- Attitude in Philosophy.Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.) - forthcoming - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Self-Favoring Theories and the Bias Argument.Bálint Békefi - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):199-213.details
|
|
The Failure of Philosophical Knowledge: Why Philosophers are Not Entitled to Their Beliefs.János Tőzsér - 2023 - London: Bloomsbury Academic.details
|
|
Would Disagreement Undermine Progress?Finnur Dellsén, Insa Lawler & James Norton - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (3):139-172.details
|
|
The biased nature of philosophical beliefs in the light of peer disagreement.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (3-4):363-378.details
|
|
(1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
|
|
Multi‐Peer Disagreement and the Preface Paradox.Kenneth Boyce & Allan Hazlett - 2014 - Ratio 29 (1):29-41.details
|
|
(1 other version)Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology.Chris Ranalli - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4975-5007.details
|
|
When Is Scientific Dissent Epistemically Inappropriate?Boaz Miller - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (5):918-928.details
|
|
Deep Disagreement, Hinge Commitments, and Intellectual Humility.Drew Johnson - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):353-372.details
|
|
The Epistemic Benefits of Worldview Disagreement.Kirk Lougheed - 2021 - Social Epistemology 35 (1):85-98.details
|
|
Formulating Independence.David Christensen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 13-34.details
|
|
Circular and question-begging responses to religious disagreement and debunking arguments.Andrew Moon - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):785-809.details
|
|
Disagreement and Religion.Matthew A. Benton - 2021 - In Matthew A. Benton & Jonathan L. Kvanvig (eds.), Religious Disagreement and Pluralism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-40.details
|
|
How Rational Level-Splitting Beliefs Can Help You Respond to Moral Disagreement.Margaret Greta Turnbull & Eric Sampson - 2019 - In Michael Klenk (ed.), Higher Order Evidence and Moral Epistemology. New York: Routledge. pp. 239-255.details
|
|
The Epistemology of Disagreement: Why Not Bayesianism?Thomas Mulligan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):587-602.details
|
|
How to respond rationally to peer disagreement: The preemption view.Thomas Grundmann - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):129-142.details
|
|
Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
|
|
After the Spade Turns: Disagreement, First Principles and Epistemic Contractarianism.Michael P. Lynch - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (2-3):248-259.details
|
|
Skepticism and Disagreement.Markus Lammenranta - 2011 - In Diego E. Machuca (ed.), Pyrrhonism in Ancient, Modern, and Contemporary Philosophy. Springer. pp. 203-216.details
|
|
Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
|
|
The Epistemic Significance of Religious Disagreements: Cases of Unconfirmed Superiority Disagreements.Frederick Choo - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1139-1147.details
|
|
Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
|
|
Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays.Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.) - 2019 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
|
|
Self-Exempting Conciliationism is Arbitrary.Simon Blessenohl - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (3):1-22.details
|
|
The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays.David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.) - 2013 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Moral Steadfastness and Meta-ethics.James Fritz & Tristram McPherson - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (1):43-56.details
|
|
Rational endorsement.Will Fleisher - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2649-2675.details
|
|
(1 other version)Contingency Anxiety and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Andreas L. Mogensen - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):n/a-n/a.details
|
|
Disagreement, Credences, and Outright Belief.Michele Palmira - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):179-196.details
|
|
Philosophy Without Belief.Zach Barnett - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):109-138.details
|
|
Conciliationism and Moral Spinelessness.James Fritz - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):101-118.details
|
|
Questionable Peers and Spinelessness.Sherman Benjamin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.details
|
|
When Expert Disagreement Supports the Consensus.Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):142-156.details
|
|
Independence and new ways to remain steadfast in the face of disagreement.Andrew Moon - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):65-79.details
|
|
Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity.Benjamin Anders Levinstein - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):342-370.details
|
|
Another Argument Against Uniqueness.Thomas Raleigh - 2015 - Philosophical Quarterly 67 (267):327-346.details
|
|
Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement.Jonathan Matheson - 2016 - Journal of Social Philosophy 47 (2):120-141.details
|
|
Disagreement, Drugs, etc.: from Accuracy to Akrasia.David Christensen - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):397-422.details
|
|
(1 other version)The Epistemology of Democracy.Elizabeth Anderson - 2006 - Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology 3 (1):8-22.details
|
|
On the Rationality of Belief-Invariance in Light of Peer Disagreement.Barry Lam - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (2):207-245.details
|
|
A Neo-Pyrrhonian Response to the Disagreeing about Disagreement Argument.Diego E. Machuca - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5):1663-1680.details
|
|
Inferior Disagreement.Maura Priest - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):263-283.details
|
|
Religious disagreement: An empirical study among academic philosophers.Helen De Cruz - 2017 - Episteme 14 (1).details
|
|
The Uniqueness Thesis.Matthew Kopec & Michael G. Titelbaum - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (4):189-200.details
|
|
Agrippan Pyrrhonism and the Challenge of Disagreement.Diego E. Machuca - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Research 40:23-39.details
|
|
Warranted Christian Belief.Alvin Plantinga - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
|
|
Conciliationism and merely possible disagreement.Zach Barnett & Han Li - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9):1-13.details
|
|