A central objection to McDowell’s conceptualism about empirical content concerns the fine-grained phenomenology of experience, which supposedly entails that the actual content of experience cannot be matched in its particularity by our concepts. While McDowell himself has answered this objection in recourse to the possibility of demonstrative concepts, his reply has engendered a plethora of further objections and is widely considered inadequate. I believe that McDowell’s critics underestimate the true force of his reply because they tend to read unrecognized empiricist (...) presuppositions into his account of experience. To show this, I introduce a new hylomorphic reading of McDowell’s account of experience and argue that the objections to his reply all rest on a specific empiricist assumption, which is untenable because it conflates the form of experience with its content. Consequently, conceptualism so understood can resist all of these objections, as I attempt to show by systematizing and answering them. (shrink)

The paper aims to give an account of practical knowledge by outlining a hylomorphic and conceptualist account of intentional action in analogy to McDowell's conceptualist account of experience. On this view, practical concepts provide the ideal or formal structure that unifies a manifold of bodily movements into a single intentional action, and hence intentional actions are structured conceptually. -/- - §1 sets out the basic features of this view in contrast to a common dualistic or two-component view of practical knowledge, (...) as an "inner" mental state with propositional content that functions as the efficient cause of some bodily movement in the "external" world, and introduces the claim that practical knowledge is the constitutive form of intentional action. - §2 illustrates the hylomorphic unity of concept and movement in action, and thus (contra Dreyfus) the corporeality of practical reason, by means of an account of practical concept formation, on which both the formation and tradition of practical concepts take place in bodily movement iself. - §3 elucidates the concept of a self-conscious disposition or rational capacity for action, actualizations of which are characterized by a syllogistic structure that accounts for both the explanation and the justification of action and thereby renders intelligible in what sense practical judgment is internal to acting itself. - Skillful exercises of such capacities express a knowledge-how that manifests itself in practical representations. §4 characterizes representations of this kind as a perceptually situated recognition of a practical pattern that amounts to the imaginative anticipation of a movement form by which the agent determines their next steps; a practical perception of the agent's particular situation that is both normative and motivational for them. - §5 starts by developing an identity theory of practical truth, on which the conceptual content of a (true) practical judgment is numerically identical with the formal structure of a (good) action, and concludes with explaining the unity of four features commonly attributed to practical knowledge, viz. that it is at the same time descriptive, normative, causally productive, and non-observational (or self-conscious). (shrink)

What is the role of intimacy in sex? The two culturally dominant views on this matter both share the implicit assumption that sex is genuinely intimate only when connected to romance, and hence that sex and intimacy stand in a contingent relationship: it is possible to have good sex without it. Liberals embrace this possibility and affirm the value of casual sex, while conservatives attempt to safeguard intimacy by insisting on romantic exclusivity. I reject their shared assumption and argue for (...) a necessary connection between intimacy and sex, in that sexual activity as such aims at a specific form of intimacy, irrespective of whether it takes place in casual encounters or romantic relationships, and the difference between good and bad sex consists in whether this end is attained. To defend this view, I develop a general account of intimacy, as based on joint action, and apply it to isolate its specifically sexual form. (shrink)

A main goal of the neuroscience of consciousness is: find the neural correlate to conscious experiences (NCC). When have we achieved this goal? The answer depends on our operationalization of “NCC.” Chalmers (2000) shaped the widely accepted operationalization according to which an NCC is a neural system with a state which is minimally sufficient (but not necessary) for an experience. A deeper look at this operationalization reveals why it might be unsatisfactory: (i) it is not an operationalization of a correlate (...) for occurring experiences, but of the capacity to experience; (ii) it is unhelpful for certain cases which are used to motivate a search for neural correlates of consciousness; (iii) it does not mirror the usage of “NCC” by scientists who seek for unique correlates; (iv) it hardly allows for a form of comparative testing of hypotheses, namely experimenta crucis. Because of these problems (i–iv), we ought to amend or improve on Chalmers's operationalization. Here, I present an alternative which avoids these problems. This “NCC2.0” also retains some benefits of Chalmers's operationalization, namely being compatible with contributions from extended, embedded, enacted, or embodied accounts (4E-accounts) and allowing for the possibility of non-biological or artificial experiencers. (shrink)

The present paper aims to contribute to the substantivalism versus relationalism debate and to defend general relativity (GR) against pseudoscientific attacks in a novel, especially inclusive way. This work was initially motivated by the desire to establish the incompatibility of any ether theories with accelerated cosmic expansion and inflation (motto: where would a hypothetical medium supposedly come from so fast?). The failure of this program is of interest for emergent GR concepts in high energy particle physics. However, it becomes increasingly (...) important to guard scientific results against their misrepresentation by fundamentally anti-scientific agendas. We therefore argue that although it is not known whether the perceived space-time is fundamental (rather than a condensed state or a particular membrane), in a fundamental theory, space-time must be abstract relational: fundamental space-time is the consistent spatial-temporal arrangement of events. To pursue its own goals, this work should be accessible to a wide audience: physicists, philosophers of science, those being tempted by anti-relativity theories, but also those who vigorously defend some orthodox relativity that is not actually supported by GR. It must thus be extensive in order to satisfy the different parties’ desire to have included and understood their respective positions. (shrink)

On some accounts, prostitution is just another form of casual sex and as such not particularly harmful in itself, if regulated properly. I claim that, although casual sex in general is not inher-ently harmful, prostitution in fact is. To show this, I defend an account of sex as joint action characteristically aimed at sexual enjoyment, here understood as a tangible experience of com-munity among partners, and argue that prostitution fails to achieve this good by incentivizing partners to mistreat each other. (...) To substantiate this claim, I explore ways in which prostitution fails on the virtues of temperance, respect, and sincerity. (shrink)

The violation of Bell inequalities by quantum physical experiments disproves all relativistic micro causal, classically real models, short Local Realistic Models (LRM). Non-locality, the infamous “spooky interaction at a distance” (A. Einstein), is already sufficiently ‘unreal’ to motivate modifying the “realistic” in “local realistic”. This has led to many worlds and finally many minds interpretations. We introduce a simple many world model that resolves the Einstein Podolsky Rosen paradox. The model starts out as a classical LRM, thus clarifying that the (...) many worlds concept alone does not imply quantum physics. Some of the desired ‘non-locality’, e.g. anti-correlation at equal measurement angles, is already present, but Bell’s inequality can of course not be violated. A single and natural step turns this LRM into a quantum model predicting the correct probabilities. Intriguingly, the crucial step does obviously not modify locality but instead reality: What before could have still been a direct realism turns into modal realism. This supports the trend away from the focus on non-locality in quantum mechanics towards a mature structural realism that preserves micro causality. (shrink)

Our senses provide us with information about the world, but what exactly do they tell us? I argue that in order to optimally respond to sensory stimulations, an agent’s doxastic space may have an extra, “imaginary” dimension of possibility; perceptual experiences confer certainty on propositions in this dimension. To some extent, the resulting picture vindicates the old-fashioned empiricist idea that all empirical knowledge is based on a solid foundation of sense-datum propositions, but it avoids most of the problems traditionally associated (...) with that idea. The proposal might also explain why experiences appear to have a non-physical phenomenal character, even if the world is entirely physical. (shrink)

There is tension between commonly held views concerning phenomenal imagery on the one hand and our first-person epistemic access to it on the other. This tension is evident in many individual issues and experiments in philosophy and psychology (e.g. inattentional and change blindness, the speckled hen, dream coloration, visual periphery). To dissolve it, we can give up either (i) that we lack full introspective access to the phenomenal properties of our imagistic experiences, or (ii) that phenomenal imagery is fully determined, (...) or (iii) that phenomenal imagery does not exist. Which option is preferable? I explore the feasibility of option (ii) in more details by distinguishing between di erent kinds of indeterminacy. One of the most often proclaimed versions of indeterminacy is tied to Representationalism. However, I argue that in this context, Representationalism appears to be the least satisfying option, for which I give ten reasons. By abduction, we should reject Representationalism in favour of (i) or (iii)—the most parsimonious option being eliminativism, and the most conservative being the rejection of privileged access. The decision between these two, however, should be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on which is most adequate given the data. I illustrate this with the comparison between visual agnosia and Charles-Bonnet-Syndrome. (shrink)

Unter einigenWissenschaftlern ist die Vorstellung verbreitet, dass Paradoxien Anzeichen von Fortschritt sein können. Es ist jedoch unklar, wie dies zu deuten ist. Dieser Essay stellt ein subjekt-relatives Verständnis von Paradoxikalität vor, das Paradoxien als »Dissonanzen der Zustimmung« (Rescher 2001) charakterisiert und dadurch erlaubt, sie als Katalysator wissenschaftlichen Fortschritts zu rekonstruieren: Durch ihre Struktur haben Problemstellungen in Form von Paradoxien wenigstens fünf fortschrittsfördernde Eigenschaften, die sie Problemstellungen in Form von Fragen voraushaben. Dadurch können Paradoxien als Angelpunkte theoretischen Fortschritts gesehen werden. Dies (...) legt eine Forderung nahe: Wenn wir theoretischen Fortschritt in den Wissenschaften fördern wollen, so sollten wir den Bau von Paradoxien aktiv verfolgen, gemäß dem Credo: Progress by Paradox! (shrink)

Some cognitive processes appear to have “phenomenal” properties that are directly revealed to the subject and not determined by physical properties. I suggest that the source of this appearance is the method by which our brain processes sensory information. The appearance is an illusion. Nonetheless, we are not mistaken when we judge that people sometimes fee lpain.

In der Diskussion um personale Identität nehmen die einflussreichen Arbeiten Derek Parfits eine Sonderstellung ein, insofern Parfit nicht bestrebt ist, eines der gängigen Identitätskriterien zu verteidigen, sondern vielmehr behauptet, dass unsere alltäglichen wie philosophischen Vorstellungen von personaler Identität unrettbar inkohärent sind und deshalb aufgegeben werden sollten. In seinem Beitrag beleuchtet Sascha Settegast die verschiedenen Argumente, die Parfit für diese provokante These vorbringt, und unternimmt insbesondere den Versuch einer systematischen Dekonstruktion der wichtigsten Gedankenexperimente Parfits, die zeigen soll, dass sich diese (...) Gedankenexperimente auf eine Weise auflösen lassen, die unsere alltäglichen Intuitionen über personale Identität intakt belässt. Settegast entwickelt dabei die Grundzüge einer Konzeption personaler Identität, die sich einerseits von den gängigen neo-lockeanischen und animalistischen Ansätzen abgrenzt und andererseits bewusst an den zeitgenössischen Neo-Aristotelismus in der Ethik anknüpft, wie er etwa bei Philippa Foot und Michael Thomp-son anzutreffen ist. Die diachrone numerische Identität menschlicher Personen gründet nach Settegasts Auffassung darin, dass der Verlauf ihres Lebens eine zeitliche Einheit aufweist, die dadurch bedingt ist, dass ihre Lebensführung die menschliche Lebensform auf eine individuell charakteristische Weise exemplifiziert. Insofern dies aber nur durch Kultivierung der Tugen-den zu erreichen ist, handelt es sich laut Settegast bei personaler Identität letztlich nicht um eine Tatsache, die einfach vorliegt oder nicht, sondern um eine Aufgabe, die uns als Menschen gegeben ist und wesentlich darin besteht, in bewusster Orientierung auf das gute Leben hin ein stabiles, sich zeitlich durchhaltendes Selbst allererst auszubilden. (shrink)

My aims are exegetical rather than critical: I offer a systematic account of Hursthouse's ethical naturalism with an emphasis on the normative authority of the four ends, and try to correct some misconceptions found in the literature. Specifically, I argue that the four ends function akin to Wittgensteinian hinge-propositions for our practice of ethical reasoning and as such form part of a description of the logical grammar of said practice.

In recent years, the science and the philosophy of consciousness has seen growing interest in structural questions about consciousness. This is the Editorial Introduction for a special volume for Philosophy and the Mind Sciences on “Structuralism in Consciousness Studies.”.

In Kapitel 5 dieses Buches wurde mit dem ontologischen Sextett eine Klassifizierung der Realität vorgestellt, die das klassische Aristotelische Viereck erweitert, indem sie Einzeldinge und Universalien in insgesamt sechs Kategorien umfaßt. Zwischen den Entitäten dieser Kategorien sind bestimmte Beziehungen postuliert worden, wie zum Beispiel Inhärenz, Partizipation, Instantiierung, Exemplifizierung und Charakterisierung. In diesem Kapitel soil der Frage nachgegangen werden, wie eben diese Beziehungen zwischen den Entitäten dieser Kategorien genauer charakterisiert und die sie bezeichnenden relationalen Ausdrücke eindeutig formal definiert werden konnen.

Possible-worlds accounts of mental or linguistic content are often criticized for being too coarse-grained. To make room for more fine-grained distinctions among contents, several authors have recently proposed extending the space of possible worlds by "impossible worlds". We argue that this strategy comes with serious costs: we would effectively have to abandon most of the features that make the possible-worlds framework attractive. More generally, we argue that while there are intuitive and theoretical considerations against overly coarse-grained notions of content, the (...) same kinds of considerations also prohibit an overly fine-grained individuation of content. An adequate notion of content, it seems, should have intermediate granularity. However, it is hard to construe a notion of content that meets these demands. Any notion of content, we suggest, must be either implausibly coarse-grained or implausibly fine-grained (or both). (shrink)

Is the basic mechanism behind presupposition projection fundamentally asymmetric or symmetric? This is a basic question for the theory of presupposition, which also bears on broader issues concerning the source of asymmetries observed in natural language: are these simply rooted in superficial asymmetries of language use— language use unfolds in time, which we experience as fundamentally asymmetric— or can they be, at least in part, directly referenced in linguistic knowledge and representations? In this paper we aim to make progress on (...) these questions by exploring presupposition projection across conjunction, which has typically been taken as a central piece of evidence that presupposition projection is asymmetric. As a number of authors have recently pointed out, however, whether or not this conclusion is warranted is not clear once we take into account independent issues of redundancy. Building on previous work by Chemla & Schlenker (2012) and Schwarz (2015), we approach this question experimentally by using an inference task which controls for redundancy and presupposition suspension. We find strong evidence for left-to-right filtering across conjunctions, but no evidence for right-to-left filtering, suggesting that, at least as a default, presupposition projection across conjunction is indeed asymmetric. (shrink)

The 2013 Rostock Symposium on Systems Biology and Bioinformatics in Aging Research was again dedicated to dissecting the aging process using in silico means. A particular focus was on ontologies, as these are a key technology to systematically integrate heterogeneous information about the aging process. Related topics were databases and data integration. Other talks tackled modeling issues and applications, the latter including talks focussed on marker development and cellular stress as well as on diseases, in particular on diseases of kidney (...) and skin. (shrink)

Heidegger Schwarze Hefte (1931-1948): An Index By Daniel Fidel Ferrer -/- Cataloging: -/- 1. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976. 2. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 3. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Indexes. 4). Metaphysics. 5). Philosophy, German. 6). Heidegger, Martin; -- Wörterbuch. 7). Heidegger, Martin; -- Schwarze Hefte. 8). Ontology. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. -/- Table of Contents 1). Preface and Introduction. 2). Background. 3). Main Index (pages, 22 to 1935). -/- Total words indexed: 37,656 (and about 26 Mbytes). (...) The four printed volumes that are combined and indexed. These are pages 1 to 1817. The actual published texts are not included because of copyright. This is an index to those four volumes (GA 94, 95, 96, and 97) written by Martin Heidegger between 1931 and 1948. Heidegger’s original note book format: 5 ¼ inches by 7 ½ inches. The physical note books ‘covers’ are colored in Black hence the name Black Notebooks or in German the Schwarze Hefte. -/- The following Main Index is a machine index of four volumes written by Martin Heidegger: Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938); Überlegungen VII-XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/39); Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939-1941), and Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942- 1948). GA 94, 95, 96, and 97. Everything is indexed there are no-stop words and all words are included. No words have been removed. -/- Daniel Fidel Ferrer, Surprise, Arizona, United States of America. In part of the Sonoran Desert. See: www.martin-heidegger.org -/- Some examples from the Main Index: -/- Amerika, 1040, 1260, 1262, 1276, 1433, 1440, 1471, 1510, 1539, 1680, 1695, 1735, 1754, 1807 Amerikaner, 1040, 1226, 1520, 1680 Amerikanern, 1341, 1812 == Husserl, 37, 55, 1048, 1732, 1733, 1752, 1760, 1807 Husserls, 1047, 1578, 1752 ==== irrationa, 856 irrational, 606, 1634 Irrationale, 606, 944, 1010, 1603 Irrationalen, 1527, 1648, 1785 Irrationales, 1484 Irrationalis, 1069 Irrationalismus, 105, 602, 1069, 1308, 1503 Irrationalisten, 1799 === Katholi, 866, 1448 Katholik, 1447 Katholiken, 702 katholisch, 346, 546, 885, 969, 1234 Katholische, 866, 867, 1385, 1447 katholische, 190, 346, 402, 509, 546, 866, 879, 951, 1234, 1448 Katholischen, 866, 867 katholischen, 121, 514, 880, 885, 1019, 1204 Katholisches, 970 Katholizismus, 190, 205, 546, 628, 649, 741, 866, 885, 896 == Kommunismus, 135, 187, 1112, 1150, 1151, 1152, 1155, 1156, 1166, 1174, 1277, 1332, 1416, 1420, 1424, 1451, 1503, 1539, 1540, 1541, 1731 Kommunist, 1243 Kommunisten, 866 Kommunistischen, 1448 === Marx, 546, 1310, 1813 Marxismus, 146, 581, 1277 marxistischen, 1318 marxistischer, 139. (shrink)

Heidegger Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942-1948): An Index / By Daniel Fidel Ferrer ©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2017. Pages 1-401. Note: the entire GA 97 is indexed. -/- Cover art by Shawn Rodriguez. -/- 1. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976. 2. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 3. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Indexes. 4). Metaphysics. 5). Philosophy, German. 6). Heidegger, Martin; -- Table of Contents -/- 1). Preface and Introduction. 2). Background. 3). Main Index (pages, 20 to 401). -/- Motto At (...) the beginning of Remarks IV in this volume Heidegger quotes Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz with the sentence (GA 97, e-text page 329, printed text page 325): -/- "Qui me non nisi editis novit, non me novit." -/- "He who knows me only from my publications does not know me.” -/- GA 97. Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942 1948), editor Peter Trawny 2015, 528 pages. [Starts on page 1 of this e-text .pdf file volume for indexing]. The e-text Ends on page 531. -/- . (shrink)

In contrast to the thesis of a thorough homology between the demystifying vocation of modernism and the profanatory tendencies of capitalist dynamics, the work of Roberto Schwarz seems to provide elements for a more nuanced conception of the modernist experience. While denouncing the setback caused by the routinisation of artistic strategies of defamiliarization, the Brazilian critic remains reluctant to accept the postmodernist assumption that any attempt to give consequence to the modernist universe in changed circumstances is necessarily doomed to (...) failure. To be sure, works that uncritically reproduce modernist tropes and tactics of representing reality in a dislocated way in order to provoke surprise, as advertisements do, are indeed bound to falter. But as long as they let themselves be informed at every stage by a critical inadequacy to the commodified world, modernist approaches may retain a critical value within an increasingly virulent anti-modernist culture. (shrink)

This paper aims to advance our understanding of Heidegger's politics as it is laid bare within the 'Schwarze Hefte'. Yet my interest is not in Heidegger's first order political views, but rather in his conception of the political sphere per se. Beginning from a close analysis of the earliest volume of the notebooks, Gesamtausgabe Bd.94, I suggest that the dominant characterisation of the political space within Heidegger's text is as a threat-to philosophy and to ontology. Underlying that characterisation, however, it (...) is simultaneously possible to identify another pattern, one on which the political is itself gradually suppressed or occluded by the ontological. This tacit occlusion has, I suggest, a number of deeply problematic consequences. I close by indicating how the argument might be extended to the question of a Heideggerian ethics. (shrink)

In Sascha Settegast’s recently published article, “Prostitution and the Good of Sex” in Social Theory and Practice, he argues that prostitution is intrinsically harmful. In this article, I object to his argument, making the following three responses to his account: 1) bad sex is not “detrimental to the good life”; 2) bad sex is not necessarily unvirtuous; 3) sex work is work as well as sex, and so must be evaluated as work in addition to as sex.

Heidegger Überlegungen XII-XV (GA96): An Index. / By Daniel Fidel Ferrer. -/- 1. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976. 2. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 3. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Indexes. 4). Metaphysics. 5). Philosophy, German. 6). Heidegger, Martin; -- Wörterbuch. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. -/- The Preface is mostly written in English. But the Main Index is an index to a volume 96 of Martin Heidegger's collected writings and that text is in German. Note: this is an index (...) and does not include the actual text of Überlegungen XII-XV (GA96) because that book is covered under copyright. -/- This is a machine created index to Martin Heidegger Volume 96 of Heidegger’s collected writing (Gesamtausgabe, “Wege – nicht Werke”). Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939-1941), ed. P. Trawny, 2014, 286p. Often abbreviated as GA 96. (shrink)

Schwarz pursues a primordial theme by Freudian means, extrapolating from the psychogenesis of a person to the psychogenesis of a nation. He thus associates monarchy with culture in its infancy, displaying infantile narcisism and meglomania. But as perhaps the best worst case, Pharaonic Egypt, demonstrates, meglomania and narcissism expresssed in colossi, grandiose claims of the king that would shame even the gods, are more likely a sign of weakness than strength. And classical republicanism continues to maintain a monarchical element, (...) now transferred to presidents. (shrink)

Many writers have held that in his later work, David Lewis adopted a theory of predicate meaning such that the meaning of a predicate is the most natural property that is (mostly) consistent with the way the predicate is used. That orthodox interpretation is shared by both supporters and critics of Lewis's theory of meaning, but it has recently been strongly criticised by Wolfgang Schwarz. In this paper, I accept many of Schwarze's criticisms of the orthodox interpretation, and add (...) some more. But I also argue that the orthodox interpretation has a grain of truth in it, and seeing that helps us appreciate the strength of Lewis's late theory of meaning. (shrink)

Petrus Nigri (Schwarz) se narodil západočeské Kadani (něm. Kaaden) kolem roku 1435 a spolu se svými třemi bratry vstoupil v Německu do dominikánského řádu. Během svého studia prošel velkou část Evropy (Německo, Itálii, Španělsko, Čechy a Maďarsko) a nakonec se stal rektorem generálního studia v Budíně (1481). Obecně je znám spíše jako význačný středověký hebraista. Do dějin filosofie se zapsal zvláště jako autor Clipeus thomsitarum (před r. 1474), což je filosofický komentář na Porfýriův Úvod (Isagoge) a na aristotelovské Kategorie, (...) formou otázek. Třebaže Nigriho práce není originální, představuje v zaalpských zemích významnou recepci pojetí pomyslného jsoucna (Clipeus, část I, ot. 3-4) tak, jak ho koncipoval Hervaeus Natalis († 1323) ve svém traktátu De secundis intentionisbus. -/- Petrus Nigri (Peter Schwarz, born in Kadaň/Kaaden before 1435, died in Buda 1483), is author of Clipeus thomistarum (printed 1481), a philosophical commentary on Porphyry's Introduction (Isagoge), and on Aristotle's Categories in the form of questions. While Nigri's discussion of the concept of being of reason (Clipeus thomistarum, part I, qq. 3-4) is not original, his work is important for contributing to this concept’s reception, and with it the teaching of Hervaeus Natalis (died 1323) in his treatise De secundis intentionibus, in the transalpine countries. Being of reason (ens rationis) is conceived as not a categorial being, nor is it an intellectual operation, nor is it caused, but is only identifiable by the human intellect. Nigri's being of reason has no subjective existence, but only an objective character, which differs both from categorial being and from mere nothingness. (shrink)

Egal was der heutige Tag auch bringen mag, der 1. April 2063 wird zumindest als der Tag in die Geschichte des Wissenschaftsjournalismus eingehen, der die bisher aufwändigste Berichterstattung erfahren hat. So viele Kamerateams, wie hier vor den Toren der Australian National University in Canberra, hat bisher kein wissenschaftliches Experiment anziehen können. Selbst der Knüller des Vorjahres, als es einer 48jährigen Hausfrau in einem Vorort von London gelang, mit einfachsten Küchenutensilien einen kleinen Kalte-Fusion-Reaktor herzustellen, der den Staubsauger und die Mikrowelle zuverlässig (...) mit sauberer Energie versorgte, hatte bei weitem nicht ein solches Echo in der Wissenschaftspresse erfahren. Es war zwar noch nichts über den Experimentausgang zu erfahren, trotzdem wurde freilich seit drei Tagen ununterbrochen live auf fast allen Kanälen aus Canberra darüber berichtet, dass nun zwar noch nichts zu erfahren sei, dass es aber ja sehr bald soweit sein müsse. Das Experiment, dessen Ausgang man hier so gespannt erwartete, war schon im Vorfeld hitzig diskutiert worden und überhaupt nur durch einen Sonderbeschluss der Vereinten Nationen zustande gekommen. Immerhin läuft die Vorbereitung bereits seit fast 30 Jahren, als sich mehrere Philosophen und Bürgerinitiativen zusammenschlossen, die UNO um eine endgültige Klärung einer der ältesten Fragen der Menschheit zu bitten: Was ist Bewusstsein? Und insbesondere: Ist Bewusstsein etwas anderes als physikalisch beschreibbare Zustände unseres Gehirns, oder sind alle Tatsachen letztlich physikalische Tatsachen? Dass diese Fragen trotz ihres Ehrfurcht einflößenden Alters zunehmend auf den Nägeln brannten, hatte nicht zuletzt die jüngste Entwicklung der Computertechnologie befördert. Nachdem die KI in den letzten Jahrzehnten einen großen Schritt vorwärts gemacht hatte, war man in Sorge, dass ohne endgültige begriffliche Klärung dieser Fragen unser zukünftiger Umgang mit unseren elektronischen Helfern auf moralisch unsicherem Boden stehen könne. Man hatte sich daher nach langer Abwägung der ethischen Aspekte dieses Experiments dazu entschieden, ein gerade neugeborenes Waisenkind in einem völlig schwarz-weiß-grauen Raum groß werden zu lassen, sorgsam darum bemüht, dass die kleine Mary (so hatte man das Mädchen in Anlehnung an die Protagonistin einer fiktiven philosophischen Geschichte genannt) keine Farben zu Gesicht bekommt.. (shrink)

Counterfactual thinking—the capacity to reflect on what would, could, or should have been if events had transpired differently—is a pervasive, yet seemingly paradoxical human tendency. On the one hand, counterfactual thoughts can be comforting and inspiring (Carroll & Shepperd, Chapter 28), but on the other they can be anxiety provoking and depressing (Zeelenberg & Pieters, Chapter 27). Likewise, such thoughts can illuminate pathways toward better future outcomes (Wong, Galinsky, & Kray, Chapter 11), yet they can also promote confusion and lead (...) us astray (Sanna, Schwarz, & Kennedy, Chapter 13). The first part of this chapter focuses on work that supports the prevailing Zeitgeist in the counterfactual thinking literature: Counterfactual thinking is beneficial. The second part of the chapter, however, strikes a more cautionary tone by reviewing work that describes some deleterious consequences of counterfactual thinking. We conclude by offering a tentative reconciliation of these conflicting perspectives and suggesting directions for future research. (shrink)

There are three obstacles to any discussion of the relationship between Heidegger’s philosophy and ethics. First, Heidegger’s views and preoccupations alter considerably over the course of his work. There is no consensus over the exact degree of change or continuity, but it is clear that a number of these shifts, for example over the status of human agency, have considerable ethical implications. Second, Heidegger rarely engages directly with the familiar ethical or moral debates of the philosophical canon. For example, both (...) Sein und Zeit (SZ) and the works that would have completed its missing third Division, works such as his monograph on Kant (Ga3), and the 1927 lecture course The Basic Problems of Phenomenology (Ga24), place enormous emphasis on the flaws present in earlier metaphysics or philosophies of language or of the self. But there is no discussion of what one might think of as staple ethical questions: for example, the choice between rationalist or empiricist meta-ethics, or between consequentialist or deontological theories. The fundamental reason for this is Heidegger’s belief that his own concerns are explanatorily prior to such debates (Ga26:236–7). By extension, he regards the key works of ethical and moral philosophy as either of secondary importance, or as not really about ethics or morals at all: for example, Ga24, when discussing Kant, states bluntly that “‘Metaphysics of Morals’ means the ontology of human existence” (Ga24:195). Essentially his view is that, before one can address ethics, construed as the question of how we ought to live, one needs to get clear on ontology, on the question of what we are. However, as I will show, the relationship between Heideggerian ontology and ethics is more complex than that simple gloss suggests. Third, the very phrase “Heidegger’s ethics” raises a twofold problem in a way that does not similarly occur with any other figure in this volume. The reason for this is his links, personal and institutional, to both National Socialism and to anti-Semitism. The recent publication of the Schwarze Hefte exemplifies this issue: these notebooks interweave rambling metaphysical ruminations with a clearly anti-Semitic rhetoric no less repulsive for the fact that it avoids the biological racism of the Nazis (see, for example, Ga95:97 or Ga96:243). In this short chapter, I will take what will doubtless be a controversial approach to this third issue. It seems to me unsurprising, although no less disgusting for that, that Heidegger himself was anti-Semitic, or that he shared many of the anti-modernist prejudices often found with such anti-Semitism Sacha Golob ([email protected]) Forthcoming in the Cambridge History of Moral Philosophy (Cambridge University Press: 2016). 2 among his demographic group. The interesting question is rather: what are the connections between his philosophy and such views? To what degree do aspects of his work support them or perhaps, most extremely, even follow from them? Yet to answer this question, one needs to begin by understanding what exactly his philosophical commitments were, specifically his ‘ethical’ commitments. The purpose of this chapter is address that question. (shrink)

This article proposes a way of blocking the zombie argument against materialism. The central idea—which can be motivated in various ways, but which I will motivate by drawing on recent work by Wolfgang Schwarz—is that sentences reporting conscious experience are modally inert, roughly in the sense that adding them to a description of a metaphysically possible scenario always results in a description of a metaphysically possible scenario. This is notable in that it leads to a way of blocking the (...) zombie argument which is perfectly compatible with modal rationalism and with the view that conceivability entails possibility. (shrink)

Newtons experimentum crucis hat ein komplementares Gegenstück, d.h. ein Experiment, in dem die Rollen von Licht und Schatten genau ausgetauscht sind. Statt wie Newton in der Dunkelkammer zu experimentieren, müssen wir das Komplement des experimentum crucis in einer Streulichtkammer aufbauen (deren Wände sog. Lambertstrahler sind). Wenn es dieses umgestülpte Experiment wirklich gibt, dann liefert es für jeden newtonischen Beweis einen umgestülpten Gegenbeweis, dessen Konklusion die Heterogenitat der Schatten wäre (also die Behauptung, dass nicht weißes Licht, sondern schwarze Schatten eine heterogene (...) Mischung verschiedenfarbiger Strahlen mit unterschiedlichen Brechungseigenschaften seien). Dass Newtons experimentum crucis in diesem Sinne umgestülpt werden kann, wird von Newtons eigener Theorie impliziert. Mehr noch, inzwischen ist der empirische Nachweis der Umstülpung gelungen. (shrink)

Vor etwa einem Jahrhundert entwickelte sich im deutschsprachigen Raum imRahmen einer allgemeinen Charakterisierung unserer ästhetischen Erfahrungvon Kunst eine umfassende Debatte über die Natur und die Möglichkeit vonGefühlen über fiktionale Charaktere und Situationen. Die damalige Debatteweist große Ähnlichkeit zur heutigen analytischen Debatte über das Paradoxonder Fiktion auf. Trotz des unterschiedlichen jeweiligen historischen Kontextesfindet sich in der analytischen Debatte und in der Philosophie zu Beginn des20. Jahrhunderts fast der gleiche Lösungsansatz. Gefühle über Fiktionen seienQuasi-Gefühle, d.h. ein gefühlsartiges Phänomen mit einer Realität sui (...) generis ,dem im Unterschied zu den wirklichen Gefühlen kein Urteil über die Existenzdes Objektes zugrunde liegt und dem die Verbindung zur Motivation fehlt. Zieldieses Aufsatzes ist es, eine Untersuchung der These der Quasi-Gefühle An-fang des 20. Jahrhunderts zu unternehmen sowie die Analogien zur heutigenDebatte zu zeigen. Der Aufsatz baut sich um drei thematische Achsen herumauf. Zunächst wird eine historische Darstellung der These der Gefühle über Fiktionen bei Groos, Lipps, Lange, Geiger und Külpe unternommen. Diese bil-det den Rahmen für die Debatte über die Quasi-Gefühle in der Grazer Schule.Anschließend wird die Aufmerksamkeit auf die Diskussion über Quasi-Gefühle bei Meinong, Witasek, Saxinger und Schwarz gerichtet. Zuletzt wer-den die Berührungspunkte zur heutigen analytischen Debatte im Ausgang vonsystematischen Fragen aufgezeigt. (shrink)

The task of the congress of the German Society for Semiotics in Passau / Germany in September 2017 was to explore and describe "boundaries". A total of 12 sections of the society wrote a call for paper for this purpose. With the present anthology it has to be made evident, how concretely also the boundaries of the own, the other and the foreign can be negotiated via pictures. -/- Papers: -/- - Martina Sauer: Ikonische Grenzverläufe. Szenarien des Eigenen, Anderen und (...) Fremden im Bild. Eine Einführung, 4 - Barbara Margarethe Eggert: Das andere Geschlecht im Altarraum – exklusive Textilien als inklusive Medien. Studien zum Gösser Ornat, 7 - Birke Sturm: Politik der Schönheit: Zur Konstruktion einer ›wissenschaftlichen‹ Bildästhetik schöner weiblicher Körper um 1900 am Beispiel des Gynäkologen Carl Heinrich Stratz, 22 - Melis Avkiran: Das rassifizierte Fremde im Bild. Zur Genese differenzbildender Konzepte in der Kunst des 15. Jahrhunderts am Beispiel des Malers Hans Memling, 40 - Leonie Licht: weiß zwischen schwarz zwischen weiß – Geschichten von Identität im Bild, 75 - Julia Austermann: Queere Interventionen im kommunistischen Polen – Krzysztof Jung und sein ›plastisches Theater‹, 91 - Sabine Engel: Tizians Porträt der Laura Dianti. Aneignung und Transformation zwischen Orient und Okzident, 111 - Anna Christina Schütz: Osman Hamdi Beys Türkische Straßenszene. Der Teppich als Verhandlungsort kultureller Identitäten im ausgehenden 19. Jahrhundert, 146 - Benjamin Häger, Claudia Jürgens: Ikonische Stadtstrategien. Das Fassadenplakat und die Musterfassade als Instrumente machtpolitischer Repräsentation, 175 - Irene Schütze: Fehlende Verweise, rudimentäre ›Markierungen‹: aufgeweichte Grenzverläufe zwischen Kunst und Alltag, 204 - Stefan Römer: Interesse an und in einem Bildarchiv für Migrant/innen und Flüchtlinge, 221 - Viola Nordsieck: Von der Fähigkeit, einen Stuhl zu ignorieren. A. N. Whiteheads Konzept der Wahrnehmung als symbolisierender Tätigkeit und die Art, wie wir Bilder als Bilder sehen, 239 - David Jöckel: Mythos und Bild. Roland Barthes’ Semiologie bildlicher Stereotypisierung, 255 -/- - Kurzbiographien der Autorinnen und Autoren, 274 - Impressum, 278. (shrink)

Als Goethe in seiner monumentalen Farbenlehre einen Angriff auf Newtons Theorie des Lichts und der Farben lancierte, setzte er eine Methode ein, die er als Vermannigfachung der Erfahrungen bezeichnete: Er variierte verschiedene Parameter der newtonischen Experimente, um neuen Spielraum für Alternativen zur Theorie Newtons zu gewinnen. Dabei erzielte er durchaus Erfolge. U.a. entdeckte er das Komplement zum newtonischen Spektrum (das aussieht wie dessen Farbnegativ und durch Vertauschung der Rollen von Licht und Finsternis entsteht). Kürzlich hat der Wiener Maler Ingo Nussbaumer (...) Goethes Methode kongenial fortgeführt. Dabei hat er sechs weitere Farbspektren entdeckt. Sie entstehen, wenn man anstelle des Hell/Dunkel-Kontrasts (in Newtons und Goethes Experimenten) mit Paaren bunter Komplementärfarben arbeitet. Die neuen Farbspektren sehen genauso differenziert aus wie Newtons und Goethes Spektrum; doch anders als diese enthalten sie die unbunten "Farben" Schwarz und Weiß. Die vielfältigen Ordnungsbeziehungen und Symmetrien, die Ingo Nussbaumer in der Farbenwelt der insgesamt acht Spektren ausgemacht hat, verhelfen uns vielleicht zu einem tieferen Verständnis der Prinzipien menschlicher Farbwahrnehmung. Und sie tauchen die überkommenen Prinzipien der additiven und der subtraktiven Farbmischung in neues Licht. (shrink)

Um die menschliche Farbwahrnehmung zu durchleuchten und nach transkulturellen Invarianten oder Variationen zu fahnden, pflegen anglophone Forscher seit Gladstones Pionierstudie aus dem Jahr 1858 zu untersuchen, wie die Farbwörter in den Sprachen anderer Zeiten und Länder funktionieren. Während die beachtlichen Ergebnisse dieser Forschung aus neuerer Zeit sehr wohl ins Schwarze treffen könnten, ist ihre Methode kritisch zu sehen: Bei der Untersuchung fremder Sprachen und Wahrnehmungsweisen erscheint es unstatthaft, eine bestimmte Ordnung des Farbenraumes vorauszusetzen, die auf Newton zurückgeht und selbst in (...) der europäischen Wissenschaft nicht ohne Alternativen ist. (shrink)

Als Goethe in seiner monumentalen Farbenlehre (1810) versuchte, Newtons Theorie des Lichts und der Farben anzugreifen, setzte er eine Methode ein, die er als Vermannigfachung der Erfahrungen bezeichnete: Er variierte verschiedene Parameter der newtonischen Experimente, um neuen Spielraum für Alternativen zur Theorie Newtons zu gewinnen. Dabei erzielte er durchaus Erfolge. U.a. entdeckte er das Komplement zum newtonischen Spektrum (das aussieht wie dessen Farbnegativ und durch Vertauschung der Rollen von Licht und Finsternis entsteht). Ingo Nussbaumer hat Goethes Methode kongenial fortgeführt. Dabei (...) hat er sechs weitere Farbspektren entdeckt. Sie entstehen, wenn man anstelle des Hell/Dunkel-Kontrasts (in Newtons und Goethes Experimenten) mit Paaren von Komplementärfarben arbeitet. Die neuen Farbspektren sehen genauso differenziert aus wie Newtons und Goethes Spektrum; doch anders als diese enthalten sie die unbunten "Farben" Schwarz und Weiss. Die vielfältigen Ordnungsbeziehungen und Symmetrien, die Ingo Nussbaumer in der Farbenwelt der insgesamt acht Spektren ausgemacht hat, verhelfen uns vielleicht zu einem tieferen Verständnis der Prinzipien menschlicher Farbwahrnehmung. Abgesehen davon haben sie einen hohen ästhetischen Reiz. Und sie regen dazu an, über kontrafaktische Verläufe der Wissenschaftsgeschichte zu spekulieren: Wie gut hätte sich Newtons Theorie des Lichts und der Farben in den Jahren nach ihrer Veröffentlichung (1672) durchsetzen können, wenn damals das newtonische Spektrum zusammen mit seinen sieben Gegenstücken bekannt geworden und daher nicht das einzige Spektrum gewesen wäre, mit dem die Theorie hätte fertigwerden müssen? (shrink)

The political actions of Martin Heidegger raise a compelling question to those concerned with philosophy: How was one of the most important philosophers of the 20th century willing to ally himself with Nazism and what does this mean for philosophy? This question has been raised and brushed aside from the end of the Second World War, when Heidegger was formally accused for his involvement with Hitler's regime and forbidden to attain any official teaching position henceforth. Important thinkers, like his colleague (...) and friend in the pre-war years, Karl Jaspers. testified then against him. But Heidegger's fame rose again above his indignity in the 1950s, when Hannah Arendt in the USA and Jean-Paul Sartre in France, among others, began once again to spread the word of his philosophy and translate his works. These problems have recently intensified after the posthumous publication of Heidegger's Black Notebooks (Schwarze Hefte) in 2014, containing his notes from 1931-1941. Their publication caused seismic tremors in the field of philosophy, with Heidegger's opponents considering themselves finally vindicated by his own pen, and his supporters trying to separate thinking from actual life. However, the influence of Heidegger's thought - as well as that of other representatives of German anti-humanist nationalistic conservatism, such as Oswald Spengler - continues to spread, not only in academic but also in broader social and political circles. In the face of this spreading influence, which is combined with the influence of some disciples such as Nick Land or Giorgio Agamben, a biographical-type confrontation is not enough. We should confront Heidegger directly at the core of his philosophy. We cannot afford to ignore him or bury him under superficial gossip. Instead, we should confront him philosophically. We might be able to clear the ground for such a confrontation, if we resort to the philosophical concepts of autonomy, temporality, and human freedom. In my opinion, the most important philosophical challenge to Heideggerian thought, in this context, has been expressed by Cornelius Castoriadis. In the following chapters, I will argue in favor of this position, outlining the Castoriadian philosophy of time in contrast to the Heideggerian and highlighting the main points of their opposition. The book is divided into two parts. Part one, "Castoriadis against Heidegger" deals with the basic concepts and arguments of both philosophers around human existence, the individual, society, and temporality. We start by presenting Heidegger's scandal in the social-historical context but also with the help of Hannah Arendt's last assessment of the thinker. We move on to outline the basic concepts and structures of Heidegger's philosophical thinking in parallel with Castoriadis' criticism as regards politics, ontology and technoscience. Part two, "Time and existence" first examines the relevant approaches of Lukacs and Ricoeur in comparison to Heidegger and Castoriadis, to elucidate the basic concept of temporality and then presents an outline of Castoriadis' insights on time and existence, before finally applying these concepts to contemporary social-historical phenomena that redefine and transform human existence and social temporalities, like space exploration, digital cyberspaces and online communications. //////// -/- "This book is a tour de force that excites those who agree or disagree with the philosophy of Heidegger. With clarity and sophistication, Schismenos revives the public debate to reveal the rich possibilities for another world. A must-read for everyone interested in a philosophy that matters." - VASILIS KOSTAKIS - Professor of P2P Governance at Tallinn University of Technology and Faculty Associate at Harvard University -/- . (shrink)

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama dvejopa machinacijos (Machenschaft) samprata Martino Heideg-gerio technikos filosofijoje. Pirmoji susijusi su Vakarų metafizikos destrukcija (Destruktion) ir jos kulmi-nacija reflektuojama moderniosios technikos plotmėje. Pirmiausiai machinaciją Heideggeris pristato kaip pačios Būties atsivėrimo būdą „pirmoje pradžioje“ (ersten Anfang). Machinacija lemia μετά judesio pamatą, nurodantį į nuolatinę transcendencijos aspiraciją bei „techninį“ esinių atvėrimo pobūdį, nors savo „pajėgumų“ prasme machinacija graikų metafizikoje dar glūdi implicitiškai. Eksplicitiškai machi-nacija pasirodo tik moderniojoje technikoje. Kiek kitokią machinacijos sampratą galime aptikti Heideg-gerio „Juoduosiuose sąsiuviniuose“ (Schwarze Hefte), rašytuose 1931–1938 (...) m. Juose pačią modernybės epochą filosofas pristato kaip machinaciją. Taigi straipsnyje siekiama išryškinti šių dviejų Heideggerio sampratų jungtį, kuri yra machinacijos galios (Macht) augimo tikrovės atžvilgiu nuoroda. (shrink)

Im Beitrag wird die Apple-Watch vor dem Hintergrund ihrer „Ästhetik der Existenz“ als biopolitisches Artefakt und kontrollgesellschaftliches Dispositiv, vor allem aber als kybernetische Black Box aufgefasst und analysiert. Ziel des Aufsatzes ist es, aufzuzeigen, dass sich in dem feedbacklogischen Rückkopplungsapparat nicht nur grundlegende Diskurse des digitalen Zeitalters (Prävention, Gesundheit, bio- und psychopolitische Regulierungsformen etc.) verdichten, sondern dass dieser schon ob seiner inhärenten Logik qua Opazität Transparenz, qua Komplexität Simplizität (d.h. Orientierung) generiert und damit nicht zuletzt ein ganz spezifisches Menschenbild forciert. (...) In methodischer Hinsicht sollen zur Aufschlüsselung der für die digitale Gesellschaft repräsentativen Black Box „Apple-Watch“ wirksame Begriffskonstellationen der Kybernetik – d.h. Feedback, Regulierung, Selbstkontrolle und nicht zuletzt das Prinzip des „schwarzen Kastens“ selbst (Wiener/ Ashby), in dem sich schon die Funktion des Apparats als (Selbst-)Regulierungstool zwischen In- und Outputs reflektiert – in den Blick genommen und mit behavioristischen Konzepten (besonders solche der Gegenwart, d.h. nudging-Konzepte etc.) kontextualisiert werden. Auf dieser Grundlage lässt sich schließlich, so die These, nicht nur ein Subjektivierungsmodell ableiten, sondern auch eine (durchaus realpolitisch wirksame) Regierungskunst („kybernetische Gouvernementalität“) dekodieren. In diesem Zusammenhang ist schließlich die These zu plausibilisieren, dass das zeitgenössische „Sicherheitsregime“ des ‚new dark age‘ (Bridle) respektive der ‚Black-Box-Society‘ (Pasquale) sich nicht auf „die Unterdrückung von Subjektivität [bezieht], sondern vor allem auf ihre ‚(Selbst)-Produktion‘, […] auf die […] Förderung von Selbsttechnologien, die an Regierungsziele gekoppelt werden können.“ (Lemke) Entsprechend fragt der Aufsatz, welche – auch politischen – Auswirkungen die exzessive Verbreitung dieser und ähnlicher „smart devices“ zeitigt: Denn nicht zuletzt lässt sich, mediiert über derartige datengenerierende schwarze Kästen, eine Form der Regierung und des Regierbar-Machens erkennen, die weniger explizit-imperativisch auf Subjekte als vielmehr implizit-suggestiv auf Datenpunkte und -profile einwirkt. (shrink)

Copyright©Daniel Fidel Ferrer, 2018. 1. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976. 2. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 3. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Indexes. 4). Metaphysics. 5). Philosophy, German. 6). Philosophy, German – Greek influences. 7). Heidegger, Martin; -- Wörterbuch. 8). Ontology. 9). Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 10). Heidegger, Martin, 1889–1976—Homes and haunts— Germany—Todtnauberg. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. Language: English (Preface and Introduction). Language: German (Main Index). Includes bibliographical references. Cover graphics by Shawn Rodriguez. Motto At the beginning (...) of a section in GA 97. Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942 1948), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) quotes Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646- 1716) with the sentence (GA 97, e-text page 329, printed text page 325): "Qui me non nisi editis novit, non me novit." "He who knows me only from my publications does not know me.” Table of Contents 1). Preface and Introduction. 2). Outline of main manuscripts (in German). 3). Main Index (in German). An Index to Martin Heidegger’s (1889-1976) two printed volumes Zum Ereignis Denken; Gesamtausgabe Volumes GA 73.1 and GA 73.2 (published in October 2013 by Verlag Vittorio Klosterman). This Preface and Introduction to the Main Index are mostly written in English. Nevertheless, the Main Index is an index to a volume Gesamtausgabe GA 73.1 and 73.2 of Martin Heidegger's collected writings and that text is in German. Note: this is only an index and does not include the actual text of Zum Ereignis-Denken (GA73.1-2), because that book is protected under current copyright law. The actual printed two volume ends with page 1496 (GA 73.2). The entire book is listed under six (I to VI) main headings in the two printed volumes (Zum Ereignis-Denken (GA73.1-2). The six main headings from the table of contents are: Zu Ereignis I. Zerklüftung und ἀλήθεια Zerklüftung des Seins. Zu Ereignis II. Die Seinsfrage und das Ereignis. Zu Ereignis III. Das Da-sein. Zu Ereignis IV. Wesen des Entwurfs – Vorgehen. Zu Ereignis V. Abschied. Eine Reihe von Manuskripten zum Ereignis (1943-1945) Zu Ereignis VI. Ontologische Differenz und Unterschied . (shrink)

Martin Heidegger Esoteric Writings: An Index. 1. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976. 2. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Concordances. 3. Heidegger, Martin, -- 1889-1976 -- Indexes. 4). Metaphysics. 5). Philosophy, German. 6). Philosophy, German – Greek influences. 7). Heidegger, Martin; -- Wörterbuch. I. Ferrer, Daniel Fidel, 1952-. -/- First step: 10 whole volumes from Martin Heidegger’s collect writings (Gesamtausgabe) were combined into one file and then indexed. The 10 volumes were selected for their emphasis on Heidegger’s later esoteric writings. It seems (...) that Zum Ereignis-Denken GA 73 may start around 1935. But the new philosophical language gets underway, GA 65 Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis. -/- What is so special about this group of Heidegger’s writings? Why are these writings called: esoteric? -/- How do use this index? Because of sorting problems it is best to use the FIND FUNCTION. Nota Bene: use umlauts because the letters sort different as well!! So, again use the FIND FUNCTION to look for words or names (Dignum memoria). Please note the German words that start with umlauts are at the end of the index because of machine sorting of the words. Starting with the German word “ßA” on page 958 page of this book (see in Main Index). -/- This is a machine created index for 10 volumes of Martin Heidegger’s collected writing (Gesamtausgabe, “Wege – nicht Werke”). -/- Gesamtausgabe (GA) indexed. This group of 10 GA volumes were combined into one file and indexed. -/- GA 65. Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis) (1936-1938). GA 66. Besinnung (1938/39). GA 70. Über den Anfang (1941). GA 71. Das Ereignis (1941/42). GA 73.1-GA 73.2 Zum Ereignis-Denken, ed. P. Trawny, 2013, 1496p. GA 94. Überlegungen II-VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931-1938), ed. P. Trawny, 2014, 536p. GA 95. Überlegungen VII-XI (Schwarze Hefte 1938/39), ed. P. Trawny, 2014, 456p. GA 96. Überlegungen XII-XV (Schwarze Hefte 1939-1941), ed. P. Trawny, 2014, 286p. GA 97. Anmerkungen I-V (Schwarze Hefte 1942-1948), ed, P.Trawny 2015, 528p. -/- Total pages of these 10 volumes is 4967 in the single file; the .pdf e-format of combining these 10 books. (shrink)

This is a review of lectures given by Eugen Fink at the University of Freiburg im Breisgau in the winter term of 1947/48, “Fundamental Questions of Ancient Philosophy,” edited by Franz A. Schwarz.