A significant part of the "struggles" that took place within Czechoslovak interwar thought can be considered to be the criticism that Emanuel Rádl, a representative of the realist approach, led against the supporters of individualism, or the younger philosophical generation, which was gathered around the journal Ruch filosofický. The core of Rádl's critical position is philosophical realism in terms of thought and methodology. Radl's realist position was gradually shaped and developed in the period before and after the First (...) World War, with the turning point being his experience and concern about the effects of Russian thought, which was based on mysticism, intuitivism and idealism. Alongside this was also a defining change in attitude towards Kant's thought, which consisted in emphasising the positive aspect of his rationalism. From this position of post-war realism, Radl proceeded to criticize the alienation, apoliticality and amorality of the philosophy of individualism and the interest of its representatives in the thinking approaches of irrationalism: mysticism, intuitivism and spiritualism. (shrink)

„Ruch Filozoficzny” and the freedom of scientific research in Poland (in 1947-1957 years). Presented article refers to the situation in the Polish philosophy, which took place between 40-50 of the twentieth century. Author’s reflections are carried on the example of attempts to reactivate in the realities of war, the polish philosophical journal “Ruch Filozoficzny” founded in 1911 by Kazimierz Twardowski. Political conditions have made the magazine was renewed twice, at each time was the greatest merit of Tadeusz Czeżowski. (...) He was assisted by the other representatives of the Lvov-Warsaw School, who worked in various academic centers in Poland. The reconstruction of the history of the magazine in the postwar years, will be based on previously unpublished archival material. In its conclusions, the author tries to point out of great importance of independent from the political authorities publishers on development of Polish philosophy. (shrink)

Pojem filosofie nabyl v průběhu historie řadu podob a významů. Kromě tradičního teoretického zaměření se lze setkat s přístupem, který vyzdvihuje praktický dopad filosofování na život člověka. Příspěvek představuje koncept filosofické praxe a reflektuje její současný stav na území České republiky. Autoři vymezují filosofickou praxi jako disciplínu filosofie, a načrtávají její možné dělení na dílčí oblasti. Nastíněny jsou její historické kořeny, které autoři identifikují v antickém Řecku. Dále se věnují systematickému představení doposud sepsaných materiálů k filosofické praxi a přehledu její (...) realizace na území České republiky. Detailní pozornost věnují autoři popisu tří jejích oblastí, mezi které patří filosofie pro děti, filosofický workshop a filosofická konzultace. Kromě teoretického vymezení reflektují rovněž své vlastní postupy v uvedených oblastech. Článek čerpá především ze zahraniční odborné literatury, konkrétně z textů a dalších materiálů filosofických praktikantů. Jeho cílem je představit českému čtenáři doposud podrobněji neřešený koncept filosofické praxe a připravit tak pole pro možnou debatu na akademické rovině. -------- The concept of philosophy has had several forms and meanings throughout the history. Besides the traditional theoretical focus, we may also encounter the approach that highlights a practical impact of philosophizing on one’s life. This text introduces the concept of philosophical practice and reflects its current situation in the Czech Republic. Authors characterize philosophical practice as a discipline of philosophy and present its possible division into subsections. They also present its historical roots, which can be found in ancient Greece. Moreover, authors introduce available sources dealing with the philosophical practice and describe how this discipline is actually practiced in the Czech Republic. Detailed attention is given to three of its sections, namely philosophy for children (P4C), philosophical workshop, and philosophical consultation. Authors present theoretical background and also reflect their own methods in these sections. The text draws primarily from scholarly literature from abroad, particularly from the manuscripts and other sources produced by philosophical practitioners. The aim of this text is to introduce the concept of philosophical practice to the Czech reader and prepare the field for further academic discussion. (shrink)

Příspěvek zprostředkovává základní vhled do bitvy o absolutní, jak bývá často označována polemika mezi Josiahem Roycem a Williamem Jamesem. Toto intelektuální zápolení, do něhož významně zasahovali Charles S. Peirce nebo John Dewey, je jedním z důležitých faktorů ovlivňujících podobu názorů amerických pragmatiků. Příspěvek se soustřeďuje především na období mezi lety 1899 a 1902, kdy je bitva o absolutní nejvyostřenější a filosoficky nejplodnější. Představené závěry jsou důležité především ve vztahu k probíhající renesanci názorů pragmaticky smýšlejících autorů v současných kognitivních vědách či (...) filosofii vědy. (shrink)

An annotated anthology of translations of traditional Chinese commentaries on the Daoist Classics Zhuangzi. (In Czech) -/- Kniha předkládá výbor a komentovaný překlad čtyř tradičních komentářů k vybraným pasážím významného díla klasického taoismu z období Válčících států (ca 4.-3. stol. př. n. l.). Komentáře pocházejí ze čtyř různých období čínských dějin od raného středověku až po poslední dynastii císařské Číny. Cílem práce je představit komentáře jako texty, které zasluhují bližší pozornost jednak proto, že nechávají nahlédnout do různorodých dějinných kontextů, jednak (...) proto, že jde o svébytné a filosoficky originální interpretace jednoho z nejvýznačnějších textů čínského myšlení. Komentáře nesou neklamnou pečeť historických období, ve kterých vznikly, zároveň se však vztahují k témuž textu, jsou součástí jedné interpretační tradice a v jistém smyslu se svou různorodostí doplňují. Publikace je určena jak sinologům či studentům sinologie, tak i filosofům či zájemcům o čínské myšlení bez znalosti klasické čínštiny. (shrink)

Larry Laudan v článku z roku 1983 označil problém demarkace, tj. rozlišení „vědy" a „pseudovědy", za filosofický pseudoproblém, kterým není třeba se zabývat, a slova „vědecké" a „pseudovědecké" za prázdné pojmy, které můžeme z našeho slovníku zcela vyškrtnout. V předkládané studii zpochybňuji toto Laudanovo stanovisko a předkládám argumenty ve prospěch tvrzení, že 1) rozlišení vědy a pseudovědy představuje důležitý a aktuální problém, kterým je třeba se zabývat, a že 2) možný způsob řešení tohoto problému nabízejí současná sociální studia vědy. Jejich (...) východiskem je pojetí vědy jako „formy života" a pojetí demarkačního kritéria jako proměnlivého souboru charakteristik, který sice nelze jednoznačně definovat, ale přesto jej lze zkoumat, a to prostřednictvím sociologické analýzy vědecké praxe. Mým záměrem je na příkladu několika vzorových studií představit specifika sociologického přístupu z hlediska jeho metodologie i povahy nabízených řešení a zhodnotit jeho možnosti i omezení pro filosofii vědy. (shrink)

This article is a translation of the paper in Polish (Alfred Tarski - człowiek, który zdefiniował prawdę) published in Ruch Filozoficzny 4 (4) (2007). It is a personal Alfred Tarski memories based on my stay in Berkeley and visit the Alfred Tarski house for the invitation of Janusz Tarski.

Work of elderly is a controversial problem. The introduction of protection of old age in form of pensions and retirement caused shaping in modern societies qualitatively new social category of persons in post-working age. Growth of human life-span with simultaneous lack of the principle changes of pensionable age inflicts grow in quantity of persons’ using welfare benefits. Growing costs of seniors livelihood lead to transformations in socio-economical structures as well as forcing them to engage in activities that will help increase (...) their social participation, including the lengthening of their professional activity. It seems that the nowadays processes of dematerialization of work combined with the shaping of knowledge-based economy and the movement of third-age universities largely enable the achievement of these objectives. Article aims to approximate the results of qualitative analysis of elderly economic activity in Bialystok conducted in the context of social capital research. Study describes main factors that restrict work opportunities for older people, as well as their hidden resources and potential workplaces. ** Wykonywanie pracy zarobkowej przez osoby starsze jest zagadnieniem kontrowersyjnym. Wprowadzenie zabezpieczenia starości w formie rent i emerytur sprawiło, że w społeczeństwach nowoczesnych ukształtowała siȩ jakościowo nowa kategoria społeczna składaj¸a}ca siȩ z osób w wieku poprodukcyjnym. Wzrost długości życia ludzkiego przy jednoczesnym braku zasadniczych zmian progów wieku emerytalnego sprawia, że ilość osób korzystaj¸a}cych ze świadczeń rośnie. Zwiȩkszaj¸a}ce siȩ koszty utrzymania seniorów prowadz¸a} do szeregu przemian w strukturach społeczno-ekonomicznych oraz wymuszaj¸a} podejmowanie działań, które pozwol¸a} na wzrost ich uczestnictwa społecznego, w tym na wydłużanie ich aktywności zawodowej. Wydaje siȩ, że zachodz¸a}ce współcześnie procesy dematerializacji pracy ł¸a}czone z kształtowaniem siȩ gospodarki opartej na wiedzy oraz ruch uniwersytetów trzeciego wieku w znacznej mierze umożliwiaj¸a realizacjȩ tych celów. Artykuł ma na celu przybliżenie wybranych wyników jakościowych analiz aktywności ekonomicznej ludzi starych w Białymstoku prowadzonych w kontekście badań nad kapitałem społecznym. Określone zostały podstawowe czynniki ograniczaj¸ace możliwości wykonywania pracy przez ludzi starych, jak również ich ukryte zasoby i potencjalne miejsca pracy. (shrink)

Lidská práva jsou v současné době předmětem řady komplexních otázek, které jsou politické, sociální či právní povahy. Abychom na otázky mohli smysluplně odpovídat, musíme brát ohled i na obecnější filosofické souvislosti a mít jasnější představu o tom, co lidská práva jsou a na jakých základech stojí. V předkládaném textu si klademe otázku, zdali máme v současné době k dispozici plně filosoficky fundovanou koncepci založení a legitimizace lidských práv. Předkládáme postupně různé současné přístupy, které jsou kandidáty na řešení tohoto problému a (...) přinášíme jejich kritické zhodnocení. Východiskem je pro nás představa lidských práv jako evidentních pravd a od ní odvozené přístupy zakládající je na racionální či emocionální evidenci. Dále se věnujeme možnosti náboženského založení lidských práv, přístupům přirozenoprávním, utilitaristickým a koncepcím vycházejícím z pojmu důstojnosti. Stručně jsou zmíněny i některé další související teorie a historický kontext analyzovaných pojetí. V závěru na položenou otázku odpovídáme, že zcela uspokojivá filosofická teorie lidských práv stále není k dispozici, a přinášíme také vlastní doporučení pro řešení předložených problémů zkoumaných teorií. (shrink)

Tematem artykułu jest manifest jako gatunek dominujący w awangardzie historycznej (w tym wypadku w dadaizmie), jak i w neoawangardzie austriackiej (akcjonizm wiedeński). Ten ostatni, radykalny ruch sztuki austriackiej lat sześćdziesiątych, dotychczas postrzegany w kategoriach jego osiągnięć w zakresie sztuki performance i body art, analizowany jest przeze mnie w kategoriach literackich na przykładzie manifestu jako środka autoprezentacji, obecnego na skalę masową po raz pierwszy w awangardzie lat dwudziestych. Istotą poruszanego przeze mnie problemu jest kontynuacja tradycji samookreślenia się awangardy w formie (...) manifestu, jak również przemiany, jakie dokonały się w strukturze tekstów tego typu w okresie swoistego renesansu awangardy w latach sześćdziesiątych. Ograniczam się przy tym do zakreślenia jednego z głównych rysów manifestu - jego kontestacyjnej krytyki skierowanej zarówno przeciwko skostniałym formom sztuki, jak i przeciwko państwu i społeczeństwu, narzucającym sztuce granice i sposoby jej oddziaływania. Manifesty dadaistyczne stanowią tutaj tło dla analizy manifestów akcjonistycznych, które, według postawionej przeze mnie tezy, mogą być rozumiane jako radykalna modyfikacja tego gatunku w neoawangardzie, która w swej ostatecznej formie prowadzi do zaniechania manifestu jako przekazu literackiego i do odwołania się do demonstracji celów artystycznych w sposób pozawerbalny - poprzez akcjonizm. W analizie manifestów obu awangard podkreślam krytyczne podejście ich autorów do gatunku jako takiego, jak i do jego korzeni wywodzących się z dziedzin pozaartystycznych (polityka i wojskowość). (shrink)

Petrus Nigri (Schwarz) se narodil západočeské Kadani (něm. Kaaden) kolem roku 1435 a spolu se svými třemi bratry vstoupil v Německu do dominikánského řádu. Během svého studia prošel velkou část Evropy (Německo, Itálii, Španělsko, Čechy a Maďarsko) a nakonec se stal rektorem generálního studia v Budíně (1481). Obecně je znám spíše jako význačný středověký hebraista. Do dějin filosofie se zapsal zvláště jako autor Clipeus thomsitarum (před r. 1474), což je filosofický komentář na Porfýriův Úvod (Isagoge) a na aristotelovské Kategorie, (...) formou otázek. Třebaže Nigriho práce není originální, představuje v zaalpských zemích významnou recepci pojetí pomyslného jsoucna (Clipeus, část I, ot. 3-4) tak, jak ho koncipoval Hervaeus Natalis († 1323) ve svém traktátu De secundis intentionisbus. -/- Petrus Nigri (Peter Schwarz, born in Kadaň/Kaaden before 1435, died in Buda 1483), is author of Clipeus thomistarum (printed 1481), a philosophical commentary on Porphyry's Introduction (Isagoge), and on Aristotle's Categories in the form of questions. While Nigri's discussion of the concept of being of reason (Clipeus thomistarum, part I, qq. 3-4) is not original, his work is important for contributing to this concept’s reception, and with it the teaching of Hervaeus Natalis (died 1323) in his treatise De secundis intentionibus, in the transalpine countries. Being of reason (ens rationis) is conceived as not a categorial being, nor is it an intellectual operation, nor is it caused, but is only identifiable by the human intellect. Nigri's being of reason has no subjective existence, but only an objective character, which differs both from categorial being and from mere nothingness. (shrink)

Berkeley, Newton, Explanation, and Causation -/- I argue in this paper that Berkeley’s conception of natural law explanations, which echoes Newton’s, fails to solve a fundamental problem, which I label “explanatory asymmetry"; that the model of explanation Berkeley uses fails to distinguish between explanations and justifications, particularly since Berkeley denies real (efficient causes) in non-minded nature. At the end I suggest Berkeley might endorse a notion of understanding, say in astronomy or mechanics, which could be distinguished from explanation.

In this article we address the question of individual identity and its place – or rather omission – in contemporary discussions about the cosmopolitan extension of liberalism as the dominant political theory. The article is divided into two parts. In the first part we show that if we consistently emphasise the complementarity of the “inner” and “outer” identity of a person, which is essential to liberalism from its very beginnings, then a fundamental flaw in the liberal cosmopolitan project becomes apparent. (...) This is the underestimation of the indispensability of an unambiguously determined public framework which will fix and enforce liberal principles and values in a comprehensible way. Such a framework for liberalism was always the political community and then, above all, the modern state, in which the liberal identity could then be realised. The discussion in this part of the article prepares the ground for an examination, in the second part, of a dilemma which cosmopolitan liberalism must face. In the second part we argue that the attempt to tackle the given problem presents liberals with the following dilemma: either it is necessary to plead for the institution of a global political authority (a “world state”), or to give up the belief that fundamental liberal principles and values can be realised to a global extent. We show, at the same time, that because of the character and ambitions of the cosmopolitan project, the promise of plural identities and multi­centred law cannot be relied upon. By way of conclusion we then ask what is the price of the realisation of cosmopolitan liberal ideals. -/- NOTE: This is a two-part article (in Czech). For download here is the first part; please see the link below for the second part as well. (shrink)

The Natural Philosophy of Jan Bayer The main focus of this study is a reconstruction of the natural philosophy of the early modern Prešov's scholar Jan (Johannes) Bayer (1630–1674), with special regard to its Mosaic profile. After a critical reading of the research done on Bayer up to this point, the author concludes that Bayer’s natural-philosophical work, as such, has not yet been satisfactorily analyzed, nor has its connection to its supposedly two most important sources, Francis Bacon and Jan Amos (...) Comenius, been sufficiently explored. The study therefore concentrates on a critical analysis of Bayer’s interpretation of creation and his natural history, which are then both situated in the philosophical context of their time. The author then notes that although Bayer’s project of erecting an original and on the (especially Aristotelian) tradition independent Mosaic natural philosophy ended in failure, the thinker’s work can be assessed as a valuable attempt to synthesize Baconian and Comenian motifs while at the same time reflecting broader intellectual contexts of the period. (shrink)

D. Evans, Argumenty platońskie, transl. Zbigniew Nerczuk.

The paper focuses on the differences between utilitarianism and non-utilitarian consequentialism.

The paper develops the theory of right action in ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism.

The paper explores the theory of right action in ethics of social consequences as a form of non-utilitarian consequentialism.

[In Czech] Merleau-Ponty’s analyses of the pathology of perception show “objective” and “subjective” events have sense for the living body only in relation to its whole equilibrium, that is, to how it organises itself overall and how it thus “meets” those events. If we apply this conception to Husserl’s example of two mutually-touching hands of one body we must then state not that we perceive here a coincidence of certain subjective sensations with certain objective qualities, but rather that my body, (...) in the sense of an object, results from the restructuralisation of the whole field of the body accomplished by the the body as the performer of perceptual intentions. The body-object, and for the same reasons also the body-subject, is therefore the product of the analysis of the body in the sense of a field of structuralisation or polarisation, not its original phenomenological “stratum”, as in Husserl. If the body understands itself as perceptible only by a change of its own structure, inasmuch as it is a certain field of structuralisation, then the "external” thing, which is likewise a pole of such grasping, must belong to the same ontological “field” as the body. Merleau-Ponty’s “flesh”, that is the circularity between questioning of perception and answering of the perceived, is thus a phenomenon appearing beyond the boundary of the body as a singular being. This fact allows the concept of flesh to be extended and to be understood as an “element”, that is, as a dimension in which individual beings appear. [In Czech language.]. (shrink)

[In Czech] Merleau-Ponty holds that Husserl’s descriptions of the body go beyond the conceptual framework of subject-object ontology to which his philosophy is usually thought to conform. Merleau-Ponty says of his own philosophy that it is founded on the circularity in the body; that is, on the fact that from the ontological point of view, perception and availability to be perceived, are one and the same in the body. The inseparability of these two aspects of the body he calls "flesh" (...) (chair). According to Husserl, I perceive my body such that in a certain perceived object I also co-perceive sensations roused by the perception of that object – I observe the “consequential parallel” between two series of objective and subjective phenomena. Husserl argues that the unity of the body should be descrived as a double unity, and the body as a subject-object. In this article I analyse Husserl’s example of two hands of the same body touching mutually and, following Merleau-Ponty, I attempt to show that the body can appear to itself as an object only on the basis of a differentiation of the body as a particular field of perceiving. The body as a double unity of subject and object is therefore grounded in the body as a pre-objective and pre-subjective field; that is, in flesh as Merleau-Ponty understands it. This is also the point of departure for an original conception of ontology as we find it in his later philosophy. [In Czech language.]. (shrink)

[This paper is written in Czech.] The aim of this article is to briefly introduce and critically analyze the dialogue between phenomenology and contemporary theories of embodied cognition in relation to the study of affectivity. The author explains how these theoretical approaches interpret the dynamic relationship between affective experiences on the one hand and bodily behavior and intersubjectively observable processes taking place in the environment on the other. He first summarizes the positions of Joel Krueger and Giovanna Colombetti, who draw (...) on the theories of extended cognition and enactivism, and then compares them with Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological approach. In this way, there are found to be inconsistencies in Krueger’s and Colombetti’s approaches, whose resolution, in the author’s opinion, requires the working out of a rigorously “relational” interpretation of affectivity. From this point of view, affectivity is not understood as an internal phenomenon causally linked to external material factors, but strictly as a dynamic relationship between a sense-making agent and his or her meaningful environment. (shrink)

In his initial lecture course at the Collège de France, Merleau-Ponty attempted to develop a new analysis of rational thought in order to clarify its link with corporeal-perceptive life. The formulation of thought in language as the most elaborate human activity of expression explicitly takes over what we already observe in perception as the implicit and mutual reference between the perceiving subject and that which is perceived.The article reconstructs Merleau-Ponty’s argumentation, based on his preparatory notes for the lectures, and provides (...) an interpretation of the key concepts of “expression” and “body schema”. [In Czech Language]. (shrink)

[In Czech] In his writings at the end of the fifties, Merleau-Ponty introduced a new semantic and expressional circuit with the concept of “visibility”, a variation on the concept of “flesh” (chair). The aim of this article is to show that a consistent interpretation of this circuit necessarily leads us to a consideration of the concept of visibility as a systematically privileged viewpoint for the interpretation of all Merleau-Ponty’s more particular discussions. The concept of visibility, or flesh, summarises Merleau-Ponty’s thesis (...) that the proper cohesion of the “horizon” or “field” is prior to that which is objectively and individually thinkable within it. Thus, Merleau-Ponty’s pivotal idea is set down not just from the phenomenological viewpoint, or in particular instances, but rather quite generally and in an ontological sense. The article offers an analysis of the lexis related to the concept of visibility, characterises Merleau-Ponty’s conception of phenomenon from its perspective and summarises its ontological consequences, using the example of two central themes i.e. the the relation between subject and object and the relation between the empirical and ideal. (shrink)

[The Ethics of Human Enhancement and Liberal Eugenics] The paper deals with the ethics of biotechnological enhancement of human qualities such as intelligence, health and lifespan. In contemporary bioethics three views have emerged concerning the moral permissibility of such a biotechnological enhancement of humans. While bioconservatives reject it as morally impermissible and dangerous, bioradicals welcome it as permissible and desirable. Between these two extremes we find bioliberals who admit some types of enhancement, under certain conditions. These debates are still overshadowed (...) by fear of eugenics, but this discredited term needs to be rehabilitated because it turns out that there are both desirable and undesirable forms of eugenics. (shrink)

[Empiricism, Naturalism, and Ideas] The author analyses the modern reception of key themes in Hume’s philosophy during the past century. The first part presents Hume’s version of three such themes – empi­ricism, naturalism and the theory of ideas. The following three parts give an exposition of modern forms of each of these themes, with the choice of modern reception being directed to those contemporary authors who not only developed Hume’s motifs in the most original way, but who also explicitly traced (...) the origin of their modern theory to Hume. For this reason, in the second part, which deals with the reception of empiricism in logical positivism, Hans Reichenbach and his treatment of Hume’s problem of inductive knowledge is discussed. In the third part, dealing with naturalism, the obvious choice is the most influential version of this doctrine in the work of W. V. O. Quine. The fourth part deals with the modern reception of Hume’s theory of ideas in a recent monograph by Jerry Fodor. The author considers Hume’s naturalism as the most live part of Hume’s legacy. Empirismus has, after all, been considerably transformed in content, or has even been rejected by later philosophers; while Fodor’s updating of the theory of ideas does not offer an adequate answer to the question of the place of thinking and intentionality in the material world. (shrink)

[For an Ethics without Theology] This study is a critical reflection on Marek Vácha's article on the ethics of euthanasia. In the first part the author offers a short consideration of the reasons for the moribund state of ethics in Czech philosophy, after which, in the second part, he presents a critique of Vácha's article. The article in question is, above all, lacking in a philosophical approach to the problem of euthanasia, and we find in it not so much arguments (...) as rhetoric. The only line of argument that is detectable in the article is founded on natural theology, something that Vácha elsewhere repudiates, and it offers the reader a false dilemma between accepting theistic ethics on the one hand or total subjectivism on the other. In reality, of course, there is a wide range of kinds of objective secular ethics. In the third part, one of these forms is summarised--a system of "everyday morality" which is founded on the concept of harm, and which treats conduct as immoral primarily when it causes unjustifiable harm to others. This form of ethics does not presuppose any controversial theory of value, and it constitutes the viewpoint from which the author then defends physician-assisted suicide. A doctor who helps a patient die--or who causes the patient's death on his own request--does not cause that individual harm if she has only a period of life filled with pain left. In conclusion the author indentifies certain points of contact between secular and theistic ethics. (shrink)

[On the Ethics of Euthanasia Again: A Reply to Critics] The article is a reply to three critics of a previous piece on the ethics of euthanasia in which I defended physician-assisted suicide. According to Ingrid Strobachová it is necessary to give a greater attention to the significance of pain, which, she claims, may benefit from a phenomenological description. According to Marta Vlasáková my argument is not valid because two principles on which it is founded – i.e. the conception of (...) life as of fundamental value and the autonomy of the patient – are not in mutual harmony. Jakub Jirsa criticises the very concept of assisted suicide and the moral legitimacy and need for the legalisation of assisted suicide. To Dr Strobachová I reply that phenomenological description is as acceptable a method as any other – as long, that is, as it is not only a verbal game, but constitutes a real source of knowledge. To Dr. Vlasáková I argue that a more charitable reading of my argument is possible. The arguments of Dr. Jirsa against assisted suicide are beset with various inconsistencies, including the fact that he himself allows that doctors should tolerate suicide by the refusal of food and drink. Such an act does not, however, differ in any relevant way from doctor-assisted suicide. (shrink)

[Materialism and Hylomorphism] The author disputes the view, expressed recently by Tomáš Machula a David Peroutka, that materialism, dominant in contemporary philosophy of mind, should be substituted by Thomist hylomorphism. The critique focuses on two aspects of Machula and Peroutka’s argument. Firstly, on their assumption that the contemporary preference for materialism is the result of chance (ignorance of the fact that in addition to materialism and dualism the position of hylomorphism is also available). This assumption fails to take into account (...) the fact that dualism was already the subject of criticism in the 17th century, but materialism only became properly established in the mid-twentieth century. Secondly, the author argues that Thomist hylomorphism can be updated in a more fruitful way than that proposed by Machula and Peroutka. This updating requires us, however, to sacrifice certain metaphysically unsustainable ideas – in particular the idea that the soul is a non-material substance independent of the body. (shrink)

A review of the new Czech-language textbook of medical ethics. I point out its multiple flaws, especially the insufficient grounding in normative theory and a bias towards the Catholic moral teachings.

[Do Animals Have Consciousness?] The study analyses the arguments of contemporary philosophers of mind concerning the subject of animal consciousness. The first part reminds the reader of the Cartesian starting point of the contemporary discussion and points to the concept of phenomenal consciousness as the main point of contention concerning the instantiation of consciousness in non-human animals. The second part of the study analyses various forms of representationalism which make up the mainstream of contemporary debate. In the third part the (...) philosophy of mind of Daniel Dennett is discussed, together with its implications for the question of animal consciousness. In contrast with critics who treat Dennett’s theory as the result of conceptual confusions, the author argues that we should look upon the theory as the rejection of the assumptions of the mainstream and an attempt to think anew the question of consciousness, including animal consciousness. (shrink)

[On Consciousness, Religion, and Freedom of the Will] An interview with Daniel Dennett on consciousness, religion and free will.

[Utilitarism, Nazism, and Euthanasia] The article is an answer to Prof. Munzarová who criticised my defence of physician-assisted suicide. The article points to shortcomings in the reply of prof. Munzarová which flow from the author’s underestimation of normative theory. Among these shortcomings are the ignoring of the arguments of her opponent; her calling into question the moral credit of the proponents of the competing theory (utilitarianism) rather than a critical analysis; unclear theoretical principles (a switching between paternalism and autonomy, the (...) presentation of the “principle of double-effect” as the standpoint of common sense); an unconvincing version of the “argument of the slippery slope” (ignoring the diametrical differences between the contemporary demand of some patients for assisted death and the Nazi programme of involuntary euthanasia). (shrink)

Je otrok podle Aristotela vykořisťovaným nástrojem výroby stojícím na úrovni zvířete, nebo méně nadaným jedincem, jenž může svoje omezené možnosti naplnit pouze jako podřízený člen domácnosti? Aristotelští badatelé zdůrazňují jednu z možností podle toho, nakolik jsou sami liberálně, či komunitaristicky orientováni: buď je Aristotelova teorie panství vykládána jako nelidská a ideologická, nebo jako realistická a solidární. Spor se však netýká pouze „liberalismu“ a „komunitarismu“ v Aristotelovi, nýbrž – jelikož je otrok v obou výkladech chápán jako nástroj pána – také dvou (...) základních pojetí techniky a v důsledku moderní civilizace obecně, jež jsou zastoupeny na jedné straně Lévinasovým Gagarinem a na druhé straně Heideggerem. Aristotelés naznačuje – a to pomocí technicky přesného důkazu – možnost techniky, která osvobozuje od nutnosti, přitom si je však vědom podmíněnosti každého takového osvobození. Výdobytkem Aristotelovy teorie panství je to, že se v ní hledisko rovnosti a svobody a hledisko podřízení a nutnosti nikoli vylučují, nýbrž vzájemně doplňují. (shrink)

Platónovy pokusy o určení dobra lze nalézt v celém jeho díle. Zahrnují jak relativně „univoční“ koncepci dobra ve smyslu sókratovského intelektualismu, tak pluralističtější koncepci obsaženou v politickém projektu Zákonů. Podle vývojové interpretace Platónových dialogů to naznačuje posun v autorově myšlení způsobený poznáním obtížnosti problému. Byl to přitom údajně teprve Aristotelés, kdo vyřešil Platónův problém dobra pomocí pojmu analogie. Proti této interpretaci článek zdůrazňuje, že aristotelské pojetí analogie je hluboce zakořeněno v Platónově vlastním potýkání se s rozdílem mezi morálním a politickým (...) dobrem. Byla to především Platónovo pochopení specifické hodnoty politické plurality, které stojí v základě akademického rozlišení mezi analogia a pros hen. (shrink)

Recenzní studie filosofického pojednání srovnávající posice Aristotela, T. Akvinského, D. Huma a I. Kanta ohledně účinné příčiny. Autor bere v úvahu také některé aspekty moderní vědy a argumenty analytické filosofie a srozumitelnými argumenty dospívá k obhajobě nutnosti principu kauzality. -/- Review article of the philosophical dissertation comparing Aristotle, Thomas, Hume, and Kant's conception of efficient cause. Arguments notes some aspects of modern science and contemporary analytic philosophy. Intelligible arguments comes to defending aprinciple of necessary causality.

Abstract The opening section outlines probabilism in the 20th century philosophy and shortly discusses the major accomplishments of Polish probabilist thinkers. A concise characterization of Bayesianism as the major recent form of probabilism follows. It builds upon the core personalist version of Bayesianism towards more objectively oriented versions thereof. The problem of a priori probability is shortly discussed. A tentative characterization of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s standpoint regarding the inductive inference is cast in Bayesian terms. His objections against it presented in Pragmatic (...) Logic are presented. His 1958 paper on justification of non-deductive inference, as amply demonstrated by K. Szaniawski and I. Niiniluoto, extends his earlier Baysian position from 1928 monograph. In the closing section Ajdukiewicz’s standpoint is presented as a characteristically pragmatist and empiricist version of Bayesianism, which remains an unexplored and stimulating position. (shrink)

[This paper is written in Czech language.] The aim of the article is to re-evaluate the still-surviving anthropological trope which, in reaction to an inquiry into the essence of man, compares humans with animals and points to culture as the means by which humans complete their “deficient” nature. This motif contrasting humans with animals has been extended by A. Gehlen who characterises humans as “beings of deficiencies”. In his view, the morphological-instinctive insufficiency of the human being must be stabilised by (...) cultural institutions, i.e. complexes of habitual actions. Merleau-Ponty, however, demonstrates that bodily beings always relate to their environment in an indirect way, on the basis of certain “standards” and “norms” of interaction, which exist by way of institution. The anthropological trope confronting humans and animals thus cannot produce, as in Gehlen, a contrast between an allegedly “direct” relationship to the world in animals, and a supposedly “indirect” relationship to the world in humans. It can be meaningfully retained only if it is interpreted in a Merleau-Pontyan way, that is, as an invitation to understand the transformation of the norms of indirect interaction with the world found in animals into those found in people, that is, if viewed as a comparison of their respective institutions. (shrink)

In this article I present the concept of human evolution by Hoene- Wroński. I believe that his ideas are still an unexplored resource which can lead us to the better understanding of the evolution of humanity and of our destiny. I follow closely his discussion of human evolution and describe its seven stages. Further, I argue that the case of human evolution is strongly supported by new scientific theories, especially by quantum theory and the novel perspectives that it opens for (...) humankind. I end my article with the conclusion that the insights on human evolution derived from the Hoene-Wroński’s writings and from new scientific theories can guide us to the new politics based on the awareness of human identity that can overcome old divisions among humankind and conflicts derived from them. Ultimately, they can initiate evolutionity – the new evolutionary epoch, which will replace modernity and postmodernity. On. (shrink)

In the annotated Czech translation of Leibniz’s dialogue Pacidius Philalethi, which was published in 2019, but also in an earlier essay by the same translator on Leibniz’s dialogic way of writing as well as in other interpretations, there is little discussion of the practical implications of his dialogic method. Leibniz’s dialogical argumentation strategy, as he later applied it in his correspondence with Samuel Clarke, is therefore either completely neglected or is referred to as being typical of the time, or alternatively (...) is confused with Zeno’s dialectical method. Thus, the aim of this study is to clarify the practical implications of Leibniz’s application of the dialogic method in his final correspondence with Clarke. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that embodied cognition, like many other research traditions in cognitive science, offers mostly fallible research heuristics rather than grand principles true of all cognitive processing. To illustrate this claim, I discuss Aizawa’s rebuttal of embodied and enactive accounts of vision. While Aizawa’s argument is sound against a strong reading of the enactive account, it does not undermine the way embodied cognition proceeds, because the claim he attacks is one of fallible heuristics. These heuristics may be (...) helpful in developing models of cognition in an interdisciplinary fashion. I briefly discuss the issue of whether this fallibility actually makes embodied cognition vulnerable to charges of being untestable or non-scientific. I also stress that the historical approach to this research tradition suggests that embodied cognition is not poised to become a grand unified theory of cognition. (shrink)

The monograph is aimed at an analysis of the reasons for theory change in science. The writer develops a model of theory change according to which the origins of scientific revolutions lie not in a clash of fundamental theories with facts, but of ‘old’ fundamental theories with each other.

The paper is concerned with the epistemological foundation of Plato's criticism of Gorgias' rhetoric in the dialogue "Gorgias".

This is the review of L. Regner's translation of Protagoras by Plato.

This is the review in Polish of the book by J. Barnes "Arystoteles".

This the review of the book:: S. Swieżawski, "Święty Tomasz na nowo odczytany".

This is the review of the book by W.K.C. Guthrie, Filozofowie greccy od Talesa do Arystotelesa.

In 1632 Rodrigo de Arriaga, an important Baroque scholastic thinker, published a textbook in philosophy, of which the last revised and extended edition was published in 1669. Arriaga develops in it a peculiar theory of beings of reason, drawing on Pedro Hurtado de Mendoza, according to which beings of reason are that which is expressed by false judgments. It is a theory quite different from the classical theories held by Francisco Suárez, the Thomists and the majority of Scotists on the (...) one hand, and reductive theories held by Richard Lynch and a growing number of later Baroque authors on the other. In this paper I analyse Arriaga’s theory and deal with the topics of nature, existence, causes, and division of beings of reason. (shrink)

In this article, I show the role that the philosopher of cognitive science can cur-rently play in cognitive science research. I argue for the important, and not yet considered, role of the philosophy of cognitive science in cognitive science, that is, the importance of cooperation between philosophers of science with cogni-tive scientists in investigating the research methods and theoretical assump-tions of cognitive science. At the beginning of the paper I point out, how the philosopher of science, here, the philosopher of (...) cognitive science, can participate in interdisciplinary research. I am opting of the cooperation in investigating the so-called reflective problems. Then, I discuss four examples of issues important for the cognitive science, in which the competences possessed by the philosopher are useful. At the ending I point out wider landscape of possible cooperation of philosophers with cognitive scientists. (shrink)