We introduce and study a variety of modal logics of parallelism, orthogonality, and affine geometries, for which we establish several completeness, decidability and complexity results and state a number of related open, and apparently difficult problems. We also demonstrate that lack of the finite model property of modal logics for sufficiently rich affine or projective geometries (incl. the real affine and projective planes) is a rather common phenomenon.

We investigate an enrichment of the propositional modal language L with a "universal" modality ■ having semantics x ⊧ ■φ iff ∀y(y ⊧ φ), and a countable set of "names" - a special kind of propositional variables ranging over singleton sets of worlds. The obtained language ℒ $_{c}$ proves to have a great expressive power. It is equivalent with respect to modal definability to another enrichment ℒ(⍯) of ℒ, where ⍯ is an additional modality with the semantics x (...) ⊧ ⍯φ iff Vy(y ≠ x → y ⊧ φ). Model-theoretic characterizations of modal definability in these languages are obtained. Further we consider deductive systems in ℒ $_{c}$ . Strong completeness of the normal ℒ $_{c}$ logics is proved with respect to models in which all worlds are named. Every ℒ $_{c}$ -logic axiomatized by formulae containing only names (but not propositional variables) is proved to be strongly frame-complete. Problems concerning transfer of properties ([in]completeness, filtration, finite model property etc.) from ℒ to ℒ $_{c}$ are discussed. Finally, further perspectives for names in multimodal environment are briefly sketched. (shrink)

Sorensen (1992) has provided two modal-logical schemas to reconstruct the logical structure of two types of destructive thought experiments: the Necessity Refuter and the Possibility Refuter. The schemas consist of five propositions which Sorensen claims but does not prove to be inconsistent.We show that the five propositions, as presented by Sorensen, are not inconsistent, but by adding a premise (and a logical truth), we prove that the resulting sextet of premises is inconsistent. Häggqvist (2009) has provided a different modal-logical schema (...) (Counterfactual Refuter), which is equivalent to four premises, again claimed to be inconsistent. We show that this schema also is not inconsistent, for similar reasons. Again, we add another premise to achieve inconsistency. The conclusion is that all three modal-logical reconstructions of the arguments that accompany thought experiments, two by Sorensen and one by Häggqvist, have now been made rigorously correct. This may inaugurate new avenues to respond to destructive thought experiments. (shrink)

In this paper the propositional logic LTop is introduced, as an extension of classical propositional logic by adding a paraconsistent negation. This logic has a very natural interpretation in terms of topological models. The logic LTop is nothing more than an alternative presentation of modal logic S4, but in the language of a paraconsistent logic. Moreover, LTop is a logic of formal inconsistency in which the consistency and inconsistency operators have a nice topological (...) interpretation. This constitutes a new proof of S4 as being "the logic of topological spaces", but now under the perspective of paraconsistency. (shrink)

A consequence relation is strongly classical if it has all the theorems and entailments of classical logic as well as the usual meta-rules (such as Conditional Proof). A consequence relation is weakly classical if it has all the theorems and entailments of classical logic but lacks the usual meta-rules. The most familiar example of a weakly classical consequence relation comes from a simple supervaluational approach to modelling vague language. This approach is formally equivalent to an account of logical (...) consequence according to which α1, ..., αn entails β just in case □α1, ..., □αn entails □β in the modal logic S5. This raises a natural question: If we start with a different underlying modal logic, can we generate a strongly classical logic? This paper explores this question. In particular, it discusses four related technical issues: (1) Which base modal logics generate strongly classical logics and which generate weakly classical logics? (2) Which base logics generate themselves? (3) How can we directly characterize the logic generated from a given base logic? (4) Given a logic that can be generated, which base logics generate it? The answers to these questions have philosophical interest. They can help us to determine whether there is a plausible supervaluational approach to modelling vague language that yields the usual meta-rules. They can also help us to determine the feasibility of other philosophical projects that rely on an analogous formalism, such as the project of defining logical consequence in terms of the preservation of an epistemic status. (shrink)

We study the general problem of axiomatizing structures in the framework of modal logic and present a uniform method for complete axiomatization of the modal logics determined by a large family of classes of structures of any signature.

ABSTRACT: The modal systems of the Stoic logician Chrysippus and the two Hellenistic logicians Philo and Diodorus Cronus have survived in a fragmentary state in several sources. From these it is clear that Chrysippus was acquainted with Philo’s and Diodorus’ modal notions, and also that he developed his own in contrast of Diodorus’ and in some way incorporated Philo’s. The goal of this paper is to reconstruct the three modal systems, including their modal definitions and modal theorems, and to make (...) clear the exact relations between them; moreover, to elucidate the philosophical reasons that may have led Chrysippus to modify his predessors’ modal concept in the way he did. It becomes apparent that Chrysippus skillfully combined Philo’s and Diodorus’ modal notions, with making only a minimal change to Diodorus’ concept of possibility; and that he thus obtained a modal system of modalities (logical and physical) which fit perfectly fit into Stoic philosophy. (shrink)

Modal logic is one of philosophy’s many children. As a mature adult it has moved out of the parental home and is nowadays straying far from its parent. But the ties are still there: philosophy is important to modal logic, modal logic is important for philosophy. Or, at least, this is a thesis we try to defend in this chapter. Limitations of space have ruled out any attempt at writing a survey of all the work going on (...) in our field—a book would be needed for that. Instead, we have tried to select material that is of interest in its own right or exemplifies noteworthy features in interesting ways. Here are some themes that have guided us throughout the writing: • The back-and-forth between philosophy and modal logic. There has been a good deal of give-and-take in the past. Carnap tried to use his modal logic to throw light on old philosophical questions, thereby inspiring others to continue his work and still others to criticise it. He certainly provoked Quine, who in his turn provided—and continues to provide—a healthy challenge to modal logicians. And Kripke’s and David Lewis’s philosophies are connected, in interesting ways, with their modal logic. Analytic philosophy would have been a lot different without modal logic! • The interpretation problem. The problem of providing a certain modal logic with an intuitive interpretation should not be conflated with the problem of providing a formal system with a model-theoretic semantics. An intuitively appealing model-theoretic semantics may be an important step towards solving the interpretation problem, but only a step. One may compare this situation with that in probability theory, where definitions of concepts like ‘outcome space’ and ‘random variable’ are orthogonal to questions about “interpretations” of the concept of probability. • The value of formalisation. Modal logic sets standards of precision, which are a challenge to—and sometimes a model for—philosophy. Classical philosophical questions can be sharpened and seen from a new perspective when formulated in a framework of modal logic. On the other hand, representing old questions in a formal garb has its dangers, such as simplification and distortion. • Why modal logic rather than classical (first or higher order) logic? The idioms of modal logic—today there are many!—seem better to correspond to human ways of thinking than ordinary extensional logic. (Cf. Chomsky’s conjecture that the NP + VP pattern is wired into the human brain.) In his An Essay in Modal Logic (1951) von Wright distinguished between four kinds of modalities: alethic (modes of truth: necessity, possibility and impossibility), epistemic (modes of being known: known to be true, known to be false, undecided), deontic (modes of obligation: obligatory, permitted, forbidden) and existential (modes of existence: universality, existence, emptiness). The existential modalities are not usually counted as modalities, but the other three categories are exemplified in three sections into which this chapter is divided. Section 1 is devoted to alethic modal logic and reviews some main themes at the heart of philosophical modal logic. Sections 2 and 3 deal with topics in epistemic logic and deontic logic, respectively, and are meant to illustrate two different uses that modal logic or indeed any logic can have: it may be applied to already existing (non-logical) theory, or it can be used to develop new theory. (shrink)

We study the modal logic M L r of the countable random frame, which is contained in and `approximates' the modal logic of almost sure frame validity, i.e. the logic of those modal principles which are valid with asymptotic probability 1 in a randomly chosen finite frame. We give a sound and complete axiomatization of M L r and show that it is not finitely axiomatizable. Then we describe the finite frames of that logic and show (...) that it has the finite frame property and its satisfiability problem is in EXPTIME. All these results easily extend to temporal and other multi-modal logics. Finally, we show that there are modal formulas which are almost surely valid in the finite, yet fail in the countable random frame, and hence do not follow from the extension axioms. Therefore the analog of Fagin's transfer theorem for almost sure validity in first-order logic fails for modal logic. (shrink)

ABSTRACTHegel's Phenomenology of Spirit provides a fascinating picture of individual minds caught up in “recognitive” relations so as to constitute a realm—“spirit”—which, while necessarily embedded in nature, is not reducible to it. In this essay I suggest a contemporary path for developing Hegel's suggestive ideas in a way that broadly conforms to the demands of his own system, such that one moves from logic to a philosophy of mind. Hence I draw on Hegel's “subjective logic”, understood in the (...) light of modern modal logic, in an attempt to model the way minds might be thought as connected by way of shared intentional contents. Here, we should not be surprised at some of the parallels that emerge between the approaches of Hegel and the modal logician Arthur Prior, as Prior had testified to the influence of his teacher, John N. Findlay, who himself had strong Hegelian leanings. In the final section, Robert Stalnaker's version of possible-world semantics is suggested as a framework within which Hegel's recognitive account of the mind might be understood. (shrink)

Dugundji proved in 1940 that most parts of standard modal systems cannot be characterized by a single finite deterministic matrix. In the eighties, Ivlev proposed a semantics of four-valued non-deterministic matrices (which he called quasi-matrices), in order to characterize a hierarchy of weak modal logics without the necessitation rule. In a previous paper, we extended some systems of Ivlev’s hierarchy, also proposing weaker six-valued systems in which the (T) axiom was replaced by the deontic (D) axiom. In this paper, we (...) propose even weaker systems, by eliminating both axioms, which are characterized by eight-valued non-deterministic matrices. In addition, we prove completeness for those new systems. It is natural to ask if a characterization by finite ordinary (deterministic) logical matrices would be possible for all those Ivlev-like systems. We will show that finite deterministic matrices do not characterize any of them. (shrink)

A modal logic for representing analogical proportions is presented. This logic is a modal interpretation of H. Prade and G. Richard's homogeneous analogy. A tableaux system is given with some examples an intuitions.

Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman’s approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of these formalisations to the alethic modal case. This logical exploration will allow us (...) to study (i) cases of metaphysical incompatibility between modal facts and (ii) cases of modal dialetheias. In turn, this will enrich our understanding of the role of impossibility in the fragmentalist framework. (shrink)

I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes that (...) only the cardinalities of these sets matters, and that not all pairs of infinite sets determine the same logic. I use so-called two-cardinal theorems from model theory to investigate the space of logics and consequence relations determined by pairs of infinite sets, and show how to eliminate the assumption that worlds are individuals from Williamson’s argument. (shrink)

In this work we propose an encoding of Reiter’s Situation Calculus solution to the frame problem into the framework of a simple multimodal logic of actions. In particular we present the modal counterpart of the regression technique. This gives us a theorem proving method for a relevant fragment of our modal logic.

Complete deductive systems are constructed for the non-valid (refutable) formulae and sequents of some propositional modal logics. Thus, complete syntactic characterizations in the sense of Lukasiewicz are established for these logics and, in particular, purely syntactic decision procedures for them are obtained. The paper also contains some historical remarks and a general discussion on refutation systems.

We introduce a modal expansion of paraconsistent Nelson logic that is also as a generalization of the Belnapian modal logic recently introduced by Odintsov and Wansing. We prove algebraic completeness theorems for both logics, defining and axiomatizing the corresponding algebraic semantics. We provide a representation for these algebras in terms of twiststructures, generalizing a known result on the representation of the algebraic counterpart of paraconsistent Nelson logic.

이 책자는 형식 논리의 일종인 양상논리에 입문하고 싶으신 분들을 위한 짧은 교재입니다. “양상논리 맛보기” 라는 말마따나, 이 책자는 양상논리에 관심은 있지만 아직 본격적으로 공부를 시작하진 않은 분들께서 ‘맛보기’를 하기에 적합한 안내 책자입니다. 아무쪼록 이 책자가 양상논리를 공부해나가시는데 유용한 첫 발판이 될 수 있기를 바랍니다. / This booklet is a Korean adaptation and translation of Part VIII of forall x: Calgary (Fall 2021 edition), which is intended to be introductory material for modal logic. The original text is based on Robert (...) Trueman's A Modal Logic Primer, which is revised and expanded by Richard Zach and Aaron Thomas-Bolduc in forall x: Calgary. (forall x: Calgary is based on forall x: Cambridge by Tim Button, which is in turn based on forall x by P. D. Magnus, and also includes material from forall x: Lorain County Remix by Cathal Woods and J. Robert Loftis.) This booklet is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license. (shrink)

We introduce now for the first time the neutrosophic modal logic. The Neutrosophic Modal Logic includes the neutrosophic operators that express the modalities. It is an extension of neutrosophic predicate logic and of neutrosophic propositional logic.

Intuitionistic logic provides an elegant solution to the Sorites Paradox. Its acceptance has been hampered by two factors. First, the lack of an accepted semantics for languages containing vague terms has led even philosophers sympathetic to intuitionism to complain that no explanation has been given of why intuitionistic logic is the correct logic for such languages. Second, switching from classical to intuitionistic logic, while it may help with the Sorites, does not appear to offer any advantages (...) when dealing with the so-called paradoxes of higher-order vagueness. We offer a proposal that makes strides on both issues. We argue that the intuitionist’s characteristic rejection of any third alethic value alongside true and false is best elaborated by taking the normal modal system S4M to be the sentential logic of the operator ‘it is clearly the case that’. S4M opens the way to an account of higher-order vagueness which avoids the paradoxes that have been thought to infect the notion. S4M is one of the modal counterparts of the intuitionistic sentential calculus and we use this fact to explain why IPC is the correct sentential logic to use when reasoning with vague statements. We also show that our key results go through in an intuitionistic version of S4M. Finally, we deploy our analysis to reply to Timothy Williamson’s objections to intuitionistic treatments of vagueness. (shrink)

Weakly Aggregative Modal Logic (WAML) is a collection of disguised polyadic modal logics with n-ary modalities whose arguments are all the same. WAML has some interesting applications on epistemic logic and logic of games, so we study some basic model theoretical aspects of WAML in this paper. Specifically, we give a van Benthem-Rosen characterization theorem of WAML based on an intuitive notion of bisimulation and show that each basic WAML system Kn lacks Craig Interpolation.

Harold Hodes in [1] introduces an extension of first-order modal logic featuring a backtracking operator, and provides a possible worlds semantics, according to which the operator is a kind of device for ‘world travel’; he does not provide a proof theory. In this paper, I provide a natural deduction system for modal logic featuring this operator, and argue that the system can be motivated in terms of a reading of the backtracking operator whereby it serves to indicate modal (...) scope. I prove soundness and completeness theorems with respect to Hodes’ semantics, as well as semantics with fewer restrictions on the accessibility relation. (shrink)

This paper and its sequel “look under the hood” of the usual sorts of proof-theoretic systems for certain well-known intuitionistic and classical propositional modal logics. Section 1 is preliminary. Of most importance: a marked formula will be the result of prefixing a formula in a propositional modal language with a step-marker, for this paper either 0 or 1. Think of 1 as indicating the taking of “one step away from 0.” Deductions will be constructed using marked formulas. Section 2 presents (...) the model-theoretic concepts, based on those in [7], that guide the rest of this paper. Section 3 presents Natural Deduction systems IK and CK, formalizations of intuitionistic and classical one-step versions of K. In these systems, occurrences of step-markers allow deductions to display deductive structure that is covered over in familiar “no step” proof-theoretic systems for such logics. Box and Diamond are governed by Introduction and Elimination rules; the familiar K rule and Necessitation are derived (i.e. admissible) rules. CK will be the result of adding the 0-version of the Rule of Excluded Middle to the rules which generate IK. Note: IK is the result of merely dropping that rule from those generating CK, without addition of further rules or axioms (as was needed in [7]). These proof-theoretic systems yield intuitionistic and classical consequence relations by the obvious definition. Section 4 provides some examples of what can be deduced in IK. Section 5 defines some proof-theoretic concepts that are used in Section 6 to prove the soundness of the consequence relation for IK (relative to the class of models defined in Section 2.) Section 7 proves its completeness (relative to that class). Section 8 extends these results to the consequence relation for CK. (Looking ahead: Part 2 will investigate one-step proof-theoretic systems formalizing intuitionistic and classical one-step versions of some familiar logics stronger than K.). (shrink)

Well-known results due to David Makinson show that there are exactly two Post complete normal modal logics, that in both of them, the modal operator is truth-functional, and that every consistent normal modal logic can be extended to at least one of them. Lloyd Humberstone has recently shown that a natural analog of this result in congruential modal logics fails, by showing that not every congruential modal logic can be extended to one in which the modal operator is (...) truth-functional. As Humberstone notes, the issue of Post completeness in congruential modal logics is not well understood. The present article shows that in contrast to normal modal logics, the extent of the property of Post completeness among congruential modal logics depends on the background set of logics. Some basic results on the corresponding properties of Post completeness are established, in particular that although a congruential modal logic is Post complete among all modal logics if and only if its modality is truth-functional, there are continuum many modal logics Post complete among congruential modal logics. (shrink)

This essay aims to provide a modal logic for rational intuition. Similarly to treatments of the property of knowledge in epistemic logic, I argue that rational intuition can be codified by a modal operator governed by the modal $\mu$-calculus. Via correspondence results between fixed point modal propositional logic and the bisimulation-invariant fragment of monadic second-order logic, a precise translation can then be provided between the notion of 'intuition-of', i.e., the cognitive phenomenal properties of thoughts, and the (...) modal operators regimenting the notion of 'intuition-that'. I argue that intuition-that can further be shown to entrain conceptual elucidation, by way of figuring as a dynamic-interpretational modality which induces the reinterpretation of both domains of quantification and the intensions and hyperintensions of mathematical concepts that are formalizable in monadic first- and second-order formal languages. Hyperintensionality is countenanced via a topic-sensitive epistemic two-dimensional truthmaker semantics. (shrink)

In proof-theoretic semantics, meaning is based on inference. It may be seen as the mathematical expression of the inferentialist interpretation of logic. Much recent work has focused on base-extension semantics, in which the validity of formulas is given by an inductive definition generated by provability in a ‘base’ of atomic rules. Base-extension semantics for classical and intuitionistic propositional logic have been explored by several authors. In this paper, we develop base-extension semantics for the classical propositional modal systems K, (...) KT , K4, and S4, with □ as the primary modal operator. We establish appropriate soundness and completeness theorems and establish the duality between □ and a natural presentation of ♢. We also show that our semantics is in its current form not complete with respect to euclidean modal logics. Our formulation makes essential use of relational structures on bases. (shrink)

A brief overview of the system S5 in modal logic as defined by Brian F. Chellas, author of "Modal Logic: An Introduction." The history and usage of modal logic are given mention, along with some applications. Very much a draft. Written for PhileInSophia on July 5, 2021.

The textbook-like history of analytic philosophy is a history of myths, re-ceived views and dogmas. Though mainly the last few years have witnessed a huge amount of historical work that aimed to reconsider our narratives of the history of ana-lytic philosophy there is still a lot to do. The present study is meant to present such a micro story which is still quite untouched by historians. According to the received view Kripke has defeated all the arguments of Quine against quantified (...) modal logic and thus it became a respectful tool for philosophers. If we accept the historical interpreta-tion of the network between Quine, Kripke and modal logic, which is to be presented here, we have to conclude that Quine’s real philosophical animadversions against the modalities are still on the table: though Kripke has provided some important (formal-logical) answers, Quine’s animadversions are still viable and worthy of further consideration. (shrink)

In this thesis we present two logical systems, $\bf MP$ and $\MP$, for the purpose of reasoning about knowledge and effort. These logical systems will be interpreted in a spatial context and therefore, the abstract concepts of knowledge and effort will be defined by concrete mathematical concepts.

We employ a recently developed methodology -- called "structural refinement" -- to extract nested sequent systems for a sizable class of intuitionistic modal logics from their respective labelled sequent systems. This method can be seen as a means by which labelled sequent systems can be transformed into nested sequent systems through the introduction of propagation rules and the elimination of structural rules, followed by a notational translation. The nested systems we obtain incorporate propagation rules that are parameterized with formal grammars, (...) and which encode certain frame conditions expressible as first-order Horn formulae that correspond to a subclass of the Scott-Lemmon axioms. We show that our nested systems are sound, cut-free complete, and admit hp-admissibility of typical structural rules. (shrink)

Brauer (2022) has recently argued that if it is possible that there is nothing, then the correct modal logic for metaphysical modality cannot include D. Here, I argue that Brauer’s argument is unsuccessful; or at the very least significantly weaker than presented. First, I outline a simple argument for why it is not possible that there is nothing. I note that this argument has a well-known solution involving the distinction between truth in and truth at a possible world. (...) However, I then argue that once the semantics presupposed by Brauer’s argument is reformulated in terms of truth at a world, we have good reasons to think that a crucial semantic premise in Brauer’s argument should be rejected in favour of an alternative. Brauer’s argument is, however, no longer valid with this alternative premise. Thus, plausibly Brauer’s argument against D is only valid, if it is not sound. (shrink)

This paper outlines a formal account of tensed sentences that is consistent with Ockhamism, a view according to which future contingents are either true or false. The account outlined substantively differs from the attempts that have been made so far to provide a formal apparatus for such a view in terms of some expressly modified version of branching time semantics. The system on which it is based is the simplest quantified modal logic.

Burgess (1997), building on Quine (1953), convincingly argued that claims in quantified modal logic cannot be understood as synonymous with or logically equivalent to claims about the analyticity of certain sentences. According to modal normativism, metaphysically necessary claims instead express or convey our actual semantic rules. In this paper, I show how the normativist can use Sidelle’s (1992a, 1995) neglected work on rigidity to account for two important phenomena in quantified modal logic: the necessity of identity and the (...) substitutivity of identicals into modal contexts. (shrink)

Hyperboolean algebras are Boolean algebras with operators, constructed as algebras of complexes (or, power structures) of Boolean algebras. They provide an algebraic semantics for a modal logic (called here a {\em hyperboolean modal logic}) with a Kripke semantics accordingly based on frames in which the worlds are elements of Boolean algebras and the relations correspond to the Boolean operations. We introduce the hyperboolean modal logic, give a complete axiomatization of it, and show that it lacks the finite (...) model property. The method of axiomatization hinges upon the fact that a "difference" operator is definable in hyperboolean algebras, and makes use of additional non-Hilbert-style rules. Finally, we discuss a number of open questions and directions for further research. (shrink)

In this paper I introduce a sequent system for the propositional modal logic S5. Derivations of valid sequents in the system are shown to correspond to proofs in a novel natural deduction system of circuit proofs (reminiscient of proofnets in linear logic, or multiple-conclusion calculi for classical logic). -/- The sequent derivations and proofnets are both simple extensions of sequents and proofnets for classical propositional logic, in which the new machinery—to take account of the modal vocabulary—is (...) directly motivated in terms of the simple, universal Kripke semantics for S5. The sequent system is cut-free and the circuit proofs are normalising. (shrink)

ABSTRACT: This 1974 paper builds on our 1969 paper (Corcoran-Weaver [2]). Here we present three (modal, sentential) logics which may be thought of as partial systematizations of the semantic and deductive properties of a sentence operator which expresses certain kinds of necessity. The logical truths [sc. tautologies] of these three logics coincide with one another and with those of standard formalizations of Lewis's S5. These logics, when regarded as logistic systems (cf. Corcoran [1], p. 154), are seen to be equivalent; (...) but, when regarded as consequence systems (ibid., p. 157), one diverges from the others in a fashion which suggests that two standard measures of semantic complexity may not be as closely linked as previously thought. -/- This 1974 paper uses the linear notation for natural deduction presented in [2]: each two-dimensional deduction is represented by a unique one-dimensional string of characters. Thus obviating need for two-dimensional trees, tableaux, lists, and the like—thereby facilitating electronic communication of natural deductions. The 1969 paper presents a (modal, sentential) logic which may be thought of as a partial systematization of the semantic and deductive properties of a sentence operator which expresses certain kinds of necessity. The logical truths [sc. tautologies] of this logic coincides those of standard formalizations of Lewis’s S4. Among the paper's innovations is its treatment of modal logic in the setting of natural deduction systems--as opposed to axiomatic systems. The author’s apologize for the now obsolete terminology. For example, these papers speak of “a proof of a sentence from a set of premises” where today “a deduction of a sentence from a set of premises” would be preferable. 1. Corcoran, John. 1969. Three Logical Theories, Philosophy of Science 36, 153–77. J P R -/- 2. Corcoran, John and George Weaver. 1969. Logical Consequence in Modal Logic: Natural Deduction in S5 Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 10, 370–84. MR0249278 (40 #2524). 3. Weaver, George and John Corcoran. 1974. Logical Consequence in Modal Logic: Some Semantic Systems for S4, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 15, 370–78. MR0351765 (50 #4253). (shrink)

A new proof style adequate for modal logics is defined from the polynomial ring calculus. The new semantics not only expresses truth conditions of modal formulas by means of polynomials, but also permits to perform deductions through polynomial handling. This paper also investigates relationships among the PRC here defined, the algebraic semantics for modal logics, equational logics, the Dijkstra???Scholten equational-proof style, and rewriting systems. The method proposed is throughly exemplified for S 5, and can be easily extended to other modal (...) logics. (shrink)

In this dissertation we present proof systems for several modal logics. These proof systems are based on analytic (or semantic) tableaux. -/- Modal logics are logics for reasoning about possibility, knowledge, beliefs, preferences, and other modalities. Their semantics are almost always based on Saul Kripke’s possible world semantics. In Kripke semantics, models are represented by relational structures or, equivalently, labeled graphs. Syntactic formulas that express statements about knowledge and other modalities are evaluated in terms of such models. -/- This dissertation (...) focuses on modal logics with dynamic operators for public announcements, belief revision, preference upgrades, and so on. These operators are defined in terms of mathematical operations on Kripke models. Thus, for example, a belief revision operator in the syntax would correspond to a belief revision operation on models. -/- The ‘dynamic’ semantics of dynamic modal logics are a clever way of extending languages without compromising on intuitiveness. We present ‘dynamic’ tableau proof systems for these dynamic semantics, with the express aim to make them conceptually simple, easy to use, modular, and extensible. This we do by reflecting the semantics as closely as possible in the components of our tableau system. For instance, dynamic operations on Kripke models have counterpart dynamic relations between tableaux. -/- Soundness, completeness, and decidability are three of the most important properties that a proof system may have. A proof system is sound if and only if any formula for which a proof exists, is true in every model. A proof system is complete if and only if for any formula that is true in all models, a proof exists. A proof system is decidable if and only if any formula can be proved to be a theorem or not a theorem in a finite number of steps. All proof systems in this dissertation are sound, complete, and decidable. -/- Part of our strategy to create modular tableau systems is to delay concerns over decidability until after soundness and completeness have been established. Decidability is attained through the operations of folding and through operations on ‘tableau cascades’, which are graphs of tableaux. -/- Finally, we provide a proof-of-concept implementation of our dynamic tableau system for public announcement logic in the Clojure programming language. (shrink)

This paper presents a recent formalization of a Henkin-style completeness proof for the propositional modal logic S5 using the Lean theorem prover. The proof formalized is close to that of Hughes and Cresswell, but the system, based on a different choice of axioms, is better described as a Mendelson system augmented with axiom schemes for K, T, S4, and B, and the necessitation rule as a rule of inference. The language has the false and implication as the only primitive (...) logical connectives and necessity as the only primitive modal operator. The full source code is available online and has been typechecked with Lean 3.4.2. (shrink)

A certain type of inference rules in modal logics, generalizing Gabbay's Irreflexivity rule, is introduced and some general completeness results about modal logics axiomatized with such rules are proved.

A system for the modal logic K furnishes a simple mechanical process for proving theorems.

A logic is called higher order if it allows for quantification over higher order objects, such as functions of individuals, relations between individuals, functions of functions, relations between functions, etc. Higher order logic began with Frege, was formalized in Russell [46] and Whitehead and Russell [52] early in the previous century, and received its canonical formulation in Church [14].1 While classical type theory has since long been overshadowed by set theory as a foundation of mathematics, recent decades have (...) shown remarkable comebacks in the fields of mechanized reasoning (see, e.g., Benzm¨. (shrink)

A fundamental question asked in modal logic is whether a given theory is consistent. But consistent with what? A typical way to address this question identifies a choice of background knowledge axioms (say, S4, D, etc.) and then shows the assumptions codified by the theory in question to be consistent with those background axioms. But determining the specific choice and division of background axioms is, at least sometimes, little more than tradition. This paper introduces generic theories for propositional modal (...) logic to address consistency results in a more robust way. As building blocks for background knowledge, generic theories provide a standard for categorical determinations of consistency. We argue that the results and methods of this paper help to elucidate problems in epistemology and enjoy sufficient scope and power to have purchase on problems bearing on modalities in judgement, inference, and decision making. (shrink)

Many authors have noted that there are types of English modal sentences cannot be formalized in the language of basic first-order modal logic. Some widely discussed examples include “There could have been things other than there actually are” and “Everyone who is actually rich could have been poor.” In response to this lack of expressive power, many authors have discussed extensions of first-order modal logic with two-dimensional operators. But claims about the relative expressive power of these extensions are (...) often justified only by example rather than by rigorous proof. In this paper, we provide proofs of many of these claims and present a more complete picture of the expressive landscape for such languages. (shrink)

A truthmaker for a proposition P is exact if it contains nothing irrelevant to P. What are the exact truthmakers for necessitated propositions? This paper makes progress on this issue by showing how to extend Fine’s truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic logic to an exact truthmaker semantics for intuitionistic modal logic. The project is of interest also to the classical logician: while all distinctively classical theorems may be true, they differ from the intuitionistic ones in how they are made (...) true. This sheds new light on the status of the T and B axioms. (shrink)

In the substitutional framework, validity is truth under all substitutions of the nonlogical vocabulary. I develop a theory where □ is interpreted as substitutional validity. I show how to prove soundness and completeness for common modal calculi using this definition.