis should, hence, exclude the first three while including the fourth. Next, (...) I go through some factors that could explain the difference between the first three cases and the fourth one before I offer my explanation. After that, I propose an analysis of fake news and show that it matches our intuitions about the four test cases. Finally, I consider a possible objection to my proposal. (shrink)

In this paper, I defend the view that it is wrong for us to consume only, or overwhelmingly, media that broadly aligns with our own political viewpoints: that is, it is wrong to be politically “partisan” in our decisions about what media to consume. We are obligated to consume media that aligns with political viewpoints other than our own – to “diversify our sources”. This is so even if our own views are, as a matter of fact, substantively correct.

The aim of this conceptual paper is to discuss the issue of managing fake news in the online environment, from an organizational perspective, by using reactive PR strategies. First, we critically discuss the most important definitions of the umbrella term fake news, in the so-called post-truth era, in order to emphasize different challenges in conceptualizing this elusive social phenomenon. Second, employing some valuable contribution from literature, we present and illustrate with vivid examples 10 categories of fake news. (...) Each type of fake news is discussed in the context of organizational communication. Based on existent literature, we propose a 3D conceptual model of fake news, in an organizational context. Furthermore, we consider that PR managers can use either reactive PR strategies to counteract online fake news regarding an organization, or communication stratagems to temporarily transform the organization served into a potential source of fake news. The existing typology of reactive public relations strategies from the literature allow us to discuss the challenge of using them in counteracting online fake news. Each reactive PR strategy can be a potential solution to respond to different types of online fake news. Although these possibilities seem to be extensive, in some cases, PR managers can find them ineffective. In our view, this cluster of reactive PR strategies is not a panacea for managing fake news in the online environment and different strategic approaches may be need, such as communication stratagems. In this context, communication stratagems consist in using organization as a source or as a vector for strategic creation and dissemination of online fake news, for the benefit of the organization. We conclude that within online environment PR managers can employ a variety of reactive PR strategies to counteract fake news, or different communication stratagems to achieve organizational goals. (shrink)

El propósito de este capítulo es argumentar la vitalidad de una ética cívica frente a una robotización del ejercicio periodístico. Para ello se contrasta la idea de que la inteligencia artificial se basta a sí misma para luchar contra los bulos con una infoética digital o algorítmica, que pone en valor los principios de la ethica cordis.

According to a prevailing view, conceptual engineering introduces a revolutionary philosophical methodology, challenging traditional conceptual analysis. However, in our paper, we argue that closer scrutiny reveals not only the falsity but also the inherent ambiguity of this narrative. We explore four interpretations of the "Anti-Novelty Claim", the claim that conceptual engineering is not a new way of doing philosophy. Discussing the Anti-Novelty Claim from the perspective of a text’s producer, the text’s consumers, and the exegetical potential of the text, we (...) examine each perspective’s metaphilosophical implications and demonstrate that taking each perspective requires different methods. Adopting these different methods, we argue that the different interpretations of the Anti-Novelty Claim range from nearly trivially true to unlikely but untested. Importantly, we emphasize that each interpretation offers unique philosophical insights, yet addressing them requires diverse types of evidence, preventing a singular, straightforward answer to whether conceptual engineering is new. (shrink)

In this chapter, I try to answer the above question, and another question that it presupposes: can philosophy of language help us navigate the political news cycle? A reader can be sceptical of a positive answer to the latter question; after all, citizens, political theorists, and journalists seem to be capable of following current politics and its coverage in the news, and there is no reason to think that philosophy of language in particular should be capable of helping (...) people make sense and respond to the news. I will illustrate the application of philosophy of language to three contrasting strategies of political propaganda: dogwhistles, meaning perversions, and bald-faced lies. I hope that these help us see that philosophy of language can be a good tool in diagnosing demagoguery, and in resisting it. (shrink)

For the theoretical construction that will allow the analysis to News of a Kidnapping (1996), I rely on the establishment of the sociological character of the disciplines of Literature and Criminology (the way of organizing society, through certain laws and regulations), besides having other similarities (artistic, interpretative and written dimensions), as pointed out by Perez (2006). The way of articulating these proposals is somewhat problematic, because there is no interdisciplinary link that is fully and intellectually elaborated, according to Nelson, (...) Treichler and Grossberg: difficulty that would not allow contextualizing, theorizing and questioning the bases with which we work. For this reason, Cultural Studies would have a necessary functionality: its methodology does not have guarantees on the privilege that is granted to the internal structures of the interdisciplinary. For this, I have developed two guidelines by which that phenomenon could be explained: the literary and criminological approaches. (shrink)

Psychologists and neuroscientists have delivered a lot of bad news about the inner workings of our minds, raising challenging questions about the extent to which we are rational in important domains of our judgments. I will focus on a central case of an unsettling effect on our perception, and primarily aim to establish that there actually is no impact from it on the rationality of our perceptual beliefs. To reach my goal, I will start with a rough review of (...) different ways bad news about our minds might negatively affect our rationality. I’ll then propose a test for when negative consequences would follow from the truth of some bad news about our minds, and I will argue that the test is not passed in a paradigmatic case of influence of bias on perception. I will then close by looking at potential wider implications of the psychological bad news for debates about internalism vs. externalism in epistemology. (shrink)

The core doctrine of ethical intuitionism is that some of our ethical knowledge is non-inferential. Against this, Sturgeon has recently objected that if ethical intuitionists accept a certain plausible rationale for the autonomy of ethics, then their foundationalism commits them to an implausible epistemology outside ethics. I show that irrespective of whether ethical intuitionists take non-inferential ethical knowledge to be a priori or a posteriori, their commitment to the autonomy of ethics and foundationalism does not entail any implausible non-inferential knowledge (...) in areas outside ethics (such as the past, the future, or the unobservable). However, each form of intuitionism does require a controversial stand on certain unresolved issues outside ethics. (shrink)

Heute gibt es kaum jemanden mehr, der nicht mit Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien in Berührung gekommen wäre. Mit dem globalen Aufstieg des modernen Populismus und besonders seit Donald Trumps US-Präsidentschaft konnten sie von obskuren Internetfo-ren und dem Rand der Gesellschaft weiter als je zuvor in die öffentliche Debatte vordringen. Mit der zunehmenden Nutzung sozialer Medien und Messenger-Apps wie Telegram oder WhatsApp findet scheinbares Wissen ungehindert Verbreitung und direkten Zugang zu den Smartphones und Köpfen der Menschen. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist (...) es nicht verwunderlich, dass Verschwörungstheorien und Fake News auch Einzug ins Klassenzimmer halten. Dabei stehen Lehrer*innen vor vielen offenen Fragen. Wie sind diese Behauptungen im Einzelnen zu bewerten? Was zeichnet Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien aus und was genau macht sie problematisch? Wie, selbst wenn sie klarerweise falsch und unbegründet sind, sollte damit im Klassenzimmer umgegangen werden? Sollte man sie offen diskutieren? Oder sollte man die Diskussion darüber unterbinden? Hier werden grundlegende und komplexe Fragen der freien Meinungsbildung und -äußerung berührt, zu denen Grundgesetz, Beamten- und Schulrecht nur begrenzt Auskunft geben. In diesem Beitrag wollen uns zuerst ein klares Bild davon machen, was Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien eigentlich sind, warum manche Menschen sie für wahr halten und was daran problematisch ist. Vor diesem Hintergrund soll anschließend die Frage diskutiert werden, wie aus demokratie- und bildungstheoretischer Sicht mit Fake News und Verschwörungstheorien im Unterricht umgegangen werden sollte. (shrink)

Social media has triggered an increase in fake news spread about different aspects of modern lives, society, politics, societal changes, etc., and has also affected companies’ reputation and brands’ trust. Therefore, this paper is aimed at investigating why social media users share fake news about environmentally friendly brands. To examine social media users’ behavior towards environmentally friendly brands, a theoretical research model proposed and analyzed using structural equations modeling in SmartPLS on a convenience sample consisting of 922 questionnaires. (...) Data was collected by means of a quantitative-based approach via a survey conducted among social media users from an emerging market. The results show that social media flow has a mediated impact on sharing fake news about environmentally friendly brands on social media. Considering the critical consequences of fake news, the paper argues that understanding the dissemination process of this type of bogus content on social media platforms has important theoretical and managerial implications. Understanding the psychological mechanisms that influence people’s behavior in sharing fake news about environmentally friendly brands on social networking sites (SNS) could help in better understanding the factors and the effects of this phenomenon. The originality of this research consists of proposing flow theory from positive psychology to be used as a theoretical framework to explain users’ behavior of sharing fake news about environmentally friendly brands on social media. (shrink)