Critics have often misunderstood the higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global The higher-order theory (HOT) of consciousness has often been misunderstood by critics. Here we clarify its position on several issues, and distinguish it from other views such as the global workspace theory (GWT) and early sensory models (e.g. first-order local recurrency theories). For example, HOT has been criticized for over-intellectualizing consciousness. We show (...) that while higher-order states are cognitively assembled, the requirements are actually considerably less than often presumed. In this sense HOT may be viewed as an intermediate position between GWT and early sensory views. Also, we clarify that most proponents of HOT do not stipulate consciousness as equivalent to metacognition or confidence. Further, compared to other existing theories, HOT can arguably account better for complex everyday experiences, such as of emotions and episodic memories. This makes HOT particularly useful as a framework for conceptualizing pathological mental states. (shrink)

“Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness.”(BBB p18). -/- “Many words then in this sense then don’t have a strict meaning. But this is not a defect. To think it is would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because (...) it has no sharp boundary.” BBB p27 -/- "Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open before us." BBB p6 -/- “Every sign is capable of interpretation but the meaning mustn’t be capable of interpretation. It is the last interpretation” BBB p34 -/- “Our method is purely descriptive, the descriptions we give are not hints of explanations.” BBB p125 -/- These quotes are not chosen at random but (along with the others in my reviews) are an outline of behavior (human nature) from our greatest descriptive psychologist. In considering these matters we must keep in mind that philosophy is the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (HOT), which is another of the obvious facts that are totally overlooked –i.e., I have never seen it clearly stated anywhere. Sadly Wittgenstein's brilliant exposition of behavior is still understood well by only a handful. -/- Much of the work is aimed at undermining the idea of introspection and private language via clever examples and of course there is a mountain of literature on this topic since but neither W nor anyone else ever makes it clear that the basic argument is trivial—if you don’t have a test that distinguishes between two words they cannot have a role in language and there cannot be any such test for private mental phenomena. In between he is describing how System 1 (the automatic functions of the brain) is described by intransitive uses of verbs such as seeing, remembering (i.e., they are Causally Self Reflexive) and differs from and blends into System 2- the deliberative linguistic system (e.g. p101, 161, 166 etc). He spends much time showing that disposition words (S2) such as thinking, meaning, judging, interpreting, knowing, understanding, believing, intending, reading, calculating, recognizing, comparing, deciding, counting, imaging etc. are not mental states with a precise duration but that their use depends on their having a clear public outcome-i.e., being transitive verbs (i.e., having Conditions of Satisfaction, which is the phrase Searle invented decades later). They are abilities to act. -/- Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but scintillating, profound and crystal clear and that to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may download from this site my e-book ‘Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization Michael Starks (2016)- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016’ by Michael Starks First Ed. 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) Amazon ASIN B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) Amazon ASIN B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

Having an agreed-upon definition of character education would be useful for both researchers and practitioners in the field. However, even experts in character education disagree on how they would define it. We attempted to achieve greater conceptual clarity on this issue through a prototype analysis in which the features perceived as most central to character education were identified. In Study 1 (N = 77), we asked character education experts to enumerate features of character education. Based on these lists, we identified (...) 30 features. In Study 2 (N = 101), experts assessed which features were central to character education through a categorization task. In Study 3 (N = 166), we assessed the extent of centrality using scalar items. We conclude by offering practical advice for the development of future character education studies and programs rooted in what is deemed central to such programs. (shrink)

This paper explores the cosmology of St Maximus the Confessor and its relevance for contemporary ethics. It takes as it’s starting point two papers on Maximus’ cosmology and environmental ethics (Bordeianu, 2009; Munteanu, 2010) and from there argues that we can not consider environmental ethics in isolation from other ethical issues. This, as both Ware and Keselopoulos have also pointed out, is because the environmental crisis is actually a crisis in the human heart and in human attitudes toward everything about (...) us. The paper goes through some key areas in Maximus’ cosmology according to his own formula of creation – movement – rest and considers at each stage the implications of this theology for the way the human should be living and treating other beings. The main sources for this exploration are Ambiguum 7, Ambiguum 41, and The Mystagogia with especial focus on the doctrine of the logoi and the divisions of nature. The paper concludes that Bordeianu and Munteanu are right to consider Maximus’ theology to be of ecological relevance, but that this relevance comes from the radical ethical statement being made about human activity. Maximus’ theology points the human toward becoming in the likeness of Christ who unites heaven and earth through love. The love of Christ when considered in an ethical context stands as a formidable challenge to current attitudes and institutions that advocate the exploitation and destruction of human or non-human creation. (shrink)

This chapter describes the potential far‐reaching consequences of contemplative higher education for the fields of science and medicine.

One of the primary concerns in animal research is ensuring the welfare of laboratory animals. Modern views on animal welfare emphasize the role of animal sentience, i.e. the capacity to experience subjective states such as pleasure or suffering, as a central component of welfare. The increasing official recognition of animal sentience has had large effects on laboratory animal research. The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Low et al., University of Cambridge, 2012) marked an official scientific recognition of the presence of sentience (...) in mammals, birds, and cephalopods. Animal sentience has furthermore been recognized in legislation in the European Union, UK, New Zealand and parts of Australia, with discussions underway in other parts of the world to follow suit. In this paper, we analyze this shift towards recognition of sentience in the regulation and practice in the treatment of laboratory animals and its effects on animal welfare and use. (shrink)

Decision theory and folk psychology both purport to represent the same phenomena: our belief-like and desire- and preference-like states. They also purport to do the same work with these representations: explain and predict our actions. But they do so with different sets of concepts. There's much at stake in whether one of these two sets of concepts can be accounted for with the other. Without such an account, we'd have two competing representations and systems of prediction and explanation, a dubious (...) dualism. Folk psychology structures our daily lives and has proven fruitful in the study of mind and ethics, while decision theory is pervasive in various disciplines, including the quantitative social sciences, especially economics, and philosophy. My interest is in accounting for folk psychology with decision theory -- in particular, for believe and wanting, which decision theory omits. Many have attempted this task for belief. (The Lockean Thesis says that there is such an account.) I take up the parallel task for wanting, which has received far less attention. I propose necessary and sufficient conditions, stated in terms of decision theory, for when you're truly said to want; I give an analogue of the Lockean Thesis for wanting. My account is an alternative to orthodox accounts that link wanting to preference (e.g. Stalnaker (1984), Lewis (1986)), which I argue are false. I argue further that want ascriptions are context-sensitive. My account explains this context-sensitivity, makes sense of conflicting desires, and accommodates phenomena that motivate traditional theses on which 'want' has multiple senses (e.g. all-things-considered vs. pro tanto). (shrink)

Meet Tega. Blue, fluffy, and AI-enabled, Tega is a relational robot: a robot designed to form relationships with humans. Created to aid in early childhood education, Tega talks with children, plays educational games with them, solves puzzles, and helps in creative activities like making up stories and drawing. Children are drawn to Tega, describing him as a friend, and attributing thoughts and feelings to him ("he's kind," "if you just left him here and nobody came to play with him, he (...) might be sad"). Scholars and members of the public alike have raised the alarm about relational robots, worrying that the relationships that people, and especially children, form with such robots are objectionably inauthentic. We, members of an interdisciplinary team that developed and studies Tega, make this inauthenticity worry precise and offer practical recommendations for addressing it. We distinguish two kinds of (in)authenticity -- inauthenticity as unreality, and inauthenticity as deception -- arguing that neither is just what others have thought it is. With our distinction in hand, we argue that the authenticity concern can be met only through co-design methods -- methods that give stakeholders of all kinds (e.g. parents, educators, and children themselves) a genuine say in how relational robots are built. (shrink)

Since antiquity, scholars have observed a structural tension within Plato’s Phaedrus. The dialogue demands order in every linguistic composition, yet it presents itself as a disordered composition. Accordingly, one of the key problems of the Phaedrus is determining which—if any—aspect of the dialogue can supply a unifying thread for the dialogue’s major themes (love, rhetoric, writing, myth, philosophy, etc.). My dissertation argues that “soul-leading” (psuchagōgia)—a rare and ambiguous term used to define the innate power of words—resolves the dialogue’s structural tension. (...) I clarify the conceptual and dramatic features of soul-leading by focusing on the dialogue’s uniquely prevalent use of the semantic network of “leading” and “following.” By continuing to foreground the language and drama of leading and following, I offer a new interpretation of the dialogue as a whole: the Phaedrus is Plato’s articulation of how the soul can be led into communion with reality. Chapter 1 discusses scholarly disputes about the unity of the Phaedrus and proposes that soul-leading adequately satisfies the criteria put forward for what would count as a unifying element. I argue that soul-leading unifies the dialogue both thematically and non-thematically; moreover, soul-leading is a theme capacious enough to account for the other principal contenders for unity put forward. Chapter 2 develops the ambiguous character of soul-leading by examining how the dialogue showcases dangerous forms thereof. Love and language are dangerous when they lead the soul toward goods which can never truly fulfill it. In order to clarify how love and language can mislead the soul, Socrates develops a set of accounts of how the soul is led, both internally and externally, in the three speeches on love. If the soul is to be led into communion with reality (the proper end of soul-leading), it must be led internally by the right part of the soul and externally by the right object of desire. Chapter 3 argues that all souls can, in principle, be harmonized and directed in the way that Chapter 2 requires. I show that Plato’s view of philosophy is neither elitist (i.e., some are intrinsically incapable of philosophy) nor naively essentialist. All can come into communion with reality because all are by nature equipped to do so. While Plato recognizes that there are forces which tend to prohibit one from exercising one’s capability of being rightly led, none of them are intrinsic to human nature. Chapter 4 argues that successful soul-leading require neither the leader nor the follower to be already well-disposed to what’s ultimate in order for the pair to come to a communion with what’s ultimate. Plato’s depiction of soul-leading love shows that love can itself promote the formation needed for both leader and follower to come into contact with reality. Love can do so because it is always already bound up reality in its responsiveness to beauty. Beauty itself calls the lover to itself by shining through the beautiful beloved, who acts as a reminder of transcendent Beauty. The lover mediates this same experience for the beloved. Each comes to desire the other as well as Beauty itself. Chapter 5 argues that the drama of the lovers’ formation mythically depicted in the Palinode (Chapter 4) is written into the drama of the dialogue as a whole. In the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, we see an enactment of love’s formative role. Likewise, in the relationship between Phaedrus and Lysias, we see an enactment of the dangerous soul-leading discussed in Chapter 2. My focus on leading and following also allows me to show the thematic significance of the drama’s setting. Chapter 6 articulates the metaphysical conditions under which one can be led into communion with reality. Transcendent Beauty invites us into communion with itself and makes possible our ascent by providing us with divine guides and images which can transport us from our ordinary experiences to the true beings. Beauty accomplishes its work—leading us in a “divine dance” where we follow the gods up to Beauty and back down to each other—through images. When we handle images of reality rightly, they lead our souls into communion with reality. Further, when we have come into communion, we’ll be inspired to be co-workers of Beauty’s soul-leading work. When we articulate reality in language, we create new images that can serve to lead others toward reality. (shrink)

Introduction to the Scientific Proof of the Natural Moral Law This paper proves that Aquinas has a means of demonstrating and deriving both moral goodness and the natural moral law from human nature alone. Aquinas scientifically proves the existence of the natural moral law as the natural rule of human operations from human nature alone. The distinction between moral goodness and transcendental goodness is affirmed. This provides the intellectual tools to refute the G.E. Moore (Principles of Ethics) attack against the (...) natural law as committing a "naturalistic fallacy". This article proves that instead Moore commits the fallacy of equivocation between moral goodness and transcendental goodness in his very assertion of a "naturalistic fallacy" by the proponents of the natural moral law. In the process the new deontological/kantian theory of natural law as articulated by John Finnis, Robert George, and Germain Grisez is false historically and philosophically. Ethical naturalism is affirmed as a result. (shrink)

Higher-order theories of consciousness typically account for introspection in terms of one's higher-order thoughts being conscious, which would require a third-order thought — i.e.a thought about a thought about a mental state. In this work, we offer an alternative account of introspection that builds on the recent HigherOrder Representation of a Representation (HOROR) theory of phenomenal consciousness. According to HOROR theory, phenomenal consciousness consists in having the right kind of higher-order representation. We claim that this theory can be extended to (...) introspection by recognizing that there is a distinctive kind of consciousness — i.e. introspective consciousness — which can be accounted for as the theory does for phenomenal consciousness generally. We call this novel view: Higher-Order Representation Intentionally For Introspective Consciousness (HORIFIC). We argue that there are independent reasons for thinking that introspective consciousness can be either 'stimuli-induced' or 'self-triggered' and that one of the benefits of the view we develop is that it can embrace a pluralist approach. Our view also accounts for what specific mental state is represented by a particular higher-order representation, and for the way in which we are aware of changes, transitions, and boundaries between mental states in specific cases of introspective consciousness. (shrink)

As its title suggests, this anthology is a collection of papers presented at a conference on feelings and emotions held in Amsterdam in 2001. One of the symposium’s main goals was to draw some of the most prominent researchers in emotion research together and provide a multi-disciplinary ‘snap shot’ of the state of the art at the turn of the century. In that respect it is truly a cognitive science success story. There are articles from a wide range of fields, (...) encompassing, e.g., philosophy, neuroscience, anthropology, sociology, and psychology. Another goal was to emulate a series of conferences of the same name that had taken place in the early parts of the 20th Century. Included in the book are the title pages of these other conferences, which put the symposium in a nice historical context. The conference seems to have met both goals. It does, for instance, offer a vital snap shot of the state of emotions research at the turn of the century, though this does not mean that it is best suited for the annals of history. This volume will provide anyone interested in the cognitive science of the emotions a clear indication of where the field has come from, and insight into where it will be going. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

It has recently been argued that a person’s moral judgments (about both their own and others’ actions) are constrained by the nature and extent of their relevant ignorance and, thus, that such judgments are determined in the first instance by the person’s epistemic circumstances. It has been argued, in other words, that the epistemic is logically prior to other normative (e.g., ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations in human decision-making, that these other normative considerations figure in decision-making only after (logically and temporally) (...) relevant ignorance has constrained the decision-maker’s menu of options. If this is right, then a person’s moral judgments in some set of circumstances should vary with their knowledge and ignorance of these circumstances. In this study, we test the hypothesis of the logical priority of the epistemic. We describe two experiments in which subjects’ knowledge and ignorance of relevant consequences were manipulated. In the second experiment, we also compared the effect of ignorance on moral judgments with that of personal force, a factor previously shown to influence moral judgments. We found broad empirical support for the armchair arguments that epistemic considerations are logically prior to normative considerations. (shrink)

Before remarking on “The New Science of the Mind”, I first offer some comments on philosophy and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of Searle (S),Wittgenstein (W), Hacker (H) et al. It will help to see my reviews of PNC (Philosophy in a New Century), TLP, PI, OC, Making the Social World (MSW) and other books by and about these geniuses, who provide a clear description of higher order behavior, not found in psychology nor philosophy, (...) that I will refer to as the WS framework. -/- As with so many philosophy books, we might stop with the title. As the quotes and comments above and in my other reviews and the books they cover indicate, there are compelling reasons for regarding the problems we face in describing the psychology of higher order thought as conceptual and not scientific. This ought to be crystal clear to all, but science envy and almost complete oblivion to WSH etc. is a la mode! But as H notes above, the issues discussed here are all about language games and have nothing to do with science. In fact, as usual, if one translates into plain English there is very little of interest here, and certainly nothing not said before and better by WS etc. countless times since the 30’s (see e.g., The Blue and Brown Books from 1933-35). It is not surprising that he makes no significant references to any of the above books or persons (the only reference to S is an article from 1958!), though in my view they are at the top of the list of the major figures in descriptive psychology. -/- On p119 he tells us that the key to all this is to figure out how “…a personal level cognitive process can belong to a representational subject. This is the task of the second half of the book.” But W did this 80 years ago and since we have the beautifully clear explanations of WSH, H&M etc., there is no point to torturing oneself with the rather aimless and opaque prose that veers off at the end into Sartre, Heidegger, Husserl, and Frege, with a dash of postmodernist word salad for good measure. A valiant effort on an interesting topic, but ultimately exhausting and fruitless. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

This paper subjects Dan Brown’s most recent novel Origin to a philosophical reading. Origin is regarded as a literary window into contemporary technoscience, inviting us to explore its transformative momentum and disruptive impact, focusing on the cultural significance of artificial intelligence and computer science: on the way in which established world-views are challenged by the incessant wave of scientific discoveries made possible by super-computation. While initially focusing on the tension between science and religion, the novel’s attention gradually shifts to (...) the increased dependence of human beings on smart technologies and artificial intelligence. Origin’s message, I will argue, reverberates with Oswald Spengler’s The Decline of the West, which aims to outline a morphology of world civilizations. Although the novel starts with a series of oppositions, most notably between religion and science, the eventual tendency is towards convergence, synthesis and sublation, exemplified by Sagrada Família as a monumental symptom of this transition. Three instances of convergence will be highlighted, namely the convergence between science and religion, between humanity and technology and between the natural sciences and the humanities. (shrink)

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The MRCT Center Post-trial Responsibilities: Continued Access to an Investigational Medicine Framework outlines a case-based, principled, stakeholder approach to evaluate and guide ethical responsibilities to provide continued access to an investigational medicine at the conclusion of a patient’s participation in a clinical trial. The Post-trial Responsibilities (PTR) Framework includes this Guidance Document as well as the accompanying Toolkit. A 41-member international multi-stakeholder Workgroup convened by the Multi-Regional Clinical Trials Center of Brigham and Women’s Hospital and Harvard University (...) (MRCT Center) developed this Guidance and Toolkit. Project Motivation A number of international organizations have discussed the responsibilities stakeholders have to provide continued access to investigational medicines. The World Medical Association, for example, addressed post-trial access to medicines in Paragraph 34 of the Declaration of Helsinki (WMA, 2013): “In advance of a clinical trial, sponsors, researchers and host country governments should make provisions for post-trial access for all participants who still need an intervention identified as beneficial in the trial. This information must also be disclosed to participants during the informed consent process.” This paragraph and other international guidance documents converge on several consensus points: • Post-trial access (hereafter referred to as “continued access” in this Framework [for terminology clarification – see definitions]) is the responsibility of sponsors, researchers, and host country governments; • The plan for continued access should be determined before the trial begins, and before any individual gives their informed consent; • The protocol should delineate continued access plans; and • The plan should be transparent to potential participants and explained during the informed consent process. -/- However, there is no guidance on how to fulfill these responsibilities (i.e., linking specific responsibilities with specific stakeholders, conditions, and duration). To fill this gap, the MRCT Center convened a working group in September of 2014 to develop a framework to guide stakeholders with identified responsibilities. This resultant Framework sets forth applicable principles, approaches, recommendations and ethical rationales for PTR regarding continued access to investigational medicines for research participants. (shrink)

This collection of articles was written over the last 10 years and edited to bring them up to date (2017). The copyright page has the date of the edition and new editions will be noted there as I edit old articles or add new ones. All the articles are about human behavior (as are all articles by anyone about anything), and so about the limitations of having a recent monkey ancestry (8 million years or much less depending on viewpoint) and (...) manifest words and deeds within the framework of our innate psychology as presented in the table of intentionality. As famous evolutionist Richard Leakey says, it is critical to keep in mind not that we evolved from apes, but that in every important way, we are apes. If everyone was given a real understanding of this (i.e., of human ecology and psychology to actually give them some control over themselves), maybe civilization would have a chance. As things are however the leaders of society have no more grasp of things than their constituents and so collapse into anarchy is inevitable. The first group of articles attempts to give some insight into how we behave that is reasonably free of the theoretical delusions that are universal. In the next group, I show how these insights apply by reviewing some books in philosophy and psychology. Next I review books on science and religion and finally provide reviews and articles showing how understanding of both science and philosophy gives insight into the tragic delusions destroying the world. People believe that society can be saved by science, religion and politics, so I provide some suggestions as to why this is unlikely via short articles and reviews of recent books by well-known writers. It is critical to understand why we behave as we do and so the first section presents articles that try to describe (not explain as Wittgenstein insisted) behavior. I start with a brief review of the logical structure of rationality, which provides some heuristics for the description of language (mind, rationality, personality) and gives some suggestions as to how this relates to the evolution of social behavior. This centers around the two writers I have found the most important in this regard, Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle, whose ideas I combine and extend within the dual system (two ii systems of thought) framework that has proven so useful in recent thinking and reasoning research. As I note, there is in my view essentially complete overlap between philosophy, in the strict sense of the enduring questions that concern the academic discipline, and the descriptive psychology of higher order thought (behavior). Once one has grasped Wittgenstein’s insight that there is only the issue of how the language game is to be played, one determines the Conditions of Satisfaction (what makes a statement true or satisfied etc.) and that is the end of the discussion. Since philosophical problems are the result of our innate psychology, or as Wittgenstein put it, due to the lack of perspicuity of language, they run throughout human discourse and behavior, so there is endless need for philosophical analysis, not only in the ‘human sciences’ of philosophy, sociology, anthropology, political science, psychology, history, literature, religion, etc., but in the ‘hard sciences’ of physics, mathematics, and biology. It is universal to mix the language game questions with the real scientific ones as to what the empirical facts are. Scientism is ever present and the master has laid it before us long ago, i.e., Wittgenstein (hereafter W) beginning with the Blue and Brown Books in the early 1930’s. "Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into complete darkness." (BBB p18) The key to everything about us is biology, and it is obliviousness to it that leads millions of smart educated people like Obama, Chomsky, Clinton and the Pope to espouse suicidal utopian ideals that inexorably lead straight to Hell on Earth. As W noted, it is what is always before our eyes that is the hardest to see. We live in the world of conscious deliberative linguistic System 2, but it is unconscious, automatic reflexive System 1 that rules. This is the source of the universal blindness described by Searle’s The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), Pinker’s Blank Slate and Tooby and Cosmides’ Standard Social Science Model. The astute may wonder why we cannot see System 1 at work, but it is clearly counterproductive for an animal to be thinking about or second guessing every action, and in any case, there is no time for the slow, massively integrated System 2 to be involved in the constant stream of split second ‘decisions’ we must make. As W noted, our ‘thoughts’ (T1 or the ‘thoughts’ of System 1) must lead directly to actions. iii It is my contention that the table of intentionality (rationality, mind, thought, language, personality etc.) that features prominently here describes more or less accurately, or at least serves as an heuristic for, how we think and behave, and so it encompasses not merely philosophy and psychology, but everything else (history, literature, mathematics, politics etc.). Note especially that intentionality and rationality as I (along with Searle, Wittgenstein and others) view it, includes both conscious deliberative System 2 and unconscious automated System 1 actions or reflexes. Thus, all the articles, like all behavior, are intimately connected if one knows how to look at them. As I note, The Phenomenological Illusion (oblivion to our automated System 1) is universal and extends not merely throughout philosophy but throughout life. I am sure that Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg and the Pope would be incredulous if told that they suffer from the same problem as Hegel, Husserl and Heidegger, (or that that they differ only in degree from drug and sex addicts in being motivated by stimulation of their frontal cortices by the delivery of dopamine (and over 100 other chemicals) via the ventral tegmentum and the nucleus accumbens), but it’s clearly true. While the phenomenologists only wasted a lot of people’s time, they are wasting the earth and their descendant’s futures. Many of the articles describe the ‘digital delusions’, which confuse the language games of System 2 with the automatisms of System 1, and so cannot distinguish biological machines (i.e., people) from other kinds of machines (i.e., computers). The ‘reductionist’ claim is that one can ‘explain’ behavior at a ‘lower’ level, but what actually happens is that one does not explain human behavior but a ‘stand in’ for it. Hence the title of Searle’s classic review of Dennett’s book (“Consciousness Explained”)— “Consciousness Explained Away”. In most contexts ‘reduction’ of higher level emergent behavior to brain functions, biochemistry, or physics is incoherent. Also for ‘reduction’ of chemistry or physics, the path is blocked by chaos and uncertainty. Anything can be ‘represented’ by equations, but when they ‘represent’ higher order behavior, it is not clear (and cannot be made clear) what the ‘results’ mean. Reductionist metaphysics is a joke, but most scientists and philosophers lack the appropriate sense of humor. Other digital delusions are that we will be saved from the pure evil (selfishness) of System 1 by computers/AI/robotics/ nanotech/genetic engineering created by System 2. The No Free Lunch principal tells us there will be serious and possibly fatal consequences. The adventurous may regard this principle as a higher order emergent expression of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Hi-tech enthusiasts hugely underestimate the problems iv resulting from unrestrained motherhood, and of course it is neither profitable nor politically correct (and now with third world supremacism dominant, not even possible) to be honest about it. The last section describes various versions of the ‘altruism delusion’ that we are selected for cooperation, and that the euphonious ideals of Democracy, Diversity and Equality will lead us into utopia, if we just manage things correctly (the possibility of politics). Again, the No Free Lunch Principle ought to warn us it cannot be true, and we see throughout history and all over the contemporary world, that without strict controls, selfishness and stupidity gain the upper hand and soon destroy any nation that embraces it. In addition, the monkey mind steeply discounts the future, and so we cooperate in selling our descendant’s heritage for temporary comforts, greatly exacerbating the problems. I describe versions of this delusion (i.e., that we are basically ‘friendly’ if just given a chance) as it appears in some recent books on sociology/biology/economics. I end with an essay on the great tragedy playing out in America and the world, which can be seen as a direct result of our evolved psychology manifested as the inexorable machinations of System 1. Our psychology, eminently adaptive and eugenic on the plains of Africa from ca. 6 million years ago, when we split from chimpanzees, to ca. 50,000 years ago, when many of our ancestors left Africa (i.e., in the EEA or Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation), is now maladaptive and dysgenic and the source of our Suicidal Utopian Delusions. So, like all discussions of behavior (philosophy, psychology, sociology, biology, anthropology, politics, law, literature, history, economics, soccer strategies, business meetings, etc.), this book is about evolutionary strategies, selfish genes and inclusive fitness (kin selection). Many accept the delusion that we are selected for cooperation with people generally (group selection or altruism) and not just our immediate relatives (kin selection or inclusive fitness), so I spend some time in the essays of the last section demolishing this fantasy. One thing rarely mentioned by the group selectionists is the fact that, even were ‘group selection’ possible, selfishness is at least as likely (probably far more likely in most contexts) to be group selected for as altruism. Just try to find examples of true altruism in nature –the fact that we can’t (which we know is not possible if we understand evolution) tells us that its apparent presence in humans is an artefact of modern life concealing the facts, and that it can no more be selected for than the tendency to suicide (which in fact it is). One does not really need science or mathematics to grasp this – it is crushingly obvious that an v organism cannot be selected for behavior that decreases the frequency of its own genes in the next generation. One might also benefit from considering a phenomenon never (in my experience) mentioned by group selectionists -- cancer. No group has as much in common as the (originally) genetically identical cells in our own bodies-a 100 trillion cell clone-- but we are all born with thousands and perhaps millions of cells that have already taken the first step on the path to cancer and generate millions to billions of cancer cells in our life. If we did not die of other things first, we (and perhaps all multicellular organisms) would all die of cancer. Only a massive and hugely complex mechanism built into our genome that represses or derepresses trillions of genes in trillions of cells, and kills and creates billions of cells a second, keeps the majority of us alive long enough to reproduce. One might take this to imply that a just, democratic and enduring society for any kind of entity on any planet in any universe is only a dream, and that no being or power could make it otherwise. It is not only ‘the laws’ of physics that are universal and inescapable, or perhaps we should say that inclusive fitness is a law of physics. The great mystic Osho said that the separation of God and Heaven from Earth and Humankind was the most evil idea that ever entered the Human mind. In the 20th century an even more evil notion arose—that humans are born with rights, rather than having to earn privileges. Thus, every day the population increases by 200,000, who must be provided with resources to grow and space to live, and who soon produce another 200,000 etc. And one almost never hears it noted that what they receive must be taken from those already alive. Their lives diminish those already here in both major obvious and countless subtle ways. Every new baby destroys the earth from the moment of conception. There cannot be human rights without human wrongs. It cannot be more obvious, but one will never see the streets full of protesters against motherhood. America and the world are in the process of collapse from excessive population growth, most of it for the last century and now all of it due to 3rd world people. Consumption of resources and the addition of 4 billion more ca. 2100 will collapse industrial civilization and bring about starvation, disease, violence and war on a staggering scale. The earth loses about 2% of it’s topsoil every year, so as it nears 2100, most of it’s food growing capacity will be gone. Billions will die and nuclear war is all but certain. In America, this is being hugely accelerated by massive immigration and immigrant reproduction, combined with abuses made possible by democracy. Depraved human nature inexorably turns the dream of democracy and diversity into a vi nightmare of crime and poverty. China will continue to overwhelm America and the world, as long as it maintains the dictatorship which limits selfishness. The root cause of collapse is the inability of our innate psychology to adapt to the modern world, which leads people to treat unrelated persons as though they had common interests. This, plus ignorance of basic biology and psychology, leads to the social engineering delusions of the partially educated who control democratic societies. Few understand that if you help one person you harm someone else—there is no free lunch and every single item anyone consumes destroys the earth beyond repair. Consequently, social policies everywhere are unsustainable and one by one all societies without stringent controls on selfishness will collapse into anarchy or dictatorship. Without dramatic and immediate changes, there is no hope for preventing the collapse of America, or any country that follows a democratic system. The popular notions supported by the Democratic Party and Third World Supremacists are that Democracy, Diversity, Equality and Social Justice will produce a Utopia in America and the world, but it is clear as crystal that they unavoidably foster selfishness and divisiveness and are producing collapse. Hence my concluding essay “Suicide by Democracy”. The most basic facts, almost never mentioned, are that there are not enough resources in America or the world to lift a significant percentage of the poor out of poverty and keep them there. Even the attempt to do this is already bankrupting America and destroying the world. The earth’s capacity to produce food decreases daily, as does our genetic quality. And now, as always, by far the greatest enemy of the poor is other poor and not the rich. -/- My writings are available as paperbacks and Kindles on Amazon. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) ASIN B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) ASIN B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) 2nd printing with corrections (Feb 2018) ASIN B0711R5LGX -/- Suicide by Democracy: an Obituary for America and the World (2018) ASIN B07CQVWV9C -/- . (shrink)

This article is part of a For-Discussion-Section of Methods of Information in Medicine about the paper "Biomedical Informatics: We Are What We Publish", written by Peter L. Elkin, Steven H. Brown, and Graham Wright. It is introduced by an editorial. This article contains the combined commentaries invited to independently comment on the Elkin et al. paper. In subsequent issues the discussion can continue through letters to the editor.

§1.1 What m otivated the perpetrators of the holocaust? Christopher Browning and Daniel Goldhagen differ in their analysis of Reserve Police Battalion 101 (Browning 1992, Goldhagen 1996). The battalion consisted of around 500 ‘ordinary’ Germ ans who, during the period 1942-44, killed around 40,000 Jews and who deported as m any to the death cam ps. Browning and Goldhagen differ over the m otivation wit h which the m en killed. I want to com m ent on a central aspect (...) of this debate. (shrink)

Campbell Brown has recently argued that G.E. Moore's intrinsic value holism is superior to Jonathan Dancy's. I show that the advantage which Brown claims for Moore's view over Dancy's is illusory, and that Dancy's view may be superior.

For more than 200 years scholars have proceeded on the assumption that there was a controversy (in the sense of an argumentative exchange) between the bishop of Cork and Ross, Peter Browne (c. 1665–1735), and his nowadays more famous contemporary, the bishop of Cloyne, George Berkeley (1685–1753) about what we might call ‘the problem of divine attributes’. This problem concerns one of the most vexing issues for 17th /18th century Irish intellectuals. Simply put, it turns on two interconnected questions, namely (...) (1) an ontological question regarding God’s attributes and (2) a semantical question regarding the proper conception of analogy: -/- (1) Do God’s attributes only differ in degree or also in kind from their human counterparts? -/- (2) Is “analogical attribution” only concerned with the structure or the modus of the attribution? That is, is it a separate mode of speech (apart from the metaphorical and literal) or does it just mean we have to use analogies for our divine attributions? -/- In regard to the first question Berkeley argues the attributes of God and humans only differ in degree but not in kind (Alc. 4.22). Browne, on the other hand, is convinced that human and divine attributes differ in kind: “What Knowledge and Goodness are in the Nature of Man, that some inconceivable but correspondent Perfections are in the Nature of God […] which tho’ totally different in Kind from those Properties in us bearing the same Name” (Procedure, 138). Furthermore, Berkeley rejects the notion that analogical attribution is a separate mode of speech in addition to the literal and the metaphorical. Rather, it is an attribution made in the form of an analogy in which the words can be used literally or metaphorically (Alc. 4.21). By contrast, Browne repeatedly insists analogical attribution is more than just using analogies for attributing something to God. He thinks it is a separate mode of speech that ought to be distinguished from literal and metaphorical language (Procedure, 12, 23–29, 123–46). -/- Hence, there can be no doubt that Browne and Berkeley advance conflicting solutions to the problem of divine attributes. Yet, advancing disagreeing positions is not the same as having a (heated) argumentative exchange, i.e., a controversy. In contrast to the controversy-reading, I will defend the following view: Browne surely felt attacked by Berkeley’s elaborations in Alciphron (1732) and reacted to them in his Divine Analogy (1732/3). However, there was no argumentative exchange because Browne’s Procedure (1728) had virtually no influence on Berkeley when he was writing Alciphron. Furthermore, the available evidence suggests that Berkeley was indifferent to the (elaborate) criticisms of Alciphron found in Browne’s Divine Analogy. Thus, while the two bishops have differing positions and Browne reacted to Berkeley there is no reaction on Berkeley’s part and hence there is no argumentative exchange between the two at all, which is why their differing opinions are best described as such and not as a controversy. (shrink)

During the last decade Jessica Brown has been one of the main participants in the on-going debate over the compatibility of anti-individualism and self-knowledge. It is therefore of great interest that she is now publishing a book examining the various epistemological consequences of anti-individualism. The book is divided into three sections. The first discusses the question of whether a subject can have privileged access to her own thoughts, even if the content of her thoughts is construed anti-individualistically. This section (...) contains a detailed and useful discussion not only of how we are to understand privileged access, but also of epistemological issues of more general import, such as the connection between knowledge and reliability. The second section focuses on various aspects of the problem of anti-individualism and reasoning, including an extensive discussion of the relation between anti-individualism and a Fregean account of content. The final section discusses the so-called reductio argument against compatibilism (i.e. the view that anti-individualism is compatible with a priori knowledge of one’s own thoughts), according to which compatibilism implies that we can have a priori knowledge of certain facts about the world that, intuitively, are not knowable that way. The book is very clearly written and structured. Readers unfamiliar with the debate will get a good sense of its broad contours and the various positions taken. Brown starts out by distinguishing different forms of anti-individualism. This is very helpful since it is quite clear that the term has come to be rather carelessly used, as if it referred to one particular thesis, whereas in fact a number of loosely related positions are labeled ‘antiindividualist’. At the outset she distinguishes three familiar anti-individualist theses: natural kind anti-individualism, social anti-individualism, and singular anti-individualism. These.. (shrink)

A AI Robotics Ethics Society (AIRES) é uma organização sem fins lucrativos fundada em 2018 por Aaron Hui, com o objetivo de se promover a conscientização e a importância da implementação e regulamentação ética da AI. A AIRES é hoje uma organização com capítulos em universidade como UCLA (Los Angeles), USC (University of Southern California), Caltech (California Institute of Technology), Stanford University, Cornell University, Brown University e a Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul (Brasil). AIRES na PUCRS (...) é o primeiro capítulo internacional da AIRES, e como tal, estamos empenhados em promover e aprimorar a Missão AIRES. Nossa missão é focar na educação dos líderes da IA de amanhã em princípios éticos, para assegurar que a IA seja criada de forma ética e responsável. Como ainda existem poucas propostas de como devemos implementar princípios éticos e diretrizes normativas na prática do desenvolvimento de sistemas de IA, o objetivo deste trabalho é tentar diminuir esta lacuna entre o discurso e a práxis. Entre princípios abstratos e implementação técnica. Neste trabalho, buscamos introduzir o leitor ao tema da Ética e Segurança da IA. Ao mesmo tempo, apresentamos uma série de ferramentas para auxiliar desenvolvedores de sistemas inteligentes a desenvolver “bons” modelos. Este trabalho é um guia em desenvolvimento publicado em inglês e português. Contribuições e sugestões são bem vindas. (shrink)

Este livro é inestimável como uma sinopse de algumas das obras de um dos maiores filósofos dos últimos tempos. Há muito valor em analisar suas respostas às confusões básicas da filosofia, e em tentativas geralmente excelentes de conectar o pensamento clássico chinês com a filosofia moderna. Eu tenho uma visão moderna de Wittgensteiniano para colocá-lo em perspectiva. Aqueles que querem uma estrutura completa até o momento para o comportamento humano do ponto de vista moderno de dois sistemas podem consultar meus (...) livros Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicídio pela Democracia 4a ed (2019), Estrutura Lógica do Comportamento Humano (2019), A Estrutura Lógica da Consciência (2019), Entendendo as Conexões Entre Ciência, Filosofia, Psicologia, Religião, Política e Economia (2019), Delírios Utópicos Suicidas no século XXI (2019), Observações sobre Impossibilidade, Incompletude, Paraconsistência, Indecidabilidade, Alealeitividade, Computabilidade, Informática, Paradoxo e Incerteza em Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, Doria, da Costa , Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock e Yanofsky (2019) e outros. Este livro é uma tentativa única de correlacionar a filosofia clássica chinesa com a de Searle (S), a quem considero ser o melhor desde Wittgenstein (W) e seu herdeiro intelectual. A qualidade dos itens é extraordinariamente alta para tal coleção, que deve ser devido à cuidadosa seleção de papéis de Mou. Os leitores acharão instrutivo comparar isso com outro volume recente de artigos sobre a filosofia de S, "Thinking About the Real World", outro livro no qual escrevi a única revisão. Como em W, tudo o que S escreve é um tesouro, mas infelizmente essa tomada tem atraído tão pouca atenção que esta parece ser a única revisão, mesmo que tenha aparecido há 6 anos. Sua única deficiência real é a falta de impressão da resposta de S a Allinson, pois corrigiria seus inúmeros erros substanciais. Como observado em minhas outras críticas, tais erros são de interesse, pois são os padrões universais de nossa psicologia devido ao fato de que nossa linguagem carece de perspicaz, como W apontou pela primeira vez no BBB (Blue and Brown Books) 3/4 de um século atrás. Quando a conferência foi gravada, tentei obter o vídeo ou uma transcrição da resposta de Mou, S, Allinson e 3 pessoas no HKUST, mas ninguém ajudou. A questão da espiritualidade inevitavelmente se mistura com as questões da linguagem da filosofia em alguns dos artigos aqui. As muitas sutilezas ao longo do caminho para dissipar a ilusão de ego e a realização da iluminação são outra questão inteira, embora como em todas as outras arenas, as confusões filosóficas inevitavelmente surgem quando falam de religião, em vez de praticá-la. Ou seja, a filosofia no sentido geral, pois reflete sobre ética, religião, moralidade, como devemos viver ou sentir sobre nossa vida e o mundo não é o sentido mais estreito em que W e S estão praticando isso , embora inevitavelmente e quase universalmente o sentido amplo é misturado com i sobre como a linguagem funciona (a mente como W nos mostrou). (shrink)

SOCIOLOGY: STRUCTURAL AND CONJUNCTURAL ASPECTS Sabemos, por intermédio de pesquisas na área sociológica, que o nascimento e formação da Sociologia como ciência é proveniente de uma série de metamorfoses históricas. Isso implica dizer que as idiossincrasias mais genéricas da Sociologia têm um elo peculiar com a maneira como o corpo social se organizou e estruturou ao passo do final do século XIX e início do século XX. O feitio do arranjo da vida em corpo social nesse lapso, isto é, o (...) feitio de conformar a educação, o conhecimento em geral, a política dos Estados, a indústria, o comércio e as relações monetárias entre os países industrializados do período, constituem o alicerce para reflexão acerca da razão de a Sociologia ter se conformado como uma ciência peculiar, divergentemente da História e da Filosofia. Durante as revoluções que se decorrera nos séculos de nascimento da Sociologia, três pensamentos serviram de alicerce para tentar compreender as complexas metamorfoses sociais da época. Marx, Durkheim e Weber analisaram o corpo social capitalista de suas respectivas épocas e enfatizaram elementos que podem ser considerados essenciais e centrais da Sociologia. Assim, ainda que partiram da mesma referência empírica, que nada mais é do que o corpo social, cada um deles obtiveram interpretações divergentes sobre a conformação social e sobre os componentes conjunturais do corpo social. Todavia, é imprescindível compreender, com base na Sociologia nascente, o que é estrutura social e o que é conjuntura social. Para o antropólogo Radcliffe-Brown (1881-1955), “a estrutura social designa a rede complexa de relações sociais que existe realmente e une seres humanos individuais num certo meio natural” 5 . Ou seja, a estrutura social dá as características de ambiência e vivência dos indivíduos na vida sodalícia, esses aspectos foram analisados e estudados pelos autores supracitados na tentativa de elucidação das transformações que se decorrera na Europa da industrialização. Para Raymond Boudon (1934-2013): [...] a expressão "estrutura social" é empregada como sinônimo de organização social: conjunto das modalidades de organização de um grupo social e dos tipos de relações que existem no interior e entre diversos domínios de toda a sociedade (tanto ao nível do parentesco como da organização econômica e política). (BOUDON, 1990)6 Isto é, a estrutura social emprega termos mais genéricos da vida sodalícia, o que implica dizer que se relaciona diretamente com a organização das esferas sociais e dos indivíduos. À medida em que se estrutura e se organiza a sociedade, aparecerão vastas transformações nos meios de produção, comércio, etc. Logo, caber-se-á ao cientista social, como acontecera na gênese da Sociologia, estudar essa estrutura e organização e como tais termos e aspectos afetam a sociedade e os meios econômicos e políticos. Em termos mais didáticos: (Alana) A sociedade é composta de elementos estruturais e conjunturais/ocasionais. Essa relação é fundamental para demonstrar que a sociedade é resultado de um processo histórico. [...] (Emanuel) Há mecanismos estruturais que são sempre repostos nas conjunturas e que garantem a perpetuação das sociedades. Ao mesmo tempo em que conferem à sociedade suas características centrais, os componentes estruturais são reconstituídos nas diferentes conjunturas com o rótulo da novidade. As relações familiares, a organização do trabalho e da política, o sistema educacional, a escola, a produção, o comércio, as religiões, etc., podem servir de exemplos para entender como a novidade é influenciada pelos aspectos permanentes de uma sociedade, de um modo de produção da vida em sociedade. [...] (Alana) É importante refletir de que maneira as condições particulares dos indivíduos tem ressonâncias da história passada, de sua família, de questões que aparentemente não têm implicações diretas em sua vida. É importante explicitar, assim, que aquilo que somos e o que pensamos é um resultado histórico-social. [...] (Emanuel) É necessário propor uma reflexão aos indivíduos sobre hábitos e costumes que nos parecem novos mas que de fato são herdados e têm fundamento na história da sociedade em que vivemos. Essa reflexão irá ajudar os indivíduos a identificar a presença de alguns desses hábitos e costumes na vida de todos os dias é um exercício que pode contribuir para a compreensão e a fixação desse conteúdo. [...] (SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da. SILVA, Alana Thaís Mayza da. Da sociedade estrutural e conjuntural na vida pragmática. [Entrevista cedida a] Eduarda Carvalho da Silva Fontain. Diálogo entre amigos. Colégio de Aplicação da UFPE, Recife – PE. 08 Jun. 2019). Os corpos sociais, por mais divergentes que sejam, capitalistas ou socialistas, escravistas, libertários, indígenas, africanos, monogâmicos ou orientais, têm componentes genéricos que se reproduzem ao passar do tempo. Esses componentes genéricos são a base do corpo social e se caracterizam como componentes típicos, ou seja, componentes que acabam tornando um corpo social completamente divergente de outro. A conformação social, assim sendo, é feitiada mediante características genéricas que dão individualidade ao corpo social e se reproduzem ao passar do tempo. Logo, dá-se a entender que se um corpo social tem seus componentes conformais destruídos, ele perde sua individualidade, metamorfoseando-se em outro tipo de sodalício. Aclarando melhor, pensemos no corpo social ao qual fazemos parte: o corpo social capitalista. Ainda que os pensadores sociais antes supracitados tenham perspectivas divergentes quanto as esferas que conformam o corpo, ambos aceitam que o labor é o componente cêntrico da estrutura do sodalismo capitalista. Não obstante, ao se analisar o labor contemporâneo e o labor que desenvolvemos atualmente, podemos notar vastas divergências. Por exemplo, na contemporaneidade o computador é usado na grande parte das profissões, algo que há trinta anos atrás era novidade para muitas ainda. O corpo social, assim, passou de uma conjuntura7 a outra, reproduzindo o labor, todavia esse mesmo labor se metamorfoseou. Ante o supracitado texto, concluímos que sempre estamos envoltos de conjunturas sociais. Não obstante, há componentes sodalísticos que se reproduzem em todas as conjunturas particulares. Isso implica dizer que, mediante toda a história do capitalismo sempre houve labor e laboradores. Logo, essa alínea dá noção de que a ideia de trabalho e trabalhador é uma parte inerente da conformação social. Todavia, o labor foi metamorfoseado inúmeras vezes, seja na forma de exploração ou até mesmo no vínculo do trabalhador com seu trabalho. Bem como na maneira como nos organizamos alicerçados no trabalho ou no elo que temos com os indivíduos com o qual trabalhamos. Observe ambas as imagens, uma da década de 30 e outra de quase 70 anos depois. Note como a maneira de se trabalhar, de como trabalhar, do ambiente de trabalho, da forma de se trabalhar se modificaram ao longo dos anos e, vale destacar, com essa modificação as máquinas e os computadores ganharam mais espaço dentro das indústrias, principalmente nas indústrias automobilísticas. Assim, de um lado, o labor em generalidade permanece, e com isso se mantém como componente cêntrico da conformação social. Todavia, no outro lado, em cada conjuntura histórica o labor se apropria de idiossincrasias peculiares, porém nem com isso desapodera-se de suas características genéricas. Por exemplo, temos um labor remunerado, ou seja, laboramos em troca de um salário. Contudo, esse mesmo salário poderá sofrer alterações em conformidade com greves, crises monetárias, introdução de novas tecnologias, qualificação profissional, da inflação, etc. Diante do supracitado texto, vimos que a conjuntura histórica, ou seja, um determinado período da História, repõe os componentes estruturantes do corpo social. Com isso, na esfera conjuntural podem existir novas protestações sociais, sejam elas individuais ou grupais, porém essas protestações sociais estão, em uma dada forma, relativas a aspectos genéricos, o feitio de conformação histórica do corpo social. Isso implica afirmar, que o corpo social é imprescindivelmente uma construção histórica e que a Sociologia é uma ciência que tem como finalidade supra analisar e compreender os componentes de regulação relativos ao que é permanente e ao que é ocasional. Por fim, aprendemos que: [...] para que possamos entender a essência do corpo social, devemos sempre pensar de forma primordial em elementos permanentes e nos componentes ocasionais [...] e que o esqueleto de um corpo social é moldada por componentes centrais que os definem como distintos de outros corpos, isto é, componentes que dão individualidade à uma sociedade. (SILVA, Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da. Da sociedade estrutural e conjuntural na vida pragmática. [Entrevista cedida a] Eduarda Carvalho da Silva Fontain. Diálogo entre amigos. Colégio de Aplicação da UFPE, Recife – PE. 08 Jun. 2019). E que: [...] Nas conjunturas históricas, podemos encontrar novos feitios de reprodução de aspectos estruturantes, ou seja, a conjuntura nada mais faz do que reproduzir esses aspectos conformacionais, reelaborando seus conteúdos. (SILVA, Alana Thaís Mayza da. Da sociedade estrutural e conjuntural na vida pragmática. [Entrevista cedida a] Eduarda Carvalho da Silva Fontain. Diálogo entre amigos. Colégio de Aplicação da UFPE, Recife – PE. 08 Jun. 2019). SBS - Sociedade Brasileira de Sociologia PUCRS - PPG em Ciências Sociais Avenida Ipiranga, 6681 – Partenon CEP: 90619-900 - Porto Alegre, RS [email protected]. (shrink)

A ansiedade gerada pela possível criação de inteligência artificial geral, algo profetizado desde a fundação do campo de pesquisa (i.e., Dartmouth's Summer Research Project on Artificial Intelligence) (MCCARTHY et al., 1955), é algo comumente investigado dentro dos círculos transhumanistas e singularistas (KURZWEIL, 2005; CHALMERS, 2010; TEGMARK, 2016; 2017; CORRÊA; DE OLIVEIRA, 2021). Por exemplo, em seu livro “Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies”, Nick Bostrom (2014) apresenta uma série de argumentos para justificar a ideia de que precisamos ser cautelosos em relação a (...) criação de inteligência artificial avançada ou inteligência artificial geral. Contudo, muito dos argumentos levantados, em suas versões originais (i.e., convergência instrumental e ortogonalidade (OMOHUNDRO, 2008), são baseados em noções “vagas” de conceitos complexos (i.e., “inteligência”, “racionalidade”, “agência”). O objetivo deste resumo (apresentação) será introduzir o leitor/ouvinte ao campo de Segurança da Inteligência Artificial. Nesse campo, questões como o “Problema de controle” (i.e., evitar construir inadvertidamente uma inteligência artificial geral que prejudicará seus criadores) e o “Problema de Alinhamento” (i.e., criar sistemas de inteligência artificial que permaneçam seguros mesmo quando atuando de forma autônoma no ambiente real), que são questões muitas vezes debatidas apenas dentro da Filosofia ou Ficção Científica, ganham um aspecto muito mais real e formal (AMODEI et al., 2016, HUBINGER et al., 2019). A criação de alguns dos modelos de inteligência artificial mais avançados já criados (e.g., AlphaGo, GPT-3) (SILVER el al., 2016; BROWN et al., 2020), está ligado a utilização de dois paradigmas da área de Aprendizagem de Máquina, i.e., Aprendizagem Profunda e Aprendizagem por Reforço. Dentro deste contexto, podemos definir “um sistema autônomo inteligente” como “um sistema que implementa uma política ótima (tecnicamente "ϵ-greedy optimal") para alguma função de recompensa” (ORSEAU et al., 2018). Podemos também definir tais sistemas como “maximizadores de utilidade esperada” (VON NEUMANN; MORGENSTERN, 1944). Um sistema de IA maximizando uma função de recompensa (i.e., objetivo) especificada erroneamente pode vir a causar danos reais quando interagindo no ambiente real, seja por erros de especificação (i.e., Efeitos Colaterais Negativos, Hackeamento de Recompensa, Interrupção Segura), ou quando o domínio de treinamento é diferente do domínio de implantação (i.e., Exploração Segura e Mudança de Domínio). Ao mesmo tempo, especificar objetivos complexos (e.g., preferências e valores humanos) é uma tarefa extremamente complexa, e quando visamos a possibilidade de inteligência artificial avançada agindo no mundo real, é imperativo que tais sistemas estejam: (1) alinhados com nossos objetivos; e (2) desenvolvidos com um design que evite os problemas citados acima. Contudo, tais problemas permanecem em aberto. Por fim, gostaria de ressaltar que no cerne desta problemática, não temos apenas problemas técnicos de aprendizagem de máquina, mas uma importante questão de cunho “Moral”: “O que é a coisa ‘certa” a fazer”? “Qual o objetivo correto a ser perseguido”? “Como podemos especificar isso”? Perguntas como essas prometem um fértil campo para pesquisas interdisciplinares envolvendo inteligência artificial, aprendizagem de máquina, ciências da computação e filosofia moral. (shrink)

Uma vez que os problemas filosóficos são o resultado de nossa psicologia inata, ou como Wittgenstein disse, devido à falta de perspicuidade da linguagem, eles correm ao longo do discurso e comportamento humano, por isso há necessidade infinita de análise filosófica, não apenas no 'humano ciências' de filosofia, sociologia, antropologia, ciência política, psicologia, história, literatura, religião, etc., mas nas "ciências duras" da física, matemática e biologia. É universal misturar as questões do jogo de linguagem com as reais científicas sobre quais (...) são os fatos empíricos. O cientismo está sempre presente e Wittgenstein, indiscutivelmente o maior psicólogo intuitivo de todos os tempos, o colocou diante de nós há muito tempo, começando com os Blue and Brown Books no início dos anos 1930. A linguagem é programada em nossos genes e está envolvida em quase todo o nosso comportamento social. Filosofia no sentido rigoroso (ou seja, filosofia acadêmica), é como Wittgenstein nos mostrou, o estudo da forma como a linguagem é usada (jogos linguísticos) e eu a considero como a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de maior ordem (ou seja, praticamente tudo envolvendo linguagem que muitas vezes é chamado de Sistema 2 ou pensamento lento). No entanto, como espero ter mostrado em meus escritos ao longo da última década, comportamento não linguístico ou Sistema 1 ou pensamento rápido também é descrito com linguagem e isso leva a uma confusão sem fim que eu tentei esclarecer aqui e que é resumida nas tabelas que eu apresento. É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heurista para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema 1. Eu forneço uma pesquisa crítica de algumas das principais descobertas de dois dos mais eminentes alunos de comportamento dos tempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle, sobre a estrutura lógica da intencionalidade (mente, linguagem, comportamento), tomando como meu ponto de partida A descoberta fundamental de Wittgenstein – de que todos os problemas verdadeiramente "filosóficos" são os mesmos — confusões sobre como usar a linguagem em um contexto específico, e assim todas as soluções são as mesmas — olhando como a linguagem pode ser usada no contexto em questão para que sua verdade condições (Condições de Satisfação ou COS) são claras. O problema básico é que se pode dizer qualquer coisa, mas não se pode significar (COS claro pelo Estado) qualquer expressão arbitrária e significado só é possível em um contexto muito específico. Analiso vários escritos por e sobre eles da perspectiva moderna dos dois sistemas de pensamento (popularizados como "pensando rápido, pensando devagar"), empregando uma nova tabela de intencionalidade e nova nomenclatura de sistemas duplos. Eu mostro que este é um heurístico poderoso para descrever o comportamento com críticas dos escritos de uma grande variedade de cientistas comportamentais (ou seja, todos). O primeiro grupo de artigos tenta dar alguma visão de como nos comportamos que é razoavelmente livre de ilusões teóricas. Nos três grupos seguintes, comento três das principais ilusões que impedem um mundo sustentável: tecnologia, religião e política (grupos cooperativos). As pessoas acreditam que a sociedade pode ser salva por elas, então eu forneço algumas sugestões no resto do livro sobre por que isso é improvável através de artigos curtos e resenhas de livros recentes de escritores conhecidos. (shrink)

Uma vez que os problemas filosóficos são o resultado de nossa psicologia inata, ou como Wittgenstein disse, devido à falta de perspicuidade da linguagem, eles correm ao longo do discurso e comportamento humano, por isso há necessidade infinita de análise filosófica, não apenas no 'humano ciências' de filosofia, sociologia, antropologia, ciência política, psicologia, história, literatura, religião, etc., mas nas "ciências duras" da física, matemática e biologia. É universal misturar as questões do jogo de linguagem com as reais científicas sobre quais (...) são os fatos empíricos. O cientismo está sempre presente e Wittgenstein, indiscutivelmente o maior psicólogo intuitivo de todos os tempos, o colocou diante de nós há muito tempo, começando com os Blue and Brown Books no início dos anos 1930. A linguagem é programada em nossos genes e está envolvida em quase todo o nosso comportamento social. Filosofia no sentido rigoroso (ou seja, filosofia acadêmica), é como Wittgenstein nos mostrou, o estudo da forma como a linguagem é usada (jogos linguísticos) e eu a considero como a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de maior ordem (ou seja, praticamente tudo envolvendo linguagem que muitas vezes é chamado de Sistema 2 ou pensamento lento). No entanto, como espero ter mostrado em meus escritos ao longo da última década, comportamento não linguístico ou Sistema 1 ou pensamento rápido também é descrito com linguagem e isso leva a uma confusão sem fim que eu tentei esclarecer aqui e que é resumida nas tabelas que eu apresento. É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heuristica para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema 1. Eu forneço uma pesquisa crítica de algumas das principais descobertas de dois dos mais eminentes alunos de comportamento dos tempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle, sobre a estrutura lógica da intencionalidade (mente, linguagem, comportamento), tomando como meu ponto de partida A descoberta fundamental de Wittgenstein – de que todos os problemas verdadeiramente "filosóficos" são os mesmos — confusões sobre como usar a linguagem em um contexto específico, e assim todas as soluções são as mesmas — olhando como a linguagem pode ser usada no contexto em questão para que sua verdade condições (Condições de Satisfação ou COS) são claras. O problema básico é que se pode dizer qualquer coisa, mas não se pode significar (COS claro pelo Estado) qualquer expressão arbitrária e significado só é possível em um contexto muito específico. Analiso vários escritos por e sobre eles da perspectiva moderna dos dois sistemas de pensamento (popularizados como "pensando rápido, pensando devagar"), empregando uma nova tabela de intencionalidade e nova nomenclatura de sistemas duplos. Eu mostro que este é um heurístico poderoso para descrever o comportamento com críticas dos escritos de uma grande variedade de cientistas comportamentais (ou seja, todos). O primeiro grupo de artigos tenta dar alguma visão de como nos comportamos que é razoavelmente livre de ilusões teóricas, como mostrado por revisões de livros de autores líderes em filosofia e psicologia, que, como notei, podem ser vistos como a mesma disciplina em muitas situações. Na próxima seção eu comento sobre confusões muito básicas onde se poderia menos esperar - em ciências e matemática. Em seguida, recorro a confusões onde a maioria das pessoas as espera — na religião (ou seja, em grupos cooperativos formados para facilitar a reprodução). Finalmente, eu forneço alguns pontos de vista sobre áreas onde todas as questões se unem — economia e política. A chave para tudo sobre nós é a biologia, e é alheio a ela que leva milhões de pessoas inteligentes como Obama, Chomsky, Clinton e o Papa para defender ideais utópicos suicidas que inexoravelmente levam direto para o Inferno na Terra. Como Wittgenstein observou, é o que está sempre diante de nossos olhos que é o mais difícil de ver. Vivemos no mundo do Consciente Sistema Linguístico Deliberativo 2, mas é inconsciente, sistema reflexivo automático 1 que governa. Esta é a fonte do cegueira universal descrita por The Phenomenological Illusion (TPI), de Searle, Pinker's Blank Slate e Tooby and Cosmides's Standard Social Science Model. A América e o mundo estão em processo de colapso devido ao crescimento excessivo da população. A causa principal do colapso é a incapacidade de nossa psicologia inata de se adaptar ao mundo moderno. Isso, além da ignorância da biologia básica e da psicologia, leva aos delírios da engenharia social dos parcialmente educados que controlam as sociedades democráticas. Daí meu ensaio "Suicídio pela Democracia". Também está claro que os sete sociopatas que governam a China estão ganhando a 3ª Guerra Mundial, e assim o meu ensaio final sobre eles. A única ameaça maior é a Inteligência Artificial que eu comento brevemente no último parágrafo. (shrink)

Uma vez que os problemas filosóficos são o resultado de nossa psicologia inata, ou como Wittgenstein disse, devido à falta de perspicuidade da linguagem, eles correm ao longo do discurso e comportamento humano, por isso há necessidade infinita de análise filosófica, não apenas no 'humano ciências' de filosofia, sociologia, antropologia, ciência política, psicologia, história, literatura, religião, etc., mas nas "ciências duras" da física, matemática e biologia. É universal misturar as questões do jogo de linguagem com as reais científicas sobre quais (...) são os fatos empíricos. O cientismo está sempre presente e Wittgenstein, indiscutivelmente o maior psicólogo intuitivo de todos os tempos, o colocou diante de nós há muito tempo, começando com os Blue and Brown Books no início dos anos 1930. A linguagem é programada em nossos genes e está envolvida em quase todo o nosso comportamento social. Filosofia no sentido rigoroso (ou seja, filosofia acadêmica), é como Wittgenstein nos mostrou, o estudo da forma como a linguagem é usada (jogos linguísticos) e eu a considero como a psicologia descritiva do pensamento de maior ordem (ou seja, praticamente tudo envolvendo linguagem que muitas vezes é chamado de Sistema 2 ou pensamento lento). No entanto, como espero ter mostrado em meus escritos ao longo da última década, comportamento não linguístico ou Sistema 1 ou pensamento rápido também é descrito com linguagem e isso leva a uma confusão sem fim que eu tentei esclarecer aqui e que é resumida nas tabelas que eu apresento . É minha afirmação que a tabela da intencionalidade (racionalidade, mente, pensamento, linguagem, personalidade etc.) que apresenta proeminentemente aqui descreve mais ou menos precisamente, ou pelo menos serve como um heurista para, como pensamos e nos comportamos, e por isso engloba não meramente filosofia e psicologia, mas tudo o resto (história, literatura, matemática, política etc.). Note especialmente que a intencionalidade e a racionalidade como eu (juntamente com Searle, Wittgenstein e outros) a vêem, inclui tanto ações ou reflexos automatizados inconscientes do Sistema 1. Eu forneço uma pesquisa crítica de algumas das principais descobertas de dois dos mais eminentes alunos de comportamento dos tempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle, sobre a estrutura lógica da intencionalidade (mente, linguagem, comportamento), tomando como meu ponto de partida A descoberta fundamental de Wittgenstein – de que todos os problemas verdadeiramente "filosóficos" são os mesmos — confusões sobre como usar a linguagem em um contexto específico, e assim todas as soluções são as mesmas — olhando como a linguagem pode ser usada no contexto em questão para que sua verdade condições (Condições de Satisfação ou COS) são claras. O problema básico é que se pode dizer qualquer coisa, mas não se pode significar (COS claro pelo Estado) qualquer expressão arbitrária e significado só é possível em um contexto muito específico. Analiso vários escritos por e sobre eles da perspectiva moderna dos dois sistemas de pensamento (popularizados como "pensando rápido, pensando devagar"), empregando uma nova tabela de intencionalidade e nova nomenclatura de sistemas duplos. Eu mostro que este é um heurístico poderoso para descrever o comportamento com críticas dos escritos de uma grande variedade de cientistas comportamentais (ou seja, todos). O primeiro grupo de artigos tenta dar alguma visão de como nos comportamos que é razoavelmente livre de ilusões teóricas. Nos três grupos seguintes, comento três das principais ilusões que impedem um mundo sustentável: tecnologia, religião e política (grupos cooperativos). As pessoas acreditam que a sociedade pode ser salva por elas, então eu forneço algumas sugestões no resto do livro sobre por que isso é improvável através de artigos curtos e resenhas de livros recentes de escritores conhecidos. (shrink)

An underexamined insight of W. E. B. Du Bois’s John Brown is that John Brown worked for much of his life to cultivate democratic relationships with the Black Americans with and for whom he worked. Brown did so through practicing deference and deliberation, and by seeking authorization. However, Brown’s commitment to these practices faltered at a crucial moment in decision making: when he raided Harpers Ferry absent widespread support. Examining this aspect of John Brown brings (...) into relief an overlooked tragic choice Brown made: To act in accordance with his own substantive vision of what justice required, Brown eschewed democratic ideals and practices that grounded the distinctive relations of equality he had cultivated with the Black communities with and for whom he worked. (shrink)

Dopo mezzo secolo di oblio, la natura della coscienza è ora l'argomento più caldo nelle scienze comportamentali e nella filosofia. A partire dal lavoro pionieristico di Ludwig Wittgenstein negli anni '30 (i libri blu e brown) e dagli anni '50 ad oggi dal suo logico successore John Searle, ho creato la seguente tabella come euristica per promuovere questo studio. Le righe mostrano vari aspetti o modi di studio e le colonne mostrano i processi involontari e i comportamenti volontari che (...) comprendono i due sistemi (processi duali) della struttura logica della coscienza (LSC), che possono anche essere considerati come la struttura logica della razionalità (LSR-Searle), del comportamento (LSB), della personalità (LSP), della realtà (LSOR), dell'intenzionalità (LSI) -il termine filosofico, filosofico la Psicologia Descrittiva della Coscienza (DPC) , la Psicologia descrittiva del Pensiero (DPT) –o meglio, il Linguaggio della Psicologia Descrittiva del Pensiero (LDPT), termini introdotti qui e nei miei altri scritti molto recenti. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica dellafilosofia, psicologia, Mind e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions nel 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

In recent years, a new generation of activists has reinvigorated debate over the public commemorative landscape. While this debate is in no way limited to statues, it frequently crystallizes around public representations of historical figures who expressed support for the oppression of certain groups or contributed to their past or present oppression. In this paper, I consider what should be done about such representations. A number of philosophers have articulated arguments for modifying or removing public monuments. Joanna Burch-Brown (2017) (...) grounds her argument for removal in what I call the “honorific” function of such representations—the ways in which they express and tend to cultivate admiration for their subjects. In the first two sections of the paper, I develop a novel argument for modifying these representations based on this insight. I argue that leaving such representations unmodified in the public space tends to undermine the dignity of members of oppressed groups as well as their assurance that society and government are committed to their rights and constitutional entitlements. In the paper’s third section, I develop a “balancing test” for determining whether the relevant moral and pragmatic considerations favor making a particular representation inaccessible to the public, or recontextualizing it for public consumption. Unlike some of the existing philosophical treatments of honorific representations that focus on particular monuments, this balancing test is designed for general application to any honorific representation that satisfies the presumptive case for modification. To conclude, I offer some reasons why weak forms of recontextualization that do not involve altering institutional context may often be an insufficient remedy for the problems I describe. (shrink)

Berkeley argues that claims about divine predication (e.g., God is wise or exists) should be understood literally rather than analogically, because like all spirits (i.e., causes), God is intelligible only in terms of the extent of his effects. By focusing on the harmony and order of nature, Berkeley thus unites his view of God with his doctrines of mind, force, grace, and power, and avoids challenges to religious claims that are raised by appeals to analogy. The essay concludes by showing (...) how a letter, supposedly by Berkeley, to Peter Browne ("discovered" in 1969 by Berman and Pittion) is, in fact, by John Jackson (1686-1763), controversial theologian and friend of Samuel Clarke. (shrink)

According to Probability 1 Infallibilism (henceforth, Infallibilism), if one knows that p, then the probability of p given one’s evidence is 1. Jessica Brown (2018, 2013) has recently argued that Infallibilism leads to scepticism unless the infallibilist also endorses the claim that if one knows that p, then p is part of one’s evidence for p. By doing that, however, the infalliblist has to explain why it is infelicitous to cite p as evidence for itself. And yet, the infallibilist (...) doesn’t seem to have a satisfying explanation available. Call this the Infelicity Challenge for Probability 1 Infallibilism. By exploiting the distinction between the justifying and the motivating role of evidence, in this paper, I argue that, contrary to first appearances, the Infelicity Challenge doesn’t arise for Probability 1 Infallibilism. However, after anticipating and resisting two objections to my argument, I show that we can identify a different version of infallibilism which seems to face a problem that is even more serious than the Infelicity Challenge. (shrink)

As a senior physicist colleague and our friend, Robert N. Boyd, wrote in a journal (JCFA, Vol. 1,. 2, 2022), Our universe is but one page in a large book [4]. For example, things and Beings can travel between Universes, intentionally or unintentionally. In this short remark, we revisit and offer short remark to Neil’s ideas and trying to connect them with geometrization of musical chords as presented by D. Tymoczko and others, then to Escher staircase and then to Jacob’s (...) ladder which seems to point to possibility to interpret Jacob’s vision as described in the ancient book of Genesis as inter dimensional or heavenly staircase, e.g. an inter dimensional bridge between heaven and earth (see also classic book: Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach). Jacob’s vision of angels going down to earth from that staircase has been depicted for instance in William Blake art etc. In our communication with others via physics literature and discussions etc, we came to several conclusions as follows: Firstly, possibility of quantum wormhole effect to mirror particle universe, which sometimes it is termed non-orientable wormhole. While such mirror particles effect have been more than 50 years predicted with the so-called parity violation (cf. Lee & Yang, 1950s), and that is called symmetry breaking. Secondly, a series of extended experiments on laser irradiated cold water may suggest possible transition from a phase of water to be at least partially fourth phase of water, which may be composed of crystalline water (see e.g. Gerald Pollack, and also Harold Aspden on liquid crystalline). If we can imagine laser cooling effect can be done in protracted time, then we can achieve a physical representation of Aspden’s liquid crystalline. Therefore, in subsequent article (Part II) we outlined simple model of such an effect of tunneling via quantum liquid crystalline Universe, which may likely be modeled with iced-water. It is interesting to remark here that certain experiments by Stockholm University scientists have shown that X-ray triggered water can exhibit properties just like liquid crystal (cf. PRL, 2020). That is why we consider it possible that there can be quantum phase transition where liquid water (comprised of iced cubes and water) can exhibit effects such as tunneling in quantum liquid crystalline Universe. Last but not least, we admit that what we outlined here is just an initial phase; and if you wish, perhaps we can call such experiments as “wormhole-at-lab” experiments (abbreviated: WHALE). (shrink)

In this paper, we propose a novel account of desire reports, i.e. sentences of the form 'S wants p'. Our theory is partly motivated by Phillips-Brown's (2021) observation that subjects can desire things even if those things aren't best by the subject's lights. That is, being best isn't necessary for being desired. We compare our proposal to existing theories, and show that it provides a neat account of the central phenomenon.

The present article was partly inspired by G. Pollack’s book, and also Dadoloff, Saxena & Jensen (2010). As a senior physicist colleague and our friend, Robert N. Boyd, wrote in a journal (JCFA, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2022), for example, things and Beings can travel between Universes, intentionally or unintentionally [4]. In this short remark, we revisit and offer short remark to Neil Boyd’s ideas and trying to connect them with geometry of musical chords as presented by D. Tymoczko and (...) others, then to Escherian staircase and then to Jacob’s ladder which seems to pointto possibility to interpret Jacob’s vision as described in the ancient book of Genesis as interdimensional staircase, e.g. an interdimensional bridge between heaven and earth (cf. classic book: Hofstadter, Godel, Escher, Bach). Jacob’s vision of angels going down to earth from that staircase has been depicted for instance in William Blake art etc. In our communication with others via physics literature and discussions etc, we came to several conclusions as follows: Firstly, possibility of wormhole effect to mirror particle universe, which sometimes it is termed non-orientable wormhole. While such mirror particles effect have been more than 50 years predicted with the so-called parity violation (cf. Lee & Yang, 1950s), and that is called symmetry breaking. Secondly, a series of extended experiments on laser irradiated cold water may suggest possible transition from a phase of water to be at least partially fourth phase of water, which may be composed of crystalline water (see e.g. Gerald Pollack, and also Harold Aspden on liquid crystalline). If we can imagine laser cooling effect can be done in protracted time, then we can achieve a physical representation of Aspden‘s liquid crystalline. Therefore, in this article we outline a series of simple experiments of laser irradiated iced-water along with beryl and selenite crystals in order to see possibility of such a quantum tunneling via quantum liquid crystalline Universe hypothesis, which may likely be modeled with iced-water. It is interesting to remark here that certain experiments by Stockholm University scientists have shown that X-ray triggered water can exhibit properties just like liquid crystal (cf. PRL, 2020). That is why we consider it possible that there can be quantum phase transition where liquid water (comprised of iced cubes and water) can exhibit effects such as tunneling in quantum liquid crystalline Universe. Last but not least, we admit that what we outlined here is just aninitial phase; and if you wish, perhaps we can call such experiments as “wormhole-at-lab” experiments (abbreviated: WHALE). (shrink)

Demonstrating that a developing norm is not yet well established in international law is frequently thought to show that states are not bound by the norm as law. More precisely, showing that a purported international legal norm has only limited support from well-established international legal sources is normally seen as sufficient to rebut an obligation on the part of subjects to comply with the norm in virtue of its legal status. I contend that this view is mistaken. Nascent norms of (...) international law (e.g., crystallizing norms of customary law) can be binding in much the same way as better-established doctrine. This point becomes perspicuous, I argue, once we get a clear sense of the plausible options for grounding the moral authority of international law generally. -/- This result is interesting in its own right, but it also reveals two other features of the character of state responsibility under international law. First, the distinction between legislation and compliance is less pronounced compared to domestic law. Consequently, the virtues of good governance will frequently be pertinent to determining the content of states’ obligations under international law. Second, normally more powerful and influential agents will be more strongly bound by international law than other subjects. This is an attractive result, addressing a concern that motivates many international lawyers to view international law as absolutely binding. An absolutist view international legal authority is unnecessary for showing that the most powerful and dangerous states are strongly bound by the terms of much existing law. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to clarify the nature of the shift in Feyerabend’s philosophical thinking in the 1970s, focusing on issues of realism, relativism, and pluralism. Contra-Preston, I argue that realism-relativism is a misleading variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in the 1970s. Rather, I characterize this shift as Feyerabend’s expansion of pluralism and suggest that this shift appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in the late-1960s (e.g., Feyerabend 1968b, 1969b, 1970a, 1970c). Adopting the terminology of Brown and Kidd (...) (2016), this shift is characterized by a move from arguments for pluralism within science to broader arguments for pluralism in society. I argue that this shift was largely due to: (1) Feyerabend’s rejection of an empiricist demarcation criterion for science in the mid-1960s, and (2) Feyerabend’s incorporation of Mill’s arguments for pluralism into his own publications starting in 1970. This shift can be characterized as a broadening or expanding the scope of Feyerabend’s arguments for pluralism from contexts of scientific knowledge to the broader context of social or cultural (including ethical) knowledge. I articulate this argument with reference to the framework for classifying Feyerabend’s works formulated by Brown and Kidd (2016). Against Brown and Kidd (and Preston), I argue that realism-relativism is a red-herring as a variable for distinguishing Feyerabend’s early and middle works. Brown and Kidd’s distinction between pluralism within science and pluralism in society is a more useful variable for characterizing Feyerabend’s shift in thinking in the 1970s. Whereas Preston (1997) and Brown and Kidd (2016) identify the beginning of Feyerabend’s pluralism in society phase in 1978 with the publication of Science in a Free Society (Feyerabend 1978), I suggest that the relevant shift occurs much earlier, and it appears in Feyerabend’s publications starting in 1970 (Feyerabend 1970a, 1970b). On this understanding, Feyerabend’s philosophical shift (c. 1970) should be viewed as an expansion (or broadening) of the scope of application of his pluralist arguments, inspired by Mill’s ethical arguments for pluralism in society (Mill 1859/1977). (shrink)

Robert Brandom’s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously - as more than a mere “heuristic aid” to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind (...) does exist in Charles Peirce’s conception of iconic signs, but that fully understood, logical diagrams involve a structured array of normative reasoning practices, as well as just a “picture on a page”. (shrink)

Since at least the mid-1980s claims have been made for rationality in rats. For example, that rats are capable of inferential reasoning (Blaisdell, Sawa, Leising, & Waldmann, 2006; Bunsey & Eichenbaum, 1996), or that they can make adaptive decisions about future behavior (Foote & Crystal, 2007), or that they are capable of knowledge in propositional-like form (Dickinson, 1985). The stakes are rather high, because these capacities imply concept possession and on some views (e.g., Rödl, 2007; Savanah, 2012) rationality indicates (...) self-consciousness. I evaluate the case for rat rationality by analyzing 5 key research paradigms: spatial navigation, metacognition, transitive inference, causal reasoning, and goal orientation. I conclude that the observed behaviors need not imply rationality by the subjects. Rather, the behavior can be accounted for by noncognitive processes such as hard-wired species typical predispositions or associative learning or (nonconceptual) affordance detection. These mechanisms do not necessarily require or implicate the capacity for rationality. As such there is as yet insufficient evidence that rats can reason. I end by proposing the ‘Staircase Test,’ an experiment designed to provide convincing evidence of rationality in rats. (shrink)

According to the BSM- Supergravitation Unified Theory (BSM-SG), the energy is indispensable feature of matter, while the matter possesses hierarchical levels of organization from a simple to complex forms, with appearance of fields at some levels. Therefore, the energy also follows these levels. At the fundamental level, where the primary energy source exists, the matter is in its primordial form, where two super-dense fundamental particles (FP) exist in a classical pure empty space (not a physical vacuum). They are associated with (...) the Planck scale parameters of frequency and distance and interact by Supergravitational forces. These forces are inverse proportional to the cube of distance at pure empty space and they are based on frequency interactions. Since the two FPs have different intrinsic frequencies, the SG forces appear different for interactions between the like and unlike FPs and may change the sign. This primordial form of matter exists in the super-heavy black holes located in the center of each well formed galaxy. The next upper level of matter organization includes the underlying structure of the physical vacuum, called a Cosmic Lattice, and the structure of elementary particles. They have common substructure elements obtained by specific crystallization process preceding the formation of the observable galaxies. The Cosmic Lattice, forming a space known as a physical vacuum, is responsible for the existence and propagation of the physical fields: electrical, magnetic, Newtonian gravity and inertia. The energy of physical vacuum is in two forms: Static (enormous) and Dynamic (weak). The Static energy is directly related to the Newtonian mass by the Einstein equation E = mc^2 and it is a primary source of the nuclear energy. The Dynamic energy is responsible for the existence of the electric and magnetic fields, the constant speed of light and the quantum mechanical properties of the physical vacuum. The next upper energy level is the dynamical energy of excited atoms and molecules. At this level a hidden energy wells exit, such as the internal energy of the electron and the internal energy of atoms with more than one electron. The next upper energy level is at some organic molecules and particularly in the biomolecules that contain ring atomic structures. In such a structure, some quantum states are not emitted immediately, but rotating in the ring. While in organic molecules the energy stored in such a ring is released by a chemical process, in the long chain molecule of proteins in the living organism the stored energy can be released simultaneously by triggering. A huge number of atomic rings are contained in the DNA strands. The release of the energy stored in DNA, for example, is an avalanche process that causes an emission of entangled photons possessing a strong penetrating capability. A sequence of entangled photons emitted by DNA should carry the genetic information encoded by the cordons. This mechanism, predicted in BSM-SG theory, is very important for intercommunication between the cells of the living organism. The next upper level of energy organization may exist in the brain. The brain is an organ of a most abundant number of atomic rings, while its tissue environment might permit complex energy interactions. The human brain contains billions of atomic rings. The next hypothetical upper level of energy organization is an information field, physically existed outside, but connected with the living brain. It corresponds to a specific field known as aura, while the possibility of its existence is still not accepted by the main stream science. The problem is that this field could not be detected by the currently existing technical means used for EM communications. The BSM-SG predicts that this field might differ from the EM field we use for communication, but it is a subject of a further theoretical development that must be supported by experiments using specifically designed technical means. According to the BSM-SG theory, the energy conversion from the primary energy source to the complex levels of matter and field organization is a permanent syntropic process based on complex resonance interactions. (shrink)

What is the ontology of collective action? I have in mind three connected questions. 1. Do the truth conditions of action sentences about groups require there to be group agents over and above individual agents? 2. Is there a difference, in this connection, between action sentences about informal groups that use plural noun phrases, such as ‘We pushed the car’ and ‘The women left the party early’, and action sentences about formal or institutional groups that use singular noun phrases, such (...) as ‘The United States declared war on Japan on December 8th, 1941’ and ‘The Supreme Court ruled that segregation is unconstitutional in 1954 in Brown vs. Board of Education’? 3. Under what conditions does it make sense to speak of a group doing something together, and what, if anything, is a collective action? In this paper, I argue that a) understanding action sentences about groups does not commit us to the existence of group agents per se, but only to the existence of individual agents; b) there is no difference in this regard between sentences which attribute actions to informal groups on the one hand and institutional groups on the other; c) collective action can be both intentional and unintentional; d) any random group of agents each of whom does something is also a group which does something together; e) while there is a sense in which groups per se perform no primitive collective actions, and therefore no actions at all, f) there is a sensible extension of talk of actions to groups, though it should be treated strictly speaking, like talk of group agents, as a façon de parler, for g) the only agents per se are individuals and the only actions are theirs. -/-. (shrink)

Since Gintis is a senior economist and I have read some of his previous books with interest, I was expecting some more insights into behavior. Sadly he makes the dead hands of group selection and phenomenology into the centerpieces of his theories of behavior, and this largely invalidates the work. Worse, since he shows such bad judgement here, it calls into question all his previous work. The attempt to resurrect group selection by his friends at Harvard, Nowak and Wilson, a (...) few years ago was one of the major scandals in biology in the last decade, and I have recounted the sad story in my article ‘Altruism, Jesus and the End of the World—how the Templeton Foundation bought a Harvard Professorship and attacked Evolution, Rationality and Civilization -- A review of E.O. Wilson 'The Social Conquest of Earth' (2012) and Nowak and Highfield ‘SuperCooperators’ (2012).’ Unlike Nowak, Gintis does not seem to be motivated by religious fanaticism, but by the strong desire to generate an alternative to the grim realities of human nature, made easy by the (near universal) lack of understanding of basic human biology and blank slateism of behavioral scientists, other academics, and the general public. -/- Gintis rightly attacks (as he has many times before) economists, sociologists and other behavioral scientists for not having a coherent framework to describe behavior. Of course the framework needed to understand behavior is an evolutionary one. Unfortunately he fails to provide one himself (according to his many critics and I concur), and the attempt to graft the rotten corpse of group selection onto whatever economic and psychological theories he has generated in his decades of work, merely invalidates his entire project. Although Gintis makes a valiant effort to understand and explain the genetics, like Wilson and Nowak, he is far from an expert, and like them, the math just blinds him to the biological impossibilities and of course this is the norm in science. As Wittgenstein famously noted on the first page of Culture and Value “There is no religious denomination in which the misuse of metaphysical expressions has been responsible for so much sin as it has in mathematics.” -/- It has always been crystal clear that a gene that causes behavior which decreases its own frequency cannot persist, but this is the core of the notion of group selection. Furthermore, it has been well known and often demonstrated that group selection just reduces to inclusive fitness (kin selection), which, as Dawkins has noted, is just another name for evolution by natural selection. Like Wilson, Gintis has worked in this arena for about 50 years and still has not grasped it, but after the scandal broke, it took me only 3 days to find, read and understand the most relevant professional work, as detailed in my article. It is mind boggling to realize that Gintis and Wilson were unable to accomplish this in nearly half a century. -/- I discuss the errors of group selection and phenomenology that are the norm in academia as special cases of the near universal failure to understand human nature that are destroying America and the world. -/- Those who wish to read all my articles please consult the ebook here Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization -- Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 by Michael Starks 662p (2016) -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX -/- . (shrink)

This article analyses in detail Wittgenstein’s ‘Cambridge period’ from his return to Cambridge in 1929 until his decease in 1951. Within the ‘Cambridge period’, scholars usually distinguish the ‘middle’ (1929–1936) and the ‘late’ (1936–1951) periods. The trigger point of Wittgenstein’s return to Cambridge and philosophy was his visit to Brouwer’s lecture on ‘Mathematics, Science, and Language’ in Vienna in March 1928. Dutch mathematician Brouwer influenced not only Wittgenstein’s ability to do philosophy again but also the development of some of his (...) ideas. Namely, for Brouwer, language was a natural development of the social history of human beings. With the help of his friends, F. P. Ramsey, J. M. Keynes, G. E. Moore, and B. Russell, in 1929 Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge. The author argues that this was the crucial turning point in his philosophy that led to the revision of some of his ideas. Wittgenstein returned from self-isolation in remote villages of Lower Austria to the intellectual academic environment, where he could discuss his ideas with intellectual interlocutors and receive their valuable remarks and comments. This article is organised in chronological order: it describes the very ‘early’ middle period of 1929–1935 involving the development of Wittgenstein’s ‘phenomenology’ and the origin of the ‘language-games’ concept in the Blue and Brown Books; 1935–1936 period of ‘romantic’ enthusiasm for Soviet Russia and a trip there; Wittgenstein’s life and work during the WWII-time; resign from teaching in Cambridge in 1947 to finally finish his Philosophical Investigations. The author suggests that the ‘romantic areal’ about the USSR was formed by Wittgenstein’s predilection for Russian poetry and literature of the nineteenth century, i.e., Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Pushkin. Analysing the development of Wittgenstein’s ideas on language in his Cambridge period, the author mentions the influence of N. Bakhtin and P. Sraffa. Also, the author touches upon the topic of the possibility of Marxism’s influence on Wittgenstein’s life and thought. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to sketch an account of Kant’s signature metaphysical doctrine (transcendental idealism) that (a) has no supporters – as far as I am aware – in the contemporary literature, and (b) draws its primary motivation (as interpretation) from considerations regarding our practical situation and needs as agents. -/- The consideration I focus on here is that people not only have mental and moral features, but they also appear to us – in our daily experience – (...) to have such features: “[w]e can perceive virtue in our experience (Wir können in der Erfahrung wohl Tugend wahrnehmen)” (24: 906). The same presumably goes for vice: When I see you casually torturing a cat, you appear to me to be brown-haired, wearing jeans, moving your arms, laughing, and so on, but you also appear to me to be vicious and cruel. Your character shines through in your actions. I can then make a defeasible inference from those appearances to the moral reality. -/- Such appearances and inferences play a central role in our practices of praise, blame, forgiveness, and punishment. An interpretation of transcendental idealism that gives primacy to the practical will thus seek to analyze the concepts of experience, acquaintance, and appearance/phenomenon in a capacious-enough way that they can apply to mental and moral features too. If successful, such an interpretation would have a clear practical advantage over those that leave us merely conjecturing from experiences of bodies, gestures, and secondary qualities to moral features that do not appear, or even to the non-appearing features of a distinct set of things. (shrink)

Abstract: The intelligent embedded agricultural robotic system is a low cost and efficient microcontroller robot which include; A soil moisture monitoring system which monitors the moisture content of the soil in the various parts of the field and the measured data to a microcontroller unit which in turn displays the received data on a Liquid Crystal Display to determine when to irrigate or spray the farm field. An automatic car, which follows a path designed in the field, i.e., a (...) white line on a black surface integrated with a spraying and irrigating mechanism for carrying out agricultural spray and irrigation. An automatic solar tracking system that tracks the sun’s position for maximum light intensity was used to charge the DC 12V battery which was used to power to the robotic system. A refilling system with obstacle detection feature was used for refilling water, chemical or fertilizer spray in the spraying and irrigating tank integrated with the line follower robotic system. This embedded system is useful for farmers who wish to monitor the soil moisture content of the field, and automate spraying and irrigation purposes at low costs and higher efficiency. (shrink)

Some rules seem more important than others. The moral rule to keep promises seems more important than the aesthetic rule not to wear brown with black or the pool rule not to scratch on the eight ball. A worrying number of metaethicists are increasingly tempted to explain this difference by appealing to something they call “authoritative normativity” – it’s because moral rules are “authoritatively normatively” that they are especially important. The authors of this chapter argue for three claims concerning (...) “authoritative normativity”: (1) that motivation for it originates in a parochial conception of “normative flavours”; (2) that arguments against alternative ways of explaining e.g., morality’s importance are overblown; and (3) that there are strong reasons against theorizing in terms of “authoritative normativity”. The overarching aim is not to show that “authoritative normativity” is incoherent or entirely unmotivated. Rather, it is to discuss some of “authoritative normativity’s” deeper commitments to correct the impression that is it largely benign or that it is entailed by familiar and popular “metanormative” positions. Authoritative normativity, it seems to us, is a solution in search of a problem. (shrink)

Recent experimental work has shown that the truth-value judgments of color predications, i.e. utterances of the form “the leaves on my tree are green” or “these walls are brown,” are influenced by slight changes in the context of utterance (Hansen and Chemla 2013, Ziółkowski, 2021). Most explanations of this phenomenon focus on the semantics of color adjectives. However, it is not clear if these explanations do justice to the nuances of the empirical data on context-sensitivity of color predications (Ziółkowski, (...) 2021). In contrast to the adjectival explanations, Agustin Vicente (2015) has recently proposed that the context-sensitivity of color predications can be explained by invoking the polysemy of the noun. In this paper, we present the results of three studies designed to empirically test this hypothesis: a traditional survey experiment (Study 1), an exploratory correlational study inspired by the semantic integration paradigm (Study 2a), and a follow-up experiment (Study 2b) that was designed to mitigate possible shortcomings of Study 2a. The results of our studies present preliminary evidence against Vicente’s theory. (shrink)