This out-of-print collection in the area of the history, politics, ethics, and theory of privacy includes selections from Peter Gay, Alan Westin, Walter Benjamin, Catharine MacKinnon, Seyla Benhabib, Anita Allen, Ann Jennings, Charles Taylor, Richard Sennett, Mark Wicclair, Martha Nussbaum, and Robert Nozick.

Can new technology enhance purpose-driven, democratic dialogue in groups, governments, and societies? Online Deliberation: Design, Research, and Practice is the first book that attempts to sample the full range of work on online deliberation, forging new connections between academic research, technology designers, and practitioners. Since some of the most exciting innovations have occurred outside of traditional institutions, and those involved have often worked in relative isolation from each other, work in this growing field has often failed to reflect the full (...) set of perspectives on online deliberation. This volume is aimed at those working at the crossroads of information/communication technology and social science, and documents early findings in, and perspectives on, this new field by many of its pioneers. -/- CONTENTS: -/- Introduction: The Blossoming Field of Online Deliberation (Todd Davies, pp. 1-19) -/- Part I - Prospects for Online Civic Engagement -/- Chapter 1: Virtual Public Consultation: Prospects for Internet Deliberative Democracy (James S. Fishkin, pp. 23-35) -/- Chapter 2: Citizens Deliberating Online: Theory and Some Evidence (Vincent Price, pp. 37-58) -/- Chapter 3: Can Online Deliberation Improve Politics? Scientific Foundations for Success (Arthur Lupia, pp. 59-69) -/- Chapter 4: Deliberative Democracy, Online Discussion, and Project PICOLA (Public Informed Citizen Online Assembly) (Robert Cavalier with Miso Kim and Zachary Sam Zaiss, pp. 71-79) -/- Part II - Online Dialogue in the Wild -/- Chapter 5: Friends, Foes, and Fringe: Norms and Structure in Political Discussion Networks (John Kelly, Danyel Fisher, and Marc Smith, pp. 83-93) -/- Chapter 6: Searching the Net for Differences of Opinion (Warren Sack, John Kelly, and Michael Dale, pp. 95-104) -/- Chapter 7: Happy Accidents: Deliberation and Online Exposure to Opposing Views (Azi Lev-On and Bernard Manin, pp. 105-122) -/- Chapter 8: Rethinking Local Conversations on the Web (Sameer Ahuja, Manuel Pérez-Quiñones, and Andrea Kavanaugh, pp. 123-129) -/- Part III - Online Public Consultation -/- Chapter 9: Deliberation in E-Rulemaking? The Problem of Mass Participation (David Schlosberg, Steve Zavestoski, and Stuart Shulman, pp. 133-148) -/- Chapter 10: Turning GOLD into EPG: Lessons from Low-Tech Democratic Experimentalism for Electronic Rulemaking and Other Ventures in Cyberdemocracy (Peter M. Shane, pp. 149-162) -/- Chapter 11: Baudrillard and the Virtual Cow: Simulation Games and Citizen Participation (Hélène Michel and Dominique Kreziak, pp. 163-166) -/- Chapter 12: Using Web-Based Group Support Systems to Enhance Procedural Fairness in Administrative Decision Making in South Africa (Hossana Twinomurinzi and Jackie Phahlamohlaka, pp. 167-169) -/- Chapter 13: Citizen Participation Is Critical: An Example from Sweden (Tomas Ohlin, pp. 171-173) -/- Part IV - Online Deliberation in Organizations -/- Chapter 14: Online Deliberation in the Government of Canada: Organizing the Back Office (Elisabeth Richard, pp. 177-191) -/- Chapter 15: Political Action and Organization Building: An Internet-Based Engagement Model (Mark Cooper, pp. 193-202) -/- Chapter 16: Wiki Collaboration Within Political Parties: Benefits and Challenges (Kate Raynes-Goldie and David Fono, pp. 203-205) -/- Chapter 17: Debian’s Democracy (Gunnar Ristroph, pp. 207-211) -/- Chapter 18: Software Support for Face-to-Face Parliamentary Procedure (Dana Dahlstrom and Bayle Shanks, pp. 213-220) -/- Part V - Online Facilitation -/- Chapter 19: Deliberation on the Net: Lessons from a Field Experiment (June Woong Rhee and Eun-mee Kim, pp. 223-232) -/- Chapter 20: The Role of the Moderator: Problems and Possibilities for Government-Run Online Discussion Forums (Scott Wright, pp. 233-242) -/- Chapter 21: Silencing the Clatter: Removing Anonymity from a Corporate Online Community (Gilly Leshed, pp. 243-251) -/- Chapter 22: Facilitation and Inclusive Deliberation (Matthias Trénel, pp. 253-257) -/- Chapter 23: Rethinking the ‘Informed’ Participant: Precautions and Recommendations for the Design of Online Deliberation (Kevin S. Ramsey and Matthew W. Wilson, pp. 259-267) -/- Chapter 24: PerlNomic: Rule Making and Enforcement in Digital Shared Spaces (Mark E. Phair and Adam Bliss, pp. 269-271) -/- Part VI - Design of Deliberation Tools -/- Chapter 25: An Online Environment for Democratic Deliberation: Motivations, Principles, and Design (Todd Davies, Brendan O’Connor, Alex Cochran, Jonathan J. Effrat, Andrew Parker, Benjamin Newman, and Aaron Tam, pp. 275-292) -/- Chapter 26: Online Civic Deliberation with E-Liberate (Douglas Schuler, pp. 293-302) -/- Chapter 27: Parliament: A Module for Parliamentary Procedure Software (Bayle Shanks and Dana Dahlstrom, pp. 303-307) -/- Chapter 28: Decision Structure: A New Approach to Three Problems in Deliberation (Raymond J. Pingree, pp. 309-316) -/- Chapter 29: Design Requirements of Argument Mapping Software for Teaching Deliberation (Matthew W. Easterday, Jordan S. Kanarek, and Maralee Harrell, pp. 317-323) -/- Chapter 30: Email-Embedded Voting with eVote/Clerk (Marilyn Davis, pp. 325-327) -/- Epilogue: Understanding Diversity in the Field of Online Deliberation (Seeta Peña Gangadharan, pp. 329-358). -/- For individual chapter downloads, go to odbook.stanford.edu. (shrink)

We discuss cases where subjects seem to enjoy conscious experience when the relevant first-order perceptual representations are either missing or too weak to account for the experience. Though these cases are originally considered to be theoretical possibilities that may be problematical for the higher-order view of consciousness, careful considerations of actual empirical examples suggest that this strategy may backfire; these cases may cause more trouble for first-order theories instead. Specifically, these cases suggest that (I) recurrent feedback loops to V1 are (...) most likely not the neural correlate of first-order representations for conscious experience, (II) first-order views seem to have a problem accounting for the phenomenology in these cases, and either (III) a version of the ambitious higher-order approach is superior in that it is the simplest theory that can account for all results at face value, or (IV) a view where phenomenology is jointly determined by both first-order and higher-order states. In our view (III) and (IV) are both live options and the decision between them may ultimately be an empirical question that cannot yet be decided. (shrink)

The period from 1900 to 1935 was particularly fruitful and important for the development of logic and logical metatheory. This survey is organized along eight "itineraries" concentrating on historically and conceptually linked strands in this development. Itinerary I deals with the evolution of conceptions of axiomatics. Itinerary II centers on the logical work of Bertrand Russell. Itinerary III presents the development of set theory from Zermelo onward. Itinerary IV discusses the contributions of the algebra of logic tradition, in particular, Löwenheim (...) and Skolem. Itinerary V surveys the work in logic connected to the Hilbert school, and itinerary V deals specifically with consistency proofs and metamathematics, including the incompleteness theorems. Itinerary VII traces the development of intuitionistic and many-valued logics. Itinerary VIII surveys the development of semantical notions from the early work on axiomatics up to Tarski's work on truth. (shrink)

Coherentism maintains that coherent beliefs are more likely to be true than incoherent beliefs, and that coherent evidence provides more confirmation of a hypothesis when the evidence is made coherent by the explanation provided by that hypothesis. Although probabilistic models of credence ought to be well-suited to justifying such claims, negative results from Bayesian epistemology have suggested otherwise. In this essay we argue that the connection between coherence and confirmation should be understood as a relation mediated by the causal relationships (...) among the evidence and a hypothesis, and we offer a framework for doing so by fitting together probabilistic models of coherence, confirmation, and causation. We show that the causal structure among the evidence and hypothesis is sometimes enough to determine whether the coherence of the evidence boosts confirmation of the hypothesis, makes no difference to it, or even reduces it. We also show that, ceteris paribus, it is not the coherence of the evidence that boosts confirmation, but rather the ratio of the coherence of the evidence to the coherence of the evidence conditional on a hypothesis. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to assess the relationship between anti-physicalist arguments in the philosophy of mind and anti-naturalist arguments in metaethics, and to show how the literature on the mind-body problem can inform metaethics. Among the questions we will consider are: (1) whether a moral parallel of the knowledge argument can be constructed to create trouble for naturalists, (2) the relationship between such a "Moral Knowledge Argument" and the familiar Open Question Argument, and (3) how naturalists can respond (...) to the Moral Twin Earth argument. We will give particular attention to recent arguments in the philosophy of mind that aim to show that anti-physicalist arguments can be defused by acknowledging a distinctive kind of conceptual dualism between the phenomenal and the physical. This tactic for evading anti-physicalist arguments has come to be known as the Phenomenal Concept Strategy. We will propose a metaethical version of this strategy, which we shall call the `Moral Concept Strategy'. We suggest that the Moral Concept Strategy offers the most promising way out of these anti-naturalist arguments, though significant challenges remain. (shrink)

Endurantists have recently faced a mereological puzzle in various forms. Here I argue that, instead of presenting a genuine worry, the puzzle actually reveals a common misunderstanding about the endurantist ontology. Furthermore, through this discussion of the alleged problem and the misunderstanding which motivates it, I reveal metaphysical commitments the endurantist has that may not be widely recognized. For instance, she is committed to interesting and perhaps controversial views about shape and location. I highlight these commitments and what they mean (...) for the endurantist. (shrink)

It is proposed that our memory is made up of individual, unconnected Records, to each of which is attached a Heading. Retrieval of a Record can only be accomplished by addressing the attached Heading, the contents of which cannot itself be retrieved. Each Heading is made up of a mixture of content in more or less literal form and context, the latter including specification of environment and of internal states (e.g. drug states and mood). This view of memory allows an (...) easy account of a number of natural memory phenomena as well as a variety of laboratory findings such as the differences between recall and recognition. The theory further proposes that Headed Records can neither be deleted nor modified. Data apparently against such a hypothesis can be accounted for in terms of the retrieval process. (shrink)

Here I defend the compatibility of presentism and time travel against a few objections. Keller and Nelson argue that, if presentism is at all plausible, presentism and time travel are as compatible as eternalism and time travel. But Miller and Sider are not convinced. I reply that for their concerns to have merit, Miller and Sider must assume presentists are committed to positions they need not be; I explain why presentists are not so committed and, in the process, defend Keller (...) and Nelson’s position that there is no roadblock to presentist time travel that does not also apply to eternalist time travel. (shrink)

Recent discussions among lawyers, philosophers, policy researchers and athletes have focused on the potential threat to privacy posed by the World Anti-Doping Agency’s (WADA) whereabouts requirements. These requirements demand, among other things, that all elite athletes file their whereabouts information for the subsequent quarter on a quarterly basis and comprise data for one hour of each day when the athlete will be available and accessible for no advance notice testing at a specified location of their choosing. Failure to file one’s (...) whereabouts, or the non-availability for testing at said location on three occasions within any 18-month period constitutes an anti-doping rule violation that is equivalent to testing positive to a banned substance, and may lead to a suspension of the athlete for a time period of between one and two years. We critically explore the extent to which WADA’s whereabouts requirements are in tension with existing legislation on privacy, with respect to UK athletes, who are simultaneously protected by UK domestic and EU law. Both UK domestic and EU law are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) Article 8, which establishes a right to “respect for private and family life, home and correspondence”. We critically discuss the centrality of the whereabouts requirements in relation to WADA’s aims, and the adoption and implementation of its whereabouts rules. We conclude that as WADA’s whereabouts requirements appear to be in breach of an elite athlete’s rights under European workers’ rights, health & safety and data protection law they are also, therefore, in conflict with Article 8 of the ECHR and the UK Human Rights Act 1998. We call for specific amendments that cater for the exceptional case of elite sports labour if the WADA requirements are to be considered legitimate. (shrink)

Mereological challenges have recently been raised against the endurantist. For instance, Barker and Dowe (2003) have argued that eternalist endurantism entails (1) persisting objects are both 3D and 4D, and that (2) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. They also argue that presentist endurantism also entails, albeit in a tensed way, that (3) the lives of persisting objects last longer than they actually do. While they’ve further argued (2005) that the objections raised by McDaniel (2003) (...) and Beebee and Rush (2003) fail, here I show that such objections are tenable without requiring further significant metaphysical commitments; I argue that such endurantist defences are tenable, contra to prior analyses. (shrink)

This paper revisits the conceptual history of the early Frankfurt School’s investigations into the authoritarian character, the set of sadomasochistic character traits that dispose an individual or group to seek their own domination. This research project, which produced Fromm’s Studies on Authority and Family and Horkheimer’s Egoism and Freedom Movements in 1936 and ended in 1939 with Fromm’s expulsion from the Frankfurt School, is generally held to have been a theoretically-unproductive and abortive endeavour. We dispute such a reading by reconstructing (...) the key concepts and methods of this research project, and demonstrating its breadth and coherence. In so doing we illustrate the centrality of Fromm’s contribution to the Frankfurt School early work on authority and indicate that the proper point of origin for those seeking to grasp the Frankfurt School’s research on the authoritarian character is 1930, the year in which Fromm joined the Frankfurt School. (shrink)

In the domain of ontology design as well as in Knowledge Representation, modeling universals is a challenging problem.Most approaches that have addressed this problem rely on Description Logics (DLs) but many difficulties remain, due to under-constrained representation which reduces the inferences that can be drawn and further causes problems in expressiveness. In mathematical logic and program checking, type theories have proved to be appealing but, so far they have not been applied in the formalization of ontologies. To bridge this gap, (...) we present in this paper a theory for representing ontologies in a dependently typed framework which relies on strong formal foundations including both a constructive logic and a functional type system. The language of this theory defines in a precise way what ontological primitives such as classes, relations, properties, etc., and thereof roles, are. The first part of the paper details how these primitives are defined and used within the theory. In a second part, we focus on the formalization of the role primitive. A review of significant role properties leads to the specification of a role profile and most of the remaining work details through numerous examples, how the proposed theory is able to fully satisfy this profile. It is demonstrated that dependent types can model several non-trivial aspects of roles including a formal solution for generalization hierarchies, identity criteria for roles and other contributions. A discussion is given on how the theory is able to cope with many of the constraints inherent in a good role representation. (shrink)

In 1949, the Department of Philosophy at the University of Manchester organized a symposium “Mind and Machine” with Michael Polanyi, the mathematicians Alan Turing and Max Newman, the neurologists Geoff rey Jeff erson and J. Z. Young, and others as participants. Th is event is known among Turing scholars, because it laid the seed for Turing’s famous paper on “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, but it is scarcely documented. Here, the transcript of this event, together with Polanyi’s original statement and his (...) notes taken at a lecture by Jeff erson, are edited and commented for the fi rst time. Th e originals are in the Regenstein Library of the University of Chicago. Th e introduction highlights elements of the debate that included neurophysiology, mathematics, the mind-body-machine problem, and consciousness and shows that Turing’s approach, as documented here, does not lend itself to reductionism. (shrink)

Ethical issues of information and communication technologies (ICTs) are important because they can have significant effects on human liberty, happiness, their ability to lead a good life. They are also of functional interest because they can determine whether technologies are used and whether their positive potential can unfold. For these reasons policy makers are interested in finding out what these issues are and how they can be addressed. The best way of creating ICT policy that is sensitive to ethical issues (...) would be to be proactive and address such issues at early stages of the technology life cycle. The present paper uses this position as a starting point and discusses how knowledge of ethical aspects of emerging ICTs can be gained. It develops a methodology that goes beyond established futures methodologies to cater for the difficult nature of ethical issues. The paper goes on to outline some of the preliminary findings of a European research project that has applied this method. (shrink)

A core commitment of Bob Hale and Crispin Wright’s neologicism is their invocation of Frege’s Constraint—roughly, the requirement that the core empirical applications for a class of numbers be “built directly into” their formal characterization. According to these neologicists, if legitimate, Frege’s Constraint adjudicates in favor of their preferred foundation—Hume’s Principle—and against alternatives, such as the Dedekind–Peano axioms. In this paper, we consider a recent argument for legitimating Frege’s Constraint due to Hale, according to which the primary empirical application of (...) the naturals is transitive counting, or answering ‘how many’-questions using numerals. We make two claims regarding Hale’s argument. First, it fails to legitimate Frege’s Constraint in virtue of resting on unsupported and highly contentious assumptions. Secondly, even if sound, Hale’s argument would vindicate a version of Frege’s Constraint which fails to adjudicate in favor of Hume’s Principle over alternative characterizations of the naturals. (shrink)

In spite of its significance for everyday and philosophical discourse, the explanatory connective has not received much treatment in the philosophy of logic. The present paper develops a logic for based on systematic connections between and the truth-functional connectives.

According to a widely held view, epistemic reasons are normative reasons for belief – much like prudential or moral reasons are normative reasons for action. In recent years, however, an increasing number of authors have questioned the assumption that epistemic reasons are normative. In this article, I discuss an important challenge for anti-normativism about epistemic reasons and present a number of arguments in support of normativism. The challenge for anti-normativism is to say what kind of reasons epistemic reasons are if (...) they are not normative reasons. I discuss various answers to this challenge and find them all wanting. The arguments for normativism each stress a certain analogy between epistemic reasons and normative reasons for action. Just like normative reasons for action, epistemic reasons provide partial justification; they provide premises for correct reasoning; they constitute good bases for the responses they are reasons for; and they are reasons for which agents can show these responses without committing a mistake. In each case, I argue that the relevant condition is plausibly sufficient for the normativity of a reason, and that normativism is in any case in a much better position to explain the analogy than anti-normativism. (shrink)

In this article, we address a major outstanding question of probabilistic Bayesian epistemology: how should a rational Bayesian agent update their beliefs upon learning an indicative conditional? A number of authors have recently contended that this question is fundamentally underdetermined by Bayesian norms, and hence that there is no single update procedure that rational agents are obliged to follow upon learning an indicative conditional. Here we resist this trend and argue that a core set of widely accepted Bayesian norms is (...) sufficient to identify a normatively privileged updating procedure for this kind of learning. Along the way, we justify a privileged formalization of the notion of ‘epistemic conservativity’, offer a new analysis of the Judy Benjamin problem, and emphasize the distinction between interpreting the content of new evidence and updating one’s beliefs on the basis of that content. (shrink)

Collected essays consider points of affinity and friction between Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger. Despite being contemporaries, Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger never directly engaged with one another. Yet, Hannah Arendt, who knew both men, pointed out common ground between the two. Both were concerned with the destruction of metaphysics, the development of a new way of reading and understanding literature and art, and the formulation of radical theories about time and history. On the other hand, their life (...) trajectories and political commitments were radically different. In a 1930 letter, Benjamin told a friend that he had been reading Heidegger and that if the two were to engage with one another, “sparks will fly.” Acknowledging both their affinities and points of conflict, this volume stages that confrontation, focusing in particular on temporality, Romanticism, and politics in their work. (shrink)

Nietzsche announces his intentions to publish a “physiology of aesthetics”, namely a naturalistic explanation for how aesthetic judgements are grounded in the physiology of both the one experiencing the work, and the creator of it. But as well as the physiological reduction of aesthetic judgements, Nietzsche in many places across his oeuvre frames the apparatus of physiology, especially the prescriptive dimension of self-cultivation, in terms amenable to being treated as ‘aesthetic’. The first section will mount a (re-) defense of the (...) use of aestheticized language for discussing Nietzschean self-cultivation. The second section demonstrates an aesthetic evaluation of capacities that make possible the acquisition and removal of instinctual components, ultimately arguing for Nietzsche’s qualified indeterminism regarding the capacity for self-cultivation. The third section will assess the pres- ence of another aesthetic measure, this time in terms of envisaging one’s psycho-physiology by reference to an external spectacle. The final section discusses metaethical questions stemming from Nietzsche’s prescriptive language regarding the aestheticization of our physiology. (shrink)

Parenting our biological children is a centrally important matter, but how, if it all, can it be justified? According to a contemporary influential line of thinking, the acquisition by parents of a moral right to parent their biological children should be grounded by appeal to the value of the intimate emotional relationship that gestation facilitates between a newborn and a gestational procreator. I evaluate two arguments in defence of this proposal and argue that both are unconvincing.

This paper argues that Kant endorses a distinction between rational and natural sympathy, and it presents an interpretation of rational sympathy as a power of voluntarya posterioriproductive imagination. In rational sympathy we draw on the imagination’s voluntary powers (a) to subjectively unify the contents of intuition, in order to imaginatively put ourselves in others’ places, and (b) to associate imagined intuitional contents with the concepts others use to convey their feelings, in such a way that those contents prompt feelings in (...) us that are like their feelings. (shrink)

我们必须记住的第一件事是，当说中国这样说或中国这样做时，我们不是说中国人民，而是控制中国共产党的社会路径者，即七大社会病态连环杀手。中共常务委员会或中央政治局委员等25人。 中共对三战和全面统治的计划在中国政府的出版物和演讲中已经非常明确地阐述了，这就是习近平的"中国梦"。只有统治中国的少数人（也许只有几十到几百人）的梦想，也是其他人（包括14亿中国人 ）的噩梦。每年100亿美元使他们或他们的傀儡拥有或控制报纸、杂志、电视和广播频道，每天在世界各地的大多数主要媒体上放置假新闻。 此外，他们有一支军队（也许有数百万人），他们滚动所有媒体进行更多的宣传，淹没合法的评论（50美分的军队）。 除了剥夺第三世界的资源外，数万亿美元的"一带一路"倡议的主要主旨是在全世界建立军事基地。他们迫使自由世界陷入大规模的高科技军备竞赛，使得与苏联的冷战看起来像是野餐。 尽管SSSSK和世界上其他的军事国家都在高级硬件上花费巨资，但WW3（或导致它的小型交战）很可能以软件为主。SSSSK，可能有更多的黑客（编码器）为他们工作，然后世界其他国家加起来，通过通过网络瘫痪他 们的敌人，以最小的物理冲突赢得未来的战争。"没有卫星，没有电话，没有通讯，没有金融交易，没有电网，没有互联网，没有先进的武器，没有车辆，火车，船舶和飞机。 罢免中共只有两条主要途径，即释放14亿中国囚犯，结束向第三次世界大战的疯狂进军。 和平的一个方案是发动一场全面的贸易战来摧毁中国经济，直到军方受够了，把中共赶出去。 关闭中国经济的替代方案是一场有限的战争，比如在中共第20届大会上，50架热压无人机进行有针对性的打击，当时所有高层成员都在一个地方，但这种情况要到2022年才会发生。一个可以击中年度全体会议。 袭击发生后，中国人将被告知，他们必须放下武器，准备举行民主选举，否则就要进入石器时代。另一种选择是全面核攻击。 鉴于中共目前的路线，军事对抗是不可避免的。 几十年后，这种情况可能会发生在南中国海或台湾的岛屿上，但随着它们在世界各地建立军事基地，它可能发生在任何地方（见"卧虎藏"等）。 未来的冲突将有硬性与软性方面与中共的既定目标，强调网络战争，通过黑客和瘫痪控制系统的所有军事和工业通信，设备，发电厂，卫星，互联网，银行，以及连接到网络的任何设备或车辆。 SS正在缓慢地部署一系列全球载人和自主水面和水下潜艇或无人驾驶飞机，这些潜艇或无人机能够发射可能处于休眠状态，等待中国发出信号，甚至寻找美国船只或飞机的签名。 在摧毁我们的卫星，从而消除美国和我们全球部队之间的通信的同时，他们将使用他们的卫星，与无人机一起瞄准和摧毁我们目前优越的海军部队。 当然，所有这一切都是越来越多地由AI自动完成的。 到目前为止，中共最大的盟友是美国民主党。 选择是现在停止中共，或者看着他们把中国监狱扩展到全世界。 当然，对我们的生活进行普遍监控和数字化是不可避免的。任何不这么认为的人，都是极度脱节的。 当然，正是那些期待中国社会路径者统治世界的人，而悲观主义者（他们认为自己是现实主义者）则期望AI的社会病态 （或我称之为"假愚蠢"或"人造社会病态"）的选择性。）接管，也许到2030年。 那些有兴趣在现代社会的疯狂道路的进一步细节可能会参考我的其他作品，如自杀的民主-美国和世界第三版2019年和自 杀乌托邦幻想在21日世纪：哲学、人性与文明的崩溃（2019）.

「ゴーデルの道」では、3人の著名な科学者が、デシッド不能、不完全性、ランダム性、計算可能性、パラコンシステンションなどの問題について議論しています。私は、ウィトゲンシュタイニアンの視点から、全く異なる 解決策を持つ2つの基本的な問題があることをこれらの問題に取り組んでいます。科学的または経験的な問題は、言語がどのように理解的に使用できるか(数学と論理に特定の質問を含む)、特定の文脈で実際にどのように 単語を使用するかを調べて決定する必要がある、観察的および哲学的な問題を調査する必要がある世界に関する事実です。私たちがプレイしている言語ゲームについて明確になると、これらのトピックは他の人と同じように 普通の科学的、数学的な質問であると見なされます。ウィトゲンシュタインの洞察はめったに等しくなく、決して上回ることはなく、彼がブルーブックスとブラウンブックスを口述した80年前と同じくらい適切です。失敗 にもかかわらず、本当に完成した本ではなく一連のノートは、半世紀以上にわたって物理学、数学、哲学の出血エッジで働いてきたこれらの3人の有名な学者の作品のユニークな源です。ダ・コスタとドリアは、普遍的な計 算に書いて以来、ウォルパート(以下または私の記事を参照)によって引用されています(ウォルパートとヤナフスキーの「理由の外側の限界」の私のレビューを参照)、,そして彼の多くの成果の中で、ダ・コスタはパラ コンシタンションのパイオニアです。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます。 .

Olfactory perception provides a promising test case for enactivism, since smelling involves actively sampling our surrounding environment by sniffing. Smelling deploys implicit skillful knowledge of how our movement and the airflow around us yield olfactory experiences. The hybrid nature of olfactory experience makes it an ideal test case for enactivism with its esteem for touch and theoretical roots in vision. Olfaction is like vision in facilitating the perception of distal objects, yet it requires us to breath in and physically contact (...) the sensory object in a manner similar to touch. The paper offers an analysis of the central theoretical components of enactivism, whose soundness and empirical viability are tested using the empirical literature on sniffing. It will be shown that even if sniffing is an essential component of olfaction, the motoric component is not necessary for perceiving smells, which is contrary to the most crucial tenet of enactivism. Thus, the paper concludes that the theory cannot account for olfactory perception. (shrink)

Alcuni anni fa, ho raggiunto il punto in cui di solito posso dire dal titolo di un libro, o almeno dai titoli dei capitoli, quali tipi di errori filosofici saranno fatti e con quale frequenza. Nel caso di opere nominalmente scientifiche queste possono essere in gran parte limitate a determinati capitoli che sono filosofici o cercanodi trarre conclusioni generali sul significato o sul significato a lungoterminedell'opera. Normalmente però le questioni scientifiche di fatto sono generosamente intrecciate con incomprodellami filosofici su ciò (...) che questi fatti significano. Le chiare distinzioni che Wittgenstein ha descritto circa 80 anni fa tra le questioni scientifiche e le loro descrizioni da parte di vari giochi linguistici sono raramente prese in considerazione, e quindi si è alternativamente stupiti dalla scienza e costerghi per la sua analisi incoerente. Così è con questo volume. Se si vuole creare una mente più o meno come la nostra, è necessario avere una struttura logica per la razionalità e la comprensione dei due sistemi di pensiero (teoria del doppio processo). Se si vuole filosofare su questo, bisogna capire la distinzione tra le questioni scientifiche di fatto e la questione filosofica di come funziona il linguaggio nel contesto in questione, e di come evitare le insidie del riduzionismo e dello scientismo, ma Kurzweil, come la maggior parte degli studenti di comportamento, è in gran parte all'oscuro. Egli è incantato da modelli, teorie e concetti, e dalla voglia di spiegare, mentre Wittgenstein ci ha mostrato che dobbiamo solo descrivere, e che le teorie, i concetti, ecc., sono solo modi di usare il linguaggio (giochi linguistici) che hanno valore solo nella misura in cui hanno un test chiaro (clear truthmakers, o come John Searle (il critico più famoso di AI) ama dire, chiare condizioni di soddisfazione (COS)). Ho cercato di dare un inizio su questo nei miei scritti recenti. Coloro che desiderano un quadro aggiornato completo per il comportamento umano dalla moderna vista a due systems possono consultare il mio libro 'La struttura logica della filosofia, psicologia, mente e il linguaggio in Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Coloro che sono interessati a più dei miei scritti possono vedere 'Talking Monkeys--Filosofia, Psicologia, Scienza, Religione e Politica su un Pianeta Condannato--Articoli e Recensioni 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) e Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019) . (shrink)

Gintisはシニアエコノミストで、私は興味を持って彼の以前の本のいくつかを読んだので、私は行動にいくつかのより多くの洞察を期待していました。悲しいことに、彼はグループ選択と現象学の死んだ手を行動理論 の中心にし、これは主に仕事を無効にします。さらに悪いことに、彼はここでそのような悪い判断を示しているので、それは彼のすべての前の仕事に疑問を呼びかけます。ハーバード大学で彼の友人によるグループ選択を復 活させようとする試みは、 ノワクとウィルソンは、数年前に生物学の主要なスキャンダルの一つであり、私は私の記事「利他主義、イエスと世界の終わり--テンプルトン財団がハーバード大学教授職を買収し、進化、合理性と文明を攻撃した方法- E.O.ウィルソンのレビュー」(2012年)とノワクとスーパーフィールド(2012)で悲しい話を述べました。ノワクとは異なり、ギンティスは宗教的狂信によって動機づけられているようには見えないが、基本的 な人間の生物学と行動科学者、他の学者、および一般市民の空白のスレート主義の(ほぼ普遍的な)理解の欠如によって容易になった人間性の厳しい現実に代わるものを生み出したいという強い願望によって。 ギンティスは、行動を記述するための一貫した枠組みを持っていないために、エコノミスト、社会学者、その他の行動科学者を正しく攻撃します。もちろん、行動を理解するために必要なフレームワークは進化的なものです 。残念ながら、彼は自分自身を提供することができず(彼の多くの批評家と私は同意します)、彼が何十年もの仕事で生み出した経済的、心理的理論にグループ選択の腐った死体を移植しようとする試みは、単に彼のプロジ ェクト全体を無効にします。 Gintisはウィルソンやノワクのような遺伝学を理解し、説明するために勇敢な努力をしていますが、彼は専門家から遠く離れており、彼らのように、数学は生物学的不可能に彼を盲目にし、もちろんこれは科学の標準 です。ヴィトゲンシュタインが文化と価値の最初のページで有名に指摘したように、「形而上学的表現の誤用が数学ほど多くの罪を引き起こし続けている宗教的宗派はありません。 自らの頻度を低下させる行動を引き起こす遺伝子は持続できないことは常に明らかでしたが、これはグループ選択の概念の中核です。さらに、グループの選択は、ドーキンスが指摘したように、自然選択による進化のもう一 つの名前である包括的なフィットネス(親族選択)に減少することがよく知られており、しばしば実証されています。ウィルソンのように、Gintisは約50年間この分野で働いてきましたが、スキャンダルが起こった 後、私の記事に詳述されているように、最も関連性の高い専門的な仕事を見つけ、読み、理解するのに3日しかかかりませんでした。ギンティスとウィルソンが半世紀近くでこれを達成できなかったことに気づくのは気が遠 くなる。 アメリカと世界を破壊している人間性を理解する普遍的な失敗の特別なケースとして、アカデミアで当たり前であるグループ選択と表現論の誤りについて議論します。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、「話す猿--運命の惑星における哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治--記事とレビュー2006-2019第3回(2019)と自殺ユートピア 妄想21世紀4日(2019))を参照してください。 .

ホフスタッター牧師による原理主義自然主義教会からの最新の説教。彼のはるかに有名な(または容赦ない哲学的誤りで悪名高い)作品ゴーデル、エッシャー、バッハのように、それは表面的な妥当性を持っていますが、こ れが哲学的なものと実際の科学的問題を混ぜ合わせた横行するサイエンティズムであることを理解すれば(つまり、唯一の本当の問題は、私たちがプレイすべき言語ゲームです)、その後、ほとんどすべての関心が消えます 。進化心理学とヴィトゲンシュタインの仕事に基づく分析のフレームワークを提供しています(最近の著作で更新されて以来)。 現代の2つのシス・エムスの見解から人間の行動のための包括的な最新の枠組みを望む人は、私の著書「ルートヴィヒ・ヴィトゲンシュタインとジョン・サールの第2回(2019)における哲学、心理学、ミンと言語の論 理的構造」を参照することができます。私の著作の多くにご興味がある人は、運命の惑星における「話す猿--哲学、心理学、科学、宗教、政治―記事とレビュー2006-2019 第3回(2019)」と21世紀4日(2019年)の自殺ユートピア妄想st Century 4th ed (2019)などを見ることができます .

Amodal completion is the representation of those parts of the perceived object that we get no sensory stimulation from. While amodal completion is rife and plays an essential role in all sense modalities, philosophical discussions of this phenomenon have almost entirely been limited to vision. The aim of this paper is to examine in what sense we can talk about amodal completion in olfaction. We distinguish three different senses of amodal completion – spatial, temporal and feature-based completion – and argue (...) that all three are present and play a significant role in olfaction. (shrink)

कुछ साल पहले, मैं उस बिंदु पर पहुँच गया जहां मैं आमतौर पर एक किताब के शीर्षक से बता सकते हैं, या कम से कम अध्याय शीर्षक से, दार्शनिक गलतियों के किस प्रकार किया जाएगा और कितनी बार. नाममात्र के वैज्ञानिक कार्यों के मामले में ये काफी हद तक कुछ अध्यायों तक सीमित हो सकते हैं जो दार्शनिक मोमकरते हैं या कार्य के अर्थ या दीर्घकालिक महत्व के बारे में सामान्य निष्कर्ष निकालने का प्रयास करतेहैं। आम तौर पर हालांकि तथ्य (...) के वैज्ञानिक मामलों उदारता से इन तथ्यों का क्या मतलब है के रूप में दार्शनिक अस्पष्ट के साथ interlarded रहे हैं. स्पष्ट भेद जो Wittgenstein वैज्ञानिक मामलों और विभिन्न भाषा के खेल द्वारा उनके विवरण के बीच कुछ 80 साल पहले वर्णित शायद ही कभी ध्यान में रखा जाता है, और इसलिए एक बारी-बारी से विज्ञान द्वारा wowed है और इसके असंबद्ध से निराश विश्लेषण. तो यह इस मात्रा के साथ है. यदि एक हमारे जैसे अधिक या कम एक मन बनाने के लिए है, एक तर्कसंगतता और विचार के दो प्रणालियों की समझ के लिए एक तार्किक संरचना की जरूरत है (दोहरी प्रक्रिया सिद्धांत). यदि एक इस बारे में दर्शन है, एक तथ्य के वैज्ञानिक मुद्दों और कैसे भाषा के मुद्दे पर संदर्भ में काम करता है के दार्शनिक मुद्दे के बीच अंतर को समझने की जरूरत है, और कैसे रिडक्शनिज्म और scientism के नुकसान से बचने के लिए, लेकिन Kurzweil, जैसे सबसे अधिकव्यवहार के छात्रों, काफी हद तक अनजान है. वह मॉडल, सिद्धांतों, और अवधारणाओं से मुग्ध है, और समझाने के लिए आग्रह करता हूं, जबकि Wittgenstein हमें पता चला है कि हम केवल वर्णन करने की जरूरत है, और है कि सिद्धांतों, अवधारणाओं आदि, भाषा का उपयोग करने के सिर्फ तरीके हैं (भाषा का खेल) जो मूल्य केवल insofar के रूप में वे एक स्पष्ट है परीक्षण (स्पष्ट truthmakers, या जॉन Searle (एआई के सबसे प्रसिद्ध आलोचक) के रूप में कहना पसंद करती है, संतोष की स्पष्ट शर्तें (COS)). मैं अपने हाल के लेखन में इस पर एक शुरुआत प्रदान करने का प्रयास किया है. आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

पादरी Hofstadter द्वारा कट्टरपंथी प्रकृतिवाद के चर्च से नवीनतम उपदेश. अपने बहुत अधिक प्रसिद्ध (या अपने अथक दार्शनिक त्रुटियों के लिए कुख्यात) काम Godel, Escher, बाख की तरह, यह एक सतही प्रशंसनीयता है, लेकिन अगर एक समझता है कि यह बड़े पैमाने पर वैज्ञानिकता है जो दार्शनिक लोगों के साथ वास्तविक वैज्ञानिक मुद्दों घोला जा सकता है (यानी, केवल असली मुद्दों क्या भाषा का खेल हम खेलना चाहिए रहे हैं) तो लगभग सभी अपनी रुचि गायब हो जाता है. मैं विकासवादी (...) मनोविज्ञान और Wittgenstein के काम में आधारित विश्लेषण के लिए एक रूपरेखा प्रदान (के बाद से मेरे और अधिक हाल ही में लेखन में अद्यतन). आधुनिक दो systems दृश्यसे मानव व्यवहार के लिए एक व्यापक अप करने के लिए तारीख रूपरेखा इच्छुक लोगों को मेरी पुस्तक 'दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, मिनडी और लुडविगमें भाषा की तार्किक संरचना से परामर्श कर सकते हैं Wittgenstein और जॉन Searle '2 एड (2019). मेरे लेखन के अधिक में रुचि रखने वालों को देख सकते हैं 'बात कर रहेबंदर- दर्शन, मनोविज्ञान, विज्ञान, धर्म और राजनीति पर एक बर्बाद ग्रह --लेख और समीक्षा 2006-2019 3 एड (2019) और आत्मघाती यूटोपियान भ्रम 21st मेंसदी 4वें एड (2019) . (shrink)

Claramente nem eu nem ninguém jamais leremos qualquer parte substancial desta enorme tomada, então discutirei o único artigo que mais me interessa e que acho que fornece o quadro necessário para entender todos os outros. Estou falando de Ludwig Wittgenstein 'W. Mesmo que eu tentasse discutir os outros, eu não passaria a primeira página, pois todos os problemas aqui surgem imediatamente em qualquer discussão de comportamento. Diferenciação de pragmáticos e semântica não faz sentido em grande parte. É defensável que este (...) trabalho "Desenvolvimentos do contextualismo de Wittgenstein" possa ser legendado, mas é claro que este termo foi inevitavelmente corrompido pelos filósofos. Pode-se então dizer que pragmáticos e semânticas são partes ou coextensivo com epistemologia e ontologia e psicologia descritiva do pensamento de alta ordem (Estrutura Lógica da Racionalidade de Searle) ou que descrevem como usamos ruídos em contextos específicos para lhes dar significado - ou seja, uso verdadeiro ou falso (proposicional). A adição do trabalho de Wittgenstein/Searle à pesquisa de pensamento moderno fornece uma estrutura para pragmáticos, semânticas e todos os outros comportamentos humanos. Aqueles que querem uma estrutura completa até o momento para o comportamento humano do ponto de vista moderno de dois sistemas podem consultar meus livros Talking Monkeys 3rd ed (2019), Estrutura Lógica da Filosofia, Psicologia, Mente e Linguagem em Ludwig Wittgenstein e John Searle 2a ed (2019), Suicide Pela Democracy 4ª ed (2020), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections Between Science, Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics and Economics (2020), Illusaos Utopias Suicidas no século 21 6ª ed (2020), Observações sobre Impossibilidade, Incompletude, Paraconsistência, Indecidabilidade, Aleatoriedade, Computação, Paradoxo e Incerteza em Chaitin, Wittgenstein, Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych Berto, Floyd, Moyal-Sharrock e Yanofsky (2019) e outros. (shrink)

According to an attractive and widely held view, all practical reasons are explained in terms of the (instrumental or final) value of the action supported by the reason. I argue that this theory is incompatible with plausible assumptions about the practical reasons that correspond to certain moral rights, including the right to a promised action and the right to an exclusive use of one’s property. The argument is an explanatory rather than extensional one: while the actions supported by the relevant (...) reasons (e.g. keeping a valid promise or respecting property) can be argued to have a certain kind of value, I argue that this value presupposes a moral right, and therefore cannot explain the reason. Reflection on such cases suggest the conclusion that reasons that are subject to normative powers are generally not value-based. This also has important implications for the dialectic between ‘value-first’ and ‘reasons-first’ approaches to normativity. (shrink)

If you ought to perform a certain act, and some other action is a necessary means for you to perform that act, then you ought to perform that other action as well – or so it seems plausible to say. This transmission principle is of both practical and theoretical significance. The aim of this paper is to defend this principle against a number of recent objections, which (as I show) are all based on core assumptions of the view called actualism. (...) I reject actualism, provide an alternative explanation of its plausible features, and present an independent argument for the transmission principle. (shrink)

Hypocrisy is widely thought to be morally objectionable in a way that undermines the hypocrite’s moral standing to blame others. To wit, we seem to intuitively accept the “Nonhypocrisy Condition:” R has the standing to blame S for some violation of a moral norm N only if R’s blaming S is not hypocritical. This claim has been the subject of intensifying philosophical investigation in recent years. However, we can only understand why hypocrisy is morally objectionable and has an effect on (...) standing to blame if we can correctly characterize hypocrisy itself. Unfortunately, some recent discussions fail to do this, which fatally undermines subsequent arguments concerning the effect of hypocrisy on the standing to blame. This paper’s central aim is to develop and defend a better account of hypocrisy. The hope is that with such an account in hand, we can explain and perhaps justify our moral aversion to hypocrisy in general as well as the Nonhypocrisy Condition in particular. (shrink)

In Emotions, Values & Agency, Christine Tappolet develops a sophisticated, perceptual theory of emotions and their role in wide range of issues in value theory and epistemology. In this paper, we raise three worries about Tappolet's proposal.

Ich behaupte, dass die Tabelle der Intentionalität (Rationalität, Bewusstein, Geist, Denken, Sprache, Persönlichkeit usw.), die hier prominent dargestellt wird, mehr oder weniger genau beschreibt oder zumindest als Heuristik dient, wie wir denken und uns verhalten, und so umfasst sie nicht nur Philosophie und Psychologie, aber alles andere (Geschichte, Literatur, Mathematik, Politik etc.). Beachten Sie insbesondere, dass Intentionalität und Rationalität, wie ich (zusammen mit Searle, Wittgenstein und anderen) es sehen, sowohl bewusst deliberative linguistische System 2 als auch unbewusste automatisierte prälinguistische System (...) 1 Aktionen oder Reflexe umfasst. Ich mache einen kritischen Überblick über einige der wichtigsten Ergebnisse von zwei der bedeutendsten Studenten des Verhaltens der modernen Zeit, Ludwig Wittgenstein und John Searle, über die logische Struktur der Intentionalität (Geist, Sprache, Verhalten), als Ausgangspunkt wittgensteins grundlegende Entdeckung – dass alle wirklich "philosophischen" Probleme die gleichen sind – Verwirrungen darüber, wie Sprache in einem bestimmten Kontext zu verwenden, und so sind alle Lösungen gleich – blickend, wie Sprache in dem Kontext verwendet werden kann, um die Wahrheitsbedingungen (Bedingungen der Zufriedenheit oder COS) sind klar. Das Grundproblem ist, dass man alles sagen kann, aber man kann keine willkürliche Äußerung und Bedeutung bedeuten (geben, die man klar coS für) willenweise nur in einem ganz bestimmten Kontext möglich ist. Ich analysiere verschiedene Schriften von und über sie aus der modernen Perspektive der beiden Systeme des Denkens (popularisiert als "schnell denken, langsam denken"), mit einer neuen Tabelle der Intentionalität und neue duale Systeme Nomenklatur. Ich zeige, dass dies eine starke Heuristik für die Beschreibung von Verhalten ist. Somit ist jedes Verhalten eng miteinander verbunden, wenn man den richtigen Standpunkt einnimmt. Die phänomenologische Illusion (Vergessen unseres automatisierten Systems 1) ist universell und erstreckt sich nicht nur über die gesamte Philosophie, sondern über das ganze Leben hinweg. Ich bin sicher, dass Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg und der Papst ungläubig wären, wenn man ihnen sagen würde, dass sie unter dem gleichen Problem wie Hegel, Husserl und Heidegger leiden (oder dass sie sich nur in gewissem Maße von Drogen- und accumbensSexsüchtigen unterscheiden, indem sie durch Stimulation ihrer Frontalkortik durch die Lieferung von Dopamin (und über 100 anderen Chemikalien) über das ventrale Tegmentum und den Kern motiviertwerden, aber es ist klar. Während die Phänomenologen nur viel Zeit verschwendeten, verschwenden sie die Erde und die Zukunft ihres Nachkommen. (shrink)

Many of the moral and political disputes that loom large today involve claims (1) in the register of respect and offense that are (2) linked to membership in a subordinated social group and (3) occasioned by symbolic or expressive items or acts. This essay seeks to clarify the nature, stakes, and characteristic challenges of these recurring, but often disorienting, conflicts. Drawing on a body of philosophical work elaborating the moral function of etiquette, I first argue that the claims at issue (...) implicate a communicative apparatus of the same basic kind—a system that I term the “etiquette of equality.” That regime, I suggest, can serve a kindred function of facilitating the expression of morally appropriate attitudes. I also argue, however, that the etiquette of equality exhibits three problematic features that counsel ambivalence about its mounting significance: (1) the costly overdetermination of relevant signals; (2) a recursive tendency toward inflation in respect’s demands; and (3) a related set of incentives for testing, and then affirming, a group’s status through the assertion and symbolic remediation of dignitary harm. The upshot is a better understanding of the trade-offs and predicaments we face in a vital area of public life. (shrink)

This entry is composed of three sections. In §1, we survey debates about what structural rationality is, including the emergence of the concept in the contemporary literature, its key characteristics, its relationship to substantive rationality, its paradigm instances, and the questions of whether these instances are unified and, if so, how. In §2, we turn to the debate about structural requirements of rationality – including controversies about whether they are “wide-scope” or “narrow-scope”, synchronic or diachronic, and whether they govern processes (...) or states; as well as examining various forms of skepticism about structural requirements of rationality. In §3, we turn to the debate about the normative significance of structural rationality, surveying central challenges for the view that structural rationality is normatively significant and the theoretical options that arise in light of these challenges. (shrink)

The principle of indifference states that in the absence of any relevant evidence, a rational agent will distribute their credence equally among all the possible outcomes under consideration. Despite its intuitive plausibility, PI famously falls prey to paradox, and so is widely rejected as a principle of ideal rationality. In this article, I present a novel rehabilitation of PI in terms of the epistemology of comparative confidence judgments. In particular, I consider two natural comparative reformulations of PI and argue that (...) while one of them prescribes the adoption of patently irrational epistemic states, the other provides a consistent formulation of PI that overcomes the most salient limitations of existing formulations. (shrink)

In this paper I present an argument for the claim that you ought to do something only if you may believe that you ought to do it. More exactly, I defend the following principle about normative reasons: An agent A has decisive reason to φ only if she also has sufficient reason to believe that she has decisive reason to φ. I argue that this principle follows from the plausible assumption that it must be possible for an agent to respond (...) correctly to her reasons. In conclusion, I discuss some implications of this argument (given that some other standard assumptions about reasons hold). One such implication is that we are always in a position to be justified in believing all truths about what we have decisive reason (or ought) to do. (shrink)

Hypocrisy is a ubiquitous feature of moral and political life, and accusations of hypocrisy a ubiquitous feature of moral and political discourse. Yet it has been curiously under-theorized in analytic philosophy. Fortunately, the last decade has seen a boomlet of articles that address hypocrisy in order to explain and justify conditions on the so-called “standing” to blame (Wallace 2010; Friedman 2013; Bell 2013; Todd 2017; Herstein 2017; Roadevin 2018; Fritz and Miller 2018). Nevertheless, much of this more recent literature does (...) not adequately address the question, “what is hypocrisy?” In this paper, I develop and defend an account of hypocrisy as vicious, value-expressing inconsistency. I show how this account solves some traditional and some novel philosophical puzzles concerning hypocrisy and affords a deeper understanding of the features of hypocrisy emphasized by other prominent accounts. (shrink)

Can understanding be based on false beliefs? I argue that it can. I first argue that the best way to understand the question is that it is whether one can increase one's degree of understanding by adopting an overall less accurate body of beliefs. I identify three sufficient conditions for one body of beliefs to be more accurate than another. Next, I appeal to two widely used methods of comparing degrees of understanding. With these methods, I show that understanding can (...) be gained by acquiring false beliefs. In addition, I show that this implies that understanding is not factive. (shrink)

According to the Balancing View of Ought, we ought to perform an action if and only if performing the action is most strongly supported by the balance of our reasons. The Balancing View faces the objection from exclusionary reasons, which are second-order reasons not to act for certain other reasons. According to Joseph Raz, the existence of exclusionary reasons undermines the Balancing View: a reason might tip the balance in favour of performing an act but at the same time be (...) excluded by an undefeated second-order reason, in which case one ought not conform with the balance of reasons. I argue that the Balancing View can be defended against this objection and that the existence of exclusionary reasons is compatible with the Balancing View. (shrink)

Which principles govern the transmission of reasons from ends to means? Some philosophers have suggested a liberal transmission principle, according to which agents have an instrumental reason for an action whenever this action is a means for them to do what they have non-instrumental reason to do. In this paper, we (i) discuss the merits and demerits of the liberal transmission principle, (ii) argue that there are good reasons to reject it, and (iii) present an alternative, less liberal transmission principle, (...) which allows us to accommodate those phenomena that seem to support the liberal transmission principle while avoiding its problems. (shrink)

Can we build machines with which we can have interesting conversations? Observing the new optimism of AI regarding deep learning and new language models, we set ourselves an ambitious goal: We want to find out how far we can get in creating a digital replica of a philosopher. This project has two aims; one more technical, investigating of how the best model can be built. The other one, more philosophical, explores the limits and risks which are accompanied by the creation (...) of digital replicas. In cooperation with Daniel Dennett, we took his complete works to fine-tune a GPT-3. In this paper, we share our first results with some piloting models and discuss legal and ethical questions about creating and interacting with digital replicas. (shrink)