- (1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality’s Fixed Point.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5.details
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Moore's Paradox and the Accessibility of Justification.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):273-300.details
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What is inference?Paul Boghossian - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (1):1-18.details
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Contemporary Theories of Knowledge.John Pollock - 1986 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 39 (1):131-140.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
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Responsible belief and epistemic justification.Rik Peels - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2895-2915.details
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Epistemic Reasons II: Basing.Kurt Sylvan - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (7):377-389.details
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Rationality Through Reasoning.John Broome (ed.) - 2013 - Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Fumerton's Puzzle for Theories of Rationality.Ru Ye - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):93-108.details
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On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs.Paul Silva - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.details
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Higher‐Order Evidence and the Limits of Defeat.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):314-345.details
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Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2013 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.details
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The puzzle of the unmarked clock and the new rational reflection principle.Adam Elga - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):127-139.details
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Rational Epistemic Akrasia.Allen Coates - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):113-24.details
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(1 other version)Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
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(3 other versions)What is Justified Belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 1979 - In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge: New Studies in Epistemology. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.details
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Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.details
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On the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):312-326.details
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(1 other version)Evidentialism, vice, and virtue.Jason Baehr - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):545-567.details
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(1 other version)Contemporary theories of knowledge.John L. Pollock - 1986 - London: Hutchinson.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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Justified belief and epistemically responsible action.Hilary Kornblith - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):33-48.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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(1 other version)The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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(1 other version)The Ethics of Belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
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(1 other version)Fumerton’s Puzzle.Richard Foley - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:109-113.details
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(1 other version)Contemporary Theories of Knowledge, 2nd Edition.John Pollock & Joe Cruz - 1999 - Rowman & Littlefield.details
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Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm & Israel Scheffler - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3):381-393.details
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The rules of thought.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Benjamin W. Jarvis - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by Benjamin W. Jarvis.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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The Epistemic Basing Relation.Keith Allen Korcz - 1996 - Dissertation, The Ohio State Universitydetails
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(3 other versions)What is justified belief?Alvin I. Goldman - 2003 - In Steven Luper (ed.), Essential Knowledge: Readings in Epistemology. Longman. pp. 178.details
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The foundational role of epistemology in a general theory of rationality.Richard Foley - manuscriptdetails
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The a priori rules of rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):113-131.details
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Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
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(1 other version)Improbable knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2011 - In Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents. Oxford, GB: Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Puzzle of Metacoherence.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.details
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(1 other version)Fumerton’s Puzzle.Richard Foley - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:109-113.details
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