Results for 'liar's paradox'

956 found
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  1. A Liar-Like Paradox for Rational Reflection Principles.Joshua Schechter - 2024 - Analysis 84 (2):292-300.
    This article shows that there is a liar-like paradox that arises for rational credence that relies only on very weak logical and credal principles. The paradox depends on a weak rational reflection principle, logical principles governing conjunction, and principles governing the relationship between rational credence and proof. To respond to this paradox, we must either reject even very weak rational reflection principles or reject some highly plausible logical or credal principle.
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  2. Liar-Like Paradoxes and Metalanguage Features.Klaus Ladstaetter - 2013 - Southwest Philosophy Review 29 (1):61-70.
    In their (2008) article Liar-Like Paradox and Object Language Features C.S. Jenkins and Daniel Nolan (henceforth, JN) argue that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage even though its object language is not semantically closed. I do not take issue with this claim. I find fault though with the following points contained in JN’s article: First, that it is possible to construct Liar-like paradox in a metalanguage, even though this metalanguage is not semantically closed. (...)
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  3. Moore’s Paradox: Self-Knowledge, Self-Reference, and High-Ordered Beliefs.A. Nekhaev - 2021 - Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science 15 (63):20–34.
    The sentences ‘p but I don’t believe p’ (omissive form) and ‘p but I believe that not-p’ (comissive form) are typical examples of Moore’s paradox. When an agent (sincerely) asserts such sentences under normal circumstances, we consider his statements absurd. The Simple Solution (Moore, Heal, Wolgast, Kriegel, et al.) finds the source of absurdity for such statements in a certain formal contradiction (some kind of like ‘p & not-p’), the presence of which is lexically disguised. This solution is facing (...)
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  4. Paradox in Perspective: A Liar's Guide to Humor.Stephen R. Palmquist - manuscript
    This is the original English version of a paper that has been published only in Chinese translation. (For the published, Chinese version, see "透視悖論說謊者的幽默指南", in page 37-44 on 拒絕再Hea──真理與意義的追尋) The paper was originally written as a lecture given at the University of Macau in April 2010. The paper argues that humor is essentially a form of paradoxical deception.
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  5. Liar paradox mirroring our reasoning as Hegel's quasi-speculative sentence.Jae Jeong Lee - manuscript
    This paper explores the liar paradox and its implications for logic and philosophical reasoning. It analyzes the paradox using classical logic principles and paraphrases it as "affirmation of the falsity of the very affirmation." The study draws connections between the liar paradox and Hegel's speculative sentence and suggests it functions as a "quasi-speculative sentence." Additionally, it examines parallels with the logocentric predicament and the determinist's assertion, highlighting their paradoxical nature. Through these analyses, the paper aims to illuminate (...)
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  6. Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox.Matt Leonard - 2012 - In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.
    One recently proposed solution to the Liar paradox is the contextual theory of truth. Tyler Burge (1979) argues that truth is an indexical notion and that the extension of the truth predicate shifts during Liar reasoning. A Liar sentence might be true in one context and false in another. To many, contextualism seems to capture our pre-theoretic intuitions about the semantic paradoxes; this is especially due to its reliance on the so-called Revenge phenomenon. I, however, show that Super-Liar sentences (...)
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  7. What the Tortoise Said to Achilles: Lewis Carroll’s paradox in terms of Hilbert arithmetic.Vasil Penchev - 2021 - Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics eJournal (Elsevier: SSRN) 13 (22):1-32.
    Lewis Carroll, both logician and writer, suggested a logical paradox containing furthermore two connotations (connotations or metaphors are inherent in literature rather than in mathematics or logics). The paradox itself refers to implication demonstrating that an intermediate implication can be always inserted in an implication therefore postponing its ultimate conclusion for the next step and those insertions can be iteratively and indefinitely added ad lib, as if ad infinitum. Both connotations clear up links due to the shared formal (...)
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  8. The truth functional hypothesis does not imply the liars paradox.M. Martins Silva - 2017 - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):1-2.
    The truth-functional hypothesis states that indicative conditional sentences and the material implication have the same truth conditions. Haze (2011) has rejected this hypothesis. He claims that a self-referential conditional, coupled with a plausible assumption about its truth-values and the assumption that the truth-functional hypothesis is true, lead to a liar’s paradox. Given that neither the self-referential conditional nor the assumption about its truth-values are problematic, the culprit of the paradox must be the truth-functional hypothesis. Therefore, we should reject (...)
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  9. A Liar Paradox.Richard G. Heck - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):36-40.
    The purpose of this note is to present a strong form of the liar paradox. It is strong because the logical resources needed to generate the paradox are weak, in each of two senses. First, few expressive resources required: conjunction, negation, and identity. In particular, this form of the liar does not need to make any use of the conditional. Second, few inferential resources are required. These are: (i) conjunction introduction; (ii) substitution of identicals; and (iii) the inference: (...)
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  10. Buddhist Epistemology and the Liar Paradox.Szymon Bogacz - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (1):206-220.
    The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction (...)
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  11.  34
    Is the Liar Paradox Never Strictly Classical?Choi Seungrak - 2024 - Korean Journal of Logic 27 (3):167-202.
    The present paper investigates whether strictly classical inferences contribute to the formalization of (genuine) paradoxes within natural deduction. Tennant's criterion for paradoxicality relies on the generation of an infinite reduction sequence, which distinguishes genuine paradoxes from mere inconsistencies. His methodological conjecture posits that genuine paradoxes are never strictly classical and can be derived without classical inferences such as the Law of Excluded Middle, Dilemma, Classical Reductio, and Double Negation Elimination. -/- It appears that there were two reasons for Tennant's proposal (...)
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  12.  95
    Which Paradox is Genuine in Accordance with the Proof-Theoretic Criterion for Paradoxicality?Seungrak Choi - 2023 - Korean Journal of Logic 3 (26):145-181.
    Neil Tennant was the first to propose a proof-theoretic criterion for paradoxicality, a framework in which a paradox, formalized through natural deduction, is derived from an unacceptable conclusion that employs a certain form of id est inferences and generates an infinite reduction sequence. Tennant hypothesized that any derivation in natural deduction that formalizes a genuine paradox would meet this criterion, and he argued that while the liar paradox is genuine, Russell's paradox is not. -/- The present (...)
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  13. The Liar Syndrome.Albert A. Johnstone - 2002 - SATS 3 (1):37-55.
    This article examines the various Liar paradoxes and their near kin, Grelling’s paradox and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem with its self-referential Gödel sentence. It finds the family of paradoxes to be generated by circular definition–whether of statements, predicates, or sentences–a manoeuvre that generates pseudo-statements afflicted with the Liar syndrome: semantic vacuity, semantic incoherence, and predicative catalepsy. Such statements, e.g., the self-referential Liar statement, are meaningless, and hence fail to say anything, a point that invalidates the reasoning on which the various (...)
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  14.  21
    Resolution of Common Paradoxes.Michael Haimes - manuscript
    The Common Paradox Resolution Argument presents a systematic approach to addressing some of philosophy’s most enduring paradoxes. By analyzing the logical structure and underlying assumptions of each paradox, this argument proposes unique resolutions that aim to preserve logical consistency while clarifying apparent contradictions. The argument covers well-known paradoxes, including the Liar’s Paradox, the Self-Reference Paradox, and the Complete Knowledge Paradox, among others, each of which is dissected and reinterpreted to reveal insights into language, truth, and (...)
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  15. Meaning, Presuppositions, Truth-relevance, Gödel's Sentence and the Liar Paradox.X. Y. Newberry - manuscript
    Section 1 reviews Strawson’s logic of presuppositions. Strawson’s justification is critiqued and a new justification proposed. Section 2 extends the logic of presuppositions to cases when the subject class is necessarily empty, such as (x)((Px & ~Px) → Qx) . The strong similarity of the resulting logic with Richard Diaz’s truth-relevant logic is pointed out. Section 3 further extends the logic of presuppositions to sentences with many variables, and a certain valuation is proposed. It is noted that, given this valuation, (...)
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  16. This sentence does not contain the symbol X.Samuel Alexander - 2013 - The Reasoner 7 (9):108.
    A suprise may occur if we use a similar strategy to the Liar's paradox to mathematically formalize "This sentence does not contain the symbol X".
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  17. Procedural Semantics and its Relevance to Paradox.Elbert Booij - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1-24.
    Two semantic paradoxes, the Liar and Curry’s paradox, are analysed using a newly developed conception of procedural semantics (semantics according to which the truth of propositions is determined algorithmically), whose main characteristic is its departure from methodological realism. Rather than determining pre-existing facts, procedures are constitutive of them. Of this semantics, two versions are considered: closed (where the halting of procedures is presumed) and open (without this presumption). To this end, a procedural approach to deductive reasoning is developed, based (...)
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  18. A Note on Logical Paradoxes and Aristotelian Square of Opposition.Beppe Brivec - manuscript
    According to Aristotle if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contrary proposition (“All men are not white”) must be false; and, according to Aristotle, if a universal proposition (for example: “All men are white”) is true, its contradictory proposition (“Not all men are white”) must be false. I agree with what Aristotle wrote about universal propositions, but there are universal propositions which have no contrary proposition and have no contradictory proposition. The proposition X “All (...)
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  19. (1 other version)Borg’s Minimalism and the Problem of Paradox.Mark Pinder - 2014 - In Piotr Stalmaszczyk (ed.), Semantics and Beyond: Philosophical and Linguistic Inquiries. Preface. De Gruyter. pp. 207-230.
    According to Emma Borg, minimalism is (roughly) the view that natural language sentences have truth conditions, and that these truth conditions are fully determined by syntactic structure and lexical content. A principal motivation for her brand of minimalism is that it coheres well with the popular view that semantic competence is underpinned by the cognition of a minimal semantic theory. In this paper, I argue that the liar paradox presents a serious problem for this principal motivation. Two lines of (...)
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  20. Alethic undecidability doesn’t solve the Liar.Mark Jago - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):278-283.
    Stephen Barker presents a novel approach to solving semantic paradoxes, including the Liar and its variants and Curry’s paradox. His approach is based around the concept of alethic undecidability. His approach, if successful, renders futile all attempts to assign semantic properties to the paradoxical sentences, whilst leaving classical logic fully intact. And, according to Barker, even the T-scheme remains valid, for validity is not undermined by undecidable instances. Barker’s approach is innovative and worthy of further consideration, particularly by those (...)
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  21. David Wolpert on impossibility, incompleteness, the liar paradox, the limits of computation, a non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and the universe as computer—the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory.Michael Starks - manuscript
    I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing the computation, and even (...)
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  22. (1 other version)Wolpert, Chaitin and Wittgenstein on impossibility, incompleteness, the liar paradox, theism, the limits of computation, a non-quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and the universe as computer—the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory (revised 2019).Michael Starks - 2019 - In Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century -- Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization-- Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 4th Edition Michael Starks. Las Vegas, NV USA: Reality Press. pp. 294-299.
    I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv dot org) on the limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the device doing the computation, (...)
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  23. The Yablo Paradox and Circularity.Eduardo Alejandro Barrio - 2012 - Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):7-20.
    In this paper, I start by describing and examining the main results about the option of formalizing the Yablo Paradox in arithmetic. As it is known, although it is natural to assume that there is a right representation of that paradox in first order arithmetic, there are some technical results that give rise to doubts about this possibility. Then, I present some arguments that have challenged that Yablo’s construction is non-circular. Just like that, Priest (1997) has argued that (...)
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  24. A Quantificational Analysis of the Liar Paradox.Matheus Silva - manuscript
    It seems that the most common strategy to solve the liar paradox is to argue that liar sentences are meaningless and, consequently, truth-valueless. The other main option that has grown in recent years is the dialetheist view that treats liar sentences as meaningful, truth-apt and true. In this paper I will offer a new approach that does not belong in either camp. I hope to show that liar sentences can be interpreted as meaningful, truth-apt and false, but without engendering (...)
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  25. (1 other version)What Paradoxes Depend on.Ming Hsiung - 2018 - Synthese:1-27.
    This paper gives a definition of self-reference on the basis of the dependence relation given by Leitgeb (2005), and the dependence digraph by Beringer & Schindler (2015). Unlike the usual discussion about self-reference of paradoxes centering around Yablo's paradox and its variants, I focus on the paradoxes of finitary characteristic, which are given again by use of Leitgeb's dependence relation. They are called 'locally finite paradoxes', satisfying that any sentence in these paradoxes can depend on finitely many sentences. I (...)
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  26. ‘Sometime a paradox’, now proof: Yablo is not first order.Saeed Salehi - 2022 - Logic Journal of the IGPL 30 (1):71-77.
    Interesting as they are by themselves in philosophy and mathematics, paradoxes can be made even more fascinating when turned into proofs and theorems. For example, Russell’s paradox, which overthrew Frege’s logical edifice, is now a classical theorem in set theory, to the effect that no set contains all sets. Paradoxes can be used in proofs of some other theorems—thus Liar’s paradox has been used in the classical proof of Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth in sufficiently rich (...)
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  27. Paradoxes and Their Resolutions.Avi Sion - 2017 - Geneva, Switzerland: CreateSpace & Kindle; Lulu..
    Paradoxes and their Resolutions is a ‘thematic compilation’ by Avi Sion. It collects in one volume the essays that he has written in the past (over a period of some 27 years) on this subject. It comprises expositions and resolutions of many (though not all) ancient and modern paradoxes, including: the Protagoras-Euathlus paradox (Athens, 5th Cent. BCE), the Liar paradox and the Sorites paradox (both attributed to Eubulides of Miletus, 4th Cent. BCE), Russell’s paradox (UK, 1901) (...)
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  28. Paradoxical hypodoxes.Alexandre Billon - 2019 - Synthese 196 (12):5205-5229.
    Most paradoxes of self-reference have a dual or ‘hypodox’. The Liar paradox (Lr = ‘Lr is false’) has the Truth-Teller (Tt = ‘Tt is true’). Russell’s paradox, which involves the set of sets that are not self-membered, has a dual involving the set of sets which are self-membered, etc. It is widely believed that these duals are not paradoxical or at least not as paradoxical as the paradoxes of which they are duals. In this paper, I argue that (...)
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  29. Truth and Paradox in Late XIVth Century Logic : Peter of Mantua’s Treatise on Insoluble Propositions.Riccardo Strobino - 2012 - Documenti E Studi Sulla Tradizione Filosofica Medievale 23:475-519.
    This paper offers an analysis of a hitherto neglected text on insoluble propositions dating from the late XiVth century and puts it into perspective within the context of the contemporary debate concerning semantic paradoxes. The author of the text is the italian logician Peter of Mantua (d. 1399/1400). The treatise is relevant both from a theoretical and from a historical standpoint. By appealing to a distinction between two senses in which propositions are said to be true, it offers an unusual (...)
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  30. solutions in the origins of Math.Paul Bali - manuscript
    i. a poetic solution of the Goldbach Conjecture; ii. several responses to the Epimenides Paradox; iii. the volitional solution to Russell's Paradox.
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  31. Solving Jörgensen's Dilemma - 2024.Jan Pociej - unknown - Https://Doi.Org/10.6084/M9.Figshare.22329178.V3.
    The dilemma mentioned in the title have long been a puzzle to logic. To solve it, it was necessary to make some philosophical decisions. The article provides these decisions and discusses the way to solve the problem.
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  32.  77
    The “Standard Liar”: Wittgenstein, Language-Games and Self-Reference.A. Nekhaev - 2020 - Tomsk State University Journal of Philosophy, Sociology and Political Science 14 (56):23–32.
    The article critically examines the heuristic capacity and methods of using separate tools of Wittgenstein’s philosophical grammar to treat various semantic pathologies (paradoxes of Liar, Truth-Teller, etc.). According to Wittgenstein, philosophical confusion associated with the analysis of such semantic pathologies arises on the grounds of our intuitive faith that we are able to express in language any property that interests us. For instance, we believe that the property “to have a length of exactly one metre” can be meaningfully attributed to (...)
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  33. Lies, half-truths, and falsehoods about Tarski’s 1933 “liar” antinomies.John Corcoran & Joaquin Miller - 2012 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 18 (1):140-141.
    We discuss misinformation about “the liar antinomy” with special reference to Tarski’s 1933 truth-definition paper [1]. Lies are speech-acts, not merely sentences or propositions. Roughly, lies are statements of propositions not believed by their speakers. Speakers who state their false beliefs are often not lying. And speakers who state true propositions that they don’t believe are often lying—regardless of whether the non-belief is disbelief. Persons who state propositions on which they have no opinion are lying as much as those who (...)
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  34. Horwich's minimalist conception of truth: some logical difficulties.Sten Lindström - 2001 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 9:161-181.
    Aristotle’s words in the Metaphysics: “to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true” are often understood as indicating a correspondence view of truth: a statement is true if it corresponds to something in the world that makes it true. Aristotle’s words can also be interpreted in a deflationary, i.e., metaphysically less loaded, way. According to the latter view, the concept of truth is contained in platitudes like: ‘It is true (...)
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  35. Semantic Paradox and Alethic Undecidability.Stephen Barker - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):201-209.
    I use the principle of truth-maker maximalism to provide a new solution to the semantic paradoxes. According to the solution, AUS, its undecidable whether paradoxical sentences are grounded or ungrounded. From this it follows that their alethic status is undecidable. We cannot assert, in principle, whether paradoxical sentences are true, false, either true or false, neither true nor false, both true and false, and so on. AUS involves no ad hoc modification of logic, denial of the T-schema's validity, or obvious (...)
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  36. About two Objections to Cook's Proposal.Federico Matías Pailos - 2012 - Análisis Filosófico 32 (1):37-43.
    The main thesis of this work is as follows: there are versions of Yablo’s paradox that, if Cook is right about the non-circular character of his version of it, are truly paradoxical and genuinely non-circular, and Cook’s version of Yablo’s paradox is one of them. Here I will not evaluate the"circular" or"non-circular" side to Cook’s proposal. In fact, I think that he is right about it, and that his version of Yablo’s list is non-circular. But is it paradoxical? (...)
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  37. On $${{{\mathcal {F}}}}$$-Systems: A Graph-Theoretic Model for Paradoxes Involving a Falsity Predicate and Its Application to Argumentation Frameworks.Gustavo Bodanza - 2023 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 32 (3):373-393.
    $${{{\mathcal {F}}}}$$ -systems are useful digraphs to model sentences that predicate the falsity of other sentences. Paradoxes like the Liar and the one of Yablo can be analyzed with that tool to find graph-theoretic patterns. In this paper we studied this general model consisting of a set of sentences and the binary relation ‘ $$\ldots $$ affirms the falsity of $$\ldots $$ ’ among them. The possible existence of non-referential sentences was also considered. To model the sets of all the (...)
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  38. Some non-revisionist solutions to some semantic antinomies.J. M. Kuczynski - 2013 - Philosophical Inquiry 37 (3-4):51-61.
    It is shown that Russell's Paradox can be solved without advocating the Theory of Types, and also that the Liar's Paradox can be solved in much the same way. Neither solution requires that any of our commonsense-based beliefs be revised, let alone jettisoned. It is also shown that the Theory of Types is false.
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  39. Inclosure and Intolerance.Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini - 2021 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 62 (2):201-220.
    Graham Priest has influentially claimed that the Sorites paradox is an Inclosure paradox, concluding that his favored dialetheic solution to the Inclosure paradoxes should be extended to the Sorites paradox. We argue that, given Priest’s dialetheic solution to the Sorites paradox, the argument purporting to show that that paradox is an Inclosure is unsound, and discuss some issues surrounding this fact.
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  40. Self-reference and gödel's theorem: A Husserlian analysis. [REVIEW]Albert Johnstone - 2003 - Husserl Studies 19 (2):131-151.
    A Husserlian phenomenological approach to logic treats concepts in terms of their experiential meaning rather than in terms of reference, sets of individuals, and sentences. The present article applies such an approach in turn to the reasoning operative in various paradoxes: the simple Liar, the complex Liar paradoxes, the Grelling-type paradoxes, and Gödel’s Theorem. It finds that in each case a meaningless statement, one generated by circular definition, is treated as if were meaningful, and consequently as either true or false, (...)
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  41. Conceptual Marxism and Truth: Inquiry Symposium on Kevin Scharp’s Replacing Truth.Patrick Greenough - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (4):403-421.
    In Replacing Truth, Scharp takes the concept of truth to be fundamentally incoherent. As such, Scharp reckons it to be unsuited for systematic philosophical theorising and in need of replacement – at least for regions of thought and talk which permit liar sentences and their ilk to be formulated. This replacement methodology is radical because it not only recommends that the concept of truth be replaced, but that the word ‘true’ be replaced too. Only Tarski has attempted anything like it (...)
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  42. Paradoxos Semânticos.Ricardo Santos - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.
    The semantic paradoxes are a family of arguments – including the liar paradox, Curry’s paradox, Grelling’s paradox of heterologicality, Richard’s and Berry’s paradoxes of definability, and others – which have two things in common: first, they make an essential use of such semantic concepts as those of truth, satisfaction, reference, definition, etc.; second, they seem to be very good arguments until we see that their conclusions are contradictory or absurd. These arguments raise serious doubts concerning the coherence (...)
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  43. Simpson's Paradox and Causality.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay, Mark Greenwood, Don Dcruz & Venkata Raghavan - 2015 - American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):13-25.
    There are three questions associated with Simpson’s Paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP?, and (iii) What should be done about SP? By developing a logic-based account of SP, it is argued that (i) and (ii) must be divorced from (iii). This account shows that (i) and (ii) have nothing to do with causality, which plays a role only in addressing (iii). A counterexample is also presented against the causal account. Finally, the causal and (...)
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  44. Swyneshed Revisited.Alexander Sandgren - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.
    I propose an approach to liar and Curry paradoxes inspired by the work of Roger Swyneshed in his treatise on insolubles (1330-1335). The keystone of the account is the idea that liar sentences and their ilk are false (and only false) and that the so-called ''capture'' direction of the T-schema should be restricted. The proposed account retains what I take to be the attractive features of Swyneshed's approach without leading to some worrying consequences Swyneshed accepts. The approach and the resulting (...)
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  45. Semantyczna teoria prawdy a antynomie semantyczne [Semantic Theory of Truth vs. Semantic Antinomies].Jakub Pruś - 2021 - Rocznik Filozoficzny Ignatianum 1 (27):341–363.
    The paper presents Alfred Tarski’s debate with the semantic antinomies: the basic Liar Paradox, and its more sophisticated versions, which are currently discussed in philosophy: Strengthen Liar Paradox, Cyclical Liar Paradox, Contingent Liar Paradox, Correct Liar Paradox, Card Paradox, Yablo’s Paradox and a few others. Since Tarski, himself did not addressed these paradoxes—neither in his famous work published in 1933, nor in later papers in which he developed the Semantic Theory of Truth—therefore, We (...)
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  46. A Note on Gödel, Priest and Naïve Proof.Massimiliano Carrara - forthcoming - Logic and Logical Philosophy:1.
    In the 1951 Gibbs lecture, Gödel asserted his famous dichotomy, where the notion of informal proof is at work. G. Priest developed an argument, grounded on the notion of naïve proof, to the effect that Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem suggests the presence of dialetheias. In this paper, we adopt a plausible ideal notion of naïve proof, in agreement with Gödel’s conception, superseding the criticisms against the usual notion of naïve proof used by real working mathematicians. We explore the connection between (...)
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  47. A Correspondence Theory of Truth.Jay Newhard - 2002 - Dissertation, Brown University
    The aim of this dissertation is to offer and defend a correspondence theory of truth. I begin by critically examining the coherence, pragmatic, simple, redundancy, disquotational, minimal, and prosentential theories of truth. Special attention is paid to several versions of disquotationalism, whose plausibility has led to its fairly constant support since the pioneering work of Alfred Tarski, through that by W. V. Quine, and recently in the work of Paul Horwich. I argue that none of these theories meets the correspondence (...)
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  48. (1 other version)透視悖論--說謊者的幽默指南.Stephen R. Palmquist - 2013 - In 拒絕再 Hea ── 真理與意義的追尋. Hong Kong: 次文化 [Subculture Limited]. pp. 37-44.
    A Chinese translation of an essay entitled "Paradox in Perspective: A Liar’s Guide to Humor".
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  49. That Truth Exists is More Logical.Noriaki Iwasa - 2011 - Think 10 (27):109-112.
    Postmodernists claim that there is no truth. However, the statement 'there is no truth ' is self -contradictory. This essay shows the following: One cannot state the idea 'there is no truth ' universally without creating a paradox. In contrast, the statement 'there is truth ' does not produce such a paradox. Therefore, it is more logical that truth exists.
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  50. Formalization of dialectical logic, Separation theory of truth. Logic of cellular automata.Zhou Senhai - manuscript
    By separating the general concept of truth into syntactic truth and semantic truth, this article proposes a new theory of truth to explain several paradoxes like the Liar paradox, Card paradox, Curry’s paradox, etc. By revealing the relationship between syntactic /semantic truth and being-nothing-becoming which are the core concepts of dialectical logic, it is able to formalize dialectical logic. It also provides a logical basis for complexity theory by transferring all reasoning into a directed (cyclic/acyclic) graph which (...)
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