Results for 'Christine Mitchell'

243 found
Order:
  1.  96
    Is the Use of Modafinil, a Pharmacological Cognitive Enhancer, Cheating?Sebastian Porsdam Mann, Pablo de Lora Deltoro, Thomas Cochrane & Christine Mitchell - 2018 - Ethics and Education 13 (2):251-267.
    Drugs used to provide improvement of cognitive functioning have been shown to be effective in healthy individuals. It is sometimes assumed that the use of these drugs constitutes cheating in an academic context. We examine whether this assumption is ethically sound. Beyond providing the most up-to-date discussion of modafinil use in an academic context, this contribution includes an overview of the safety of modafinil use in greater depth than previous studies addressing the issue of cheating. Secondly, we emphasize two crucial, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  2. The Spanish Mathematician Ventura Reyes Prósper and His Connections with Charles S. Peirce and Christine Ladd-Franklin.Jaime Nubiola - 2000 - Arisbe. The Peirce Gateway.
    In this paper the relations between the almost unknown Spanish mathematician Ventura Reyes Prósper (1863-1922) with Charles S. Peirce and Christine Ladd-Franklin are described. Two brief papers from Reyes Prósper published in El Progreso Matemático 12 (20 December 1891), pp. 297-300, and 18 (15 June 1892) pp. 170-173 on Ladd-Franklin, and on Peirce and Mitchell, respectively, are translated for first time into English and included at the end of the paper.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  3.  48
    A Nietzschean Theory of Emotional Experience: Affect as Feeling Towards Value.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    This paper offers a Nietzschean theory of emotion as expressed by following thesis: paradigmatic emotional experiences exhibit a distinctive kind of affective intentionality, specified in terms of felt valenced attitudes towards the (apparent) evaluative properties of their objects. Emotional experiences, on this Nietzschean view, are therefore fundamentally feelings towards value. This interpretation explains how Nietzschean affects can have evaluative intentional content without being constituted by cognitive states, as these feelings towards value are neither reducible to, nor to be thought along (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  4.  41
    Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
    Review of Jean Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  5. The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):524-546.
    According to some philosophers, when introspectively attending to experience, we seem to see right through it to the objects outside, including their properties. This is called the transparency of experience. This paper examines whether, and in what sense, emotions are transparent. It argues that emotional experiences are opaque in a distinctive way: introspective attention to them does not principally reveal non-intentional somatic qualia but rather felt valenced intentional attitudes. As such, emotional experience is attitudinally opaque.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  6.  93
    Emotional Experience and Propositional Content.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (4):535-561.
    Those arguing for the existence of non-propositional content appeal to emotions for support, although there has been little engagement in those debates with developments in contemporary theory of emotion, specifically in connection with the kind of mental states that emotional experiences are. Relatedly, within emotion theory, one finds claims that emotional experiences per se have non-propositional content without detailed argument. This paper argues that the content of emotional experience is propositional in a weak sense, associated with aspectual experience and correctness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  7. Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):505-523.
    This article clarifies the nature of meta-emotions, and it surveys the prospects of applying a version of the perceptualist model of emotions to them. It first considers central aspects of their intentionality and phenomenal character. It then applies the perceptualist model to meta-emotions, addressing issues of evaluative content and the normative dimension of meta-emotional experience. Finally, in considering challenges and objections, it assesses the perceptualist model, concluding that its application to meta-emotions is an attractive extension of the theory, insofar as (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  8. Passive Frame Theory: A New Synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Godwin Christine, Jantz Tiffany, Krieger Stephen & Gazzaley Adam - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.
    Passive frame theory attempts to illuminate what consciousness is, in mechanistic and functional terms; it does not address the “implementation” level of analysis (how neurons instantiate conscious states), an enigma for various disciplines. However, in response to the commentaries, we discuss how our framework provides clues regarding this enigma. In the framework, consciousness is passive albeit essential. Without consciousness, there would not be adaptive skeletomotor action.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  9.  44
    Review of Thomas Stern (Ed.), The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, Cambridge. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  10. Affective Representation and Affective Attitudes.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Synthese:1-28.
    Many philosophers have understood the representational dimension of affective states along the model of sense-perceptual experiences, even claiming the relevant affective experiences are perceptual experiences. This paper argues affective experiences involve a kind of personal level affective representation disanalogous from the representational character of perceptual experiences. The positive thesis is that affective representation is a non-transparent, non-sensory form of evaluative representation, whereby a felt valenced attitude represents the object of the experience as minimally good or bad, and one experiences that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  11. The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods.Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):118-135.
    This article offers an account of moods as distinctive kinds of personal level affective-evaluative states, which are both intentional and rationally intelligible in specific ways. The account contrasts with those who claim moods are non-intentional, and so also arational. Section 1 provides a conception of intentionality and distinguishes moods, as occurrent experiential states, from other states in the affective domain. Section 2 argues moods target the subject’s total environment presented in a specific evaluative light through felt valenced attitudes (the Mood-Intentionality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  12. The Epistemology of Emotional Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):57-84.
    This article responds to two arguments against ‘Epistemic Perceptualism’, the view that emotional experiences, as involving a perception of value, can constitute reasons for evaluative belief. It first provides a basic account of emotional experience, and then introduces concepts relevant to the epistemology of emotional experience, such as the nature of a reason for belief, non-inferentiality, and prima facie vs. conclusive reasons, which allow for the clarification of Epistemic Perceptualism in terms of the Perceptual Justificatory View. It then challenges two (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  13. The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology.Jonathan Mitchell - forthcoming - Erkenntnis 1.
    Emotion theory includes attempts to reduce or assimilate emotions to states such as bodily feelings, beliefs-desire combinations, and evaluative judgements. Resistance to such approaches is motivated by the claim that emotions possess a sui generis phenomenology. Uriah Kriegel defends a new form of emotion reductivism which avoids positing irreducible emotional phenomenology by specifying emotions’ phenomenal character in terms of a combination of other phenomenologies. This article argues Kriegel’s approach, and similar proposals, are unsuccessful, since typical emotional experiences are constituted by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  14. Can Evaluativism About Unpleasant Pains Meet the Normative Condition?Jonathan Mitchell - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7).
    This paper assesses whether Evaluativism, as a view about the nature of unpleasant pains, can meet a specific normative condition. The normative condition says whatever candidate state is offered as an analysis of unpleasant pain should be intrinsically phenomenally bad for its subject to be in. I first articulate a method reflecting this condition, called the normative contrast method, and then frame Evaluativism in detail. The view is then tested through this method. I show that Evaluativism can explain why cases (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  15. On the Non-Conceptual Content of Affective-Evaluative Experience.Jonathan Mitchell - 2018 - Synthese:1-25.
    Arguments for attributing non-conceptual content to experience have predominantly been motivated by aspects of the visual perception of empirical properties. In this article, I pursue a different strategy, arguing that a specific class of affective-evaluative experiences have non-conceptual content. The examples drawn on are affective-evaluative experiences of first exposure, in which the subject has a felt valenced intentional attitude towards evaluative properties of the object of their experience, but lacks any powers of conceptual discrimination regarding those evaluative properties. I also (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  16.  48
    Nietzschean Self-Overcoming.Jonathan Mitchell - 2016 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47 (3):323-350.
    Nietzsche often writes in praise of self-overcoming. He tells us that his humanity consists in “constant self-overcoming” 1 and that if someone wanted to give a name to his lifelong self-discipline against “Wagnerianism,” Schopenhauer, and “the whole modern ‘humaneness,’” then one might call it self-overcoming. He says that his writings “speak only” of his overcomings, later claiming that “the development of states that are increasingly high, rare, distant, tautly drawn and comprehensive … are dependent on the constant ‘self-overcoming of man’”,2 (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  17.  57
    Nietzsche on Taste: Epistemic Privilege and Anti-Realism.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (1-2):31-65.
    The central aim of this article is to argue that Nietzsche takes his own taste, and those in the relevant sense similar to it, to enjoy a kind of epistemic privilege over their rivals. Section 2 will examine the textual evidence for an anti-realist reading of Nietzsche on taste. Section 3 will then provide an account of taste as an ‘affective evaluative sensibility’, asking whether taste so understood supports an anti-realist reading. I will argue that it does not and that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  18.  65
    A Nietzschean Critique of Metaphysical Philosophy.Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Journal of Nietzsche Studies 48 (3):347.
    This article provides a new account of Nietzsche’s critique of metaphysical philosophy. After framing Nietzsche’s anti-metaphysical project (Section 1), I suggest that to understand the logic of his critique we should reconstruct a taxonomy which distinguishes between ‘rich metaphysics’ and ‘thin metaphysics’ (Section 2). I then consider Nietzsche’s methodological critique of ‘rich metaphysics’, arguing that his position, which alleges motivational bias against ‘rich metaphysics’, is not compelling, since even granting that previous ‘rich metaphysicians’ exemplified such bias there is no necessity (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  19.  71
    The God Delusion - Book Review.Steven Mitchell - unknown
    This review serves the function of assessing Dawkins "The God Delusion". The thesis of “The God Delusion” is that there is no scientific evidence for a god, or other supernatural entity. Dawkins makes his case through a twofold approach where he discusses the horrors of theology and shows how evolution (science) works independent of a creator. The author of this review will make the case the Dawkins was not successful in meeting the criteria, in order to meet the threshold of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  20.  40
    Katsafanas, Paul. The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency and the Unconscious.Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. Pp. 272. $74.00. [REVIEW]Jonathan Mitchell - 2017 - Ethics 127 (3):777-783.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  21.  29
    Mutual Funds of Irwin Consulting Planning in Singapore and Tokyo, Japan.Brenda Mitchell - 2006 - Financial Consultants 1.
    Mutual funds are common investments because they provide a cost-effective and effective means to vary your investments (or possess an assortment of securities -- stocks, bonds, etc.) without having to make a huge starting investment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  22. Abnormal Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex Function in Children With Psychopathic Traits During Reversal Learning.Elizabeth C. Finger, Abigail A. Marsh, Derek G. Mitchell, Marguerite E. Reid, Courtney Sims, Salima Budhani, David S. Kosson, Gang Chen, Kenneth E. Towbin, Ellen Leibenluft, Daniel S. Pine & James R. Blair - 2008 - Archives of General Psychiatry 65: 586–594.
    Context — Children and adults with psychopathic traits and conduct or oppositional defiant disorder demonstrate poor decision making and are impaired in reversal learning. However, the neural basis of this impairment has not previously been investigated. Furthermore, despite high comorbidity of psychopathic traits and attention deficit/hyperactivity disorder, to our knowledge, no research has attempted to distinguish neural correlates of childhood psychopathic traits and attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder. Objective—To determine the neural regions that underlie the reversal learning impairments in children with psychopathic traits (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  23.  25
    Consciousness Duplication And Our Capacity To Learn From Literary Fictions.Allison Mitchell - 2004 - Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics 1 (1).
    Many of us share a strong intuition that fictional literature possesses cognitive value in the sense that it has the capacity to expand and/or clarify our knowledge or understanding of the world. If we agree that we learn something when we read and discuss certain texts, we may nevertheless find the form this learning takes to be anything but obvious.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  24. The Hymn to Eros: An Interpretation of Plato's "Symposium.".Robert Lloyd Mitchell - 1978 - Dissertation, Duquesne University
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  25. Sir William Mitchell and the "New Mysterianism".W. Martin Davies - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (3):253-73.
    This paper is about the work of a long forgotten philosopher and his views which have surprising relevance to discussions in present-day philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that, far from being a traditional idealist, Mitchell advanced a very subtle position best seen as marking a transition from idealist views and later materialist accounts, the latter popularly attributed to Australian philosophers in the second half of the 20th century.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  26.  78
    Christine Korsgaards moralfilosofi.Gunnar Björnsson - 2005 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 1:38–54.
    Critical introduction in Swedish of Christine Korsgaard's Sources of Normativity and Self-Constitution.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  27.  14
    Review of Christine Tappolet, Emotions, Values and Agency (Oxford University Press, 2016). [REVIEW]Benjamin De Mesel - 2017 - Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2017.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  28. Peirce's Arrow and Satzsystem: A Logical View for the Language-Game.Rafael Duarte Oliveira Venancio - 2013 - Asian Journal of Humanities and Social Studies 1 (5):265-273.
    This article is an effort to understand how the Peirce's Arrow (Logical NOR), as a logical operation, can act within the concept of Ludwig Wittgenstein's language-game, considering that the language game is a satzsystem, i.e., a system of propositions. To accomplish this task, we will cover four steps: (1) understand the possible relationship of the thought of C. S. Peirce with the founding trio of analytic philosophy, namely Frege-RussellWittgenstein, looking for similarities between the logic of Peirce and his students (notably (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  29.  96
    Peirce entre Frege e Boole: sobre a busca de diálogos possíveis com Wittgenstein.Rafael Duarte Oliveira Venancio - 2012 - Estudos Semioticos (USP) 8 (2):99-108.
    O presente artigo busca debater a posição de Charles Sanders Peirce e dos primeiros estudantes peirceanos de Lógica (Christine Ladd e O. H. Mitchell nos Studies in Logic, 1883) dentro do debate inspirador da visão da linguagem dentro da Filosofia Analítica, conhecido como “Lingua Universalis contra Calculus Ratiocinator”, cujos primórdios podem ser traçados desde a filosofia de Gottfried Leibniz. Para isso, comparamos esse campo do pensamento peirceano com o debate crucial entre a conceitografia de Gottlob Frege (Begriffsschrift, 1879) (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  30. Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals, by Christine M. Korsgaard.Andrew Chignell - 2020 - Mind.
    A review of "Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals," by Christine M. Korsgaard. New York: Oxford, 2018. Pp. 271.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  31. On Mitchell and on Glazebrook on Βίος.Babette Babich - 2011 - In Pol Vandevelde (ed.), Supplement to the 2011 Proceedings of the Heidegger Circle.
    Commentary on Andrew Mitchell and Patricia Glazebrook on plants and agriculture in the context of Heidegger's own reflections on botany and technology in which I discuss, bees, cell phone radiation, the relatively complex but fairly obvious sociological dynamics of science and powerful commercial interests (capital), and mantid copulation.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  32. Christine M. Korsgaard, the Constitution of Agency. [REVIEW]Fritz J. McDonald - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (2):235-236.
    Review of Christine Korsgaard, The Constitution of Agency.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  33. Mary Mitchell Slessor (1848 – 1915) and Her Impact on the Missionary Enterprise in the Cross River Region.Augustine Onah Odey & Gregory Ajima Onah - 2019 - International Journal of Scientific and Engineering Research Volume 10 (7).
    Born December 2, 1848 in Gilcomston, Aberdeen, Scotland, Mary Mitchell Slessor, a five foot, red haired Scottish Missionary who pioneered her way into the jungles of Africa was undoubtedly one of the most outstanding missionaries who made tremendous contributions to evangelism, charity work, educational and healthcare services and publicized Nigeria in the map of the world. She faced many challenges living with the villagers, and at times, even had to be a peacemaker between tribesmen. Her work and strong personality (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  34.  66
    Fellow Creatures, by Christine Korsgaard. Oxford University Press, 2018. ISBN 0198753853. 272 Pp. $24.95. [REVIEW]Colin McLear - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 28 (1):258-262.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  35. Review of "Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity", by Christine M. Korsgaard, 2009. [REVIEW]Markus E. Schlosser - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (242):212-214.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  36. Swanton, Christine. The Virtue Ethics of Hume and Nietzsche.Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015. Pp. 248. $99.95.Mark Alfano - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):1120-1124.
    This book has a noble aim: to free virtue ethics from the grip of the neo- Aristotelianism that limits its scope in contemporary Anglophone philosophy. Just as there are deontological views that are not Kant’s or even Kantian, just as there are consequentialist views that are not Bentham’s or even utilitarian, so, Swanton contends, there are viable virtue ethical views that are not Aristotle’s or even Aristotelian. Indeed, the history of both Eastern and Western philosophy suggests that the majority of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  37. Review of Christine Overall`s Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate'. [REVIEW]Shelley Tremain - 2013 - Apa Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy 12 (2):20-22.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  38.  23
    Christine Korsgaard’s Constructivism.Hossein Atrak - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Investigations 12 (25):1-20.
    Constructivism is a theory that believes moral judgments are not real things but they are constructed by practical reason in a rational procedure for resolving practical problems in front of us. Christine Korsgaard, a contemporary American philosopher, is a Kantian constructivist, whose theory I consider in this paper. She is a radical constructivist and disagrees with moral realism and denies moral truths even as abstract facts. According to Korsgaard moral judgments are constructed by rational agents. She believes moral and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  39. Does the Origin of Normativity Stem From the Internalization of Dominance Hierarchies?Emilian Mihailov - 2015 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (4):463–478.
    Many natural scientists explain the evolutionary origin of morality by documenting altruistic behaviour in our nearest nonhuman relatives. Christine Korsgaard has criticized such attempts on the premise that they do not put enough effort in explaining the capacity to be motivated by normative thoughts. She speculates that normative motivation may have originated with the internalization of the dominance instincts. In this article I will challenge the dominance hierarchy hypothesis by arguing that a proper investigation into how and when dominance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  40. Guilt, Practical Identity, and Moral Staining.Andrew Ingram - 2017 - Philosophy 92 (4):623-645.
    The guilt left by immoral actions is why moral duties are more pressing and serious than other reasons like prudential considerations. Religions talk of sin and karma; the secular still speak of spots or stains. I argue that a moral staining view of guilt is in fact the best model. It accounts for guilt's reflexive character and for anxious, scrupulous worries about whether one has transgressed. To understand moral staining, I borrow Christine Korsgaard's view that we construct our identities (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  41. Agency and Responsibility.Fritz J. McDonald - 2010 - Journal of Value Inquiry 44 (2):199-207.
    According to Christine Korsgaard, Kantian hypothetical and categorical imperative principles are constitutive principles of agency. By acting in a way that is guided by these imperatives, an individual makes herself into an agent. There is hence, on her theory, an inextricable link between the nature of agency and the practical issue of why we should be rational and moral. The benefits of such an account would be great: in Korsgaard’s view, an account that bases morality on the nature of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  42. Overall and Aquinas on Miracles.David K. Kovacs - 2016 - Dialogue 55 (1):151-160.
    Christine Overall has argued that miracles, if they exist, would be an evil committed by God and therefore disprove the existence of God. However, her notion of a miracle as an intervention presupposes a view about the relation between God and creation that posits God as an ‘outsider.’ Such a view has not been held by all theists. It was not held by Thomas Aquinas. I show that Aquinas ’s conception is not susceptible to Overall’s criticisms. The upshot is (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  43. Kant's Fact of Reason as Source of Normativity.Bryan Lueck - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (6):596 – 608.
    In _The Sources of Normativity_, Christine M. Korsgaard argues that unconditional obligation can be accounted for in terms of practical identity. My argument in this paper is that practical identity cannot play this foundational role. More specifically, I interpret Korsgaard's argument as beginning with something analogous to Kant's fact of reason, viz. with the fact that our minds are reflective. I then try to show that her determination of this fact is inadequate and that this causes the argument concerning (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  44. Commitments of a Divided Self: Authenticity, Autonomy and Change in Korsgaard's Ethics.Lydia L. Moland - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):25-44.
    Christine Korsgaard attempts to reinterpret Kantian ethics in a way that might alleviate Bernard Williams’ famous worry that a man cannot save his drowning wife without determining impartially that he may do so. She does this by dividing a reflective self that chooses the commitments that make up an agent’s practical identity from a self defined as a jumble of desires. An agent, she then argues, must act on the commitments chosen by the reflective self on pain of disintegration. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  45. Practical Reason and Motivational Scepticism.Paul Russell - 2006 - In Heiner F. Klemme, Manfred Kühn & Dieter Schönecker (eds.), Moralische Motivation. Kant und die Alternativen. Felix Meiner Verlag.
    In her influential and challenging paper “Skepticism about Practical Reason” Christine Korsgaard sets out to refute an important strand of Humean scepticism as it concerns a Kantian understanding of practical reason.1 Korsgaard distinguishes two components of scepticism about practical reason. The first, which she refers to as content scepticism, argues that reason cannot of itself provide any “substantive guidance to choice and action” (SPR, 311). In its classical formulation, as stated by Hume, it is argued that reason cannot determine (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  46. Commitments of a Divided Self: Narrative, Change, and Autonomy in Korsgaard's Ethics.Lydia L. Moland - 2008 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 4 (1):27-46.
    Christine Korsgaard attempts to reinterpret Kantian ethics in a way that might alleviate Bernard Williams’ famous worry that a man cannot save his drowning wife without determining impartially that he may do so. She does this by dividing a reflective self that chooses the commitments that make up an agent’s practical identity from a self defined as a jumble of desires. An agent, she then argues, must act on the commitments chosen by the reflective self on pain of disintegration. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  47. Ethical Naturalism and the Constitution of Agency.John Hacker-Wright - 2012 - Journal of Value Inquiry 46 (1):13-23.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  48. Der kleine Unterschied. Zu den Selbstverhältnissen von Verantwortung und Pflicht.Frieder Vogelmann - 2015 - Zeitschrift Für Praktische Philosophie 2 (2):121-164.
    Die Debatte um die Differenz von „Verantwortung“ und „Pflicht“ ist kein bloßer Streit um Wörter, geht es doch um Begriffe, für die der Anspruch erhoben wird, sie seien konstitutiv für moralische Normativität oder gar für Normativität per se. Doch welchen Unterschied macht es, die besondere Bindungskraft von Normativität über Verantwortung oder über Pflicht zu explizieren? Die Genealogie der philosophischen Reflexionen auf Verantwortung lokalisiert die Differenz zwischen Pflicht und Verantwortung in den jeweiligen Selbstverhältnissen, die mit diesen Begriffen verbunden werden. Die Analyse (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  49.  60
    How Should We Understand the Psychoanalytic Unconscious?Michael Lacewing - 2019 - In Richard Gipps & Michael Lacewing (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Oxford, UK: pp. 407-432.
    I review the debate between ‘realist’ and ‘constructivist’ understandings of the psychoanalytic unconscious. To oversimplify, realists hold that unconscious mental states exist in the analysand’s mind fully formed and with determinate intentional content, independent of consciousness, and these are discovered in analysis. Constructivists (including relationalists and intersubjectivists) hold that the unconscious meaning of clinical material does not exist ‘pre-organised’ in the analysand’s mind, but is constructed, not discovered, through the analytic relationship. I argue that the debate is multiply confused. For (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  50. Balet Dawkinsa w ogrodzie teologii. Uwagi krytyczne w sprawie racjonalności głównych twierdzeń dotyczących wymiaru poznawczego twierdzeń o Bogu, zawartych w książce Richarda Dawkinsa Bóg urojony. Część I.Marek Pepliński - 2012 - Filo-Sofija 12 (18):293-322.
    DAWKINS’ BALLET IN THE GARDEN OF THEOLOGY. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF RICHARD DAWKINS’ EPISTEMOLOGICAL THESES ON THEISTIC BELIEFS FROM THE GOD DELUSION. PART I My paper presents a detailed analysis and assessment of Richard Dawkins’ epistemological theses from The God Delusion concerning the nature of religious belief, the existence of God and treating belief in God as a scientific hypothesis. In the first part of the article, I am interpreting Dawkins’ statement that atheism deserves respect as an epistemic achievement. I (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
1 — 50 / 243