- Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.details
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Theory of Knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm & Israel Scheffler - 1966 - Synthese 16 (3):381-393.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 1998 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 61 (2):459-466.details
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Why open-minded people should endorse dogmatism.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):529-545.details
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(1 other version)What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.details
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John Locke and the Ethics of Belief.Nicholas Wolterstorff - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Deontology and Descartes’s Demon.Brian Weatherson - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):540-569.details
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The virtues of epistemic conservatism.Kevin McCain - 2008 - Synthese 164 (2):185–200.details
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Memory and epistemic conservatism.Matthew McGrath - 2007 - Synthese 157 (1):1-24.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.details
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Against Kornblith Against Reflective Knowledge.Timothy Perrine - 2014 - Logos and Episteme 5 (3):351-360.details
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Freedom and (theoretical) reason.Margaret Schmitt - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):25-41.details
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(1 other version)Phenomenal Conservatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Analysis 75 (2):296-309.details
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Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon.B. J. C. Madison - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107.details
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On Reflection.Hilary Kornblith - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief control and intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):145-163.details
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(2 other versions)On What Matters: Two-Volume Set.Derek Parfit - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.details
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Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds?Jack C. Lyons - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.details
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(1 other version)Internalism Defended.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 2001 - American Philosophical Quarterly 38 (1):1 - 18.details
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Knowledge and its place in nature.Hilary Kornblith - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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We Have No Positive Epistemic Duties.Mark T. Nelson - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):83-102.details
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Theory of knowledge.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1966 - Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,: Prentice-Hall.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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(1 other version)Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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Epistemic Justification: Essays in the Theory of Knowledge.William P. Alston - 1989 - Cornell University Press.details
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Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Justification without awareness: a defense of epistemic externalism.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge in a social world.Alvin I. Goldman - 1991 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Knowledge and belief.Frederick F. Schmitt - 1992 - New York: Routledge.details
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The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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(1 other version)Conservatism and its virtues.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 1989 - Synthese 79 (1):143 - 163.details
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Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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(2 other versions)The epistemic significance of disagreement.Thomas Kelly - 2005 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-196.details
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Justification and truth.Stewart Cohen - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 46 (3):279--95.details
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Varieties of epistemic conservatism.Hamid Vahid - 2004 - Synthese 141 (1):97 - 122.details
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Responsibility for attitudes: Activity and passivity in mental life.Angela M. Smith - 2005 - Ethics 115 (2):236-271.details
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Methodological conservatism.Lawrence Sklar - 1975 - Philosophical Review 84 (3):374-400.details
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Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
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Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
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(1 other version)The ethics of belief.Richard Feldman - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):667-695.details
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Epistemic obligations.Richard Feldman - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:235-256.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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Conservatism in epistemology.David Christensen - 1994 - Noûs 28 (1):69-89.details
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Involuntary sins.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1985 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):3-31.details
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Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
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(3 other versions)Freedom of the will and the concept of a person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.details
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Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.details
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