Sexuel offences are classified in six groups and the most serious one is raping. If defloration is accompained with this offence, the punishment will increase seriously. -/- In this paper, the raping on the woman was violated through vagina have been investigated and at the offence fixation, the importance of the hymen have been determined.

Cet essai présente une description de plusieurs travaux inédits de Jacques Derrida au sujet de Marx et d'Althusser datant des années 1960 et 1970. Au-delà du travail philologique, il s'agit aussi d'une étude théorique de notions telles que 'idéologie', 'fétichisme', 'reproduction', 'division du travail', 'différence sexuelle', 'domination', 'économie politique', 'matérialisme dialectique', ou 'production culturelle' — tout autant à travers les textes marxistes que dans les lectures déconstructives qu'en propose alors Derrida. Durant les années 1970, dans le cadre de son séminaire, (...) Derrida s'efforce de penser une autre économie politique, au-delà de l'économie du propre qu'il identifie aussi bien chez les économistes classiques que chez leurs critiques marxistes. Ces lectures détaillées et combattives de textes marxistes restent aujourd'hui inédites. Leur prise en compte contribue à redéfinir l'image de Derrida et de la déconstruction, en témoignant de ses discussions très avancées de Marx, d'Althusser, et de la pensée marxiste — et ce dès la fin des années 1960 et le début des années 1970, plus de 20 ans avant la publication de Spectres de Marx (1993). -/- Une version plus courte de cet article fut traduite en espagnol par Ramiro Parodi, et publiée en 2019 dans le numéro 7 de la revue Demarcaciones — numéro consacré au 25ème anniversaire de la publication de Spectres de Marx. (shrink)

Criminal offences and regulatory breaches in using social networking evidence in personal injury litigation Pages 2-7 Current Criminal Law ISSN 1758-8405 Volume 2 Issue 3 March 2010 Author SALLY RAMAGE WIPO 900614 UK TM 2401827 USA TM 3,440.910 Orchid ID 0000-0002-8854-4293 Sally Ramage, BA (Hons), MBA, LLM, MPhil, MCIJ, MCMI, DA., ASLS, BAWP. Publisher & Managing Editor, Criminal Lawyer series [1980-2022](ISSN 2049-8047); Current Criminal Law series [2008-2022] (ISSN 1758-8405) and Criminal Law News series [2008-2022] (ISSN 1758-8421). Sweet & Maxwell (...) (Thomson Reuters) (Licensed Annotator of UK Statutes) in Current Law Statutes Annotated, (2006, 2009, 2010 editions) (sole and separate S&M contracts) for 7 UK Criminal Justice Statutes: UK Safeguarding Vulnerable Persons Act 2006; UK International Development Act 2006; UK Fraud Act 2006; UK Policing and Crime Act 2009, UK Local Democracy Act 2009; UK Bribery Act 2010; and UK Crime and Security Act 2010. Trade Mark SALLY RAMAGE ® 2401827 (2005-2025) in the UK, WIPO Trade Mark SALLY RAMAGE® 900164; USA-(Trade Mark 3,440,910) (2008-2028). WARNING: The doing of an unauthorized act in relation to a copyright work may result in both a civil claim for damages and criminal prosecution. Essentially, Social Network information may not always be admissible in a court of law but may be the door to lead to other, non-contentious evidence. In fact, even illegally obtained evidence may sometimes be admissible evidence, though this is not absolute. Most of the information available on social networking sites will be ‘personal data’. The data controller is the network operator, without whose consent, collecting such information could be an offence, unless it was necessary for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime. (shrink)

I argue that fitting resentment tracks unacceptable ‘ecological’ imbalances in relative social strength between victims and perpetrators that arise from violations of legitimate moral expectations. It does not respond purely, or even primarily, to offenders’ attitudes, and its proper targets need not be fully developed moral agents. It characteristically involves a wish for the restoration of social equilibrium rather than a demand for moral recognition or good will. To illuminate these contentions, I focus on cases that I believe demonstrate a (...) corollary thesis, namely, that strength, broadly construed, is a necessary condition of resentment-worthiness. I argue that weakness can make resentment unfitting in two ways. First, weakness may prevent a wrongdoer from shifting the balance of social power. Second, a weak wrongdoer may do social damage but be so lowly that resentment, which would represent him as excessively strong, would be inapt. Finally, I consider how accepting the ecological view might affect our theorizing about moral responsibility and the ethics of blame. (shrink)

Diskriminierung und Menschenrechtsverletzungen gegenüber LSBTI-Personen werden heute international thematisiert und angeprangert – ein vergleichsweise neues Phänomen. Dennoch tragen die herrschenden Normen von Zweigeschlechtlichkeit und Heterosexualität weiterhin zur Diskriminierung bei: So sind gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften in fast allen Staaten schlechter gestellt als heterosexuelle. Transgeschlechtliche Menschen erfahren Gewalt, weil ihr Verhalten und Äußeres nicht geltenden Normen entsprechen.

Wenn man heute Instagram öffnet, begegnen vielfältige Beiträge zu Gendervielfalt, sexueller Aufklärung, Umweltengagement und Körperoptimierung. Auf Instagram gibt es Queerness ebenso wie neue Lebensformen, ein neues Verhältnis zur Umwelt, veränderte Selbstverständnisse, eine breite Varianz von Formen der Selbstdarstellung und Körperinszenierung. Die hier gezeigten veränderten Lebenswirklichkeiten und Selbstverständnisse der Menschen legen nahe, dass diese neuen Entwicklungen in eine zeitgenössische Anthropologie, die sich mit dem menschlichen Selbstverständnis wissenschaftlich auseinandersetzt, aufgenommen werden müssen. Der Aufsatz nimmt die Social-Media-Plattform Instagram als Anlass, um Perspektiven für (...) eine zeitgenössische Anthropologie aufzuzeigen. Dazu wird untersucht, durch welche Perspektiven die Anthropologie ergänzt werden muss und wie die theoretischen Ansätze des Neuen Materialismus dafür fruchtbar gemacht werden können. Im ersten Schritt wird in die Themen auf Instagram sowie den Zusammenhang von Instagram und Anthropologie eingeführt (2). Davon ausgehend werden drei Themen für eine zeitgemäße Anthropologieuntersucht: Technik (Technikanthropologie), Körper und Körperoptimierung sowie Umwelt und die Beziehungen zu nichtmenschlichen Entitäten (3). Anschließend werden der Neue Materialismus (4) vorgestellt und dazu die Ansätze von Donna Haraway und Karen Barad skizziert, sodass daraus Schlüsse für eine zeitgemäße Anthropologie gezogen werden können (5). Dies mündet in einen Ausblick auf die weitere anthropologische Forschung (6). (shrink)

Le politologue, philosophe et sociologue Karsten Schubert examine le lien entre sexualité et politique gay et se demande quel type de politique a été favorisé ou au contraire entravé suivant la situation liée à la pandémie de VIH. Il présente deux thèses à cet égard.

This article explores the many offences (e.g. noise pollution, unlicensed performances, and Health and Safety offences) that may be committed by personnel in the music industry and their employers. It also explores the many breaches of Intellectual Property law that may be committed by others against the musician’s rights.

Comment en arrive-t-on à proposer comme oeuvre d’art une relation sexuelle tarifée avec un collectionneur? En 2003, l’artiste en art conceptuel et performeuse américaine, Andrea Fraser, commettra l’impensable de « coucher » avec un collectionneur afin de critiquer le milieu et surtout le marché de l’art contemporain. L’article qui suit propose une analyse thématique de l’aspect sexuel et éthique de cette oeuvre intitulée Untitled. Il sera d’abord question des significations possibles de cette performance et ses questionnements artistiques plus autoréférentiels. (...) Je compte ensuite aborder plus précisément la position trouble de la subjectivité de l’artiste qui oscille entre une posture d’objet sexuel et d’artiste. De même, le texte fera état de la position novatrice que l’oeuvre présente sur les enjeux éthiques du travail du sexe en déconstruisant les arguments paternalistes généralement invoqués pour criminaliser le travail du sexe. Et finalement, j’aborderai la question de savoir comment la nature sexuelle de l’oeuvre vient désacraliser à la fois l’art et la sexualité, et par le fait même critiquer l’idée que la sexualité soit le siège de la subjectivité. En désacralisant ainsi la sexualité, je postule qu’Untitled offre la possibilité de concevoir le travail du sexe de manière plus neutre.How can a sexual act in exchange of money with an art collector be offered as a work of art? In 2003, performer and conceptual artist Andrea Fraser committed the unthinkable of sleeping with an art collector in order to critique the contemporary art milieu and market. The following article proposes a thematic analysis of sexual and ethical components of this work of art entitled Untitled. I will first discuss possible meanings of such a performance and its artistic considerations. I will then address more precisely the troubled position of the artist’s subjectivity, which vacillates between a sexual object and an artist. Moreover, the article will highlight the innovative position presented by this work of art on ethical issues regarding sex work by deconstructing paternalistic claims generally used to support the criminalization of sex work. Finally, I will discuss how the sexual nature of this work of art comes to desecrate art, along with sexuality, thereby criticizing the idea that sexuality is the main site of subjectivity. Through this desecration of sexuality, I argue that Untitled offers the possibility to apprehend sex work in a more neutral way. (shrink)

Cet article parle de la nécessité de repenser la notion de la différence sexuelle après le mal appropriation de celle-ci par « la manif pour tous ». Chaque tentative de former une ontologie fondée sur cette différence risque une favorisation de l’hétéronormativité et de l’essentialisme. En me servant de la philosophie d’Elizabeth Grosz sur Darwin, j’essaie de reformuler la différence sexuelle en des termes positifs et de voir celle-ci comme une notion qui facilite (plutôt que limite) la diversité. Le texte (...) est divisé en deux parties : 1. L’instrumentalisation de la différence sexuelle pour promouvoir l’hétéronormativité, et 2. Repenser une ontologie fondée sur la différence sexuelle. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that the publication of cartoons caricaturing Islam by Jyllands- Posten is problematic for a number of reasons. First, within liberal political theory itself, there are reasonable arguments that the depictions (at least two) perpetuate prejudice and verge on hate speech. Second, such depictions weaken the social conditions that make possible a thriving democracy (i.e., participation) by marginalizing the already marginalized. Moreover, the caricatures perpetuate an Orientalist discourse about the nature of Islam and the non-West, and (...) hinder global intercultural dialogue and understanding between nations. (shrink)

Intended and merely foreseen consequences: The psychology of the ‘cause or allow’ offence. A short report for the Socio-Legal Community on ESRC Grant RES-000-22-3114.

Slurring is a kind of hate speech that has various effects. Notable among these is variable offence. Slurs vary in offence across words, uses, and the reactions of audience members. Patterns of offence aren’t adequately explained by current theories. We propose an explanation based on the unjust power imbalance that a slur seeks to achieve. Our starting observation is that in discourse participants take on discourse roles. These are typically inherited from social roles, but only exist during a discourse. A (...) slurring act is a speech-act that alters the discourse roles of the target and speaker. By assigning discourse roles the speaker unjustly changes the power balance in the dialogue. This has a variety of effects on the target and audience. We show how these notions explain all three types of offence variation. We also briefly sketch how a role and power theory can help explain silencing and appropriation. Explanatory power lies in the fact that offence is correlated with the perceived unjustness of the power imbalance created. (shrink)

Slurs are typically defined as conveying contempt based on group-membership. However, here I argue that they are not a unitary group. First, I describe two dimensions of variation among derogatives: how targets are identified, and how offensive the term is. This supports the typical definition of slurs as opposed to other derogatives. I then highlight problems with this definition, mainly caused by variable offence across slur words. In the process I discuss how major theories of slurs can account for variable (...) offence, and conclude that contempt based on group-membership doesn’t cover all the data. I finish by noting that the most offensive slurs are those that target oppressed groups. I claim it is oppression that underpins most offence, and that beyond this offensive property, some slurs are actively used to oppress. (shrink)

Purpose: Illicit financial flows are targeted by the United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). However, these illicit flows are not entirely understood. Furthermore, they can benefit from economic norms, laws, and regulations that lack mechanisms to detect and penalize them. This paper investigates whether a recent test, the embezzler test, can be used to identify regulatory architectures that facilitate illicit financial flows and related financial crimes. -/- Design/methodology/approach: To develop a more advanced version of the embezzler test in terms (...) of definitions and practical implementation methodology. -/- Findings: In this test, the definition of embezzlement can be understood to be the occurrence of illicit financial flows crossing the boundaries of organizations and/or countries. This is a multi-stage test, which intentionally simulates illicit financial flows to observe how well equipped is the regulatory architecture to deal with other financial offences that are related with these flows, such as theft, money laundering, fraud, corruption, market manipulation, and tax evasion. -/- Originality: This is the first explicit test that has been presented to identify norms, laws, and regulations that facilitate illicit financial flows and related financial crimes. -/- Research implications: Future research can employ the version of this test to stress test a large range of economic norms, laws, and regulations. -/- Practical/Social implications: This test’s new version can assist achieve the UN SDGs’ illicit financial flow reduction target. Furthermore, it can be used to study both existing and proposed norms, laws, and regulation. (shrink)

“Denn das Maß der Widerwärtigkeiten und Schlechtigkeiten wird augenblicklich wieder durch neue aufgefüllt, als glitte das eine Bein der Welt immer wieder zurück, wenn sich das andere vorschiebt. Daran müßte man die Ursache und den Geheimmechanismus erkennen!” (Robert Musil, Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften, I, 27) Die Frage, ob Evolution eine Fortschrittskomponente beinhalte, oder zumindest einen Trend zur Komplexität der Organismen oder der Ökosysteme, beschäftigt nicht nur Romanschreiber, sondern Biologen wie Philosophen (Ruse 1993). Ist Anpassung ein Schritt vorwärts? Wovon weg - (...) worauf zu? Ist der komplexere Organismus besser an seine Umwelt angepaßt? Wenn ja, was sind die Konsequenzen und Kosten solchen Fortschritts? Ludwig von Bertalanffy wunderte sich über den Sinn eines evolutionären Dramas, in dem das Leben sich umständlich immer höher schraubt, um für jede erreichte Ebene einen neuen Preis zu zahlen: für Vielzelligkeit den Tod des Individuums, für das Nervensystem den Schmerz, für das Bewußtsein die Angst (Davidson 1983). Daß Evolution nicht, wie man lange glauben wollte, partout der Komplexität zustrebt, zeigt sich am Verlust der Flugfähigkeit bei vielen Inselvögeln in Abwesenheit terrestrischer Räuber, oder an der strukturellen Vereinfachung der meisten Parasiten, wird aber besonders deutlich in den klassischen Experimenten von Spiegelman (1967). Spiegelman inkubierte die RNA eines Virus in einer konstant gehaltenen Brühe aus freien Monomeren und Replikase. Unter artifizieller Selektion für rapide Reproduktion etablierte sich in diesem Experiment nach nur 75 Generationen eine stabile Mutante, die sich zwar fünfzehnmal so schnell vermehrte, sich aber von ursprünglich 4200 Nukleotiden auf nur mehr 220 reduziert hatte, nicht viel mehr als die Erkennungsstelle für die Replikase. Im Schlaraffenland, wo Ressourcen nie weniger werden, Abfälle sich nie anhäufen und Feinde nicht existieren, in einer Umwelt also, in welcher der Organismus weder bedroht noch von den Rückwirkungen seiner eigenen Handlungen betroffen wird, verläuft die Evolution anscheinend nicht in Richtung auf zunehmende Größe und Komplexität, wie dies Bonner (1988) für die reale Welt zu zeigen versuchte, sondern genau umgekehrt. Ich werde im folgenden eine Antwort auf dieses Paradoxon skizzieren, die aus den folgenden Thesen besteht: 1. Jeder Adaptivschritt eines evoluierenden Organismus zieht einen Komplementärschritt seiner unbelebten und seiner belebten Umwelt nach sich. Die Umwelt weicht vom sich adaptierenden Organismus zurück. Der Organismus von heute ist an die Umwelt von gestern angepaßt. 2. Während die unbelebte Umwelt lediglich in passiver Weise auf das energetische Vordringen des Organismus reagiert, sind Wechselwirkungen zwischen Organismus und belebter Umwelt, also anderen Organismen, teleonomisch. Wechselwirkungen, die im Energiefluß asymmetrisch sind (wie zum Beispiel zwischen Räuber und Beute), sind im Informationsfluß komplementär asymmetrisch. In dem Maße wie Energie zum erfolgreichen Räuber fließt, fließt Information zur erfolgreichen Beute. Der Räuber von heute erbt das Beutebild von gestern. 3. Einmalige Individualität, das Resultat sexueller Fortpflanzung, vermittelt diese asymmetrische Rückkoppelung und puffert die daraus resultierende zeitverschobene Eskalation. Der Trend zur Individualisierung ist selbstverstärkend und führt zu zunehmender räumlicher und zeitlicher Komplexität von Organismen und Umwelten. Individualität ist die stärkste Triebfeder in der Gestaltung der Biosphäre. (shrink)

As a type of evidence glass can be very useful contact trace material in a wide range of offences including burglaries and robberies, hit-and-run accidents, murders, assaults, ram-raids, criminal damage and thefts of and from motor vehicles. All of that offer the potential for glass fragments to be transferred from anything made of glass which breaks, to whoever or whatever was responsible. Variation in manufacture of glass allows considerable discrimination even with tiny fragments. In this study, we worked glass (...) classification and testing of artificial neural network model created by the JustNN. The aim of the study is help investigator in identifying the type of glass found in arena of the crime. The Neural Network model was trained and validated using the type of glass dataset. The accuracy of model in predicting the type of glass reached 96.7%. Thus neural network is suitable for predicating type of glasses. (shrink)

It is widely accepted that there is what has been called a non-hypocrisy norm on the appropriateness of moral blame; roughly, one has standing to blame only if one is not guilty of the very offence one seeks to criticize. Our acceptance of this norm is embodied in the common retort to criticism, “Who are you to blame me?”. But there is a paradox lurking behind this commonplace norm. If it is always inappropriate for x to blame y for a (...) wrong that x has committed, then all cases in which x blames x (i.e. cases of self-blame) are rendered inappropriate. But it seems to be ethical common-sense that we are often, sadly, in position (indeed, excellent, privileged position) to blame ourselves for our own moral failings. And thus we have a paradox: a conflict between the inappropriateness of hypocritical blame, and the appropriateness of self-blame. We consider several ways of resolving the paradox, and contend none is as defensible as a position that simply accepts it: we should never blame ourselves. In defending this startling position, we defend a crucial distinction between self-blame and guilt. (shrink)

Menschenrechtsverletzungen aufgrund sexueller Orientierung und Geschlechtsidentität (SOGI) wurden auf internationaler Ebene lange Zeit kaum zur Kenntnis genommen. Doch seit einigen Jahren wird dem Thema in den Vereinten Nationen breiterer Raum eingeräumt. Die Yogyakarta-Prinzipien und eine Studie des Amtes des Hohen Kommissars für Menschenrechte stellen nur die ersten Schritte auf dem Weg zu einem umfassenderen Schutzansatz dar. Er muss gegen den Widerstand vieler Staaten weiterverfolgt werden.

Mettre en rapport des textes de Hegel sur l’amour érotique avec quelques passages du penseur romantique Friedrich Schlegel permet de mettre en relief la méfiance hégélienne à l’égard du désir sexuel. Selon l’échelle hiérarchique de désirs chez Hegel, le désir érotique fait preuve d’un déséquilibre entre le sujet désirant et l’objet désiré, ce qui est typique d’un rapport purement naturel et non spirituel. C’est dire que la connaissance charnelle, avec son objet dénué de Soi propre, représente pour Hegel une (...) forme inférieure de savoir. L’inégalité sujet-objet propre à l’amour érotique n’est dépassée que par la participation à la substance éthique, ce qui exige la reconnaissance réciproque de consciences de soi égales. Dans ce contexte, il s’agit du mariage. Juxtaposing some of Hegel’s texts on erotic love with certain passages from the romantic thinker Friedrich Schlegel throws light on Hegel’s problematic relationship with sexual desire. According to his hierarchy of types of desire, erotic desire betrays an imbalance between the desiring subject and the object of desire, typical of a purely natural, non-spiritual relation. This means that carnal knowledge, with its self-less object, represents an inferior form of knowing. The inequality between subject and object, inherent in erotic love, is only surpassed through participation in the ethical substance, requiring the reciprocal recognition of equal self-consciousnesses. In the present context, this means marriage. (shrink)

1. We sometimes angrily confront, pointedly ostracize, castigate, or denounce those whom we think have committed moral offences. Conduct of this kind may be called blaming behaviour. When genuine,...

It is generally agreed that for blame to be appropriate the wrongdoer must be blameworthy. However, blameworthiness is not sufficient for appropriate blame. It has been argued that for blame to be appropriate the blamer must have standing to blame. Philosophers writing on the topic have distinguished several considerations that might defeat someone’s standing to blame. This paper examines the underexplored consideration of how personal relationships can influence who has the standing to express blame. We seem to assume that if (...) we do not stand in the right relation to the wrongdoer, it is not our business to blame them. I identify three challenges to this view. First, we do not know what is wrong with meddling (whether it is morally or prudentially wrong). Second, there are cases where we have no close relation to the wrongdoer, but where we seem to have standing nonetheless – murder and other serious moral offences are examples of this. Third, we don’t seem to have a clear conception of what ‘standing’ means, and this makes it hard to see how discussion on standing can help us determine the propriety of blame. This paper defends the notion of standing as a propriety condition on blame in cases of meddling. I argue that personal relationships influence who has the standing to blame through constitution of relationship-specific norms; and that the role these norms play in developing and regulating our relationships can explain why meddlesome blame is morally wrong. (shrink)

Recent pragmatic accounts of slurs argue that the offensiveness of slurs is generated by a speaker's free choice to use a slur opposed to a more appropriate and semantically equivalent neutral counterpart. I argue that the theoretical role of neutral counterparts on such views is overstated. I consider two recent pragmatic analyses, Bolinger (Noûs, 51, 2017, 439) and Nunberg (New work on speech acts, Oxford University Press, 2018), which rely heavily upon the optionality of slurs, namely, that a speaker exercises (...) a deliberate lexical choice to use a slur when they could have easily used a neutral counterpart instead. Against such views, I argue that across a range of different offensive uses of slurs, a speaker's choice to use a slur opposed to a neutral counterpart plays little to no role in accounting for why the slur generates offence. Such cases cast serious doubt upon the explanatory depth of these pragmatic analyses, and raise more general concerns for views which draw upon the relationship between a slur and its neutral counterpart. The main upshot is this: theorists should exercise caution in assuming that neutral counterparts play any fundamental or systemic role in explaining why slurs are offensive. (shrink)

Jury science is fraught with difficulty. Since legal and institutional hurdles render it all but impossible to study live criminal jury deliberation, researchers make use of various indirect methods to evaluate jury performance. But each of these methods are open to methodological criticism and, strikingly, some of the highest-profile jury research programmes in recent years have reached opposing conclusions. Uncertainty about jury performance is an obstacle for legal reform—ongoing debates about the ‘justice gap’ for complainants of sexual offences has (...) rendered these problems stark. This paper proposes a way to advance the debate. (shrink)

According to the Behavioral View of consent, consent must be expressed in behavior in order to release someone from a duty. By contrast, the Mental View of consent is that normatively efficacious consent is entirely mental. In previous work, I defended a version of the Behavioral View, according to which normatively efficacious ‘consent always requires public behavior, and this behavior must take the form of communication in the case of high-stakes consent’. In this essay, I respond to two arguments by (...) proponents of the Mental View. First, Larry Alexander, Heidi Hurd and Peter Westen have argued that my view has mistaken implications concerning the culpability of different actors. I counter that my version of the view does not have these implications, as it leaves us free to draw moral and legal distinctions between different offences involving non-consensual behavior. Second, Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan have argued for an analogy between consent and abandonment: on the grounds that the normative power to abandon resides in one’s will, Alexander and Ferzan concludes consent does too. I counter that abandonment requires behavior, and call into question the assumption that the ethics of property have much to teach us about the ethics of sexual consent. (shrink)

PrEP (Präexpositionsprophylaxe) ist ein relativ neues Mittel zur Prävention von HIV-Infektionen. HIV-negative Menschen nehmen antivirale Medikamente ein, die verhindern, dass der Kontakt mit dem Virus zu einer Infektion führt. Im Gegensatz zum Kondomgebrauch basiert dieses Präventionsverfahren auf Medikamenten und nicht auf einer Verhaltensänderung. Aus der Perspektive der Biopolitik fügt sie sich in einen größeren Trend in Richtung Medikalisierung, des Anstiegs der Macht der Pharmaindustrie und der Reglementierung des Risikos ein. Sexuelles Verhalten ist das Ergebnis der Subjektivierung, des Prozesses, durch den (...) soziale Normen Subjekte und ihre Wünsche bilden. Die Medikalisierung von schwulem Sex durch PrEP verändert die sexuelle Subjektivierung und geht daher mit einer Veränderung der Praktiken von schwulem Sex einher. Nach einer kurzen Erläuterung der medizinischen Besonderheiten und der Geschichte von PrEP (1) vereint dieser Artikel eine Rekonstruktion zeitgenössischer theoretischer Ansätze zur Biopolitik im Zusammenhang mit PrEP (2) mit einer Darstellung aktueller politischer Debatten um PrEP (3). Die Untersuchung zeigt, dass sich Gouvernementalitätsstudien und die Italienische Theorie auf repressive Machtverhältnisse konzentrieren und daher die Komplexität der Debatte nicht berücksichtigen können, die sich aus der Subjektivität und Handlungsfähigkeit verschiedener beteiligter Akteure, insbesondere schwuler PrEP-Aktivisten, ergibt. Dennoch werden Interpretationen von PrEP als repressiver Macht auch von einigen Akteuren in der politischen Debatte um PrEP genutzt, meist ohne ausdrücklichen Bezug zur biopolitischen Theorie. Nikolas Roses und Paul Rabinows differenziertes Konzept der Biopolitik bietet einige Ansätze wie diejenigen der biopolitischen Bürgerschaft und der somatischen Ethik, um die Debatte um PrEP und die damit verbundenen komplexen Verhandlungen über Sexualität zu beschreiben. Ausgehend von diesen Ideen entwickle ich ein neues Konzept der ‚demokratischen Biopolitik‘ von PrEP, die eine weitere Demokratisierung der Sexualität im biopolitischen Zeitalter ermöglicht. (shrink)

In 1993 the Law Lords upheld the original conviction of five men under the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act for participating in sado-masochistic practices. Although the five men were fully consenting adults, the Law Lords held that consent did not constitute a defence to acts of violence within a sado-masochistic context. This paper examines the judgements in this case and argues that sado-masochistic practices are no different from the known exceptions cited by the court to the idea that (...) consent is no defence to violence (sport, parental chastisement and surgery). It also argues that if we can make sense of rape as a non-consensual, violent act, expressed through sex, then we can make sense of sado-masochism as a consensual sexual act, expressed through violence. (shrink)

Geschlecht und Gewalt, das Thema dieses Bandes, betrifft nicht nur die Frage nach den Charakteristika und Ursachen sexueller Aggression, sondern auch die Frage nach angeblichen geschlechtsspezifischen Formen der Aggression. Der vorliegende Beitrag befasst sich mit beidem und diskutiert sie als Teil von begrifflichen Ausweitungen der Kampfzone, d.h. der Erweiterungen des Aggressionsbegriffs im Verlauf der wissenschaftlichen Aggressionsforschung der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Der Beitrag zeigt unter Anderem: was als Aggression wahrgenommen wird und in der Wissenschaft als solche gezählt wird, verändert (...) sich mit der Gesellschaft. Dabei wird aus epistemologischer bzw. wissenschaftsphilosophischer Perspektive gezeigt, wie sich rassistische, Status-, und Geschlechtsstereotype auf begriffliche Entscheidungen in wissenschaftlicher Forschung auswirken und somit die wissenschaftliche Arbeit am Begriff beeinflussen können. (shrink)

Das Themengebiet der Psychopathie hat in den letzten Jahrzehnten vor allem durch Filme, die sich mit (vermeintlich) psychopathischen Charakteren beschäfti- gen, ein breites gesellschaftliches Interesse erfahren (vgl. Swart 2016). Holly- woods Blockbuster zeigen hier Beispiele hochintelligenter (z. B. Hanibal Lector in „Das Schweigen der Lämmer“) oder sexuell devianter (z. B. Patrick Bateman in „American Psycho“) Serienkiller, welche aus klinischer Sicht tatsächlich hoch psy- chopathische Tendenzen aufweisen. Demgegenüber werden psychisch andersartig beeinträchtigte Filmcharaktere, wie z. B. Norman Bates („Psycho“) oder Travis Bickel (...) („Taxi Driver“) wohl aufgrund ihrer schreckenseinflößenden Wirkung im allgemeinen Sprachgebrauch oft als Psychopathen bezeichnet, obwohl ihre Symptome aus forensisch-psychiatrischer Sicht eher schizoiden Wahnvorstellungen ähneln und keine Anzeichen einer klas- sischen Psychopathie darstellen (vgl. Leistedt / Linkowski 2014). Auch Medienbe- richte über tatsächlich existierende, brutale (z.B. Serienkiller Ted Bundy) oder dreiste (z.B. Anlagebetrüger Bernard Madoff) Figuren der Zeitgeschichte haben die konzeptionelle Unübersichtlichkeit des in der Öffentlichkeit wahrgenommenen Bildes der Psychopathie befeuert. Und sogar in medizinischen bzw. psychiatri- schen Kreisen scheint eine uneinheitliche Sichtweise die Konfusion um das Stö- rungsbild Psychopathie weiter anzufachen (vgl. Berg et al. 2013). (shrink)

The UK has been slack in fulfilling its international obligations regarding human trafficking. The UK Modern Slavery Act 2015 has apparently nothing to say about the demand for women trafficked into prostitution, although it addresses the demand for other forms of trfficking though the supply chain provisins in the Act. The UK has disappointed many in condoning prostitution, as Lady Butler-Sloss describes as 'one of the longest standing industries'. However it is one of the longest-standing forms of exploitation. The Act (...) instead, has given much importance to modern -day slavery. An effective way of tackling demand for prostitution and the attendant exploitation would be to make it an offence to purchase someone for sex. Yet perhaps the point is that to curb modern-day slavery is to curb prostitution and pornography, through curbing the supply side. However the UK hasragged its feet over many years, especially when one considers that Internet pornography brings in over £4 billion annually to the UK Gross Domestic Product. (shrink)

Some environmental views characterise the human abuse of nature as an offence against nature itself. What conception of nature would best fit that characterisation? To focus upon such a conception, aesthetic offences against nature are examined and distinguished at the outset from moral offences. Aesthetic offences are divided into those internal to our cultural outlook and external to it. The external outlook, conceiving nature as a thing wholly apart from us, is shown to be necessary to any (...) view of nature being offended against. Central to the external outlook is a conception of nature as the victim of offence without ever being itself an offending agent. Best fitting this is the notion of nature as primordially innocent. Given this metaphorical extension, the awkward consequence arises that any human use of nature constitutes thereby an abuse of it from the external standpoint. (shrink)

Suppose that it can be right to grant amnesty from criminal and civil liability to those guilty of political crimes in exchange for full disclosure about them. There remains this important question to ask about the proper form that amnesty should take: Which additional burdens, if any, should the state lift from wrongdoers in the wake of according them freedom from judicial liability? I answer this question in the context of a recent South African Constitutional Court case that considered whether (...) an officer having been granted amnesty for apartheid-era killings should be held to mean that the police force may not discharge him on the ground of having been convicted of a serious offence. The Court ruled that, despite amnesty having been granted to the guilty officer, the police force was permitted to discharge him. I distinguish the major ethical reasons the Court gives for its conclusion, which ultimately appeal to the value of national reconciliation, and I argue not only that the reconciliation-based rationales rest on empirical contingencies for which there is little evidence, but also that their logic in fact provides some reason to reject the Court’s conclusion. Then, I sketch an attractive new theory of right action, grounded on salient sub-Saharan values often associated with talk of ‘ubuntu’, that I maintain provides a stronger, unitary foundation for the Court’s key pronouncements. I conclude by discussing some of the broader implications of the moral theory for related matters, such as the rights of victims in the processes leading up to presidential pardons of those who have committed atrocities and the duties of newspapers with regard to the reputations of the latter. (shrink)

This paper explores the derogatory uses of nicknames within closely-knit social settings such as villages, households, and schools. By examining ethnographic and psychological data on nicknaming practices, this paper contends that pejorative nicknames and slurs share structural and functional attributes. On the one hand, pejorative nicknames and slurs can elicit deep offence regardless of the speaker’s intentions or whether they occur within speech reports. On the other, pejorative nicknames can contribute to creating and reinforcing unjust intra-group hierarchies, hence mirroring the (...) role of slurs within a smaller social scale. To explain these shared attributes, this paper argues (i) that both forms of verbal aggression index multiple dimensional qualities such as ‘negative valence’, ‘neutral arousal’, and ‘high dominance’ rather than discrete emotional categories such as ‘contempt’ or ‘anger’, and (ii) that the expression of high dominance in social interactions underlies their capacity to offend. Then, it translates this hypothesis into a Bayesian model of sociolinguistic variation inspired by Heather Burnett’s work on identity construction, thus integrating pragmatic reasoning into a psychologically informed framework for interpreting emotional cues. By studying both phenomena in tandem, this paper shows how understanding nicknaming dynamics within smaller speech-act communities can contribute to our comprehension of the derogatory impact of slurs in more intricate social contexts. (shrink)

The neurosciences not only challenge assumptions about the mind’s place in the natural world but also urge us to reconsider its role in the normative world. Based on mind-brain dualism, the law affords only one-sided protection: it systematically protects bodies and brains, but only fragmentarily minds and mental states. The fundamental question, in what ways people may legitimately change mental states of others, is largely unexplored in legal thinking. With novel technologies to both intervene into minds and detect mental activity, (...) the law should, we suggest, introduce stand alone protection for the inner sphere of persons. We shall address some metaphysical questions concerning physical and mental harm and demonstrate gaps in current doctrines, especially in regard to manipulative interferences with decision-making processes. We then outline some reasons for the law to recognize a human right to mental liberty and propose elements of a novel criminal offence proscribing severe interventions into other minds. (shrink)

The Covid-19 pandemic has fuelled indignation. People have been indignant about the breaking of lockdown rules, about the mistakes and deficiencies of government pandemic policies, about enforced mask-wearing, about vaccination programmes (or lack thereof), about lack of care with regards vulnerable individuals, and more. Indeed, indignation seems to have been particularly prevalent on social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, where indignant remarks are often accompanied by variations on the hashtag #WTF?! In this paper, I explore indignation’s distinctive character (...) as a form of moral anger, in particular suggesting that what is characteristic of indignation is not only that it discloses moral injustices but betrays our disbelief at the very occurrence of the offence. Having outlined the character of indignation, I consider how the structure of indignation impacts how we do, respond to, and receive indignation. I explore indignation in action, so to speak, in the context of Covid-19, with a particular emphasis on how indignation occurs ‘on the internet’. (shrink)

Fifty years ago this year a legal practitioner turned military intelligencer turned philosopher, Herbert Hart, published The Concept of Law, still deservedly best-seller in thought about law. It presents law, especially common law and constitutionally ordered systems such as ours, as a social reality which results from the sharing of ideas and making of decisions that, for good or evil, establish rules of law which are what they are, whether just or unjust. But right at its centre is a chapter (...) on justice, informed by Hart’s professional knowledge of Plato and Aristotle and the tradition of civilized thought about justice, thought which he sums up like this: “the general principle latent in [the] diverse applications of the idea of justice is that individuals are entitled in respect of each other to a certain relative position of equality or inequality.” “Hence”, he goes on, “[the] leading precept [of justice] is often formulated as ‘Treat like cases alike’; though we need to add … ‘and treat different cases differently’”. This article will say something about three aspects of this vast topic: (i) about the factual basis and normative grounds of equality; (ii) about the proposed principle of equal concern; and (iii) about laws and social policies that pursue equality by selective prohibition of direct and indirect discrimination, and of harassment or vilification, victimisation and offence. (shrink)

Les désirs sont centraux pour agir et être heureux. Qu’est-ce qu’un désir ? En quoi les désirs sont-ils importants ? Dans cette entrée, nous tenterons de mettre les mots sur cette expérience si familière et pourtant négligée par la philosophie contemporaine. (1) En guise de préliminaires, nous délimiterons notre objet d’étude à la lumière des principales distinctions entre les désirs et d’autres états mentaux tels que les croyances et intentions, ainsi qu’à l’aide des distinctions classiques parmi les désirs. (2) Notre (...) exploration débutera par l’exposé de diverses facettes du désir : (i) les désirs s’accompagnent de l’apparence du bien; (ii) les désirs nous poussent à agir ; (iii) le monde doit se conformer à nos désirs (la direction d’ajustement monde-esprit); et (iv) les désirs portent sur ce que nous ne pensons pas être réel (le principe de la mort du désir). (3) Dans la troisième partie, nous présenterons les principales conceptions du désir en philosophie contemporaine, particulièrement les deux approches classiques: désirer est faire l’expérience du bien (théorie évaluative) et désirer est être motivé à agir (théorie motivationnelle). Nous esquisserons aussi des théories alternatives: l’approche déontique et neuroscientifique. Après avoir tenté de délimiter le désir, nous examinerons son importance. (4) Nous questionnerons trois types de désir qui occupent une place privilégiée dans nos vies: l’espoir, la curiosité et le désir sexuel. (5) Nous explorerons les bienfaits du désir à travers les théories désidératives du bonheur, des raisons d’agir et de la personnalité. (6) Nous conclurons en discutant les vicissitudes épistémiques du désir ou leur pouvoir de nous faire baigner dans l’illusion (l’auto-duperie). (shrink)

Advances in forensic techniques have expanded the temporal horizon of criminal investigations, facilitating investigation of historic crimes that would previously have been considered unsolvable. Public enthusiasm for pursuing historic crimes is exemplified by recent high-profile trials of celebrities accused of historic sexual offences. These circumstances give new urgency to the question of how we should decide which historic offences to investigate. A satisfactory answer must take into account the ways in which the passage of time can erode the (...) benefits of criminal investigation, the costs associated with investigating old crimes, and the need to prioritize investigations in the face of limited police resources. This article emphasizes the first of these factors. It begins by considering the moral goals of a criminal justice system and the contribution of criminal investigations to the achievement of these goals, distinguishing between contributions that depend on further steps in the criminal justice process, such as prosecution and punishment, and contributions that can have value independently of these further steps. Using this important distinction, the article then examines a range of factors that relate the passage of time to criminal justice goals, including the seriousness of the crime; deterioration of evidence; death of the offender, victim and others affected by the crime; and diminished psychological connectedness between those affected by the crime and their current selves. While the range and non-uniformity of relevant factors preclude a simple answer to the question of when historic crimes should be investigated and call instead for case-by-case assessment, we find that the analysis does support some general conclusions that can guide such an assessment. (shrink)

I shall argue that advocates of denunciatory forms of expressivism can make a good case for restricting the range of measures that can be an appropriate form of punishment. They can do so by focusing not on the conditions of uptake of the message conveyed by punishment, but by the content of that message. For it is plausible that part of that message should be that the offender is a responsible agent and a member of the political community. Forms of (...) punishment which do not treat the offender as such are, for that reason unacceptable. Among the forms of punishment which are thereby ruled out are the extended use of solitary confinement, since this undermines the capacity for moral agency – and permanent felon disenfranchisement. -/- I also address two objections to this line of argument. One focuses on penal practices involving those who are not members of the political community: resident aliens and minors. These two cases raise different issues, but they both appear to show that justifiable punishment does not need to communicate a message which has components affirming agency and membership of a political community. I argue that in both cases the justifiability of punishment piggy-backs on the kind of justification available in the standard case. A second objection suggests that the offender has excluded themselves from the political community, and that measures that recognize this are therefore acceptable: I argue that very few offences, if any, have this character. ---. (shrink)

What is discrimination and what makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Even after an ever-rising tide of research over the course of the past twenty-five or so years these questions still remain hard to answer. Exercising candid and self-critical hindsight, Larry Alexander, who contributed his fair share to this tide, thus remarked: “All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.” If this is true it (...) raises serious doubts as to how wrongful discrimination can be a moral wrong in itself. Also, the question comes up as to who it is who breaches a promise or a fiduciary duty. This paper defends the view that the substance of these remarks is better understood by couching them in a political approach towards discrimination. Against this background, they give rise to real and pressing concerns. Once we conceptualise the realm political along Hobbesian lines as the battleground comprising both the private sphere of the individual and the public sphere of the commonwealth it emerges that discrimination has different significance with regard to these respective spheres. In order to illustrate this, I adopt Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s descriptive account of discrimination as „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ and the common view that wrongful discrimination is wrong because it is harmful, disrespectful, or both. In the private sphere the case can be made for morally permissible cases of discrimination. Sexual discrimination due to sexual self-determination with consequently freely choosing your sexual or romantic partner is the central case in point. Where somebody feels unfairly rejected and consequently hurt neither the charge of harm inflicted nor that of disrespect endured need be justified. No “breach of promises or fiduciary duties” is involved. The case is different, however, when it comes to the fiduciary of power. In discriminating, he who exercises the power of the commonwealth necessarily breaches a promise and a fiduciary duty. Discrimination thus appears to be more of a problem of political philosophy than one of applied ethics. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ******************** Was ist Diskriminierung und warum ist Diskriminierung verwerflich, wenn sie es denn ist? Dies bleibt ungeachtet der seit fünfundzwanzig Jahren anschwellenden Forschungsliteratur unverändert eine harte Nuss. Larry Alexander, der selbst maßgeblich zu dieser Forschungsliteratur beigetragen hat, merkt daher selbstkritisch an: „All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.“ Wenn dies der Fall ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie moralisch verwerfliche Diskriminierung dann noch an sich verwerflich sein kann. Es stellt sich dann auch die Frage, wer hier ein Versprechen bricht und seine Treuepflichten verletzt. Die leitende Annahme dieses Aufsatzes ist es, dass man dem sachlichen Kern dieser Bedenken Rechnung tragen kann, indem man eine politische Perspektive auf das Phänomen der Diskriminierung einnimmt. Die Bedenken erweisen sich dann als substanziell und zutreffend. Konzeptualisieren wir den Bereich des Politischen mit Thomas Hobbes als das Spannungsfeld, das die private Sphäre des Individuums und die öffentliche Sphäre des Gemeinwesens gegeneinander abgrenzt, wird sichtbar, dass Diskriminierung in diesen Sphären jeweils unterschiedlich zu bewerten ist. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, lege ich Kasper Lippert-Rasmussens deskriptives Verständnis von Diskriminierung als „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ zugrunde und mache von der in der Diskussion verbreiteten Ansicht Gebrauch, dass das Zufügen von Schaden oder die Verweigerung von Respekt Diskriminierung verwerflich macht. In der privaten Sphäre kann es nun Fälle moralisch zulässiger Diskriminierung geben. Zentral ist die sexuelle Diskriminierung aufgrund der Ausübung einer freien Wahl des eigenen Sexual- oder Liebespartners. Auch wenn sich der Abgewiesene womöglich geschädigt sieht, wird unbilliger Schaden nicht zugefügt und geschul- deter Respekt nicht verweigert. Den Grund finden wir in Alexanders Formel: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt nicht vor. Anders im Fall staatlicher Diskriminierung: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt hier stets vor, da Fälle staatlicher Diskriminierung regelmäßig Machtmissbrauch darstellen: Der Inhaber staatlicher Gewalt verletzt die Treuepflicht, das Mandat unparteilich auszuüben, das getreulich auszuführen er gelobt hat. Diskriminierung erscheint also weniger als ein Problem der angewandten Ethik denn als eines der politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

In January 2024, non-consensual deepfakes came to public attention with the spread of AI generated sexually abusive images of Taylor Swift. Although this brought new found energy to the debate on what some call non-consensual synthetic intimate images (i.e. images that use technology such as AI or photoshop to make sexual images of a person without their consent), female celebrities like Swift have had deepfakes like these made of them for years. In 2017, a Reddit user named “deepfakes” posted several (...) videos in which he had used opensource machine learning tools to swap the faces of female celebrities on to the faces of female porn actors, displaying what appeared to be live video footage of the celebrity engaging in sex acts she never engaged in. Since that time, deepfake technology has advanced astronomically. What once were choppy sexualized videos are now nearly flawless videos that can be difficult to distinguish from a real video. According to recent research on deepfakes by Sensity AI, this technology has been used primarily on women to create sexual videos. These women’s sexual autonomy has been co-opted for the purposed of gratifying men’s sexual pleasure, but have also been used in campaigns to delegitimize and humiliate female journalists and politicians. In Canada, civil and criminal legislation has addressed the non-consensual distribution of intimate images, but in only a few provinces – British Columbia, New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island and Saskatchewan – does this offence include altered images that could include deepfakes. This paper explores the evolution of synthetic technology such as AI image generators and Canada’s legal responses to the non-consensual sharing of intimate images. (shrink)

According to Christopher New, prepunishment is punishment for an offence before the offence is committed. I will first analyze New’s argument, along with theepistemic conditions for practicing prepunishment. I will then deal with an important conceptual objection, according to which prepunishment is not a genuine kind of ‘punishment’. After that, I will consider retributivism and present conclusive reasons for the claim that it cannot justify prepunishment without leading to paradoxical results. I shall then seek to establish that from the utilitarian (...) point of view it is possible to provide a plausible justification of this practice. Finally, I shall attempt to defend the claim that the fact that utilitarianism can justify prepunishment in a satisfactory way is clearly a favourable characteristic of this ethical position. (shrink)

In this chapter I defend the construction of inclusive, tightly governed DNA databases, as long as police can access them only for the prosecution of the most serious crimes or less serious but very high-volume offences. I deny that that the ethics of collecting and using these data sets the pattern for other kinds of policing by big data, notably predictive policing. DNA databases are primarily used for matching newly gathered biometric data with stored data. After considering and disputing (...) a number of objections to this practice, I conclude that DNA databases used in this way are ethically acceptable, if not valuable, contributions to legitimate policing. (shrink)

This is a case that should go to the European Court of Human Rights. A decent, senior qualified family doctor was accused by his mentally ill daughter of sex abuse. Without real evidence except for what the girl told another mentally ill patient at a psychiatric hospital she stayed at for several years, and wit just two witnesses, one a younger child wo saw none of the accused offences, and the other parent, struck off the General Medical Council Register (...) for drunk driving more than once, the case was fitted up by those who are rampantly seeking to raise statistical numbers for child sex abuse offences by high level persons- a bizarre situation and a travesty against tis family doctor's human rights, because a judge can use his 'discretion' to send a much needed family doctor to 18 years in jail. The International Community should scrutinize the United Kingdom's Criminal Justice System. (shrink)

The state has always authoritatively used criminal law to give effect to its policy of condemning acts either antisocial or unacceptable to the conscience of the law and society. The existence of criminal law is well justified on grounds of ‘social welfare’ or “reinforcement of those values most basic to proper social functioning”. This initiates or sustains the process of criminalization. The relativity of ‘social welfare’ makes law ‘dynamic’ as well as ‘varying’, vis-à-vis its ambit and scope. Current scholarship is (...) critical of what is referred to as the trend of overcriminalization or rapid increase in criminalizing of acts, as leading to ‘uncertainty’ in criminal law. The rationale for such a critique is that there are activities that need not be labeled as offences if they do not possess the potential to cause damage that criminal law seeks to protect. In light of the overcriminalization critique, this paper examines the criminalization of certain offences labeled as public welfare offences. (shrink)

The liberal conception of rights which has dominated the greater part of the 19th and 20th centuries is still very relevant today with its emphasis on individual interests. The liberals consider the rights or the interests of individual members of the society as trumps over group interests. Under the liberal harm and offence principles for example, they hold that whatever interests claimed by the groups should have adequate protection under individual interests or rights. This paper, while recognizing the controversies and (...) difficulties in a wholesome acceptance of group rights, aims to show that the considerations of the liberal harm and offence principles that ignore the interests of groups or collectives will be incomplete in handling or managing the problems of the political society. We argue that in spite of the difficulties and controversies related with group interests and rights, we cannot ignore the constant problems of the political society that require proper attention to such interests. Our major interest is therefore to show that there is certainly a good case for its recognition in the language of rights. The theory of group rights that stresses the independent existence of group interests from that of individuals is particularly admirable and may not be ignored easily in modern political thinking. (shrink)

While many of us would not want to abandon the requirement that a defendant can only be found guilty of a serious criminal offence by a unanimous jury, we should not expect epistemology to give us the resources we need for justifying this requirement. The doubts that might prevent jurors from reaching unanimity do not show that, say, the BARD standard has not been met. Even if it were true, as some have suggested, that rationality requires that a jury composed (...) of epistemic peers should coalesce around one view about the defendant’s guilt, the failure to reach unanimity might be a good reason to worry about the epistemic failings of some small number of jurors but no reason to worry that we’ve failed to protect the defendant from an unjustified imposition of, say, the risk against wrongful conviction. The arguments for the unanimity requirement will need to come from outside of epistemology. (shrink)