- Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
|
|
Belief's Own Ethics.[author unknown] - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):269-272.details
|
|
A subjectivist’s guide to objective chance.David K. Lewis - 2010 - In Antony Eagle (ed.), Philosophy of Probability: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 263-293.details
|
|
Epistemic anxiety and adaptive invariantism.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):407-435.details
|
|
Working Without a Net: A Study of Egocentric Epistemology.Richard Foley - 1998 - Noûs 32 (2):265-275.details
|
|
Credence and Correctness: In Defense of Credal Reductivism.Matthew Brandon Lee - 2017 - Philosophical Papers 46 (2):273-296.details
|
|
Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
|
|
Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes.Paul M. Churchland - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (2):67-90.details
|
|
Dracula Meets Wolfman: Acceptance vs. Partial Belief.Richard Jeffrey - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 157-185.details
|
|
Change in view: Principles of reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 2008 - In . Cambridge University Press. pp. 35-46.details
|
|
Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
|
|
Fallibilism, closure, and pragmatic encroachment.Adam Zweber - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2745-2757.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.R. Foley - 2002 - Mind 111 (443):718-726.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism, and knowledge of knowledge.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):213–235.details
|
|
Outright Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):309–329.details
|
|
Games, Beliefs and Credences.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):209-236.details
|
|
Can we do without pragmatic encroachment.Brian Weatherson - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):417–443.details
|
|
Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman - 1974 - Science 185 (4157):1124-1131.details
|
|
Belief and cognitive limitations.Weng Hong Tang - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):249-260.details
|
|
Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
|
|
Knowledge and practical interests.Jason Stanley - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Précis of Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168-172.details
|
|
How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
|
|
Accuracy for Believers.Julia Staffel - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1):39-48.details
|
|
Knowing Full Well.Ernest Sosa - 2010 - Princeton University Press.details
|
|
The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
|
|
A Generalised Lottery Paradox for Infinite Probability Spaces.Martin Smith - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):821-831.details
|
|
Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
|
|
Speaking of knowing.Patrick Rysiew - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):627–662.details
|
|
.P. Rysiew - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 126 (1):126-132.details
|
|
Belief, Credence, and Pragmatic Encroachment.Jacob Ross & Mark Schroeder - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):259-288.details
|
|
The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate.Blake Roeber - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):171-195.details
|
|
Anti-Intellectualism.Blake Roeber - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):437-466.details
|
|
Resisting Encroachment. [REVIEW]Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):465-472.details
|
|
A defense of stable invariantism.Baron Reed - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):224-244.details
|
|
Epistemology and Probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):65.details
|
|
Epistemology and probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Noûs 17 (1):65-67.details
|
|
Epistemology and probability.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Synthese 55 (2):231-252.details
|
|
Warrant: The Current Debate.Warrant and Proper Function.Christopher Hookway - 1995 - Philosophical Quarterly 45 (178):122-125.details
|
|
II—Pluralism about Belief States.Richard Pettigrew - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):187-204.details
|
|
The Epistemic Value of Moral Considerations: Justification, Moral Encroachment, and James' 'Will To Believe'.Michael Pace - 2010 - Noûs 45 (2):239-268.details
|
|
The Case Against Purity. [REVIEW]Ram Neta - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):456-464.details
|
|
Anti-intellectualism and the knowledge-action principle. [REVIEW]Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180–187.details
|
|
Anti‐intellectualism and the Knowledge‐Action Principle.Ram Neta - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):180-187.details
|
|
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of changing stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.details
|
|
Knowledge ascriptions and the psychological consequences of thinking about error.Jennifer Nagel - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):286-306.details
|
|
Moral Encroachment.Sarah Moss - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2):177-205.details
|
|
Credence: A Belief-First Approach.Andrew Moon & Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (5):652–669.details
|
|
Knowledge in Flux: Modeling the Dynamics of Epistemic States.Peter Menzies & Peter Gardenfors - 1994 - Philosophical Review 103 (1):159.details
|
|